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A Guide to


Canadian Policies on

Arms Control, Disarmament,

Defence and

Conflict Resolution

1987-1988



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A GUIDE TO
CANADIAN POLICIES ON
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,
DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1987-88

Peter Gizewski

Michael Holmes

Francine Lecours

Ron Purver and

Roger Hill, editors

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PREFACE

This third volume of the Guide outlines major developments in international peace and security during 1987-88 and describes the main Canadian policy statements and parliamentary debates in the field. Covering the areas specified in the mandate of the Institute, the survey deals first with various aspects of arms control and disarmament, and afterwards goes on to look at defence and then at conflict resolution.

The Guide is divided into 31 distinct sections, focussing on such issues as the efforts to establish a new treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, the acquisition of new equipment for the Canadian armed forces, and the evolution of regional conflict situations in Central America and elsewhere. All are important items on the international or Canadian peace and security agendas.

Global developments pushed themselves increasingly to the centre of Canadian attention during 1987-88. The signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons (INF) at the Washington Summit in December 1987, as well as increased hopes for a new treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, Soviet moves towards withdrawal from Afghanistan, and some extraordinary political developments within the Soviet Union itself, sparked off a good deal of speculation about the future prospects for East-West relations. Meanwhile, the persistence of conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, within Lebanon, in Kampuchea, in Central America, and elsewhere, underlined the limits of superpower influence. Concern about the global economic, social, health and ecological situation also continued to grow, as the greenhouse effect and other threats to human survival loomed like dark

clouds on the horizon.


There were other important developments at the national level. In pursuit of policies adopted since it came to power in 1984, the Progressive Conservative Government reached a free trade agreement with the United States and undertook the process of seeking parliamentary approval for this accord. It proceeded with the task of up-grading North America's air defences. It participated in international consultations on arms control measures and continued to emphasize a number of areas such as a comprehensive test ban and verification. In efforts to give effect to the Defence White Paper of June 1987, it began the process of consolidating and strengthening the commitments to NATO. A major public debate continued over the government's plans to acquire 10-12 nuclear-propelled submarines for the Canadian Navy, with some critics claiming that they would cost far more than the \$8 billion estimated by the government or that they would undermine the moral bases of Canada's efforts to stem international nuclear proliferation. Sovereignty and arms control in the Arctic also attracted significant interest in Canada in 1987-88.

These are the kinds of things we have to think about as we consider Canadian policies on peace and security in the past year. We need to recall that Canada is involved in international affairs in many ways: this country is located geostrategically between the United States and the Soviet Union; it maintains a vast array of economic, defence and other relations with other members of the international community; and it works to promote worldwide peace, security, and prosperity through the United Nations and regional international organizations. It does this while seeking to preserve its own security and territorial integrity by maintaining national defence forces as well as collective defence arrangements with the United States and other allies. An

entire complex of peace and security objectives have to be pursued at one and the same time, and the government has to do its utmost to forge its various activities into coherent policies. A vital task is to set out key objectives and to establish priorities that can be reached within a realistic time frame.

In effect Canadians are caught up in world affairs and know that they share the destiny of the human race. While they recognize that the government has particular, national objectives to pursue, such as the maintenance of national unity and protection of the country's sovereignty, they hope as well that Canadian policies will contribute to a safer and more harmonious world as well as to the promotion of immediate national goals. Canadians are fortunate that for the most part Canada's national interests co-incide with those of the wider world.

We hope that this Guide will provide a useful tool for tracing the development of Canadian policies on international peace and security during 1987-88 and for judging this country's performance in that period.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Geoffrey Pearson". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name and last name clearly distinguishable.

Geoffrey Pearson

Executive Director

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INTRODUCTION

This Guide is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period between August 1987 and July 1988, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to identify a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

The Guide is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble in one collection materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category - conflict resolution - has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under five headings, as follows:

Background provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1987 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary for an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

Current Canadian Position is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies recent developments in Canadian policy.

Parliamentary Comment is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

Current References is designed for the most part to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

Further Reading contains a limited number of earlier references which the reader may wish to consult for more detailed background.

This year's Guide differs in certain respects from last year's, in part reflecting changing developments on the national and international scene. The number of individual entries has been reduced from 36 to 31, by means of the following changes:

- the sections on "SALT II Compliance," "A Comprehensive Nuclear Freeze," "Nuclear Winter," and "Canada-US: SDI Research" have all been eliminated, for lack of current developments;
- the section on "Biological Weapons" has been consolidated with that on "Chemical Weapons," to form "Chemical and Biological Weapons";
- the section on "Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations" has been split into three separate entries: "START," "INF", and "Defence and Space Arms," the latter incorporating last year's section on "The ABM Treaty"; and
- an entirely new section has been added on the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III), held during 1988.

In addition, the section on "Comprehensive Test Ban" has been renamed "Nuclear Testing," to reflect more accurately the range of topics encompassed (from ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty to new proposals for a lower threshold or quota of tests). Similarly, the sections on "Canada as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," "The Non-Proliferation Treaty," and "Arctic Sovereignty and Surveillance" have been renamed "Canada and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones," "Nuclear Non-Proliferation," and "Arctic Sovereignty and Security," respectively, again to reflect their broader scope.

Finally, Section III on "Conflict Resolution" has been reorganized along regional lines, rather than by individual country or conflict, so as to encompass conflicts that would not otherwise merit inclusion as separate

entries. Thus, the previous section on "Afghanistan" now falls within "South Asia"; "Central America" remains as before; "The Iran-Iraq War," "The Israeli-Arab Conflict," and "Lebanon" all fall within "The Middle East"; "Libya" within "North Africa"; and "South Africa" within "Sub-Saharan Africa," while a new section on "East Asia and the Pacific" has been added. The section on "Cyprus" has been subsumed under "Peacekeeping and Observation."

The appendices remain as before (with updating).

The individual entries were researched and written by Peter Gizewski, Michael Holmes, and Francine Lecours of the Institute's Research Division. Mr. Gizewski was responsible for entry numbers 4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, and 22; Mr. Holmes for numbers 1-3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 18, 20-21, and 31; and Ms. Lecours for numbers 8, 13, 16, 23, and 24-30. In addition, Brad Feasey of the CIIPS Public Programmes Division contributed entry number 14, on UNSSOD III.

Ron Purver, Research Associate, and Roger Hill, Research Director, have edited the volume, Mr. Purver being responsible primarily for those entries submitted in English (i.e., those by Messrs. Gizewski, Holmes and Feasey); and Mr. Hill for those submitted in French (i.e., those by Ms. Lecours).

Once again, the authors and editors owe a special debt of gratitude to Doina Cioiu, now Administrative Assistant of the Research Division, for her tireless and invaluable work in guiding the manuscript through its various stages from beginning to end. Thanks are also due to H       Samson and Eva Bild of the Public Programmes Division for copy-editing of French- and English-language entries, respectively.

The Institute welcomes comments on the Guide's utility and format, as well as suggestions for improvement. All such communications should be addressed to:

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SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (NST): STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Background

On 8 January 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), the discussions have been divided into three distinct negotiations, involving: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defence and space weapons.

No official name has been selected for the group dealing with strategic nuclear arms, though it is often referred to by the name of the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START, which ended without agreement in December 1983, was preceded by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I (1969-72) and II (1972-79). Each of these negotiations dealt with intercontinental, strategic nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are generally defined as those weapons capable of reaching the territory of one superpower from that of the other (specified in SALT II as those with a range in excess of 5500 km).

When the new START negotiations began on 27 March 1985, the opening positions of both sides demonstrated little change from those taken in the previous talks. By the end of the first round of the new negotiations (23 April 1985), the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze on

negotiations (23 April 1985), the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze on the nuclear arsenals of both sides. A reduction of strategic offensive arms by one-quarter as an opening move leading to deeper mutual cuts, and a ban on all cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. The United States had suggested limits of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, 400 heavy bombers, and 850 ballistic missile launchers.

On 30 September 1985 the Soviet Union presented a new proposal calling for a 50 per cent reduction in strategic launchers and a 6000-warhead ceiling, with no more than 60 per cent of the warheads allowed on any one leg of the strategic triad (air-, land- and sea-based weapon systems).

The United States presented a counter-proposal on 1 November calling for ceilings of 4500 on ballistic missile warheads, 1500 on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), 3000 on ICBM warheads, and 350 on heavy bombers, together with a 50 per cent cut in the Soviet Union's aggregate throw-weight (the total weight that can be thrust over a given range by a ballistic missile). Both sides agreed that reductions would take place over a period of five to eight years.

At their 19-21 November 1985 Summit in Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, together with effective measures of verification.

On 15 January 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev made a public statement outlining a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Reductions would occur in three stages over a fifteen-year period, culminating in a universal accord to prevent such weapons from coming into existence again.

At the second summit meeting between the two leaders, in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11-12 October 1986, the Soviet Union proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons over a ten-year period. The United States proposed the elimination of all ballistic missiles within ten years. There was agreement that in the first five years each side would reduce to 6000 their strategic warheads and to 1600 their strategic launchers. The summit talks broke down, however, over the issue of strategic defence, which the Soviets linked to any possible accord on offensive arms.

Some limited progress on the strategic forces issue was made at the 7-10 December 1987 Washington Summit. At its close, the superpowers agreed on the following points: a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms; a 6000-warhead ceiling with no more than 1600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers; a sub-ceiling of 4900 ICBM and SLBM warheads (permitting up to 1100 air-launched cruise missiles); a 50 per cent cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs to 154, with ten warheads each; a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs at 50 per cent of the current Soviet level; a separate ceiling (outside the 6000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and certain methods of verification of an accord. In addition, the two sides agreed on the "counting rules" for determining how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each type of ballistic missile.

Nevertheless, a number of critical issues remained in dispute, leaving many officials pessimistic over the possibility of the superpowers reaching an accord in 1988. These problems included:

- methods of verification for SLCMs, given the difficulty in differentiating between nuclear and conventionally armed missiles;

- the question of warhead sublimits, with the Soviets not willing to agree to the US proposal for an ICBM warhead sublimit of 3300 and desiring a "freedom-to-mix" between SLBMs and ICBMs;
- counting rules for ALCMs, with the US proposing a count of six per bomber, regardless of the number an aircraft is capable of carrying, and the Soviets demanding separate counts for each type of bomber;
- the US desire for a ban on mobile ICBMs;
- the US proposal to exclude ALCMs with ranges of under 1500 km from restrictions (while the Soviets insist on using the SALT II definition for long-range ALCMs of 600 km); and
- the reduction period itself, with the Soviets suggesting five years and the US seven.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Moscow in late May for their fourth summit, but it was clear some time in advance that a START agreement would not be reached at the meeting. Verification, counting rules and sub-limits continued to be major stumbling blocks on the way to an accord. Following the Moscow Summit, the sides issued a Joint Document outlining the meeting's achievements. In regard to START, the Document stated:

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of ALCMs and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to

the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs.¹

In response to a question following the Summit's conclusion, General-Secretary Gorbachev stated that a START agreement in 1988 could not be ruled out:

I am sure that there still is a possibility to achieve a treaty this year and I'm reinforced in this optimism by the headway we have made...and also the exchange of views here....It gives me grounds to voice such an optimistic assessment.²

Current Canadian Position

Following the signing of the INF agreement on 8 December 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney expressed the Government's views on the developments in arms control that took place at the Washington Summit:

Security is indivisible. The elimination of intermediate-range weapons benefits all Western countries. But the weapons that directly threaten Canada - destabilizing intercontinental missiles, as well as nuclear-armed submarines and bombers - are not affected by this agreement. We therefore especially welcome the progress that has been made on strategic weapons at this Summit. Canada hopes that the INF Treaty will now provide the momentum for reducing the huge number of nuclear weapons that remain, and lead to an agreement in Moscow next spring. This would meet the fundamental Canadian priority - stable security at much lower levels of armaments.³

¹ New York Times, 2 June 1988, p. 17.

² New York Times, 2 June 1988, p. 18.

³ Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 10 December 1987, p.

In his cross-country tour, Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche was optimistic over the direction in which arms control negotiations were heading:

An historical process of disarmament is actually underway. These achievements represent a success for those countries, like Canada, that have been pressing both superpowers hard for radical reductions in nuclear weapons.

He continued:

At their Reykjavik Summit of 1986, both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev suddenly projected a vision of a nuclear-free planet, which startled the world with its implication that East-West confrontation might possibly give way to a new approach to international cooperation. This vision requires many steps to bring it about, but the continuing discussion of the full meaning of Reykjavik itself represents a new sense of direction for the international community.⁴

Caution has been expressed, however, due to the complexities of the arms control issue. The Prime Minister stated this clearly while speaking in reference to the agreement-in-principle on the INF negotiations in October 1987:

The next step, reduction of long-range intercontinental missiles, will undoubtedly be even more arduous and protracted than the negotiations which will culminate with

⁴ "Beyond the Summit: the Future of Disarmament (Address by Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, 8 December 1987)," Department of External Affairs Statement 87/71, p. 1.

the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit next month. But if both sides continue to manage the issue with care, there is every prospect for further mutual reductions.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

On 9 December 1987, NDP member Pauline Jewett asked the Prime Minister whether and to what extent Canada had expressed its concern on arms control, and on ALCMs and SLCMs in particular, to the superpowers. The Prime Minister replied:

On the communications we have had on this very important subject, we have conveyed the views of the Government of Canada in regard to the steps which we believe ought to be taken to secure further reductions in the possible deployment of nuclear arms.⁶

The question of cruise missiles and the START agenda was raised again in January by Liberal Member Douglas Frith:

...in a post-INF world both superpowers will be putting more emphasis on air-launched and sea-launched cruise missile weaponry systems. Therefore, today it is more important than ever for the two superpowers to put cruise missile systems on the START agenda as a priority.

Why does Canada not cease the testing of the cruise and demand that Canada's long-term policy objectives and defence interests be given top priority in that START agenda?

⁵ Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address Before the Bilderberg Dinner," 1 October 1987, p. 4.

⁶ Commons Debates, 9 December 1987, pp. 11626-27.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark responded:

...the question of cruise missiles is included in the START negotiations. It is a matter of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. If an ally of the United States took an action that broke the solidarity of the West on questions in negotiation with the Soviet Union, that would weaken the prospects of progress being made in these negotiations.⁷

Mr. Clark later declared: "What worked on the INF can work on strategic systems."⁸

The issue of cruise missiles and START was raised by Ms Jewett again in March 1988. She stated:

As far as I can determine, the Government has not pressed upon the superpowers the absolute necessity of including cuts on both sides in cruise missile arsenals at the START talks in Geneva.⁹

Later in the debate, Progressive Conservative member Barbara Sparrow replied:

Canada has consistently supported the agreed USA and Soviet objective of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arsenals. We have also advocated the negotiation of effective limits on long range air and sea launched cruise missiles. In addition, we have regularly conveyed our views to both negotiating parties on how this joint aim of radical

⁷ Commons Debates, 19 January 1988, p. 12059.

⁸ Ibid., p. 12059.

⁹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14157.

reductions in strategic weaponry can best be realized.¹⁰

Optimistic viewpoints were expressed in the House of Commons in the aftermath of the Moscow Summit. On 3 June, NDP Member Mike Cassidy paid tribute to the superpower leaders by stating:

...all Canadians, men and women, will want to congratulate President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev for this week's Summit in Moscow, not so much for specific successes as for the feeling that the two countries are learning to live together and beginning to reduce the arms race that threatens the whole world with nuclear destruction.¹¹

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark responded to a question from Progressive Conservative Member Dave Nickerson by outlining the accomplishments of the Moscow Summit:

...a great deal was accomplished at the Summit between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. There has not been the conclusion of a START treaty yet. As the Hon. Member knows, that is the number one priority in the view of the Government of Canada.

However, significant progress was made on that question and on the signing of verification protocols that will allow the ratification of other important arms control agreements. We are continuing to make steady progress toward effective regimes of arms control. That has been highlighted and given real impetus by the meeting in Moscow between the President and Mr. Gorbachev.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 14158.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 3 June 1988, p. 16104.

¹² Ibid., p. 16112.

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Canada-US: Cruise Missile Testing

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Arms

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

2. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS: INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Background

Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) consist of non-strategic, theatre-based nuclear weapons. Both long-range (LRINF:1000-5500km) and short-range (SRINF:500-1000 km) weapons are included in the INF category. INF have long been deployed in Western Europe, as well as in other military theatres (for example, Soviet Asia). These weapon systems gained prominence in the late 1970s with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 ballistic missiles and the resulting NATO decision in December 1979 to modernize its LRINF forces in Western Europe.

In what is known as the "two-track" decision, NATO began a parallel process of pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for LRINF while proceeding toward deployment of new weapons systems in 1983. The weapons involved included 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), stationed in five NATO nations: the United Kingdom (160 GLCMs), Italy (112 GLCMs), Belgium (48 GLCMs), the Netherlands (48 GLCMs), and West Germany (96 GLCMs and 108 Pershing IIs).

Preliminary meetings between the US and the USSR on INF began in October 1980. On 18 November 1981, President Reagan announced the "zero option" as the United States' opening position, calling on the USSR to dismantle all of its INF globally in return for the US cancelling its planned LRINF deployment. The Soviets did not accept the "zero option" and negotiations continued without result until the arrival of the first GLCMs in the United Kingdom on 15 November 1983, after which the Soviets

broke off the talks.

On 8 January 1985, US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko signed a joint communiqué outlining the nature and objectives of new negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." These negotiations, known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), began on 27 March 1985.

Various proposals on INF were put forth by both sides in the opening months of the negotiations. On 15 January 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000. In the first stage, the US and the USSR would eliminate all US and Soviet INF in the European zone. In early February the Soviets stated that an INF agreement was possible without prior limitations on the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States, on 24 February 1986, proposed a time-table of reductions to eliminate all US and Soviet INF deployments worldwide.

On 11-12 October 1986, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met for their second summit meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland. The leaders agreed, as a package separate from strategic forces, to eliminate all LRINF missiles in Europe and retain 100 LRINF warheads elsewhere. SRINF missile levels in Europe were to be frozen and dealt with in future negotiations. By the close of the summit, however, General Secretary Gorbachev had re-linked INF to an agreement on a larger package including strategic and space arms.

On 28 February 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would again separate the INF issue from the larger package. The Soviets also proposed a separate negotiation for SRINF and the

withdrawal of these weapons from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

In the summer of 1987 the pace toward an INF agreement increased dramatically. On 21 July General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would agree to eliminate all INF missiles rather than maintaining the 100 in Asia. Throughout August, pressure built up on NATO to agree to dismantle 72 West German-owned Pershing 1A SRINF missiles, armed with US-owned nuclear warheads. At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on 6 August, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that "72 nuclear warheads stand between us and an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles." On 26 August West German Chancellor Kohl announced the Federal Republic's willingness to get rid of the Pershing 1As, given certain preconditions. These included prior ratification of a treaty between the US and USSR to ban INF worldwide, with verification questions resolved satisfactorily and a time-table for dismantling agreed upon. Further, Kohl stated that the threat West Germany faced from SRINF in Czechoslovakia and Poland must be eliminated. The Soviet reaction to Kohl's statement was hesitant but positive.

In a joint statement 18 September, the US and the USSR announced an "agreement in principle to conclude a treaty" on INF. Later, a procedure for dismantling the Pershing 1A missiles was agreed upon. This involved the Federal Republic destroying its missiles by the time all American and Soviet missiles were destroyed.

In Washington on 8 December 1987 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty, banning all US and Soviet land-based INF. The Treaty is historic for a number of reasons. First, it eliminates an entire class of nuclear weapons, calling for the destruction of 857 missiles with 1,667 warheads, currently deployed by

the Soviets; and 429 single-warhead missiles deployed by the US. Soviet and American INF missiles in storage are also included in the Treaty, bringing the total number of Soviet missiles to be destroyed to 1,836 and American to 867. SRINF, including SS-12/22 and -23 missiles on the Soviet side and Pershing 1A missiles on the American, must be destroyed within 18 months of ratification of the Treaty. LRINF, including SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles (stored, but not yet deployed) on the Soviet side and Pershing IIs and GLCMs on the American, must be destroyed within three years.

The Treaty is historic, second, because of its extensive verification measures. For the first time ever, for a period of thirteen years, each side will station inspectors outside one missile production site on the other's territory--in the Soviet Union, the Votkinsk SS-20 and SS-25 assembly plant, and in the United States the former Pershing II production plant in Magna, Utah. Also for thirteen years, each side is allowed to conduct on-site, short-notice inspection of all INF installations that have been used for storage, repair, basing, and deployment of missiles, including over 100 sites in the U.S., Western Europe, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. Twenty such inspections per calendar year can be conducted during the first three years of the Treaty, fifteen per year during the next five years, and ten per year during the remaining five years. In addition, one factory producing GLCM launchers on each side will be open to short-notice inspection. The Treaty itself is of unlimited duration. Between 30 to 90 days after its entry into force, each party will be allowed to inspect all operating missile and support bases to verify the number of missile launchers, support structures and support equipment.

Although the vast majority of commentators have supported the Treaty, it has been criticized for including only a small percentage of the

superpowers' missile arsenals; allowing the INF's intended targets to be covered by other weapon systems; leaving NATO vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces; and containing verification provisions insufficient to ensure full compliance.

Following the defeat of a number of proposed "killer amendments", the US Senate approved the INF Treaty on 28 May 1988, by a vote of 93 to 5. The instruments of ratification were exchanged by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Moscow Summit on 1 June.

Current Canadian Position

In a statement issued on 10 December 1987, the Prime Minister declared the Canadian Government's approval of the signing of the INF Treaty:

I am sure that all Canadians applaud this treaty as a pragmatic step towards a better and safer world. It is a celebration of common sense over adversity.¹

On the day the agreement was signed, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark spoke of its importance, as well as of the importance of NATO unity and steadfastness:

This agreement is an unprecedented breakthrough in efforts to reverse the nuclear arms spiral and engage in actual reductions in nuclear arms rather than just their limitation. The INF accord will result in the complete elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles and is therefore the first nuclear disarmament agreement in modern history.

¹ Office of the Prime Minister, Statement, 10 December 1987.

The outcome of the INF negotiations has reaffirmed the validity of NATO's December, 1979, "double-track" decision. It underlines the important role Alliance unity and solidarity have played throughout. The difficult decisions taken over the past 8 years on the issue of INF have had a direct bearing on the successful outcome of these negotiations. Canada is satisfied with the results and looks forward with anticipation to similarly successful conclusions to other arms control negotiations currently underway.²

In his cross-Canada speaking tour in December 1987, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche drew out some of the broader implications of the signing of the Treaty:

Clearly, the agreement to eliminate all medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles (INF) is a breakthrough in re-building East-West relations. For the first time an entire class of weapons will be destroyed. Although the agreement will eliminate only 3 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal, its political significance is enormous. The bilateral negotiating process has, in fact, achieved a concrete result.³

Parliamentary Comment

In the House of Commons on 8 December 1987, comments were heard from representatives of each Party in regard to the signing of the INF Treaty. Progressive Conservative Member Alex Kindy spoke of the need to remain wary of the Soviet Union's record in complying with international agreements:

² DEA, News Release No. 245, 8 December 1987.

³ SSEA, Statement 87/71, 8 December 1987, page 1.

The event is the signing of a treaty to ban INF range nuclear missiles. Some people see it as a move in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Who would quarrel with that proposition?

The only problem is that the U.S., a democracy, is signing a treaty with the biggest colonial power of the twentieth century. The record of the Soviet Union in respecting treaties is dismal....Yalta is an agreement to hold free elections in Poland and other satellite countries. We are still waiting forty years later for these free elections....

Let us put the signing of the treaty in its proper perspective.⁴

Liberal Member Marcel Prud'homme saw the agreement in a more optimistic light, referring to the trend toward openness or glasnost in Soviet society:

... I rejoice at the fact that the two most powerful men on this earth can come to an agreement.

I publicly applaud the open-mindedness which now exists in the USSR thanks to the new Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachev. I hope that this openness to new ideas will meet a corresponding attitude in the Western world.

I hope that this would only be the first step toward the real summit of total disarmament, the real summit toward better comprehension and a better world.⁵

Mr. Bill Blaikie of the New Democratic Party (NDP) spoke of the agreement as raising a new hope for the future. He cautioned, however, that the INF Treaty must be used as a first step in a continuing process:

The agreement to be signed is a first, in that it eliminates

⁴ Commons Debates, 8 December 1987, p. 11583.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 11583-4.

a whole class of nuclear weapons, but it must become the building block upon which future agreements to rid the world eventually of nuclear weapons are built. Otherwise, it will have been an occasion for false hope.⁶

The following day, 9 December 1987, Mr. Blaikie referred to the contribution of the peace movement in Canada and elsewhere in helping to bring about the INF agreement.⁷

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Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Talks

3. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS: DEFENCE AND SPACE ARMS

Background

The Defence and Space Talks began in Geneva on 27 March 1985, as part of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NST also deals with long-range strategic and intermediate-range theatre nuclear weapons control. The aim of the Defence and Space Talks is to prevent an arms race in outer space and in strategic defences. This issue has drawn considerable attention since the announcement by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI or, as it is often referred to, Star Wars).

SDI, in its most basic form, is a plan to provide defence against incoming ballistic missiles. As conceptualized at present, SDI calls for research, development and testing of new weapon technologies, many of which would be based in outer space. These weapons may include "exotic" technologies such as lasers and particle beams, as well as more conventional anti-satellite (ASAT) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons. Naturally, there is a close link between this project and the status and future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States in May 1972.

The ABM Treaty itself was the result of increased interest in anti-ballistic missile defence, on the part of both the US and USSR, throughout the 1960s. In the United States, the ABM issue sparked a prolonged public debate, centered on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that ABM deployments might

destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, assumes the impossibility of an adequate defence against nuclear weapons.

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide ABM defence and limits each to two ABM deployment areas, later amended on 3 July 1974 to one area. The intent of the Treaty is outlined in Article I (2):

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for defence of an individual region except as provided for in Article III [establishing two specific deployment areas] of this Treaty.

Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with questions of interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research into ballistic missile defence. In 1976, the US dismantled the ABM system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviet Union has kept its ABM deployment around Moscow.

In his March 1983 announcement, President Reagan stated that the United States would pursue a new programme, SDI, aimed at providing a defence which would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". Although he initially stated that SDI was only a research programme and would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration has put forward, and moved towards acceptance of, a "new" interpretation of the

Treaty which would allow the US to carry out tests and development of systems previously considered prohibited by it.

This new interpretation, also known as the "broad" interpretation, would allow the testing and development of ABM systems based on new physical principles and would prohibit only their actual deployment. The Reagan Administration has stated that it believes this broad interpretation to be legally valid.

The interpretation of the ABM Treaty has, therefore, become an issue of considerable debate, centering on how ABM systems based on new technologies are dealt with by the Treaty. The key to the debate lies in Article V of the Treaty which states that:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Proponents of the broad interpretation maintain that the systems and components referred to in Article V are defined by Article II. The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as part of the definition of a system in Article II, according to this interpretation, means that only systems based on 1972 technology (current at the time the Treaty was signed) are banned. This would mean that systems based on new technology in the basing modes listed were not affected.

The narrow interpretation holds that Article V clearly bans all sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems and components, whether they are based on 1972 technology or not. The phrase "currently consisting of" was used in Article II only to demonstrate the functional nature of the definition, not to exclude future technologies.

The Soviet Union has stated that it believes the narrow interpretation to be the only valid interpretation of the Treaty. Indeed, until 1985 this was the only interpretation held by the United States. The Soviets have stood by this position at the Defence and Space Talks, insisting that the testing of ABM systems and components must be restricted by the traditional interpretation. The general approach of the United States at the Defence and Space Talks consists of discussing the effects of the relationship between offence- and defence-based systems on the strategic balance, negotiating a smooth transition from an offense-dominated to a defence-dominated military structure, and resolving concerns over possible Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty.

At the Washington Summit in December 1987, both sides agreed to establish a non-withdrawal period of some (as yet undetermined) length for the ABM Treaty. Currently the United States is suggesting six years, while the Soviet Union has put forward a ten-year proposal.

On 15 January 1988, at the ninth round of the NST talks, the Soviets tabled a draft protocol to the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. During the 10 year non-withdrawal period suggested in the proposal, testing of ABM systems and components would be restricted by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have consistently held that agreement on SDI and the ABM Treaty must be reached before a START agreement is possible.

The United States rejected the Soviet-proposed Protocol, arguing that a START Treaty should not be tied to restrictions on SDI. On January 22, the United States presented a draft treaty on ballistic missile defence (BMD). The draft was intended to provide a basis for a transition to a defence-oriented military structure by allowing for development, testing, and deployment of advanced missile defences.

In the United States, recently, pressure has increased on the Reagan Administration for greater flexibility in its position on SDI. Congress has consistently cut back proposed budget appropriations for SDI research. Congress has also continued to insist that spending that does occur on SDI-related projects must be kept within the confines of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada has declared that it is in favour of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Following a meeting with Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to President Reagan on arms control issues, on 5 March 1987, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated the Canadian position:

The Canadian Government has consistently supported the USA in its adherence to the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security....Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern.¹

On 26 March 1985, Canada and the other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger reassured US allies that they were to be included in the benefits of the SDI programme and the decision-making process, and invited them to become participants in the research stage of the

¹ DEA Statement 87/14, 5 March 1987.

programme, insofar as they were allowed under the limits of the ABM Treaty.

On 7 September 1985, Canada refused the offer of government-to-government participation in the research programme but left open the possibility that private companies could compete for SDI contracts. The Canadian Government has expressed its belief that while it does not want to get involved directly in SDI research, it is only prudent to have some such research pursued in the West. The Canadian view was elaborated in March 1987 following the Nitze visit:

Canada has expressed its support for the Strategic Defence Initiative research program as a prudent measure in light of significant similar Soviet activity in the field of ballistic missile defence. We believe, however, that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces....[T]he SDI program should continue to be pursued within the current restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We welcome the assurance by Secretary of State Shultz that the USA Administration considers premature any decision on deployment of a ballistic missile defence at this point.²

In his speech before a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City in May 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that strategic defences must meet the criteria that were outlined previously by Mr. Nitze--cost effectiveness, survivability, and affordability--along with two other criteria: "extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike" and "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the

² DEA Statement 87/14, 5 March 1987.

arms control process...."³

Parliamentary Comment

Upon learning of the involvement of the Canadian Commercial Corporation, a Crown Corporation, as a prime contractor for a SDI contract, Liberal member Douglas Frith, in November 1987, asked External Affairs Minister Joe Clark to explain the Government's guidelines concerning such involvement. Mr. Clark stated:

The Canadian Commercial Corporation is required by law... to act as an agent for Canadian companies that are involved in contracts with the United States Department of Defence. That is the exclusive and total nature of the role of the Canadian Commercial Corporation in this transaction. It is mandated by law, a law that predated the Strategic Defence Initiative.⁴

Mr. Frith pursued the questioning, asking for an amendment to the law in order to disallow such involvement:

Either a Crown corporation which is an agent of the federal Government will become involved in a peripheral or direct way, or it will not. It seems clear to me that it is in violation of the Prime Minister's commitment to the House that the Government of Canada, which I believe includes Crown corporations, should not be involved in star wars projects.⁵

³ Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address before the North Atlantic Assembly", 23 May 1987, p. 3.

⁴ Commons Debates, 16 November 1987, p. 10829.

⁵ Ibid., p. 10829.

In response Mr. Clark reaffirmed the Government's position on SDI research:

The policy with respect to the Strategic Defence Initiative is very clear. There will be no government-to-government involvement. There is no government-to-government involvement.

It was also made very clear in the decision by the Government of Canada at the time of the announcement of the U.S. program that we did not intend to use the fact that research or other activities that had previously been allowed between Canadian companies and American companies would be eliminated or prohibited simply because the Strategic Defence Initiative process was in place. We are dealing with an arrangement that predates the Strategic Defence Initiative, that uses the Canadian Commercial Corporation in its agency role exclusively, which is among the roles for which it was established.⁶

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4. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Background

The use of chemical weapons during the first world war led the international community to increase its efforts to eliminate them. Such efforts were also extended to the related problem posed by the prospect of biological agents being used as weapons of warfare. By 1925 these initiatives resulted in the signing of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare".

The Protocol's failure to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, however, led to a growing recognition of the need for more comprehensive restrictions. This goal has been actively pursued in various United Nations disarmament bodies, particularly during the last twenty years.

By 1971, the difficulties of concluding a single agreement banning both chemical and biological weapons led to a decision in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to consider them separately. Progress in the area of biological weapons control soon followed, producing a convention signed in 1972 which came into force three years later. Considered the first international agreement requiring actual disarmament measures, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of bacteriological or poisonous weapons, and calls for the destruction of existing stocks. As of 1 July 1987, the Convention had 108 signatories and 26 parties.

The BWC has been subject to two review conferences aimed at ensuring its effectiveness, in 1980 and 1986. Among the concerns addressed at both review conferences were the ability of the Convention to cover potential weapons developments made possible by new technologies, such as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA); the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxic agents, together with the possible weapons applications of such research; and problems of verifying compliance with the Convention.

Such issues were highlighted by a stream of allegations beginning in the mid-1970s concerning the development and use of biological and toxic weapons by the superpowers and their allies. Particularly noteworthy were charges that the Soviet Union and its allies had used toxin weapons in Southeast Asia (i.e. yellow rain), and the inability to establish the facts conclusively.

In an attempt to strengthen the BWC further, the final declaration of the Second Review Conference included a new arrangement allowing any state to call a meeting of an advisory group of experts if a problem arises concerning application of the Convention. It also requires signatories to begin work on measures to prevent or reduce any "ambiguities, doubts and suspicions concerning bacteriological activities and to improve international cooperation on the peaceful uses of microbiology." Specific measures included an exchange of information concerning research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases. In order to elaborate precise procedures for such exchanges, an ad hoc group of scientific and technical experts from the states parties met in Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987. The 1986 Review Conference had also requested that states send information to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. On 30 October 1987, both the United States and the Soviet Union filed reports including information on their research

centres and laboratories. A second report was filed by the United States in April 1988.

A ban on chemical weapons has been on the UN agenda since 1968. Yet progress has materialized only recently. In 1980, the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. By 1983, this Group had developed a consensus document identifying elements of a comprehensive treaty, and had outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

An important step in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons was taken by the United States in 1984 when it tabled a draft treaty providing for verification by challenge inspections (i.e. short-notice, mandatory inspections of plants suspected of cheating). That year also saw general agreement that the destruction of existing chemical weapon stockpiles should be subject to systematic international inspection--although disagreement persisted over the particular inspection procedures to be used.

Concern over chemical weapons has been fed by recent allegations of their use. Since 1980, the UN Secretary General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, has confirmed that chemical weapons have been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988 Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons--this time against its Kurdish population. A UN investigation of the alleged attacks was undertaken 17 March-4 April 1988. On 26 April, a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war was presented by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action.

In Geneva, progress towards a chemical weapons ban has been made in recent years, as the negotiators have moved closer to agreement on the definition of chemical weapons and on procedures for their destruction. Detailed provisions have been elaborated on the verification of declarations of existing stocks, and the closure and elimination of production facilities, while useful work has also been done on the guidelines for an international inspectorate. On 11 August 1987 the USSR tabled a proposal on compulsory on-site inspection which came close to that put forth by the United States in 1984. The Soviet proposal accepted the concept of challenge inspection of all chemical weapon facilities with no right of refusal. It also provided for the entry of inspection teams within 48 hours of a challenge (previously the Soviets had insisted on the right to veto requests for challenge inspection, and did not require that inspections be so expeditious).

On 3 October 1987, the representatives of forty-five nations visited a Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhan, on the Volga River south of Moscow. The foreign delegations were shown 19 different types of chemical munitions, as well as a mobile complex used for the destruction of chemical weapons. Bilateral talks between the superpowers also resulted in arrangements whereby the United States would visit a Soviet facility devoted to the destruction of chemical weapons at Chapayevsk, while the Soviets would visit an American chemical weapon facility at Tooele, Utah. During the Tooele visit, which took place 19-20 November 1987, Soviet military experts viewed various elements of the United States stockpile. The American visit to the Soviet facility is scheduled to take place this year.

On 26 December 1987, the Soviet Union declared the size of its chemical weapons stockpile as being no more than 50,000 tons of poisonous agent,

all located on Soviet territory. Superpower bilateral talks on chemical weapons are now moving toward negotiation of arrangements on data exchange.

In the meantime, however, after a hiatus of 18 years, the United States has renewed its production of chemical weapons to counter the Soviet Union's chemical arsenal. On 16 December 1987 it began final assembly of its first binary artillery shell. Plans for the production of a chemical weapon deterrent also continue in France.

Notwithstanding the progress made on a chemical weapons convention in the CD, several issues require further attention. These include: a definition of chemical weapons; verification difficulties, given the ease with which such weapons can be manufactured; the cost, size and scope of an international monitoring agency; the procedural details for instituting challenge inspection; and the problem of ensuring the broadest possible participation in a chemical weapons convention.

Canada has signed and ratified both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Since the conclusion of the BWC, Canada has shown great interest in the elaboration of verification measures to strengthen its enforcement. Moreover, successive Canadian governments have sought to help define and promote a chemical weapons convention, as well as to ensure its effective verification. The conclusion of such a ban constitutes one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament of the present Canadian government.

Current Canadian Position

Among Canada's recent contributions to biological and chemical arms

control have been its production of a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons in 1985; its sponsorship of three investigations of alleged Soviet use of toxin weapons in Southeast Asia;¹ and the submission to the CD of various working papers relating to a chemical weapons ban. In 1986 Canada tabled a document dealing with an international system for classifying chemical substances, and on 9 July 1987, Canada and Norway submitted a working paper on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This paper contained proposals to be included in the annex to article IX of a future convention.²

Canada was an active participant at the Ad Hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts held in Geneva in March and April 1987 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the second review conference on the BWC. There Canada contributed to a better understanding of the utility of adopting criteria relating to disease outbreaks, as well as containment standards for research facilities.³

¹ Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, November 1985; Butler, G. C., Report on the Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia (Memo to External Affairs), 2 December 1981; Shiefer, H. B., Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia (A Report to the Department of External Affairs), Ottawa, 1982; Norman, J. J., and Purdon, J. J., Final Summary Report on the Investigation of Yellow Rain Samples from Southeast Asia, Ottawa, Defence Research Establishment, February 1986; Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1986 Session, Ottawa, June 1987; and Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons - Final Records (PV), 1986 Session, Ottawa, June 1987.

² CD/766, 9 July 1987.

³ "Biological Weapons: Successful Conference Outcome," The Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 10.

Canada has been similarly active recently on the issue of a chemical weapons convention. On 9 July 1987, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, Alan Beesley, presented a series of compendia on chemical weapons comprising documents from the 1986 CD session, as well as a report entitled "Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples".⁴ Ambassador Beesley also expressed concern over the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as evidence of their development by an increasing number of countries. Nevertheless, he cautioned that negotiations should proceed with care and deliberation.⁵

Such sentiments were echoed on 13 October 1987 at the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly by Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, who noted that "A treaty banning chemical weapons will require the most complex set of verification measures ever included in a multilateral arms control agreement."⁶

In November 1987, three resolutions were put forth in the General Assembly on chemical and biological weapons. Resolution 42/37A of which Canada was the lead sponsor, urged that efforts be intensified and that increased time be devoted to negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.⁷ Resolution 42/37B called for strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol; efforts by the Secretary General to improve the capability for

⁴ CD/PV 420, 7 July 1987.

⁵ Ibid..

⁶ Speech by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament to the 42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, New York, 13 October 1987.

⁷ UNGA Resolution 42/37 (A), 30 November 1987.

timely investigations into accusations of use; and the appointment of experts for this purpose.⁸ Finally, Resolution 42/37C requested the Secretary General to provide assistance and services required for implementing the final declaration of the second review conference on the BWC, and called upon states to ratify or sign the Convention without delay if they had not yet done so.⁹ All three resolutions were adopted without a vote.

On 8 December 1987, during a cross-Canada speaking tour, Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche referred to the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban as a matter of "paramount importance." Mr. Roche also called upon states to take every step to prevent the transfer of chemical weapons to other states in the interim. In this regard, he recommended following the example of countries which had established export controls on highly toxic chemicals and a warning-list procedure for other chemicals (a practice followed by Canada in co-ordination with other countries since 1984).¹⁰

Early 1988 saw additional expressions of Canadian concern over the use of chemical weapons. On 25 March 1988, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, condemned the use of such weapons against civilians in Northern Iraq. In addition, Canada asked the UN Secretary General to consider sending experts to investigate the tragedy. The government conveyed its message to Iran and instructed the Iraqi Ambassador to inform his government as well.¹¹

⁸ UNGA Resolution 42/37 (B), 30 November 1987.

⁹ UNGA Resolution 42/37 (C), 30 November 1987.

¹⁰ DEA, Statement 87/71, 8 December 1987, p. 6.

¹¹ DEA Communiqué No. 068, 25 March 1988.

On 10 March 1988, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, de Montigny Marchand, reviewed some of the outstanding verification issues relating to a chemical weapons convention. Ambassador Marchand also expressed Canada's satisfaction with recent moves by the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of data exchange. Finally, he announced that Canada intended to submit working papers to the CD on the international inspectorate for a chemical weapons convention.¹² On 31 March 1988, Canada tabled one such document entitled "Factors Involved in Determining Verification Inspectorate Personnel and Resource Requirements". The paper addressed the factors which should have an impact on the size of the inspectorate and technical support staff, associated costs, and related issues.¹³

Parliamentary Comment

On 22 March 1988 Conservative Member John Oostrom made a statement in the House condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. He said:

...there has been a dangerous escalation in the Iran-Iraq war. Strong evidence has emerged that confirms the use of chemical weapons. Such an escalation will lead to heavier casualties as well as increased terror among the innocent civilian population.¹⁴

¹² Speech by the Canadian Ambassador de Montigny Marchand to the Conference on Disarmament, 10 March 1988.

¹³ CD/823, 31 March 1988.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 22 March 1988, p. 14002.

Recognizing existing prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons, Mr. Oostrom went on to note:

The use of these chemical agents leaves the possibility of a future biological catastrophe for the region and perhaps for other nations which are not involved in this conflict. We in this House must use all means at our disposal to prevent any more chemical weapons from being used and to see to a speedy end to this tragic conflict.¹⁵

Later that day, Mr. Oostrom asked Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark whether he would investigate recent charges of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and--if such allegations proved correct--whether he would communicate Canada's objections and concerns to the warring parties.¹⁶ Mr. Clark replied:

It is hard to secure detailed information but I agree...that we have to do our best to try. It is our view that there should be an expert investigation. We believe that it would best be conducted under the United Nations and we would recommend to the Secretary General that he put in place such an expert investigation.¹⁷

Conservative MP Alex Kindy also referred to the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war, and noting that it was his understanding that the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires had asked Canada for medical assistance for injuries incurred as a result of the chemical weapon attacks. Mr. Kindy went on to ask Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark whether such help would be forthcoming, and also if the Minister could assure the House that there was "no Canadian content" in the chemical warfare taking

¹⁵ Ibid..

¹⁶ Ibid..

¹⁷ Ibid..

place.¹⁸ Responding to the latter question, Mr. Clark stated:

...to the best of my knowledge there is no Canadian content in the chemical warfare. I use that phrase simply out of normal prudence. I think there is no reason to believe that there is any Canadian content in that chemical warfare.¹⁹

As to the question of Canadian medical aid to Iran, Mr. Clark stated:

That is a complex problem that requires co-ordination between federal and provincial Governments. We are looking to see if there is a way in which Canada can respond effectively.²⁰

On 25 March 1988, NDP Member Bill Blaikie inquired about the Government response to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, asking:

What has the Government clearly said to the Iraqi Government in respect to the use of chemical weapons? What is the Government planning to do to give leadership in the UN and in the international community in general to censure Iraq, to censure the use of chemical weapons, and finally to bring about the cease-fire which the United Nations requested many months ago in respect to this ugly conflict?²¹

Responding to Mr. Blaikie's questions, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark explained:

...we have made the strongest possible representations to the Ambassador of Iraq and will be following these up through

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14134.

other channels.²²

Referring to the fact that the Government also planned to raise the issue with the United Nations, Mr. Clark went on to state that:

...there is established in the United Nations secretary generalship a requirement and a capacity to seek expert confirmation of the facts that should be done, and then the problem arises...to find ways in which international opinion, apart from simply being expressed in the strongest possible terms, can be made effective against Iraq and against Iran. That is the challenge. If there is some way in which Canada can move that process forward, I am certainly eager to find and follow that way.²³

Mr. Blaikie referred to the possibility of an arms embargo on the two countries, observing:

I think Canada has a special role to play in calling the world community to account, the superpowers and everyone motivated....One of the opportunities the Minister has, it seems to me, is to take a leading role in getting the world community to put that kind of arms embargo on both those nations.²⁴

Mr. Clark agreed with Mr. Blaikie's suggestion, but questioned how such an idea would be put into practice.²⁵ Nevertheless, the Minister stated:

We are seeking more unanimity by more countries, and we want to make it clear that not only are we prepared to be a part of an embargo...but that we will be actively urging others to

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 14135.

²⁵ Ibid.

seek that, or to follow that or other procedures that can bring an end to a conflict which is more and more gruesome every day.²⁶

On 4 May 1988, NDP Member Pauline Jewett also condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict. Further, Ms Jewett pointed to the US decision to produce binary weapons and stated:

...I urge the Government to reconsider its misguided and unqualified support of the United States' production of a new regime of chemical weapons, namely, binary agents. Real progress toward an international convention banning chemical weapons will be encouraged if the Government of Canada now takes a strong stand against these new agents of death.²⁷

On 25 March 1988, questions were raised in the House concerning the production of chemical weapons and antidotes to them at the Defence Research Establishment at Suffield, Alberta. NDP Member Jim Fulton referred to the fact that production contracts for the antidote drug HI-6 were being considered for a firm in Edmonton, and asked:

Will the deputy Prime Minister give his assurance that before any further production...of chemical or biological weapons or potential antidotes to those is contracted in Canada, the Government will produce in public a position paper on how such production by Canada will affect the potential for progress toward a world-wide production ban on chemical and biological weapons?²⁸

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark replied:

I cannot accept the premises of [the] question without

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Commons Debates, 4 May 1988, p. 15109.

²⁸ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14136.

looking into all the circumstances and I cannot answer him without doing that.²⁹

In a follow-up question, Mr. Fulton asked the Minister if he could give his assurance that HI-6 studies would be reviewed publicly prior to its use on Canadian soldiers.³⁰ Once again, Mr. Clark stated that more time would be needed to examine the issue before an answer could be given.³¹

On 14 June 1988, responding to information that the Department of National Defence had been conducting open-air tests of nerve gas at the Defence Research Establishment in Suffield since 1983³², NDP Member Nelson Riis asked:

Does the Government of Canada manufacture this nerve gas at Suffield? Does it import the nerve gas? If so for whom? Why did the Government allow this nerve gas to be released into the atmosphere without prior notification to the people living in adjacent areas?³³

In response to Mr. Riis' inquiries, Associate Minister of National Defence Paul Dick stated:

...the Department of National Defence has never made any bones about the fact that at Suffield, in an isolated area, we have tested nerve gas in small quantities, in laboratories and elsewhere, in order to protect our own troops in case they were ever faced with this situation. I should point out

²⁹ Ibid..

³⁰ Ibid..

³¹ Ibid..

³² See, for instance, Geoff White, "Nerve Gas Tested in Alberta," Ottawa Citizen, 14 June 1988, p. A1-2.

³³ Commons Debates, 14 June 1988, p. 16426.

that in the case of testing done outside it was between 1.4 and 1.5 kilograms of nerve gas that was used in an area of 2 square miles from which everybody else was excluded at the time the tests were conducted. At the present time we are negotiating in Geneva on the quantities countries can have for their own testing and the suggested level is 1,000 kilograms. This is 1.4 to 1.5 kilograms.³⁴

On 23 June 1988, NDP Member Jim Fulton questioned the safety of the open air tests being conducted at the Suffield experimental site. Mr. Fulton addressed the Minister of National Defence, Perrin Beatty:

The Minister has stated these tests pose no danger, but...the Deputy Director of Mountain Region of Labour Canada...has confirmed that on May 26, 1986, there was a near fatal accident at Suffield involving two researchers who were exposed to lethal nerve gas. In fact the experimental station was evacuated and the researchers were hospitalized, one for a lengthy period.³⁵

Mr. Fulton then asked how Mr. Beatty squared this information with assurances he had given that the tests at Suffield posed no health risks.³⁶ Mr. Beatty replied:

I understand that in 1986 a World War II shell which contained nerve gas was found on the range. In the process of decontaminating it one of the technicians had an accident and two technicians were exposed to gas. Both of them were taken in for medical treatment and both of them were released immediately afterward. In follow-up studies, neither one suffered long-term damage at all.³⁷

³⁴ Ibid..

³⁵ Commons Debates, 23 June 1988, p. 16765.

³⁶ Ibid..

³⁷ Ibid..

In a follow-up question, Mr. Fulton pointed to an independent analysis of the field tests which concluded that they constituted a "real and immediate" threat to the public health communities near the base. He then asked if, in light of the near fatalities, and the severe health threat posed by tests, the Minister would order an immediate halt to them.³⁸

Mr. Beatty replied:

...in one case one technician spent one day in hospital. The technician was given an additional three days off. The junior technician returned to work the following day. That is hardly an indication of "lengthy time in hospital" as a result of this.³⁹

Mr. Beatty also noted:

With respect to the scare tactics being used by the Hon. Member to prevent defensive research designed to protect member of the Canadian Forces, the public is well protected.⁴⁰

³⁸ Ibid..

³⁹ Ibid..

⁴⁰ Ibid..

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5. CANADA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

Background

Nuclear Weapon-free Zones (NWFZs) consist of defined geographic areas in which the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Various types of NWFZs exist and have been proposed since the 1950s. They have been supported as a means to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a confidence-building measure (CBM) in the pursuit of regional security, as well as constituting steps in a progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Five NWFZs have been established by international agreement: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, following a unanimously adopted UN resolution calling upon nations to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space; the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, establishing Latin America as the first populated NWFZ in the world; the Seabed Treaty of 1971; and the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone. The latter, negotiated by the thirteen members of the South Pacific Forum, bans the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons in their area. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft

carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. The Treaty has encountered problems, in that only two of the five nuclear weapons states, China and the Soviet Union, have signed the relevant Protocols. France, which maintains an active nuclear testing programme in the region, is opposed to the zone. So are the United States and the United Kingdom, which have both expressed reservations over the Treaty's symbolic importance as a precedent allegedly incongruent with their national interests.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Balkan states, the South Atlantic, the Nordic states, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia. Most of these efforts have been made in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, with interest in them varying over time. Two areas which have received considerable international attention recently, include the Arctic--stimulated by the Soviet Union's October 1987 initiative (please see the Arctic Sovereignty section of the Guide), and Southeast Asia--through the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At their December 1987 summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to intensify efforts for a Southeast Asia NWFZ given the example of New Zealand and improved US-USSR relations as an impetus. The US has stated its strong opposition to the concept, however.

Current Canadian Position

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones whenever they are considered feasible and likely to promote stability in an area. Although the creation of such a zone is not judged a satisfactory alternative to having the countries involved ratify the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can make a significant contribution to preventing the

spread of nuclear arms and increasing regional security in the absence of NPT ratification.

The Canadian Government's stance remains unchanged. It is prepared to study such proposals on a case-by-case basis but it believes that to be effective, any proposals must meet certain requirements: the zone must apply to a defined geographic area; it must be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers; it must not give advantage to any state or group of states; it must contain adequate treaty assurances and means to verify that countries abide by their commitments; and it must not permit the development of an independent nuclear explosive capability in the area.¹

At the 42nd Session of the UNGA in 1987, Canada voted in support of related resolutions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in the Middle East (adopted without a vote), Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in South Asia, Denuclearization of Africa, Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (adopted without a vote), and Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic.

As a result of Canada's NATO membership, it has always been opposed to the establishment of such zones in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans. The Government believes that the establishment of zones in these areas would cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent and expose certain areas to the risk of Soviet attack, without making a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament.

¹ DEA, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones," Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Fall 1986, p. 12.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon-free status for Canada. Although Canada does not possess nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory, Canada is a member of NATO which, as already indicated, relies on a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone, it is maintained, would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.²

Despite this position the local authorities in 169 municipalities across Canada have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario, and the Northwest Territories have each declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately 60 percent of the Canadian public resides in locally declared NWFZs.

Parliamentary Comment

Proposals to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone have been put forward in the House of Commons on several occasions. On August 31, 1987 Mr. Neil Young of the New Democratic Party (NDP) put forth a Private Member's Motion (C-214) to declare Canada a NWFZ. The motion called for a prohibition of "the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada, [and] the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms," while calling on the government to "encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world to undertake similar action."³ In Mr. Young's view, Canada would thereby strengthen its position on international disarmament and proliferation matters, building upon its traditional support for the establishment of NWFZs.

² Ibid..

³ Commons Debates, 31 August 1987, p. 8627.

At the two special sessions of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, Canada supported the final declarations encouraging the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. In Mr. Young's words: "It would appear from all that activity that Canada should have taken the lead and shown by example what it is indeed encouraging other nations to do. Instead, we have managed to confuse our position by acts of both the present and past Governments."⁴

The Honourable Allan MacKinnon responded to Mr. Young from the Government side of the House. Mr. MacKinnon emphasized the threats facing Canada and the Canadian approach as a Western alliance member to responding to those threats:

Although the alliance has pledged never to resort to force except in response to attack, it remains united in its determination to deter any aggression against its members. The Honourable member who has just spoken wishes to do away with deterrence. Our Government continues to believe that it is through participation in these collective defence arrangements, rather than retreating into the uncertain security of a nuclear weapon-free zone, that we can make our most effective contribution to preserving the peace and security for ourselves and others.⁵

The Liberal Party, as determined at its 1986 Convention, favours the establishment of a NWFZ for Canada, but not at the expense of abrogating Canada's alliance obligations as they perceive them. The Honourable Donald Johnston raised some of the Liberal Party's concerns in the debate on C-214:

⁴ Ibid., p. 8628.

⁵ Ibid., p. 8629.

The question is: Would a unilateral decision contribute? Or would it not, on the contrary, tend to remove Canada from nuclear policy decisions at the NATO table? Might it not compromise our ability to influence our allies on arms control? In addition, could we enforce it? Obviously we could not.⁶

On 14 December 1987 the motion was defeated by a vote of 34 in favour to 93 against.

A second Bill, C-304, was introduced on 30 June 1988 by NDP Member Svend Robinson. The purpose of this Bill was to "...establish in the North of Canada a nuclear weapons free zone hopefully together with other Nordic countries as an important step toward peace and disarmament and a nuclear weapons free world."⁷ Mr. Robinson suggested that it was important for the West to respond positively to changes occurring in the Soviet Union through the policies of glasnost and perestroika.

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⁶ Commons Debates, 20 October 1987, p. 10207.

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6. NUCLEAR TESTING

Background

In the 1950s, the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban all forms of nuclear testing. While efforts to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) proved unsuccessful, the negotiations bore some fruit with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. As of January 1986, the treaty had 115 states parties, although two nuclear weapons states--France and China--have yet to sign.

Further progress on the limitation of nuclear testing came when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) in 1976. The former limits underground nuclear testing to 150 kilotons, while the latter does the same for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions." Neither the TTBT or the PNET has, however, been ratified by the US Senate.

Efforts to achieve more ambitious limitations on nuclear testing continued when the Carter Administration reopened trilateral negotiations on a CTB in 1977. Although some headway was made in developing a draft treaty, strong domestic political opposition in the United States ensured that progress was limited. These negotiations ceased with the advent of the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, later extended three times. Yet the Soviet initiative

failed to prompt the United States to take similar action, or to resume negotiations on a CTB. Soviet testing resumed on 28 February 1987. The US Congress has put forth proposals seeking a moratorium on nuclear tests above one kiloton, but these have never been accepted by the Administration.

The Reagan Administration has maintained that, although it regards a total ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective, the need to ensure weapon reliability and national security requires continued testing. In addition, the Administration has contended that progress on a CTB can be achieved only in stages--first by securing more stringent monitoring provisions for the TTBT and PNET; then by negotiating intermediate limitations on testing; and finally by pursuing a total ban as part of a broad, effective disarmament process.

While the Soviets initially opposed the US government's approach to limits on nuclear testing--favouring instead immediate negotiations on a total ban--the prospects for accommodation began to brighten by the summer of 1986. In July of that year, the two sides resumed talks on testing at the expert level in Geneva. By summer 1987, the Soviets had largely acceded to the US position on how negotiations toward a CTB should proceed.

On 17 September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the two sides had agreed to begin "full-scale stage by stage negotiations on nuclear testing" before 1 December 1987. The negotiations would begin by searching for mutually agreeable procedures for verifying the TTBT and the PNET. On 9 December 1987, during the first round of talks, Robert Barker, head of the US negotiating team, announced that the two sides had further agreed to visit each other's testing sites in January 1988 in order to better

familiarize themselves with the test site layouts and equipment. Barker added that the parties also planned to hold joint nuclear test explosions in order to calibrate equipment to help in verifying any future limits on testing. In particular, the joint tests would aid in settling differences between the superpowers regarding their preferred methods of monitoring the size of atomic tests. The Soviets prefer to rely on seismic devices, while the United States prefers the Corrtex system of hydrodynamic measurements. The Soviets have, however, agreed to negotiate on-site hydrodynamic methods as a step toward a CTB.

In accordance with the agreements reached in December 1987, a twenty-man team from the US visited the principal Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk in Central Asia from 11 to 14 January 1988. A twenty-member Soviet delegation visited the US testing site in Nevada two weeks later. This followed a series of scientific exchanges aimed at testing methods of monitoring limits on underground explosions, sponsored jointly by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-profit environmental and disarmament organization in the United States, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In September 1987, US scientists tested seismic monitoring equipment near Soviet test ranges by measuring the detonation of three non-nuclear explosions. Similar monitoring by the Soviet Union took place in an area not far from the Nevada test site in late April 1988. The tests in the Soviet Union have indicated that seismic devices are capable of measuring most meaningful nuclear explosions. Soviet seismic tests on American soil have been less successful, owing to the geological peculiarities of Nevada.

During their 21-22 April 1988 meetings in Moscow, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the joint verification experiment on nuclear testing announced in December 1987, and reached an agreement on its conduct. The experiment

is scheduled to take place this summer. In addition, the Ministers instructed their negotiators to complete ongoing work on a verification protocol for the PNET. At the Moscow Summit on 28 May - 1 June 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted that substantial progress had been made on a new protocol to the PNET. They instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously work on this protocol, as well as to complete a protocol to the TTBT as soon as possible after the joint verification experiment had been conducted and analyzed.

Additional efforts at limiting nuclear testing have been made in multilateral forums. In 1983, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) established a CTB working group. Now called the Ad Hoc committee, the group has been unable to agree on a programme of work and has not met since 1983.

Despite the inability of the CD to agree on a mandate for the CTB working group, the Group of Scientific Experts--a CD body charged with developing a global system of seismic monitoring--met from 22 of July to 7 August 1987. The Group discussed options for the establishment of international data centers (IDCs), communication links, and procedures for IDCs. It also set up new study groups to elaborate an international seismic data exchange system, as well as to plan new data exchange experiments. The Group's report and its recommendations were adopted by the CD in late August 1987. The Group met again in Geneva from 7 to 18 March 1988, and discussed the exchange of seismic data and its processing at IDCs. The Group also continued work on the design of an international data exchange system that might be ready for large-scale experimental testing by 1990.

In November 1987, Mexico and five other non-aligned countries initiated a draft resolution in the UN's First Committee recommending that non-nuclear states parties to the PTBT call on depository governments to

convene a conference to consider amending the treaty by converting it into a CTB. As UNGA resolution 42/26 (B), it was adopted by a vote of 128-3-22 on 30 November 1987. While Britain, France and the United States voted against the resolution, the Soviet Union voted in favour.¹ The sponsoring states have begun work in preparation for the Conference, although it is not expected to take place before 1989.

While some progress on limiting nuclear testing has been made recently, significant issues remain to be resolved. Among these are: the nature of the verification measures required to improve the monitoring of existing treaties; the character of intermediate limitations on the size and number of nuclear tests, as well as their acceptability; and the circumstances under which a CTB can be achieved.

Further limitations on nuclear testing have been a priority item on the Canadian Government's agenda, a CTB remaining one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament during 1987 and 1988. Canada has contributed to this goal in various ways in the recent past. In 1986, the government approved the sum of \$3.2 million in order to upgrade the seismic array station in Yellowknife as a contribution toward seismic verification. Modernization of the array is to be completed by 1989, at which point it will constitute a world-class facility and possibly a prototype for other international stations.² In 1985, the government awarded a grant to the University of Toronto for further research on the use of regional seismic data for verification of a CTB. Canada also hosted a technical workshop on seismic verification of a CTB in October 1986. Attended by 43 representatives from 17 countries, the workshop

¹ UNGA Resolution 42/26 (B), 30 November 1987.

² "Canada's Role in Verification," The Disarmament Bulletin, Supplement, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 3.

produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. The workshop's proceedings were tabled by Canada in the CD on 28 April 1987.³

Current Canadian Position

On 4 November 1987, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche addressed the issue of a CTB before the First Committee. Expressing Canada's satisfaction with the Fall 1987 decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing, Ambassador Roche went on:

Canada supports a step by step approach to the realization of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty....We should not lose sight of the fact that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to the ultimate goal which is the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. I would submit that the primary purpose of the reduction and cessation of nuclear testing should be to enhance confidence in the global arms control and disarmament process.⁴

The Ambassador added that the CD had an important role to play in supporting and encouraging the process of achieving a CTB--particularly through consideration of questions of scope, compliance and verification. In this regard, he noted Canada's support for the work of the Ad Hoc group of scientific experts, and welcomed the selection of Dr. Peter Basham, a Canadian, as co-ordinator of a major text for the development of an international Seismic Data Exchange. Ambassador Roche also urged members of the CD to define a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee, allowing

³ CD/753, 28 April 1987.

⁴ DEA, Press Release No. 42, 4 November 1987, p. 2.

it to begin substantive discussions.⁵

At the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly, three resolutions were passed regarding a CTB. Resolution 42/26 (A) called upon the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a CTB, comprising two working groups--one on compliance and verification, and another on content and scope. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 137-3-14, with the United States, Britain and France voting against it, and Canada abstaining.⁶ Resolution 42/26 (B) (discussed above) called for the convening of a conference to amend the PTBT by converting it into a CTB. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 128-3-22, with the United States, Britain and France once more voting against the resolution and Canada again abstaining.⁷ Finally, Canada co-sponsored resolution 42/27, which called on the CD to initiate substantive work and for the nuclear weapon states to agree to "appropriate verifiable interim measures on nuclear testing". It also called on the CD to set up an international seismic monitoring network. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 143-2-8, with France and the United States voting against.⁸

On 10 March 1988, Canada's Ambassador to the CD de Montigny Marchand reiterated the importance accorded a CTB in Canadian policy. Welcoming the US-Soviet negotiations and their planned exchange of on-site observations of nuclear tests on their respective territories, Ambassador Marchand also expressed Canada's hope that the negotiations would proceed to a consideration of further limitations on nuclear tests as soon as

⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

⁶ UNGA Resolution 42/26 (A), 30 November 1987.

⁷ UNGA Resolution 42/26 (A), 30 November 1987.

⁸ UNGA Resolution 42/27, 30 November 1987.

possible. He added that developments between the superpowers should be seen as presenting an opportunity for the work of the CD, and should not detract from it. In this regard, the Ambassador stressed the need for the two major nuclear powers to become constructively engaged in the multilateral process in order to facilitate progress therein. That process, Ambassador Marchand noted, also required that a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee be defined so that substantive work on a test ban could commence, and that careful consideration be given to how best to structure such work so as to support and complement the bilateral talks.⁹

Parliamentary Comment

On 9 December 1987, following the conclusion of the INF Treaty between the superpowers, NDP Member Pauline Jewett referred to the issue of nuclear testing when questioning Prime Minister Brian Mulroney about official Canadian communications with US and Soviet leaders on arms reductions. Ms Jewett asked:

Did [the Prime Minister] ask both or did he tell both of them of Canada's particular concern about air-launched cruise missiles and submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles?....Finally, did he also press upon both the need now for a comprehensive test ban before there is further enlargement or enhancement of the nuclear arms race?¹⁰

Prime Minister Mulroney replied:

⁹ Speech by the Canadian Ambassador de Montigny Marchand to the Conference on Disarmament, 10 March 1988.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 9 December 1987, p. 11627.

In the communications we have had on this very important subject, we have conveyed the views of the Government of Canada in regard to the steps which we believe ought to be taken to secure further reductions in the possible deployment of nuclear arms.¹¹

On 26 April 1988, Conservative Member John Oostrom criticized France for its conducting of underground nuclear tests in the South Pacific, stating:

I believe that conducting underground nuclear testing on South Pacific Islands which are mostly extinct volcanoes, is like playing Russian roulette with the environment. This region of the world has been fortunate that the atoll of Mururoa did not break up and release its deadly radiation into the ocean, creating an environmental disaster of epic proportions. Canada must make its concerns known to France that testing in this area of the world could have severe repercussions on life.¹²

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¹² Commons Debates, 26 April 1988, p. 14826.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

7.CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CCSBMDE)

Background

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was the culmination of two years of negotiation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act contained three "Baskets" of issues: Basket I - Questions relating to Security in Europe; Basket II - Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment; and Basket III - Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields. There was also a section concerning the follow-up to the Conference.

In Basket I, the 35 nations participating in the CSCE agreed, among other things, to voluntary observance of limited confidence-building measures, designed to further such objectives as reducing the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities. The measures agreed to were in the following areas: prior notification of major or other military manoeuvres; exchange of observers; and prior notification of major military movements.

CSCE Follow-up meetings have been held in Belgrade (1977-78), Madrid (1980-83), and Vienna (1986 - present). The Madrid follow-up meeting established a Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), also commonly referred to as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), to take place in Stockholm. The aim of this conference was "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give

effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

The Stockholm talks opened on 17 January 1984. The 35 participating nations, roughly divided into three main groupings, included the sixteen NATO members, the seven Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries. The mandate for the talks committed the participants to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation. These measures were to be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space", to be militarily significant, politically binding, and adequately verifiable.

NATO proposals put to the Conference in its first year contained six concrete measures: the exchange of general military information; the exchange of information on planned military activities one year in advance; the announcement of manoeuvres involving at least one division, or 6,000 men, 45 days in advance; compulsory invitations to observers for announced military activities; methods of monitoring compliance and verification including challenge on-site inspections; and the establishment of communication links in order to implement or facilitate rapid contact in situations of tension.

These Western proposals were followed by others from Romania, the Soviet Union, the Neutral and Non-Aligned States, and Malta.

The Soviet Union, representing the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), tabled its proposals in May, 1984. These suggestions were of a more political nature than NATO's, including a proposed treaty on the non-use of force; a no first-use of nuclear weapons pledge; a ban on chemical

weapons in Europe; support for nuclear weapon-free zones in the Balkans, Central Europe, and the Nordic area; a freeze and reduction of military spending; and improvements on the CSBMs agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act. The last of these elements focussed on practical military measures relating to limits on exercises, prior notification of troop movements, and development of the practice of exchanging observers.

The Neutral and Non-Aligned Group indicated a particular interest in the adoption of "constraint measures" which would limit or constrain military activities through geographical restrictions or ceilings on manpower and/or equipment.

In December 1984, the Conference agreed to a Finnish/Swedish proposal for a set of working groups. Group A considered measures of observation and notification (items already included in the Helsinki Final Act); Group B examined all other measures (those not in the Final Act); and a combined group considered linked issues. This helped the work to proceed.

In January and February 1985, the NATO countries submitted six working documents which recommended such measures as 45 days' prior notification for any military manoeuvres involving 6,000 troops (compared with 21 days' notice for manoeuvres of 25,000 troops in the Final Act).

The Warsaw Pact tabled their proposals for CSBMs at the same time, calling for 30 days' notification of movement of more than 20,000 men and an overall limit for any manoeuvres to 40,000 men. In November 1985, the NNA submitted a revised proposal that many hoped would be a bridge between the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions. It combined the Western emphasis on specific information exchange and on demanding verification measures with the Warsaw Pact's desire for a declaration on non-use or threat of force.

The pace of the negotiations gradually quickened during the first half of 1986, in pursuit of efforts to reach an agreement by September (before preparatory phases of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting started in Vienna). For example, new Western proposals were tabled on 30 June 1986, agreeing to raise the limit on the troop numbers requiring notification above 6,000. The Soviet Union accepted the principle of on-site inspections on 19 August and compromises were pursued on other issues such as arrangements for aerial inspections.

On 22 September 1986, after almost three years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in Stockholm. The terms of the accord, effective 1 January 1987, included the following: notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be given 42 days in advance; host states must extend invitations to foreign observers to attend manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 men; each state has the right to request a ground and/or aerial inspection of any military activity raising doubts about compliance with agreed CSBMs, although no state is required to submit to more than three such inspections per year; aircraft for aerial inspections will be chosen by the mutual consent of the parties involved, and inspectors will furnish the monitoring equipment and specify the flight path of the aircraft in the suspected area; and calendars outlining the schedule for military activities subject to prior notification in the following year are to be exchanged by 15 November. Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 or 75,000 troops must be given by 15 November, one and two years in advance, respectively. Finally, the signatories agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or political independence of other

states in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.¹

The question of how to follow up the Stockholm Conference was on the agenda of the third CSCE Follow-up meeting in Vienna, which began on 19 November 1986. The working group on security is discussing a proposal for two distinct negotiations on conventional arms control. One set of talks, part of the CSCE process, would build up and expand the CSBM regime agreed to in Stockholm. The second set, also within the CSCE framework but autonomous and involving only the 23 nations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, would deal with enhancing security and stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. These latter talks, generally referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), would follow the informal Mandate Talks now under way and would likely replace the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks (see MBFR section). The concept of having two distinct conventional security negotiations was first outlined in the NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1986.

In future negotiations on CSBMs, the West appears to be especially interested in discussing proposals intended to enhance "openness" about military formations and troop levels. For its part, the Soviet Union appears to be interested in extending the application of CSBMs to include sea and air exercises, increase transparency, and include issues concerning military doctrine.

¹ Canada, Department of External Affairs, Document of the Stockholm Conference: On confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the concluding document of the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986, pp. 1-20.

All states appear to have been generally satisfied with the fulfillment of the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement since its establishment. In 1987 a total of 19 observable exercises involving the Warsaw Pact and NATO took place. Canada sent observers to every exercise attended by the West. Nine challenge inspections were conducted, five by the East and four by the West. Sixteen observable exercises were notified for 1988.

Current Canadian Position

The agreement on a confidence-building regime in September 1986, to which Canada is a signatory, drew unqualified Canadian support. Canada's official position was outlined in the Government's response to a recommendation contained in the 1986 report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons:

Canada has been an active participant in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and security-building measures and hailed its successful conclusion. In the government's view, Stockholm represents a significant accomplishment in the field of arms control which will impart an unprecedented openness to the conduct of military affairs in Europe.²

Canada's strong commitment to the work of the Stockholm Conference and satisfaction at its successful outcome were also indicated in articles in the Disarmament Bulletin, Winter 1986 - Spring 1987, by Ambassador Tom Delworth and the Military Advisor to the Canadian Delegation, Colonel C. A. Namiesniowski. In a speech before an International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention held in Ottawa in

² DEA, Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 1986, p. 48.

October, 1987, Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs James Taylor spoke of the importance of the Stockholm Conference, given its political nature:

Arms control has traditionally largely confined itself to the issue of military capability, leaving the question of intent to largely declaratory political gestures. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement in Stockholm in 1986 on specific measures, subject to agreed verification procedures, designed to increase mutual assurance about the benign military intent of parties to the agreement. The notably efficient and effective way in which challenge inspections of conventional military exercises were recently conducted on the territories of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic respectively is a most welcome development. So, too, are recent formulations by official spokesmen of the USSR which speak in terms of a "sufficiency" of military force. More than at any time in recent years, parties on all sides of the East-West divide seem to accept that security is a matter of mutuality. Neither side can feel secure unless both do.³

Parliamentary Comment

On 23 February 1988, Mr. Bud Bradley, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, outlined the conventional arms control process in which Canada is currently involved in Vienna. Referring to the Conventional Stability Talks and the negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Mr. Bradley stated

³ "Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa, October 7, 1987," in: DEA Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canadian Policy on Arms Control and Disarmament: Excerpts from Official Statements and Communications," 21 March 1988, p. 14.

that these talks would address the conventional military problem from "two complementary directions."⁴

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⁴ Commons Debates, 23 February 1988, p. 13069.

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Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

8. DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Background

Disarmament and development have been matters of increasing concern to the United Nations throughout the entire history of the Organization. The General Assembly has often considered the growth of military expenditures around the world, the possibility of redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development, and the relationship between disarmament and development. This latter issue led to a number of UN recommendations ranging from the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development to working out specific measures for disarmament and the control of armaments. Other causes for concern have been the worsening of world socio-economic conditions as well as the arms race.

At the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) held in 1978, the General Assembly assigned a Group of Governmental Experts to conduct a study on the relationship between disarmament and development which was completed in 1981. Undertaken by representatives of twenty-seven states (including Canada) under the chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, this study concluded that the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship and that the world can either indulge in an arms race or make deliberate attempts to establish a more stable and equitable socio-economic development coupled with a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both.¹

¹ The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 11, 1986.

These issues have continued to interest the UN since the release of the Thorsson report. The General Assembly subsequently accepted the 1984 Disarmament Commission's recommendation to hold an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development. Held from 24 August to 11 September 1987, and attended by 150 states, this conference dealt primarily with the existing contrast between global military expenditures and the frequent failure to meet basic human needs. The Conference's final report reveals that "a reduction in global military spending would considerably enhance development". It also mentioned that security involved not only a military dimension but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and ecological aspects, and that its strengthening could create favourable conditions for disarmament and development and vice-versa. According to this report, "security is equally undermined by underdevelopment, the ever gloomier prospects for development and the mismanagement and waste of resources". Moreover, it shows that "the world's military expenditures actually devoted to the defence of security interests are, in real terms, at a level four to five times higher than what they were at the end of the second world war" and that they represent about 6 per cent of the world's total output. Finally, the report underlines the importance of "releasing, at the national level, resources formerly devoted to the military which could be reallocated to the civilian sector".²

The United States did not participate at this conference because the American government does not consider that disarmament and development are linked and because it is opposed to the idea that western countries should transfer to the poor nations the money provided for military expenditures.

² Report of the international Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, United Nations, New York, 1987.

In November 1987, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution (42/45) requesting the Secretary-General to take measures to implement the plan of action adopted by the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The resolution (42/45) also recommends that this issue be included in the agenda of the third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

Current Canadian Position

From the very beginning, Canada supported the decision to hold a conference on this matter. Speaking at its plenary session on 24 August 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark noted that "progress toward development and progress toward disarmament can both contribute to increase world security", and he recognized "that the level of a nation's security is the main criterion against which efforts for disarmament must be measured, not the level of economic gain". The same view had been expressed in March of that same year by the Ambassador for disarmament Douglas Roche at the United Nations Regional Conference on the World Campaign for Disarmament. Mr. Clark added: "I mean security in its broadest sense - not just military strength. The sense of economic and social well-being is an important factor in a nation's overall security." He underlined the importance of examining further what possibilities disarmament measures could bring in favour of development, having recalled that as far as disarmament is concerned "the record of the United Nations - and its member states - has been less impressive". Finally, Mr. Clark mentioned some aspects of Canada's assistance for

development, adding that disarmament was one of the major objectives of Canadian foreign policy.³

The Government believes that disarmament and development are two distinct processes linked to each other only to the extent that each contributes to security and in turn benefits from its strengthening. Ottawa is not prepared to accept the notion of a direct transfer of resources provided for military expenditures to socio-economic development. So far, Canada has not taken any steps to implement the plan of action adopted by the international Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

Parliamentary Comment

In the House of Commons on 28 August 1987, Conservative Member Barry Turner asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark what consequences the absence of the United States would have on the outcome of the Conference and if a consensus on the issues of disarmament and development could be reached.

Mr. Clark expressed his confidence that a constructive consensus would be reached and deplored the absence of the United States from the Conference, noting that it could incite the Soviet Union to score propaganda points in an area in which it had nothing to claim. The contribution of the Eastern countries to United Nations development

³ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Press release, No. 17, New York, 24 August 1987.

efforts, including the Soviet Union's, is less than that of the Western countries and even that of the developing countries.⁴

Furthermore, on 25 September 1987, NDP Member Jim Manly introduced a motion on this question according to which the Canadian Government should consider the advisability of transferring, on an annual basis, one per cent of its defence budget to official development assistance, over and above the present expenditure; the amount recovered in this way would be made available only to those countries which decreased their military budgets by at least one per cent on an annual basis. Mrs. Monique Tardif, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Health and Welfare, called the proposition interesting, but in fact unrealistic. She did not believe that there is a causal link between defence and development expenditures (reduction of the former would be followed by an increase of the latter), as the motion suggested. She was also opposed to any arbitrary reduction of Canada's defence budget, adding that the proposition does nothing to attack the reasons why developing countries spend too much for military purposes.

As for Liberal Member Roland de Corneille, he called this proposition inconsistent because, according to him, the assistance given to these countries cannot be related to the amount of their military expenditures. He cited the case of Mozambique, a beneficiary of Canadian aid, which would suffer from a reduction of its defence budget.

Mr. Bud Bradley, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence, mentioned for his part, that "the motion and most of the foreign and defence policies of the Honourable Member's Party seem to come from

⁴ Commons Debates, 28 August 1987, p. 8570.

the same naive idealistic base". He added that the idea of any prescribed transfers of funds saved through disarmament is unrealistic and that "Canadian development assistance is provided in accordance with well-established socio-economic criteria which, in the Government's view, must remain the principal guide".

Finally, NDP Member Cyril Keeper supported Jim Manly's motion arguing that it is important to link defence spending to development aid. According to him, new ways must be found to resolve problems and conflicts. This motion suggests one and asks that action be taken now.⁵

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⁵ Commons Debates, 25 September 1987, pp. 9357-64.

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9. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)

Background

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact have been going on in Vienna since 1973. The aim of the talks is to reduce the level of conventional forces in a Central European zone covering the territories of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Direct participants include the eleven NATO and Warsaw Pact nations with troops stationed in these countries--the above seven, plus the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Eight nations, known as "flank states", are indirect participants in the talks. These consist of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Italy, and Turkey from NATO; and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania from the Warsaw Pact.

The MBFR talks showed some progress through the 1970s, including an agreement in principle in 1977 to reduce each side's forces in the region to 900,000 air and ground personnel with a 700,000 sub-ceiling for ground forces alone. In the past several years, however, the talks have come to a stalemate largely over the issues of the number of troops each side has stationed in the area and the methods that would be used for verifying any troop reductions.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO's positions have centered on achieving parity with the Warsaw Pact in military manpower; agreeing on effective verification measures to ensure Treaty compliance; allowing for geographical asymmetries, given the greater distance to the central front

from North America and the UK; and requiring collectivity in force reductions--enabling deployments of troops from one nation to substitute for those of another while remaining under the overall manpower ceiling. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has opposed collectivity and pushed to have national sub-ceilings on force levels in any agreement; desires the inclusion of equipment reductions in addition to manpower; and wishes verification measures less intrusive than those proposed by the West.

A longstanding dispute in the negotiations has raged over the size of current force-levels, with the West counting 230,000 more Warsaw Pact troops than officially declared by the East bloc.

The most recent proposal tabled by the West, in December 1985, called for an immediate withdrawal of 5000 American and 11,500 Soviet troops from Central Europe without prior agreement on force levels. The proposal also included provisions for exchanging force data following the reduction; freezing force levels in Central Europe for three years; and a verification regime involving up to 30 on-site challenge inspections annually, as well as permanent entry/exit points for troops moving in and out of the zone.

The Warsaw Pact responded by suggesting force reductions of 6500 American and 11,500 Soviet personnel. According to Eastern figures, this would leave overall post-reduction force ratios unchanged and, as a result, set a precedent for future reductions. The Eastern Bloc would allow on-site inspection to take place if the basis for the request to inspect was well-founded.

Little progress has been made in the negotiations over the past couple of years. The political atmosphere surrounding the talks has changed,

however, for a number of reasons. First, in April 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to expand the "zone of reductions" to the "entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals". Subsequently, in June 1986, the Warsaw Pact suggested troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over the next two years, with ultimate reductions of 500,000 on each side by the early 1990s. The Soviets suggested that negotiations on these proposals could take place in an expanded MBFR forum (including countries not already involved), a forum related to the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE)(please refer to CCSBMDE section in the Guide), or a new forum altogether. In May 1986, NATO formed a High Level Task Force (HLTF) as a steering body for the review and development of Western positions on conventional arms control.

Second, in September 1986, the first stage of the CCSBMDE concluded with an agreement signed in Stockholm. There was hope that the success of these talks in creating a more open and predictable security regime in Europe would carry over to the MBFR negotiations.

In December 1986, the North Atlantic Council issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. It recommended that two distinct negotiations take place: one, to expand upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security-building measures; and the second, to establish conventional stability at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. The former would be for all CSCE participants while the latter would be restricted to the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In February 1987 the Conventional Mandate Talks (CMT) between the Warsaw Pact and NATO began with the aim of drafting a mandate for the anticipated new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe,

generally referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). While the latter will be conducted within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the precise link to the CSCE is undecided.

Currently the mandate talks are running parallel to the MBFR negotiations. Most analysts expect that upon agreement on a mandate, MBFR will be suspended. At the 43rd session of MBFR, however, the West rejected East Bloc efforts to end the talks with a symbolic agreement. In the meantime, greater political impetus has been injected into the subject of conventional arms control as a result of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement signed in December 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Current Canadian Position

The Government of Canada, with its NATO Allies, supports the goal of conventional force reduction to the lowest levels commensurate with security and stability. In a symposium at the McGill Centre for Research in Air and Space Law on 21 October 1987, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, spoke of the importance of conventional arms control, particularly in light of progress in the nuclear arms control field:

Already, the pending INF agreement has triggered vigorous discussion about the most desirable combination of conventional and nuclear military forces which ought to be retained in order to preserve and strengthen stability in the European theatre, a debate which will predictably continue for some time. This increased awareness of the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear forces, particularly at the theatre level, has doubtless been one of the factors which has given impetus to the efforts to

formulate a mandate for negotiations among members of the two major alliances, within the CSCE framework, on conventional forces in Europe.¹

Canada has expressed its full support for establishment of the CST, including agreement to making it autonomous from the CSCE process yet related to it in some form.

Parliamentary Comment

In a discussion in the House of Commons on 23 February 1988, Progressive Conservative Member Reginald Stackhouse raised the issue of the conventional arms balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He voiced his concern that, despite the current priorities of the Soviet Union to pursue negotiations, Canada must continue and perhaps increase its efforts toward improving Canada's contribution to its forces in Europe.² Mr. Bud Bradley, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, responded that "...the importance of redressing the current imbalance in conventional weapons in Europe is a top priority for this Government, as well as for NATO as a whole."³ To accomplish this, he stated, Canada would continue its efforts to improve its contribution, while, at the same time, encouraging conventional arms control negotiations:

¹ Speech to McGill University, Centre for Research in Air and Space Law's Symposium on Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification, 21 October 1987.

² Commons Debates, 23 February 1988, p. 13068.

³ Ibid., p. 13069.

We are currently engaged in exploratory mandate negotiations with representatives of the Warsaw Pact in Vienna. It is our hope that these preliminary talks will bear fruit, and that two new conventional arms control negotiations will commence some time late this year, or possibly early in the new year.⁴

Mr. Bradley explained that one set of talks would deal with confidence-building measures while a second set would attempt to eliminate disparities. Of the latter, he said: "We will try to establish a level of force which would remove the ability of one side to threaten the other, but would retain an ability to meet legitimate defences."⁵

The question of Canada's participation in MBFR discussions was raised by Liberal Party Member Douglas Frith in the Standing Committee on National Defence on 23 March 1988. Mr. Frith asked whether Canada had put forward any proposals within the NATO Alliance as to the course conventional arms control should follow. Defence Minister Perrin Beatty responded:

On a continuing basis we have been consulting very closely with our NATO Allies...ensuring that Canada's views are brought forward....We have made the argument very strenuously in favour of the need for cuts at the conventional level. Unfortunately, in the case of MBFR we have not made great progress in recent years. It is an area where we would like to see progress made.⁶

Mr. Robert Fowler, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), added:

⁴ Ibid., p. 13069.

⁵ Ibid., p. 13069.

⁶ SCND, 23 March 1988, p. 13.

The key issue facing MBFR and the follow-on from MBFR is of course the challenge of asymmetrical reductions, to deal in a stabilizing way with the enormous preponderance of Warsaw Pact conventional forces.⁷

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The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

NATO

10. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Background

International efforts to control nuclear proliferation date back to the early 1940s, during the initial stages of the development of the first atomic bomb. In 1943, allied governments, including the United States and Britain, met in Quebec and concluded agreements aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear technologies to states other than the US and the UK. In 1945, the United States, Britain, and Canada signed the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy which foresaw the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

While more ambitious international efforts aimed at preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons were initially frustrated, some success was eventually achieved with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1956. Under the aegis of the UN, the IAEA's function--as defined in the agency's statute of 1957--is "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity" as well as "ensure that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its operation and control is not used to further any military purpose". Although not exclusively devoted to the task of curbing proliferation, the IAEA has contributed significantly to this goal through the application of safeguards and inspections to insure that states not divert nuclear energy, material and facilities used for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons. At the end of 1986, the Agency had concluded 164 safeguards agreements with 94 states.

Chief among existing international non-proliferation measures is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Evolving out of a 1961 UN General Assembly

Resolution, the Treaty was signed on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970. It contains provisions for quinquennial reviews of its operation, and is due for renewal in 1995.

The NPT contains provisions to be followed both by existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Thus, Article I of the Treaty declares that each NWS "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In turn, under Article II, non-nuclear weapon states agree not to receive and not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives or other nuclear explosive devices; and agree to accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. For their part, nuclear weapon states parties agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information and assistance to their non-nuclear counterparts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, all states parties undertake not to provide fissile material, or equipment used for processing or producing it, unless under IAEA safeguards.

Finally, under Article VI, nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT agree to undertake to pursue negotiations "on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict, effective international control."

Although viewed by some as an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, only three of the states possessing these weapons--the

United States, Britain and the Soviet Union--have actually signed the NPT. France and China--as well as suspected or "near" nuclear weapon states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa--have all yet to accede to the Treaty. So far, however, India is the only non-signatory, NNWS known to have exploded a nuclear device. The explosion took place in 1974, and was described by the Indian government as intended "for peaceful purposes only." On the 5 November 1987, Spain, a nation with a fairly substantial nuclear program, acceded to the Treaty.

One obstacle to further accession to the NPT has been the long-held view among some states that it is discriminatory. Not only does it allow nuclear weapon states to maintain their arsenals while refusing the right of acquisition to others, but it requires the latter to open their facilities to the IAEA while the former are not required to do so. Nevertheless, as of November 1987, 135 states were party to the Treaty.

Three review conferences have thus far been held on the operation of the NPT. At the first review, in 1975, expressions of concern were voiced by the neutral and non-aligned nations regarding the failure of the NWS to halt the arms race. These states called for an end to underground nuclear testing, large reductions in nuclear arsenals, and a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear counterparts. Agreement by the NWS to make a greater effort to address these concerns was reflected in the Final Document.

The second review conference in 1980 was less successful than its predecessor. This was in large part due to the fact that since 1975, none of the demands of the neutral and non-aligned states had been met. Although some agreement was reached on safeguards for peaceful nuclear

programs, no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals ("vertical proliferation"). In fact, no final declaration, nor any reaffirmation of support for the Treaty, was issued from the review's proceedings.

The failure of the NWS to make substantive progress in the area of vertical proliferation resurfaced as the key issue at the most recent review in 1985. Indeed, in the five years separating the third review from the second, no major arms control measure of any kind had been achieved. A Final Declaration was, however, adopted by consensus. In it, the participants expressed the conviction that the NPT was essential for international peace and security, and reaffirmed their support for the Treaty and its objectives.

The declaration also expressed the deep regret of all but some participants (ie. the United States and Britain), over the failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban, and called on nuclear weapon states parties to resume trilateral negotiations, as well as to participate actively in the CD, to achieve it.

Canada has always played a leading role in the quest for strict non-proliferation measures. While Canada assisted the US in the development of the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II, it was also the first nation to forgo the option of developing them despite possession of the capacity to do so. One of the three states participating in the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy in 1945, Canada also took part in the negotiation of the IAEA, its statute, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime has been articulated as one of the six specific arms control goals

of the Canadian Government.

Current Canadian Position

Present Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation is based on changes introduced by Ottawa in 1974 and 1976, imposing tighter controls over nuclear exports.

Under this policy, nuclear co-operation will be allowed only with those non-nuclear weapon states that have made a general commitment to non-proliferation by either ratifying the NPT, or accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Moreover, Canada will export nuclear materials only to those states (both nuclear and non-nuclear) which have undertaken to accept, in a formal agreement, a number of additional requirements designed to minimize proliferation risks. Such states must assure that Canadian-supplied nuclear items (eg. nuclear material, heavy water, nuclear equipment, and technology) will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices. In addition, they must be willing to accept fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguard functions. These fallback safeguards include controls over both the re-transfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items, and the reprocessing of Canadian-origin spent fuel.¹ Since 1976, these requirements have been negotiated with the United States, Euratom, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

¹ DEA, "Canada's Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," 1985, p. 13.

In 1978 Canada also began work on an extensive programme aimed at developing and improving the verification mechanisms of the NPT. This initiative, known as the Canadian Safeguards Research and Development Programme, was designed to assist the IAEA in the development of safeguards systems for CANDU reactors. Work under this programme, which received a five-year budget of approximately \$11 million, is reported to be well advanced.²

On 13 June 1988, in his speech at UNSSOD III, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark referred to the importance of the NPT, and described future Canadian policy initiatives in support of it. Mr. Clark noted:

No measure demonstrates the commitment of a nation to nuclear disarmament more effectively than adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beginning last week and throughout this session, officials of the Canadian Government, on my instructions, will be calling on the Governments of all non-signatories of this treaty, strongly urging any nation that has not done so to accede to this essential arms control treaty. I hope that the Special Session will issue a similar call.³

² "Canada's Role in Verification," The Disarmament Bulletin, Supplement, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 3.

³ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Statement 88/31, 13 June 1988, p. 5.

Parliamentary Comment

The Defence White Paper of June 1987 called for the purchase of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines. For reasons of military security, and because neither the NPT nor the IAEA deals with the use of nuclear material for non-explosive military purposes, fuel for these vessels would not be subject to the safeguards that would apply if it were allotted to peaceful, non-military activity. Although bilateral safeguards between the supplier of the fissionable material and the recipient are possible, the submarine programme has nevertheless raised concern as to whether Canada's use of the uranium fuel would be fully consistent with its obligations under the NPT, and past Canadian non-proliferation policy. Speaking before the Standing Committee on National Defence on 23 February 1988, NDP Member Derek Blackburn speculated upon the possible implications of Canada's removal of fissionable material from international safeguards for the purpose of fuelling nuclear submarines:

I am not suggesting that a country like Canada would deliberately and knowingly in any way try to use the spent fuel for other purposes, for explosive purposes for example--or not even spent fuel, but divert some of the high grade fuel for other illegal purposes. What I am saying is that by getting this exemption for us we are setting an example that other countries, sort of the bad guys might use in their submissions--countries that are not as reputable as ours--and they might use the same example whereby we have the fuel encased in not only a physical wall but a security wall away from any kind of third party objective scrutiny or observation, and we have it for up to five or seven years. We know what we are going to do with it, we are the good guys. What about other countries that might want to use our precedents and hide their high grade fuel, their enriched uranium for five to seven years? We do not know what is

going on--we will never know...--but they have used our exemption, our example, our precedent.⁴

Responding to the Member's statement, Mr. Armand Blum, Canadian Submarine Project Co-ordinator for the Department of External Affairs, observed that after the fissionable material had been used in the submarines and had been taken out, it would either fall back under IAEA safeguards or would remain under bilateral inspection.⁵ He added:

...at least in the case of Canada a system will have been developed that will ensure that there is no possibility of diverting the material. That material, as I said, will be safeguarded either by the IAEA or by a reputable guarantor, so to speak, which would be either the United Kingdom or France. Now, we hope any other supplier, anybody who in the future would wish to sell a submarine to a third country, would perhaps copy the Canadian example....⁶

In turn, Mr. Blackburn commented:

But...obviously there is no guarantee. You are talking about Canada, a reputable country....We are arguing...about the dangerous precedent that I suggest we are setting in this exemption that other countries could possibly use, and where you will not get that kind of bilateral agreement and where we will not be able to put our trust in that agreement. We will not have a guarantee that this highly enriched uranium will be used for this specific propulsion purpose, but it could be diverted and

⁴ SCND Proceedings, 23 February 1988, p. 13.

⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

⁶ Ibid..

again add to the world's explosive nuclear capability.⁷

Similarly, on 7 March 1988, again before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Liberal Member Douglas Frith commented that:

We have always been in favour of strengthening IAEA safeguards. I think a lot of other countries in the world that are not nuclear have always looked at Canada as a leader in this respect, and they view the decision to go to a nuclear powered submarine as a departure from past practice.⁸

In reply, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty stated that he believed that current Canadian policy with respect to the acquisition of nuclear submarines:

...is entirely consistent with past practice. The position Canada has taken from the outset is that we strongly oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What we are talking here in the case of nuclear-propelled submarines is not a nuclear weapon, but simply a propulsion system. If the NPT had been designed to outlaw in some way the use of nuclear propulsion for military purposes it would have said so.⁹

The Minister went on:

What we will demonstrate is that a country that is nuclear--that is, that uses nuclear energy for both civil and military purposes--is capable of using them consistently with the spirit of the NPT and of specifically renouncing the

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, p. 15.

⁹ Ibid.

acquisition of nuclear weapons despite our capacity to develop them here.¹⁰

Mr. Frith also expressed the opinion that, despite the fact that the non-proliferation regime does not deal with the use of nuclear material for non-explosive military purposes, it was his understanding that the governors and senior officials of the IAEA had always expressed the hope that no signatory state would ever put this exclusion to the test.¹¹

Comment on the possible negative consequences of the Government's plan to purchase nuclear-powered submarines for the NPT and Canadian non-proliferation policy continued to be voiced in the House in early summer 1988.¹²

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¹⁰Ibid..

¹¹ Ibid..

¹² See, for instance, Commons Debates, 7 June 1988, pp. 16205-6; 9 June 1988, p. 16283; and 15 June 1988, pp. 16485-86.

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Nuclear Testing

Uranium and Tritium Exports

Canada and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

Defence--Major Equipment Acquisitions

11. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Background

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. Two years later, one hundred and twenty-five countries, including the US and the Soviet Union, signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any weapons of mass destruction in space, and also prohibits military bases, installations, or fortifications; weapons testing of any kind; and military manoeuvres on the moon and other celestial bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars. Under Article V of the Treaty, the parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or

mobile land-based" (emphasis added). The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 urged that further agreements be developed to reserve outer space for solely peaceful purposes.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, as well as the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons.

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems":

I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.¹

In 1982, as a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper in the CD outlining the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms

¹ Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau, "Technological Momentum the Fuel That Feeds the Nuclear Arms Race: An Address...to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, June 18, 1982," DEA Statements and Speeches No. 82/10, p. 5.

control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.² The following year, Canada initiated a national research programme on the problems for verification which were likely to arise from the possible dual nature of many space systems.

For a long time the forty nations represented at the Conference on Disarmament were unable to reach a consensus on a mandate for the Ad Hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was only in 1985 that the matter was resolved. It was agreed that in addition to studying the issues involved in such a ban, the committee should also study existing treaties and international law relating to outer space along with any proposals concerning the issue. During 1986 the CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its examination of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1986 mandate was, in turn, re-established in 1987 and 1988.

In April 1988 the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD, concluding that "the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space." The report also recognized the need to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime in order to enhance its effectiveness. Finally, it called for strict compliance with existing multilateral and bilateral agreements.³

In 1985 the Canadian delegation at the CD tabled a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at

² CD/320, 26 August 1982.

³ Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/833, 25 April 1988.

the CD."⁴ This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law. Over twenty international agreements, including the UN Charter, were examined, and a variety of issues were identified as being fundamental to the successful development of a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space.

The multilateral negotiations at the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space take into consideration the bilateral talks between the United States and Soviet Union on this topic. The most important difference between these two parties is that Moscow thinks priority should be given to obtaining a general agreement banning an arms race in outer space, while Washington insists that the coverage of earlier agreements (1962-1967) should be examined first.

The 42nd session of the UN General Assembly in the Fall of 1987 passed Resolution 42/33, calling on the CD to give priority to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this question. It also called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their negotiations on this issue. The US changed its vote, as compared to the previous year's similar resolution (41/53), from an abstention to a "no". This was possibly due to the inclusion of a new clause recognizing the current legal regime applicable to outer space as being insufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution passed by a vote of 154-1-0.

⁴ CD/618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 July 1985.

Current Canadian Position

Since the beginning of the 1980s, Canada has been conducting a research project on verification called "PAXSAT A," studying the feasibility of developing a system of satellites capable of verifying arms control agreements in outer space. "PAXSAT A" involves space-to-space remote sensing, with satellites used to identify the purpose and function of other space objects. A second project, "PAXSAT B," is a feasibility study of the use of satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing to verify agreements on conventional forces. Canada presented its analysis of PAXSAT to the CD in April 1987.

Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche has summarized Canada's substantive contributions to outer space arms control as follows:

Canada has contributed to the Conference on Disarmament's deliberations on this subject in several ways: the first substantive working paper dealing with possible stabilizing and destabilizing space-based military systems; an extensive survey of international law to provide a data base concerning its applicability to outer space; an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal to examine ways to strengthen the legal regime for outer space.⁵

The workshop to which Mr. Roche referred was a cooperative effort between the Department of External Affairs and the McGill Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, held in May 1987. Thirty-nine officials, including eleven ambassadors representing 35 nations, were present. The purpose of the workshop was to "provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

⁵ "Beyond the Summit: The Future of Disarmament," Secretary of State for External Affairs, Statement 87/71, 8 December 1987, pp. 10-11.

As Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, James Taylor, has stated, Canada recognizes the limits to its influence:

It is important to recognize that the current bilateral efforts by the USA and the USSR to prevent an arms race in outer space and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are not and must not be at cross-purposes. We urge the USA and the USSR to continue their efforts in this area, while at the same time, we recognize that arms control in relation to outer space has an important multilateral dimension.⁶

These sentiments were expanded upon by Canada's Ambassador de Montigny Marchand in his speech before the Conference on Disarmament on 10 March 1988:

Here too we can try to enrich our work through interaction with the bilateral discussion between the two major space powers. A first order of priority of the Canadian delegation is to ensure that we do nothing to set back or interfere with the work that is being done in the bilateral space talks. We hope that the two major space powers might see advantage in promoting discussion in this forum of some of the practical and legal problems brought to light in the bilateral talks.⁷

⁶ International Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa, 7 October 1987.

⁷ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Speech of Ambassador de Montigny Marchand to the Conference on Disarmament, Thursday, 10 March 1988, Geneva."

Parliamentary Comment

The issue of peaceful uses of outer space was raised in the House of Commons, in a general sense, in regard to Canadian participation in the space station (see Canada-US-Space Station section of the Guide) and in relation to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). On 14 December 1987, Liberal Member William Rompkey stated:

We in the Liberal Party have taken the position all along that Canada should participate in the space station only if it is used for peaceful purposes and only if there is no military use of that space station. There is still no confirmation that that has been agreed to. There is still no confirmation, far from it, that the Government has reached agreement with the Americans that there will be no military use.⁸

In the same debate NDP Member Mike Cassidy made clear his position on the space station:

The Government wishes to ensure that any military use of the space station is consistent with international law, and with the treaty obligations of all participants in the space station. The Minister of State for Science and Technology is nodding, Mr. Speaker. I would like to know what are the treaty obligations.

Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan met in a summit last week, which was welcomed by people from around the world, but on the question of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty which effectively governs experimentation in space that might be used for the SDI, for star wars, they went away agreeing to

⁸ Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, pp. 11734-35.

disagree. They simply stated that both countries would respect the treaty obligations.⁹

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Verification

12. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS

Background

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. During World War II it was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons from Port Radium in the Northwest Territories. Canada continued to provide uranium and plutonium for the weapons programmes of the United States and Britain for twenty years, although it renounced any intention of developing its own atomic weapons. In 1965, Canada's uranium export policy was altered when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announced that, henceforth, Canadian uranium exports would be used for peaceful purposes only.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ushered in greater restrictions on the uses of nuclear material internationally. In addition to agreeing not to develop nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty are required to submit to full IAEA safeguard measures over their nuclear programmes. In turn, nuclear-weapon states parties agree to work toward halting the proliferation of their own arsenals ("vertical" proliferation), and are required to cooperate with their non-nuclear counterparts in the development of the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

India's explosion of its "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 served as the harbinger of change in Canadian policy on the export of nuclear material and equipment. After the Indian government admitted that the plutonium used in its "device" had been produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, Canada suspended all nuclear cooperation with India, and later

that year announced more stringent safeguards on its nuclear exports.

Natural uranium is not classified as a strategic material. A blend of uranium 235 (U235) and uranium 238 (U238), natural uranium contains less than one per cent U235--a quantity too low to generate a nuclear explosion.

Approximately 85 percent of the uranium exported from Canada goes to the United States, Great Britain and France. There it is enriched for use in light water nuclear reactors. Because these reactors require uranium with a 3 per cent concentration of U235, the natural uranium must be enriched to this level by increasing the percentage of U235 isotope. Elaborate and expensive, the enrichment process was, until recently, confined to those countries possessing nuclear weapons programmes, as only they could afford the cost of such large operations.

The Canada-United States Nuclear Co-operation Agreement, signed in 1955 and most recently renewed in 1980, stipulates that uranium of Canadian origin cannot be used for any kind of military purposes. Similar conditions govern uranium exports to Britain and France under the Canada-Euratom agreement (1978).

Since enrichment plants have both civilian and military uses, the separation of materials for either application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large "pot" and is not kept separate according to the country of origin or its intended use. In a letter to NDP leader Ed Broadbent in October 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated:

It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants ... However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the

enrichment plant, the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally-accepted notion of fungibility.¹

After the uranium is enriched to the required 3 per cent concentration, the commensurate amount is taken off, and the depleted uranium (which still contains small amounts of U235) is stored.

Depleted U238 can be used in military reactors to breed plutonium--a substance which itself can be used to make nuclear weapons. U238 also constitutes an important element of hydrogen bombs--providing 50 per cent of their explosive power.

Following the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the Canadian government announced that no uranium of Canadian origin could be enriched or reprocessed without Canada's prior consent. In January 1977, Canada halted uranium shipments to both the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan after two years of negotiation failed to produce their agreement to the Canadian stipulations. Although Japan consented to abide by the clause soon afterwards, the EEC remained intransigent. It was not until 1980 that an agreement was signed by Canada and the EEC which allowed sales to occur, with consultation on a case-by-case basis. Canadian uranium is also enriched by the Soviet Union for use by Spain, East Germany, Sweden and Finland. In this case, Canada requires that both the depleted as well as the enriched uranium be supplied to the countries concerned.

¹ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, constitutes another key component of nuclear weapons. It is generally found as tritiated water. Canadian CANDU reactors use heavy water to control the nuclear reaction. The heavy water--containing deuterium--captures neutrons from the main reaction chamber, converting deuterium to tritium. This process is peculiar to CANDU reactors, and therefore more tritium is produced as a by-product by the CANDU reactors than by any other type of reactor.

Each year, approximately 0.5 kg of tritium is used for civilian purposes such as phosphorescent lights and fusion experiments, while approximately 11 kg is used for military purposes. A component of all but very primitive nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 per cent per year. Consequently, older nuclear weapons must have their tritium supply replaced from time to time.

For health and safety reasons, the tritium by-products of CANDU reactors require removal. Ontario Hydro is constructing a tritium recovery facility at Darlington, Ontario, and plans to market the recovered tritium--which sells for approximately \$15 million per kilogram on the international market. Tritium is not classified as a nuclear material by the IAEA, and is therefore not subject to international safeguards. It possesses a relatively short half-life and thus would create problems for IAEA monitoring. In June 1986, in response to a letter from author Margaret Laurence that expressed concern over Ontario Hydro's plans for the export of tritium, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated:

The Canadian Government believes that, given the physical nature of tritium and its limited proliferation significance, the application of safeguards to tritium is not appropriate. It should be clear, however, that export licences and permits

for tritium will not be issued unless the government is satisfied that tritium will not be used for nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive purposes.²

The recovery facility at Darlington is scheduled to begin operations in the fall of 1988.

Current Canadian Position

Canada continues to require that its uranium exports be used for non-explosive purposes, pursuant to bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, and in keeping with its nuclear non-proliferation commitments. The export of tritium is also to take place within the general framework of Canada's non-proliferation policy.

In November 1987, at the UN General Assembly, Canada was the lead sponsor of Resolution 42/38L entitled "Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes". The resolution noted that such a prohibition would be an important step in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. It therefore requested that the CD pursue its consideration of the question of an adequately verifiable cessation and prohibition, and that it keep the General Assembly informed of that consideration. The resolution passed by a vote of 149-1-6, with France being the only state opposing it.

² Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Letter to Margaret Laurence, 19 June 1986, as quoted in The Disarmament Bulletin, Summer-Autumn 1986, pp. 18-19.

Parliamentary Comment

Before the Standing Committee on National Defence on 23 February 1988, NDP Member Derek Blackburn noted that Canada's acquisition of nuclear submarines could require the transfer of technology from the United States. In this connection, Mr. Blackburn asked whether the Department of External Affairs had considered the possibility that:

...the US Congress may ask something in return to wit, a revision to the already existing agreement between Canada and the United States on inspection control over the use of spent fuel in the United States that they acquire from Canada.³

In particular, the Member noted the possibility that the US Congress would be "very interested" in breaking out of the tight nuclear export controls which Canada has traditionally imposed through its bilateral agreement with the United States⁴ (i.e., that Canadian nuclear exports not be used for any military purpose whatsoever).

In response to Mr. Blackburn's query, Mr Armand Blum, Canadian Submarine Project Co-ordinator for the Department of External Affairs, stated that there had been "no indication whatsoever" of any such desire.⁵

The issue of tritium exports has not been raised in the Commons this year.

³ SCND Proceedings, 23 February 1988, p. 27.

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⁵ Ibid..

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

13. VERIFICATION

Background

Verification is now recognized as a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreements in any of these sectors. However, two important developments have occurred since the end of summer 1987: talks have resumed on verification of nuclear testing after an eight-year hiatus, and the Soviet Union and the United States have signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF). The INF treaty contains certain innovative provisions on verification that could set a precedent for future disarmament and arms control agreements.

Over the years, Canada has acquired solid expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. Following the United Nations' First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which stressed the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in disarmament agreements, the Canadian Government announced in 1983 the launching of an Arms Control Research Program, which now has an annual budget of \$1 million. This Department of External Affairs program involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector and includes such projects as studies of problems that arise in international negotiations, creation of specialized technical training programs and organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Program focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities include a \$3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station at Yellowknife, two studies given to the UN Secretary-General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and working papers on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Canada has also set up a project known as PAXSAT; this is a feasibility study of two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to the verification of multilateral arms control agreements. PAXSAT 'A' studies the use of space-based remote sensing for arms control agreements governing arms in outer space, while PAXSAT 'B' is concerned with verifying conventional arms control agreements.

In 1985, at the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada's UN delegation initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 on all aspects of verification, which was passed by consensus. The resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures," and urged them "to communicate to the Secretary-General [...] their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques [...] and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The resolution was

called "a historic breakthrough", since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.⁶

Carrying out the requirements of this resolution, in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General and subsequently published A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152 (0). This publication, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, despite the fact bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will likely continue to be of paramount importance in this context. That same year, during the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada tabled Resolution 41/86 Q on the role of verification in arms control agreements, which was passed by consensus.

In October 1986, Canada hosted an international workshop on the exchange of seismic data. Experts representing 17 countries met in Ottawa to study the problems posed by rapid exchange of numerical seismic data in wave form. The purpose of this workshop was to support the work of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). Canada has made another notable contribution to this issue: in 1987, a Canadian, Peter Basham, was appointed coordinator of the project to develop an international exchange of seismic data, which forms part of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

In May 1987, Canada invited CD delegation heads and observers to attend a workshop in Montreal on arms in outer space. The purpose of this

⁶ Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, News Release, No. 62, 22 November 1985.

workshop was to promote dialogue on the major legal issues linked to preventing an arms race in outer space and focussed in particular on the current legal system governing outer space. Results were also presented of research conducted in Canada on the use of space-based remote sensing for verification of arms control and disarmament (PAXSAT study).

In 1987 and 1988, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document containing 16 principles on verification. The Group also held discussions on procedures and techniques and on the role the United Nations might play in verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. This last point was the subject of a speech by Mr. Roche on 12 May 1988, in which he listed certain roles the UN could play with regard to verification:

- development of internationally recognized standards on arms control and disarmament verification;
- creation of a verification data base, especially to assist negotiators;
- provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to regional arms control negotiators, on request;
- research into structures, procedures and techniques for verification;
- on a responsive basis and with the consent of the parties to an arms control or disarmament negotiation or agreement, potential

involvement in the formulation and execution of verification provisions of specific agreements.⁷

Current Canadian Position

On 25 August 1987, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Allan Beesley, reviewed recent progress in negotiations on chemical warfare, nuclear testing and weapons in outer space. After noting that the verification measures accompanying certain bilateral and multilateral agreements were imperfect, he stated:

These few examples--in multilateral and bilateral agreements--demonstrate not only the importance of verification and compliance, but the political sensitivity of the whole process of detecting and handling events suggesting possible non-compliance. Indeed, recent concerns about verification and compliance seem in some cases to have eroded the confidence among the parties to arms control agreements rather than reinforced it. None the less, it is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions and the establishment of the necessary implementing mechanisms is essential to preventing such a deterioration of confidence. This applies *a fortiori* to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests.⁸

In a speech to the UN First Commission on 13 October 1987, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche noted:

⁷ Intervention on the Role of the United Nations in Verification by Canadian Representative at UNDC, Verification Working Group, United Nations, 12 May 1988.

⁸ CD/PV 433, 25 August 1987.

Verification [...] is a basic and normal process that reflects a legitimate concern about on-going compliance with a commitment. The conduct of verification activities must come to be accepted as a necessary and normal part of the relations between parties to arms control agreements.⁹

On 31 March 1988, Canada submitted a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament regarding verification of a future Convention on Chemical Weapons, under the title: Factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements (CD/823).

At the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament in June 1988, Canada and the Netherlands submitted a paper on the role the United Nations might play in verification. The two countries proposed in particular that a UN Group of Experts conduct a thorough study of this subject, to serve as a key international document on future UN activities in this field. The Group of Experts would hold its first meeting after January 1990 and submit its report to the 46th Session of the General Assembly, in 1991.

⁹ Canadian Policy on arms control and disarmament, Excerpts from official statements and communications, DEA, March 1988.

Parliamentary Comment

On 18 September 1987, Conservative MP Barry Turner questioned Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on the Soviet-US agreement on nuclear testing concluded the previous day:

Considering that Canada is upgrading its seismic verification capacity in Yellowknife to world-class standards, coupled with our potential satellite capabilities, does the Minister see Canada playing a verification role in this vital arms reduction progress?

Mr. Clark replied:

[...] one of the surprising and important developments is that there has been an agreement, after an eight-year hiatus, to resume discussions on nuclear testing. That brings directly to the fore the importance of verification in which Canada has some very real expertise. That expertise will be available fully if it can be put into service.¹⁰

On 13 June 1988, Liberal MP André Ouellet referred to the United Nations debate on disarmament, and asked Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty:

Why is Canada not ready to accept the proposal that has been put forward which is now under discussion to have an international verification agency come under the auspices of the United Nations? Why is Canada not ready to accept this? Certainly such an agency would be absolutely essential to monitor disarmament, and certainly to monitor a treaty such as the INF.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 18 September 1987, pp. 9090 and 9091.

Mr. Beatty noted that after returning from the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark agreed to discuss proposals made by Canada. He added:

Suffice it to say that across the board our position has been, first, to press for cuts in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons and, second, to press for regimes of verification and control which would ensure that those treaties are met."¹¹

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¹¹ Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, pp. 16373 and 16374.

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Chemical and Biological Weapons

Nuclear Testing

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

14. THIRD UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (UNSSOD III)

Background

The Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD III) was held from 31 May to 25 June 1988. The substantive issues on its agenda included an assessment of the implementation of the decisions taken at the previous two UNSSODs, a forward-looking assessment of developments and trends in the disarmament process, and consideration of the role of the UN in disarmament and the effectiveness of UN disarmament machinery, including information and educational activities. Despite the stopping of the clock in the last hour of June 25 in order to provide more time, the Special Session was unable to reach consensus on a broad range of issues. As a result, no final document, or even concluding statement, was agreed upon.

The First Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) was held in New York 23 May to 1 July 1978. UNSSOD I was largely due to the lobbying of the non-aligned states, and produced an ambitious 129-paragraph Final Document adopted by consensus. Divided into four sections - Introduction, Declaration, Programme of Action, and Machinery - the Final Document established what it described as "the foundations of an international disarmament strategy...in which the United Nations should play a more effective role."

Some of the substantive achievements of the First Special Session included: i) agreement that the Committee (later renamed Conference) on Disarmament in Geneva would be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in the international community; ii) the decision that

henceforth, the First Committee of the General Assembly would deal exclusively with matters of "disarmament and related international security questions"; and, iii) the call for a Second Special Session devoted to disarmament to be convened in the future.

At UNSSOD I, Prime Minister Trudeau delivered the Canadian address, calling for the adoption of a "strategy of suffocation." This strategy included: i) a Comprehensive Test Ban; ii) a cessation of flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; iii) a prohibition of all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and iv) agreement to limit, then reduce, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems.

The Final Document of UNSSOD I marked the UN's assertion of the importance of multilateral disarmament efforts. The success of UNSSOD I did not carry over to UNSSOD II, however, held from 7 June to 10 July 1982. At a time of growing tension between East and West, UNSSOD II was characterized by disagreement and paralysis. Consensus was not reached on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which was to be its centrepiece. Neither could a consensus be achieved on an evaluation of the results of the First Special Session in 1978. UNSSOD II did, however, inaugurate the World Disarmament Campaign, an attempt to influence world public opinion in favour of disarmament. Public opinion was well expressed at the time of the Second Special Session, independent of the efforts of the UN. On June 12, an estimated 750,000 to 1,000,000 people marched past the UN headquarters in New York in support of nuclear disarmament.

At UNSSOD II, Canada reaffirmed the strategy of suffocation and the validity of the Final Document of UNSSOD I, while urging the US and USSR to resume strategic arms talks.

Current Canadian Position

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, delivered the Canadian statement to the plenary meeting of UNSSOD III on 13 June 1988. In his statement, he noted the achievements in arms control which had occurred since the convening of UNSSOD II. The Stockholm Agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987, and the Moscow Summit of 1988 between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were presented as evidence of forward movement in arms control. Mr. Clark called upon the Special Session to build upon recent arms control successes by setting "clear, realistic goals" and adhering to priorities.

Mr. Clark spoke strongly of the importance of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He argued that it was no longer possible to demand that the superpowers reduce their own nuclear arsenals before others sign the Treaty, since superpower disarmament had begun.¹ To emphasize the importance Canada attaches to the NPT, Canadian officials had been instructed to make representations to nations which had not signed the NPT, calling upon them to do so.

Another Canadian initiative at the Special Session was contained in a working paper presented jointly with the Netherlands. This urged that the Special Session request the Secretary General "to undertake an in-depth study on the subject of the existing and possible activities of the United Nations in the verification of multilateral arms control and

¹ Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Press Release No. 28, 13 June 1988.

disarmament agreements."² France later joined the Netherlands/Canada initiative. A major verification proposal was also put forth by the Group of Six Nations/Five Continent Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania). It called on the Special Session to endorse "the principle of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations" and requested the Secretary-General to prepare "an outline of such a system."³ For much of the Special Session, consultations were carried out on how to bridge these two proposals in order to present one consensus proposal. Two agreed-upon paragraphs were presented to the Committee of the Whole on June 25 as part of the draft final document of the Special Session but were for naught as the latter itself did not garner consensus.

Canada played an active role at the Special Session, delivering formal interventions in all three working groups, and later presenting these interventions as working papers. In addition to the Netherlands/Canada working paper on verification, Canada also presented working papers on the role of the UN in the field of disarmament and the effectiveness of UN disarmament machinery⁴, UN information and educational activities⁵, and a proposed orientation programme for representatives of non-governmental organizations.⁶ Lastly, Canada co-sponsored a working paper

² UN Document A/S-15/25, 3 June 1988.

³ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/1, 3 June 1988.

⁴ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/1, 9 June 1988.

⁵ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/5, 10 June 1988.

⁶ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/WG.III/4, 10 June 1988.

with Australia and New Zealand calling for an enhanced role for women in the field of disarmament, and particularly within the UN Secretariat.⁷

Parliamentary Comment

On 31 May 1988, NDP Member Bill Blaikie told the House of Commons that, while the superpower Summit in Moscow was a welcome event, Canada must keep in mind the "equally important discussions" taking place at the Third Special Session. He criticized the Government for not having "adequately outlined the positions it plans to take at the special session."⁸ Mr. Blaikie returned to this theme on 13 June when he referred to letters written by numerous non-governmental organizations to Mr. Clark, seeking a statement of the Government's position. The NDP Member asked why these inquiries had not been answered. Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty replied that Government policies on arms control and defence were already in the public domain.⁹

Prior to Mr. Clark's speech at the Special Session, on 3 June 1988, Liberal MP André Ouellet asked whether Mr. Clark would "propose an arms suffocation strategy like the one suggested ten years ago by former Prime Minister Trudeau?" Mr. Clark replied that Canada's position would have to take into account "the constructive differences in the present situation - there have been many changes in attitude among the superpowers and changes in the international situation with respect to arms control." He declared that he was "prepared to consider any

⁷ UN Document A/S-15/AC.1/24, 22 June 1988.

⁸ Commons Debates, 31 May 1988, p. 15938.

⁹ Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, p. 16370.

suggestions the Hon. Member and any other Members of this House may wish to make," and stated: "...our main concern is to continue to play a constructive role in the present situation."¹⁰

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¹⁰ Commons Debates, 3 June 1988, p. 16112.

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SECTION II - DEFENCE

15. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

Background

Successive Canadian Governments have attributed great economic and political value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system, a line of early warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was initiated primarily by the United States, co-operative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed in 1969 when a privately owned oil tanker, the Manhattan, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned with the threat to sovereignty and a possible increase in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970, which established Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. As

late as 1969 considerable confusion seemed to characterize the Canadian Government's position on the precise nature of Canadian claims to the Arctic waters. After 1973 however, Canadian Governments were consistently claiming the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal, and that no right of innocent passage through them existed.

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW line. Unlike the earlier system, which was largely manned and operated by US personnel, the NWS will be manned and controlled entirely by Canadians. (for more information, see the "NORAD" section of this Guide).

Although the first nuclear submarine operated under the Arctic icecap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is only recently that both superpowers have developed the technology needed to operate ballistic missile submarines under the ice. This development has raised the prospect of the Arctic becoming an area of growing strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created dilemmas for the Canadian Government. As nuclear submarines are particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively under the ice, their operation in the Arctic poses a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the region.

In August 1985, a more visible threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself with the voyage of the US Coast Guard vessel, the Polar Sea, through the Northwest Passage. The declared purpose of the voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska. The US Government failed, however, to request the Canadian Government's permission to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it nevertheless

proposed that the voyage be made on a co-operative basis. To this end, the US Coast Guard provided information to its Canadian counterpart and took Canadian observers on board the vessel. Moreover, the US Government stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters.¹

The Canadian Government responded to the Polar Sea incident with a firm assertion of Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. On 10 September 1985, in a statement before the House of Commons, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, said:

Only with full sovereignty can we protect the entire range of Canadian interests. Full sovereignty is vital to Canada's security. It is vital to the Inuit people. And it is vital to Canada's national identity. The policy of this Government is to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic archipelago and this applies to the airspace above as well. We will accept no substitutes.²

Mr. Clark announced several measures that the Government would undertake to better ensure the protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These included: an Order in Council establishing straight baselines (enclosing Canada's internal waters) around the outer perimeter of the archipelago; the introduction of measures designed to extend the application of Canadian civil and criminal law to all offshore zones, including the Arctic (Bill C-104); an increase in the number of surveillance flights and in the level of naval activity in eastern Arctic waters; and the construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. The Government also

¹ This was made clear in a State Department Press Guidance released on 14 June 1985, the day after the Canadian public was made aware of the impending transit.

² Commons Debates, 10 September 1985, p.6463.

indicated its willingness to have the sovereignty question referred to the World Court, by withdrawing its earlier reservations in this regard. Finally, it called for immediate discussions with the United States on all means of co-operation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty. Negotiations between Canada and the United States began soon afterwards.

On 5 April 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney commented on the ongoing negotiations on Canada-US Arctic co-operation. The Prime Minister stated:

We are...aware of certain international geopolitical realities where Canada as a friend and ally will seek to reach a mutually beneficial accommodation. But on the fundamental issue of sovereignty we expect the United States in the course of ongoing negotiations to recognize that and to reach an agreement with Canada.³

On 1 October 1987 in a speech in the Soviet city of Murmansk, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic become a zone of peace. Specifically, the Soviet leader called for negotiations aimed at scaling down militarization and naval activity in the Baltic, Greenland and Norwegian Seas. Limitations on anti-submarine weapons, advance notification of major military exercises, and the banning of naval activity in international straits and shipping lanes that are heavily travelled were proposed as possible confidence-building measures for the region. General Secretary Gorbachev also called for multilateral co-operation in the development of Arctic resources, in scientific exploration, and in Arctic environmental protection. Finally, he raised the possibility of the Soviet Union opening to other nations the Northern Sea Route from Europe to the Far East.

³ Prime Minister Mulroney, Interview with Meet the Press, 5 April 1987.

On 6 October 1987, the Soviet draft text of a Soviet-Canadian agreement on Arctic cooperation was released by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. First proposed by the Soviets in early 1987, the provisions of the draft included: recognition of the rights of both countries to control pollution and govern navigation in the Arctic waters adjacent to their territories, provision for information exchanges on environmental, natural resource and navigation safety issues, and the extension of existing scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries.

Current Canadian Position

On 1 October 1986, in her speech from the throne, the Governor General of Canada stated that:

The Government asserts complete sovereignty over the Arctic and recognizes that sovereignty requires a vigorous national presence.⁴

In June 1987 Canada's Defence White Paper stated:

After the defence of the country itself there is no issue more important to any nation than the protection of its sovereignty. The ability to exercise effective national sovereignty is the very essence of nationhood.⁵

The passage went on to point out that the Canadian forces have an important role to play in sovereignty protection. The White Paper also lists a number of sovereignty-related defence initiatives that the

⁴ Commons Debates, 1 October 1986, p. 13.

⁵ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 6.

Government plans to undertake. These include: the on-going modernization of the DEW line radars; the upgrading of 5 northern airfields to accommodate fighter interceptors, an increase in the number of Aurora Long-Range Patrol Aircraft, the modernization of the Tracker medium-range aircraft; an expansion of the Canadian Ranger force, the establishment of a Northern training centre for Canadian Forces⁶, and the planned deployment of fixed sonar systems in the Arctic passages. In addition, recognizing the Arctic's potential as a viable passageway for submarines between the Arctic and Atlantic oceans, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to acquire 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines of its own, partly because of their under-ice capability.

Canada's Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty commented on the utility of nuclear submarines for protection of Arctic sovereignty on 7 February 1988, in testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence:

With any breach of Canadian or international law including unwanted incursions into Canadian territory or waters, the possibility of seeking recourse to diplomatic means in international courts will be an important option for us. However the preferred government approach is to deter the intrusion in the first place. Deterrence in this regard can only be provided by adequate surveillance and monitoring of our territory and waters, backed up by the means to enforce our laws. At the moment, nuclear propelled submarines are the best, if not the only, vehicles that can meet these difficult requirements in the Arctic.⁷

⁶ In February 1988, the Government announced its choice of Baffin Island for the training centre, DND, News Release, 59/88, 2 June 1988, p. 2.

⁷ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, pp. 8-9.

The Government has also indicated a desire to develop a comprehensive Northern foreign policy. Speaking at the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues on 9 December 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated the elements of this policy as follows: 1) affirming Canadian sovereignty; 2) modernizing Canada's northern defences; 3) preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4) promoting enhanced circumpolar co-operation.⁸

On 11 January 1988, after two years of discussion, Canada and the United States signed the Canada-United States Arctic Co-operation Agreement (also known as the "Icebreaker" Agreement). This agreement seeks to facilitate navigation by the icebreakers of the two nations, and to develop co-operative procedures for this purpose. Under its terms, the United States pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers in waters claimed to be internal by Canada will be undertaken with the consent of the Canadian Government.⁹ It goes on to state that nothing in the Agreement nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the two Governments on the law of the sea in this or other maritime areas, or their positions regarding third parties.¹⁰

Describing the agreement as "an important step for Canada in the North," Prime Minister Brian Mulroney went on to say:

While we and the United States have not changed our legal positions we have come to a practical agreement that is fully

⁸ Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromsø, Norway, 9 December 1987.

⁹ "Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation," DEA, News Release, No. 010, 11 January 1988.

¹⁰ Ibid..

consistent with the requirements of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic. It is an improvement over the situation which prevailed previously. What we have now significantly advances Canadian interests.¹¹

On 9 December 1987, at the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, commented on Soviet leader Gorbachev's proposal for an Arctic "zone of peace." Noting that Canada was interested in the development of realistic policies aimed at enhancing security and stability in the North, Mr. Clark stated that the Canadian Government had "very serious reservations" about the Soviet proposals. He explained:

Mr. Gorbachev appears to focus exclusively on the Western Arctic without discussing the Barents Sea or other waters adjacent to the USSR. He does not offer any detail as to how a ban on naval activity would be verified or enforced. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to discuss the Western Arctic and not the Soviet Archipelago. Finally, Mr. Gorbachev's words do not reflect the actions of his Government. Unlike Canada or the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union has an enormous concentration of military forces and weapons in the Arctic region.¹²

Parliamentary Comment

In a speech in Vancouver on 6 February 1988, Liberal Party leader John Turner voiced his opposition to the Government's submarine programme. In its place, Mr. Turner called for the acquisition of conventionally

¹¹ Ibid..

¹² Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromsø, Norway, 9 December 1987.

powered submarines, together with negotiation of an international treaty to remove the military presence in the Arctic. Comparing Mr. Turner's proposals with Government policy, Liberal MP Andre Ouellet stated in the House:

It is obvious that the Leader of the Opposition has suggested a much more serious and praiseworthy method... namely, the development of a new international regime for the Arctic under a treaty which would have the support of all powers in the region. With such a treaty, we could stop the militarization of the Arctic, pave the way for technological, economic and environmental co-operation, and most importantly, guarantee the future of northern residents.¹³

That same day, NDP member Derek Blackburn registered his party's opposition to the Government's policy. Referring to the July 1987 NDP paper on defence, Mr. Blackburn stated:

We brought forward our version of a Maritime policy; to pursue the frigate program, to purchase conventionally powered submarines, to increase the number of long-range patrol aircraft, and to put in place a passive peacetime surveillance network in the Canadian Arctic, although not to militarize it as the Conservative Government wants to do.¹⁴

On 29 January 1988, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty commented on NDP policy regarding the Arctic:

The difference between us and the NDP is that we want, to have an enforcement capability. It is clear that someone's Navy is going to be in Canada's North. The real question that remains is whether Canada's Navy is going to be there

¹³ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, p.13430.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.13426. See also: 6 June 1988, pp. 16160-61; and 9 June 1988, pp. 16282-83.

and we want Canada to have the capacity to go there.¹⁵

On 7 March 1988, during testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Mr. Beatty responded to calls by the Liberal Party for the demilitarization of the Arctic by stating:

When Canadians propose we accept seductive Soviet proposals for demilitarization of the Canadian Arctic, the onus is on them to say whether they would insist that the Soviets demilitarize theirs or whether they would simply strip down the defences of Canada without any response from the Soviet Union.¹⁶

In the House on 7 December 1987, Liberal leader John Turner raised the issue of the Canada-US Arctic co-operation negotiations. Noting that details of an agreement were becoming available, Mr. Turner stated:

The Secretary of State admitted yesterday that a secret deal has been signed between Canada and the United States which allows the Americans access to our northern waters, waters which we claim as national waters, but does not recognize full sovereignty of Canada over those waters.¹⁷

NDP leader Ed Broadbent also referred to the impending agreement. Recalling Mr. Clark's speech to the Commons on 10 September 1985 in which he stated that the Government's intention was to exercise "full sovereignty" in, on, and above the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, Mr. Broadbent stated:

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 29 January 1988, p. 12429.

¹⁶ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, p.30.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 7 December 1987, p. 11536.

...there is a clause [in the agreement] which leaves open to the US again to challenge the sovereignty question. Will [Ms. Carney] comment on that? Second, will the Minister acknowledge that this commitment made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, has specific reference to the notion of US submarines in the territory and that the secret agreement...excludes that? Will the Minister tell us what procedures if any, US submarines will now have to follow if they want to go through this water?¹⁸

Responding to Mr. Broadbent's questions, Ms. Carney said:

... with the discussions which are taking place, which involve the exercise of our sovereignty over the Arctic, we are seeking a major concession from the US, namely, that the Americans have to seek our permission before the passage of ice-breakers through the Northwest Passage. There are other arrangements in place through our environmental laws for merchant shipping.¹⁹

As a follow-up question, Mr. Broadbent requested further information regarding arrangements governing submarines. He asked:

Is the Minister telling us now... that there is a secret agreement between Canada and the United States that is pertinent to submarines? Or, will she admit that the Government got nothing at all in terms of controlling access to the waters by submarines?²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 11539.

¹⁹ Ibid..

²⁰ Ibid..

Addressing Mr. Broadbent's question, Canada's Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Harvie Andre, stated:

It is not in the interests of Canada's security or sovereignty to go into details about that kind of information on submarines in our Arctic.²¹

On 18 January 1988, after the text of the Icebreaker Agreement had been released, Liberal leader, John Turner, again raised the issue in the Commons. Addressing Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, Mr. Turner asked:

In view of the fact that last week the Secretary of State for External Affairs... signed an agreement with the United States which fails to recognize Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic, which makes no mention of American submarines patrolling our waters, and which in effect clearly weakens Canada's legal claim to the Arctic, why would the Prime Minister tolerate a senior Minister... negotiating and signing an agreement... which clearly violates a declaration and undertaking he gave to the House of Commons?²²

Responding to the Liberal leader's statement, Mr. Clark stated:

...before that agreement was signed the United States did not acknowledge its need to seek Canada's consent before the transit through our Northwest Passage of US Government owned or operated ice-breakers. As a result of that agreement the United States now acknowledges and has a legal obligation to seek Canada's consent before the transit through our Northwest Passage of Government owned or operated ice-breakers. That is a small but significant step forward in

²¹ Ibid..

²² Commons Debates, 18 January 1988, p. 11999.

Canada's control over the North.²³

On 14 March 1988, Mr. Turner called attention to a study on Canada's North by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), and asked, with regard to the Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement:

How does the Prime Minister respond to a...conclusion of this working group which says: "the Working Group is unable to agree with the opinion of the Prime Minister...that "What we have now significantly advances Canadian interests"...?.²⁴

Citing the Working Group's study in his response, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, stated:

The Right Hon. Leader will know that their view continues that; - "if a prior consent is required on a case by case basis -", and that is the case, "- there will be no damage to the Canadian position. Indeed, it should be normally affirmed by practice."²⁵

On 21 October 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark was asked if the Government had yet made any formal response to Soviet proposals for an Arctic zone of peace. In his reply, Mr. Clark commented that the Government had not yet received the proposals, but was interested in continuing to pursue the question of Arctic co-operation with the Soviet Union as well as other Northern states. In addition, he stated:

²³ Ibid..

²⁴ Commons Debates, 22 March 1988, p.14005.

²⁵ Ibid..

We will look very carefully at the proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in his speech. Naturally, we will not conclude any agreements with them on the basis of a speech that he makes. If there are some specific proposals that might flow from it, we would be interested in pursuing them in detail and formally.²⁶

On 7 March 1988, in testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Liberal MP Douglas Frith asked Canada's Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty about the extent to which the Government had pursued ideas that the Soviets had proposed. In reply to the Member's inquiry, Mr. Beatty stated:

What we said is that if the Soviets want to make proposals to us that are meaningful, we are anxious to discuss them. We should discuss them in the context of all of the western democracies and not simply a unilateral deal, obviously between Canada and the Soviet Union. Now the position that was taken...was that they will talk about the rest of the world, but when it comes to these forces in the Soviet Union, they are essentially strategic forces and not fit to be discussed here.²⁷

On 22 March 1988, Liberal leader, John Turner, raised the issue of Arctic co-operation with Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark. Mr. Turner stated:

... the Prime Minister, through his own Secretary of State for External Affairs, did not respond to my suggestion that a new international regime be created for the Arctic, and the Minister of National Defence did not react constructively to

²⁶ Commons Debates, 21 October 1987, p. 10226.

²⁷ SCND Proceedings, 7 March 1988, p. 19.

the proposition made by Soviet Leader Gorbachev.²⁸

The Liberal leader then asked whether the Prime Minister or Mr. Clark would respond to a proposal made by the CIIA Working Group for Canada to take the initiative in convening all countries interested in the Arctic with a view to creating a Nordic Council in order to settle issues relating to the Nordic regions. In response, Mr. Clark noted:

Mr. Speaker I think this is an interesting, serious and important recommendation concerning co-operation in the North. Indeed our government took a number of initiatives and, for the first time we took the position that we ought to establish Canadian sovereignty in the North. We as a Government are prepared for the first time--I cannot make the same comment about the administration of the...Leader of the Opposition--to recognize the jurisdiction of a world tribunal with respect to our sovereignty in the North.²⁹

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²⁸ Commons Debates, 20 March 1988, pp. 14005-06.

²⁹ Ibid., p.14006.

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Defence--Major Equipment Acquisitions

Canada-US: NORAD

NATO

16. ARMS TRANSFERS

Background

After growing steadily for more than a decade, the global arms trade has declined in recent years; the value of conventional arms imports peaked around US\$49 or US\$50 billion (constant 1984 dollars) between 1981 and 1984, then dropped to US\$42 billion in 1985 and US\$34.6 billion in 1986.¹ The decline was quite sharp in the developing countries, especially the Middle East. Arms imports by these countries, which accounted for 80 per cent of world arms sales in 1977 and 84 per cent in 1982, dropped to 75 per cent in 1985. This year, the Middle East was still the largest buyer of arms (34.8 per cent), followed by Europe (21.5 per cent), Africa (12.1 per cent), East Asia (11.5 per cent), South Asia and Oceania (10.1 per cent), and Latin America (8 per cent).²

The Soviet Union, the United States and the other NATO countries (especially France, Britain, Germany and Italy) are the world's primary arms suppliers. From 1982 to 1986, Soviet arms transfers, destined primarily for the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America, were valued at US\$87 billion (current dollars); US arms transfers, destined primarily for Europe and East Asia, represented US\$51.4 billion, while transfers by

¹ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Washington: ACDA, 1987, p. 6. In its annual report for 1987, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also published figures showing a decline in the value of the global arms trade after 1984 (SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook, 1987, pp. 218 to 221).

² Ibid., p. 7.

other NATO countries amounted to US\$42.6 billion.³

In 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States shared 63 per cent of the global market for arms exports, with 35 and 28 per cent respectively. Only the USSR has not followed the recent (1985-1986) downward trend in global arms exports.⁴

Arms transfer controls by exporters, whether through regulation, creation of a world arms register, or any other means, have often been considered but never effectively enacted by members of the United Nations. The most recent experiment in specifically limiting conventional arms transfers was President Carter's 1977 unilateral restrictive policy limiting US arms exports, followed by CAT (Conventional Arms Transfers) talks with the Soviet Union. The process ultimately failed, however.

Canada is a very minor player in the global conventional arms market; in 1986, military goods represented only 0.1 percent of total Canadian exports.⁵ However, according to figures published by the federal government, the volume of Canadian military exports has risen over the years, from C\$336.2 million in 1970 to C\$721.7 million in 1980 and C\$1,388 million in 1986 (current dollars). In 1986, 68.2 per cent of these exports were destined to customers in the US,⁶ a pattern reflecting both the overall continental orientation of Canadian trade and the impact of the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) between Canada and the United States.

³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵ Ibid., p. 95.

⁶ DEA, Defence Programs Bureau, March 1988, unpublished.

Questions have been raised in the past about Canada's arms exports practices. Alleged violations of the Canadian policy, particularly the granting of export permits for sales of strategic goods to governments involved in conflicts or known to systematically violate human rights, have been the subject of public debate. Many have also questioned the ultimate use of defence goods produced in Canada. Middlemen in countries such as the United States can purchase Canadian military equipment to manufacture arms systems which may then be exported to developing countries.

Current Canadian Position

Canadian military exports are primarily in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Since Canadian firms manufacture few complete arms systems, most exports consist of support goods, despite Ottawa's continued efforts to develop a domestic industry specializing in this field. Canada's policy on military exports has not changed since Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced revised guidelines on 10 September 1986 aimed at regulating Canadian exports.⁷ This policy restricts military exports to countries that seriously or persistently violate human rights, "unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population," countries under UN Security Council sanctions, and countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities. Restrictions also apply to exports of civilian strategic equipment to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and countries where there is a risk the goods will be rerouted to these destinations

⁷ For a full overview of the new policy, see: "Export Controls Policy", DEA Communiqué, No. 155, 10 September 1986.

(COCOM proscribed destinations).

Despite the proposed free trade agreement between Canada and the United States, protectionists in the US Congress are pressing for a review of US military equipment procurement and purchase policies. This wave of protectionism has led in particular to the tabling of trade bills in the Senate and House that would place restrictions on purchases of foreign defence goods, in order to promote US products. These measures may well affect existing Canada-US agreements on military trade, such as the Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) and the Defence Development Sharing Agreement (DDSA). Consequently, Canadian overseas military exports, which have risen since the early 1980s, will most likely continue to grow.

Acting on a recommendation of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Foreign Relations (Simard-Hockin Report, June 1986) that Ottawa should strive to convince other nations to support the proposals "for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions," (p. 145) the government asked the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security to study the feasibility of and opportunity for such a register. CIIPS completed this study in July 1987, and then held a conference on the global arms trade in October, at which Canada's Under-Secretary of State, James Taylor, delivered an address on the subject of an arms trade register. After pointing out that Canada supports the idea of such a register, Mr. Taylor listed the current obstacles to such a measure, especially the type of information to be provided and the range of goods to be declared. He also realized that some countries might refuse to be included on such a register for security reasons, since this register would contain virtually all information on a country's military strength, and might be used by a potential enemy. Finally, Mr. Taylor explained that the problem of the

arms trade could not be solved until the insecurity of some countries, which is often the result of flawed international security mechanisms, has been addressed.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

On 20 November 1987, in the House of Commons, New Democrat MP John Parry asked the Deputy Prime Minister why the government had authorized a Canadian company, Expro, to supply a Portuguese firm with 1,250 tons of gunpowder, even though the CBC claimed to have discovered links between this firm and the government of Iran.

Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, answered:

Exporting gun powder or munitions from Canada takes two permits: a permit for the exporting country, which has been issued, and a permit for the importing country, which has also been issued. We have no control over any re-exporting that may occur subsequently, and that is exactly what is happening. The RCMP is investigating to determine whether [...] there may have been illegal diversion of goods from the legal destination apparent from the contracts signed by the parties concerned.

Mr. Parry added, "I would like to have the Government's commitment that not only will our ambassador in Lisbon be instructed to attempt to identify whether that explosive is being re-exported, but also what will the Government do to introduce controls to ensure that Canadian munitions

⁸ Krause, K., The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects, (Conference Report), Ottawa: CIIPS, October 1987.

do not end up on the battlefields of Iran and Iraq?"

Mr. Hudon ended the discussion with the observation, "[...] We have met our commitments and we have complied with the regulations that exist today and have always been enforced here in Canada. If there are people who subsequently re-export those goods, the receiving country has a responsibility, and that is what should be investigated."⁹

On 22 April 1988, Liberal MP John Nunziata in turn raised this issue with a question to Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on why these permits had been issued when DEA "knew or ought to have known that the ultimate destination for this gun powder was Iran."

After denying that the government knew the ultimate destination of these shipments of gunpowder, Mr. Clark reminded Mr. Nunziata that an RCMP investigation had absolved Expro Chemical Products of any wrongdoing, and further, that no export permits had since been issued to this firm. The Secretary of State for External Affairs did admit, however, that he was very concerned over the fact Expro had apparently acted on export permits issued prior to his order prohibiting any future permits. Mr. Clark promised to look into the situation.¹⁰

On 27 April 1988, New Democrat MP Pauline Jewett voiced her approval of Mr. Clark's decision to set up a technical working group to study the feasibility of an arms register. However, she pointed out the "Department's failure to invite representatives of disarmament groups, particularly Ernie Regehr, of Project Ploughshares, who has skilfully and eloquently promoted the need for an arms register for many years, to

⁹ Commons Debates, 20 November 1987, p. 11015.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 22 April 1988, p. 14741.

attend the inaugural meeting of the working group." Mrs. Jewett added, "Unless the Minister broadens the representation of this group to include disarmament organizations, the group's credibility is put seriously in question."¹¹

On 21 June 1988, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy reminded the government and the Secretary of State of their commitment to close loopholes in the export control policy, and amend that policy. Noting that Pratt & Whitney continued to ship helicopter engines to various countries engaged in human rights violations or major wars, he asked why the government had reneged on its commitment to close these loopholes.

Minister for External Relations Monique Landry explained, "Exports of military engines and engines with strategic technology are governed by the Export Act. As far as we are concerned, the claim that Pratt & Whitney circumvented Canadian law is absolutely false."¹²

On 30 June 1988, Conservative MP Dave Nickerson made a statement on the subject of the top achievers in the international arms trade. He noted that, "Perestroika notwithstanding, the USSR comes in first by a wide margin, with annual arms exports of \$120 billion. Yankee traders manage only a little less than half of this. France, with its Mirage jets and Exocet missiles, comes in third at \$30 billion. The prize for most improved performance goes to China, at \$11 billion, which has now cornered some 80 per cent of the lucrative Iran-Iraq market. These

¹¹ Commons Debates, 27 April 1988, p. 14861.

¹² Commons Debates, 21 June 1988, p. 16643.

countries must certainly be very proud of their contribution to world peace."¹³

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¹³ Commons Debates, 30 June 1988, p. 16981.

17. CANADA-US: CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

Background

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement establishing a procedure for the testing of US defence systems in Canada. Known as the "Canada/US (CANUS) Test and Evaluation Program", the agreement, initially valid for five years, was renewed automatically for an additional five-year period on 28 February 1987.

Covering only the testing of US systems in Canada, the agreement is not reciprocal. Under its terms, the United States can request testing of various systems, including: artillery equipment; helicopters; surveillance and identification systems; and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may, however, refuse any project, and no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country. Furthermore, the agreement can be terminated on twelve months' notice.¹

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the programme. A steering group, charged with exercising authority over the programme itself, makes recommendations concerning which projects are acceptable to Canada. In addition, a co-ordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. At the beginning of each year, the United States submits a 30-month forecast to DND, outlining the projects it wishes to see implemented in Canada. After review and ministerial approval, the government informs the US of its approval in principle. US sponsors then submit a project proposal to DND. This is again reviewed, and when the proper authority is granted, a project

¹ DEA, "Testing of Defence Systems in Canada: Background Notes," 1983.

arrangement is jointly developed, which, when it is signed, allows testing to begin. Cabinet approval may, however, be required for specific tests.

On 15 July 1983, the Canadian Government announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to be conducted in Canada. The cruise missile is an unmanned vehicle propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. It can be sea-, ground-, or air-launched.

The Government's rationale for agreeing to the US request was that testing of the cruise missile guidance system was "linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD, and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament". Canadian territory was particularly suitable for such testing because it offered extensive stretches of uninhabited cold weather terrain similar to the attack routes into the Soviet Union. The tests generally take place during the first three months of the year in order to ensure that proper weather conditions exist. The government made clear, however, that its agreement to allow such testing "...in no way changed Canada's own renunciation of nuclear weapons for our national forces".

Agreement to test the cruise missile has generated considerable public debate. Some Canadians have felt that it has compromised Canada's position on nuclear weapons and has contributed to the arms race. Concern has also been voiced regarding the potential harm which such tests could have on Canadian citizens and on the environment, if anything went wrong. In announcing individual tests, however, the Canadian government has assured Canadians that the flight of the cruise missile will never be closer than eight kilometres "to any built-up area".

To date, eleven tests of the cruise missile have been carried out. These

include one in 1984, three in 1985, and two in 1986. Five tests have occurred during the last two years. In 1987, three tests were carried out. The first--a "free flight" test--took place on 24 February 1987. Following the release of the missile over the Beaufort Sea by a US B-52 bomber, US F-4 and F-16 fighter aircraft joined Canadian CF-18 fighters in an attempt to intercept the missile. This was followed by a similar test on 1 March.

The third test of 1987 occurred on 27 October. In a "captive carry" test, the missile remained attached to the US B-52 bomber carrying it during its entire journey from the Beaufort Sea to the Primrose Lake testing range in Northwestern Alberta. The flight followed a slightly different path from that of previous tests in response to public concerns about safety.

Two tests of the cruise missile have thus far occurred in 1988. A "free flight" test took place on 19 January. The missile was released by a B-52 bomber over the Beaufort Sea, and later intercepted by US F-15 and F-16, as well as Canadian CF-18, fighter aircraft. Similarly, after poor weather conditions and technical problems with bomber and cruise missile guidance systems caused successive delays, a second "free flight" test occurred on 27 January. Both tests were considered successful by military authorities.

The announcement of a tentative agreement on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) by US and Soviet negotiators in September 1987, followed by the signing of a Treaty on 9 December 1987, prompted more vigorous questioning of cruise missile testing in Canadian air space. In October 1987, protests were staged by the Alberta Citizens Coalition Committee--a coalition of church, labour and peace groups--and the Toronto Disarmament Network. Similar protests were held in January 1988, during which a poll was taken in 32 cities across Canada by the Canadian Peace Alliance to determine public opinion regarding continued testing of the cruise. A spokesperson for the group reported that, of the 8,655 people polled, 84 per cent believed that

such testing should cease, while only 16 per cent favoured its continuation.

More recently, a Gallup poll conducted from 2-5 March 1988 and based on in-home interviews with over 1000 Canadians, reported that of those polled, 54% opposed cruise missile testing, 38 per cent favored it, and 9 per cent were undecided. The results reportedly represented a nine-point increase in opposition to the testing of the cruise missile since 1985.

Current Canadian Position

In January 1985, a Department of National Defence publication stated that the ALCM is an important retaliatory element of the US strategic triad which provides the ultimate deterrent for NATO. This continues to be the Government's position. On 6 March 1987, during debate on an NDP motion to halt cruise testing, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated:

The cruise missiles being tested in Canada ... are air-launched and are part of the strategic deterrent forces of the United States. The role played by U.S.-based strategic deterrent forces in maintaining the global balance of nuclear deterrence would expand if an INF agreement were to lead to the elimination of U.S. missiles in Europe. In this perspective, tests to verify the reliability and effectiveness of air-launched cruise missiles would be needed even more if an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces were concluded, both from the point of view of arms control and of defence.²

The same day the Associate Minister of National Defence told the House that:

² Commons Debates, 6 March 1987, p. 3909.

The agreement has always been and still is, liable to termination at any time by either party giving 12 months' notice... Either party can terminate a specific arrangement under the agreement - for example, cruise missile testing - at any time on one days notice should imperative circumstances so warrant... We have repeatedly stated our intention to carry on, and will do so, but this in no way precludes second thoughts should circumstances change.³

The first term of the umbrella testing agreement officially ended on 28 February 1988. Its renewal now extends the agreement to 1993.

Parliamentary Comment

On 1 October 1987, Liberal party leader John Turner called for an end to cruise missile testing. Referring to past Liberal policy linking testing to the outcome of superpower negotiations on INF, Mr Turner stated:

As I said in my speech to the House... when the issue was debated on March 6, we should test the cruise missile until such time as there are concrete results in the negotiations between the two super powers on intermediate range nuclear weapons.... There have been concrete results, much to the relief of the world and I say the time has arrived to move forward in the world search for peace and for Canada to suspend cruise missile testing in Canada.⁴

The Liberal leader then asked Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark whether he agreed with the statement, and later, whether the Government would seek to persuade the US to stop cruise testing. Mr Clark replied:

³ Ibid., p. 3918.

⁴ Commons Debates, 1 October 1987, p. 9545.

... the suggestion that Canada should now renege on commitments observed in the past that had made a major contribution toward the ratification of an agreement on reducing levels of nuclear arms, as far as that question is concerned, we do not agree with a policy that could destroy the unity of NATO, and we do not agree with a policy that could be a threat to what we have accomplished so far in reducing levels of nuclear arms.⁵

Mr. Clark's statement prompted accusations from both opposition parties that the government had changed its stance with regard to cruise missile testing. Referring to a statement made by Mr. Clark on 2 March 1987, in which he explained that Canadian Government policy on cruise missile testing would be determined "on the basis of what is actually decided in Geneva", NDP leader Ed Broadbent stated:

Mr. Speaker, I, and many Canadians at the time thought that the Secretary of State for External Affairs was linking the testing of the cruise missile with progress being made in the disarmament field.⁶

He went on to ask:

Why does the Canadian Government not clearly live up to the implication left with the people of Canada? Why does it not make a contribution toward disarmament instead of moving in the opposite direction?⁷

In response, Mr. Clark stated:

Mr. Speaker, my words are clear. They are on the record, and they

⁵ Ibid., p. 9546.

⁶ Ibid., p. 9547.

⁷ Ibid..

have just been read by the leader of the New Democratic Party. He drew an interpretation from them that he claims is a legitimate interpretation. I would quarrel with that. I think my words speak for themselves.⁸

On 19 January 1988, Liberal MP Douglas Frith asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Why does Canada not cease the testing of the Cruise and demand that Canada's long term foreign policy objectives and defence interests be given top priority in the START agenda?⁹

Mr. Clark replied that:

If an ally of the United States took an action that broke the solidarity of the West on questions in negotiation with the Soviet Union that would weaken the prospects of progress being made in those negotiations. That may be in the interest of the Liberal party of Canada... but it is certainly not the position of this Government.¹⁰

On 25 March 1988, NDP member Pauline Jewett put forward a motion to end cruise missile testing. Previously introduced in the House in March 1987, the motion read:

That in the opinion of the House, the Government should consider the advisability of giving notice, under the terms of the weapons testing umbrella agreement with the United States, for the termination of cruise missile testing in Canada.¹¹

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Commons Debates, 19 January 1988, p. 12059.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14156.

Ms. Jewett noted an "enormous and tragic" increase in cruise missile development over the last two years. Expressing concern regarding Canadian involvement in the US Air Defence Initiative (ADI), and possible involvement in the testing of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) in the future, she stated:

When we read about these developments ... we think of the constant buildup and the modernization that has taken place... and we wonder what has happened to arms control. We wonder what the government is thinking about. So far at least, it has given only a military response to the modernization of the cruise. It has signed on to the US Air Defence Initiative which is supporting the development of a supersonic cruise of a first strike capability. We have apparently, gladly signed on... We will, therefore undoubtedly be testing the advanced cruise missiles.¹²

Ms. Jewett also pointed to a lack of Canadian initiative with regard to negotiated cuts in superpower cruise missile arsenals. She stated that the Government:

...has said nothing at all about the importance of pursuing negotiated cuts in cruise missile arsenals rather than the superpowers engaging in activities that encourage enhancement and modernization of cruise missile arsenals. As far as I can determine the Government has not pressed upon the superpowers the absolute necessity of including cuts on both sides in cruise missile arsenals at the START talks in Geneva.¹³

Referring to the results of the Gallup poll on cruise missile testing conducted earlier that month, she concluded by urging an end to cruise missile tests:

...we should, as this motion suggests give notice now. Canadian

¹² Ibid., p. 14157.

¹³ Ibid..

public opinion wants to see all the response to the modernization of the cruise missile, not the testing of it, not the testing of the new radar avoiding cruise missiles but rather the pressing on the superpowers, in all fora for cuts in cruise missile arsenals and the elimination of cruise missile modernization. The Canadian public wants to see an end to cruise missile testing.¹⁴

Liberal MP Andre Ouellet supported the motion, stating:

Clearly, as the situation has evolved there is no reason for the Canadian Government to pursue the same position in regard to cruise missile testing. It is clear that the recent agreement between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev has changed the situation and does not force the Canadian Government to continue to allow this testing to take place on our soil.¹⁵

Conservative MP Michel Champagne, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for External Relations, voiced opposition to the NDP resolution, noting:

Without the Alliance's solidarity and determination to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would have accepted to resume the Geneva negotiations... which have finally resulted in the elimination of a class of weapons. The same solidarity and determination will be necessary to achieve any progress on the reduction of strategic systems. A unilateral decision by Canada to terminate airborne cruise missile testing in Canada would have detrimental effects on the Alliance's strategic deterrent force and would jeopardize the solidarity which has proven so efficient in the INF area.¹⁶

Expiration of the time provided for consideration of private members'

¹⁴ Ibid..

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 14160.

¹⁶ Ibid..

business precluded a vote on the NDP motion.

On 13 June 1988, Liberal Member André Ouellet inquired about the Government's policy on cruise missile testing after referring to complaints from the Canadian Peace Alliance that it had failed to receive pertinent answers from the Government on questions that it had raised earlier that day. Mr. Ouellet asked:

In view of the USA-USSR agreement banning intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, is the Deputy Prime Minister now in a position to declare that cruise missile testing in Canada will no longer be accepted?¹⁷

Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty replied:

...the INF agreement...which was a result of the two-track decision taken by NATO, deals only with the issue of ground-launched cruise missiles. Submarine-launched and air-launched cruise missiles are not covered by the agreement. Our hope would be to have them covered under the START talks....At the present time we continue to find Soviet long-range bombers approaching the Canadian air defence identification zone. The purpose of those...bombers is to carry the air-launched cruise missile. The air-launched cruise missile continues to be a threat to Canada's security. It is appropriate that Canada should continue to test an unarmed guidance system of an air-launched cruise missile in Canada.¹⁸

Current References

For the full debate on the NDP motion in the House of Commons, see: Commons

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 13 June 1988, p. 16373.

¹⁸ Ibid..

Debates, 25 March 1988, pp. 14156-14162.

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18. CANADA-US: NORAD

Background

On 7 August 1957 the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis between Canada and the United States. It began operations on 12 September 1957, and was established formally by the two governments on 12 May 1958.

NORAD was the result of many years of continental defence co-operation between Canada and the United States following the Second World War. Its purpose was to defend against air attack on North America, particularly from the Soviet bomber force. For Canada, a major concern from NORAD's conception was the effect it would have on Canadian sovereignty. NORAD's commander is an American, while a Canadian officer holds the Deputy Commander position.

The NORAD agreement, initially of ten years' duration, established an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over both nations' forces dedicated to continental defence. At the outset, the Command included both active and passive defence systems with a joint fighter-interceptor force and a series of radar nets across the continent. These nets included the Pinetree Line, built in 1951, at 50° North latitude; the Mid-Canada Line, completed in 1954, at 55° North latitude; and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, completed in 1957, at 70° North latitude.

As the threat assessment evolved, NORAD's resources also changed. The development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in particular, lessened the need for bomber defence. By 1965, the 98 detection stations of the Mid-Canada Line--the only system built, designed and financed solely by

Canada--were deactivated. The number of DEW Line and Pinetree Line installations was reduced from 78 to 31 and from 39 to 15, respectively. From its height between 1958 to 1962 of nearly 250,000 (including 17,000 Canadians), the manpower available to NORAD had decreased to approximately 64,000 (including 6,700 Canadians) in 1985. Canadian financial contributions have traditionally been about 10 percent of the annual total of \$6.8 billion (in 1985 dollars).

In May 1968 the NORAD agreement was renewed for the first time for a period of five years. The renewed agreement included two changes: one, clarifying that either party could nullify the agreement after review and a period of notice of one year; and second, the insertion of a clause stating that the NORAD agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The 1973 renewal of the agreement was for two years only to allow for re-evaluation of the strategic situation. Both the existence of a substantial Soviet ICBM force and developments within the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) prompted this reassessment.

The 1975 renewal recognized the changed strategic circumstances, namely a higher degree of mutual and stable deterrence and a less significant long-range bomber threat. The NORAD function to warn of bomber attack and provide some limited defence remained. In addition, reflecting the increased emphasis on ICBMs, NORAD was charged with providing space surveillance and warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack to ensure an effective response should deterrence fail. These new tasks involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems, including the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS), although Canada's involvement was quite minimal.

As a result of a continuing debate in Canada on NORAD and an upcoming election, the 1980 Agreement was for a single year. In March 1981 the agreement was renewed for five years with two important changes for Canada. First, in recognition of the changing nature of the arrangement and the threat it was meant to answer, the title was changed to North American Aerospace Defence Command (emphasis added). Second, the 1981 Agreement also removed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) clause which had been inserted in 1968. Officials attributed this change to the fact that the United States did not have an ABM system at the time, as well as the desire to avoid any suggestion that either Canada or the United States would breach the ABM Treaty. Some analysts have argued that the change was made so as not to preclude any future ABM possibilities.

In August 1984, with the coming into operation of two, co-located Canadian Region Operations Control Centres (ROCCs) at North Bay, Ontario, Canada took over full command and control of NORAD operations within its own airspace. Previously, a significant amount of Canadian airspace had been under the command and control of US facilities.

At the Quebec City Summit on 18 March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on an extensive modernization of NORAD's assets. Most important, the Memorandum set out the terms for the construction of the North Warning System (NWS) to replace the DEW Line.

The modernization programme included the following:

- a system of four very-long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars to be deployed in the United States (one in Alaska and three in the continental United States) to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to North America;

- the North Warning System consisting of 13 long-range (11 in Canada) and 39 short-range (36 in Canada) radars located along the northern periphery of the continent;
- use of USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to supplement NWS at times of alert;
- upgrading of forward operating locations and dispersed operating bases to accommodate fighter and AWACS aircraft; and
- improvements to the command, control and communications (C3) elements of the system.

The modernization programme will cost over \$7 billion, of which Canada will contribute 12 per cent (about \$840 million). The programme is scheduled to be fully completed by 1992.

The Canadian commitment to the programme includes: meeting all the communication needs of the North Warning System; integration of the radars with the ROCCs in North Bay, Ontario; design and building of any new facilities required by the NWS in Canada; 40 percent financing of the \$1.3 billion NWS system (a 60/40 cost-sharing ratio also applies to operational and maintenance costs of the NWS); managing the final stages of the programme after 1989; and complete operational control of the NWS in Canada upon its completion. Canada will also be involved, to a limited extent, in the manning of the OTH-B radars and the AWACS.

On 19 March, 1986 Canada and the United States renewed the NORAD Agreement for a further five years without any changes.

In March 1987 Canada announced the locations of the five forward operating locations for NORAD fighter-interceptors as being Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and Kuujjuaq in Quebec. Canada and the US will share equally the cost of their development.

The first five long-range radars of the NWS, the westernmost of the Canadian-based ones, became operational in November 1987. Construction of the remaining six Canadian NWS long-range radars in the Eastern Arctic, Labrador and Baffin Island began in Spring 1988, with completion scheduled for Fall 1988. The first OTH-B radar, on the east coast of the United States, is due to come into service by mid-1988. In Spring 1989 construction is to begin on the first of the 39 short-range NWS radars. This system will be completed by Fall 1992.

Current Canadian Position

The Government remains fully committed to its membership in and support of NORAD. In September, 1987 Defence Minister Beatty was able to celebrate NORAD's thirtieth anniversary with a testing of the newly installed equipment for the NWS. On that occasion he stated:

... this system ... when completed will extend from Alaska, across the Canadian Arctic and down the east coast of Labrador and will provide clear warning of an attack on North America. It will improve our ability to deter aggression and maintain peace. With this modernization, Canadians can be confident that we are able to deny any potential aggressor the free and undetectable use of Canadian airspace.¹

While visiting the ROCCs at North Bay, the Defence Minister related the protection of North America to the security of Western Europe, declaring: "We are conscious that a strong vigilant North America, with its important industrial capability, makes the NATO job of preserving the peace in Europe

¹ DND, News Release, 16 September 1987, p. 1.

easier. And that is good for the prospects of global peace."²

As revealed in the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada has also agreed to participate in the United States' Air Defense Initiative (ADI). This is a small (US\$300 million) programme concentrating on research into radar technologies that offer the promise of reliable detection of cruise missiles with Stealth characteristics. Canada is also pursuing a \$50-million research and development programme for Canadian industry, in particular, on space-based surveillance systems for the future. This project began in 1987 and will run for approximately seven years. Current studies aim at determining the feasibility of space-based radar with "look-down" capability for detecting low-flying objects.

Parliamentary Comment

In September 1986, Brigadier-General (Retired) C. Beattie and Brigadier-General (Retired) K. Greenaway published an article arguing that the NWS had been located too far south for purposes of protecting Canadian sovereignty. They called for radars to be placed along the outer edge of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, not limited to the vicinity of 70° North, as at present.³ Before the House Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND), New Democrat member Derek Blackburn asked Defence Minister Beatty whether the NWS had been "misplaced geographically", in favour of the United States, leaving gaps in coverage of Canadian territory. Mr Beatty replied that he knew such concerns had been raised and that the Government had pursued the

² DND News Release, 18 September 1987, p. 1.

³ Beattie, C. E. and Greenaway, K. R., "Offering Up Canada's North," Northern Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4, September 1986, pp. 5-8.

practicality of basing the NWS further north. However, "If we were to do that, we would cost ourselves in the range I believe, of hundreds of millions of dollars more. Yet the difficulty would still exist".⁴ Stating that a gap over the Beaufort Sea presents a problem that cannot be solved by land-based radars, the Defence Minister suggested that the only cost-effective solution was radar coverage by AWACS aircraft. He added that the temporary nature of the NWS made further expenditure on it even less warranted:

We see the North Warning System as being a major improvement over the old DEW Line, but as being a stop-gap. The next generation of technology will be space-based radars, which will give us much more comprehensive coverage....The North Warning System provides only a tripwire today....Space-based radar will enable you to track anything that flies throughout the whole of its activities.⁵

He continued to say that it was necessary for Canada to obtain space-based radar technology to defend North America against air-breathing, including cruise missile, attack.⁶

Regarding the cost of such a space-based system, Mr. Beatty argued that it would be put in place regardless of Canadian participation or financing. Mr. Healey, DND's Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, referred to the \$50 million programme the DND is financing for space-system research and development as the beginning of a process to prepare Canada for participation in space-based surveillance:

In the final analysis, we would see the space-based radar being a

⁴ SCND Proceedings, Issue #30, 23 March 1988, p. 22.

⁵ Ibid..

⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

joint project, where we would have an invisible share in Canadian industry and a share of the output of the radar.⁷

NORAD has also received attention over the past year as a result of the New Democratic Party's declared intention to cancel the agreement if elected. In its international security policy paper, Canada's Stake in Common Security, released in April 1988, the NDP argues that the nature of the Agreement has changed. It believes that NORAD is drawing Canada closer to the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and that it has a detrimental effect on Canadian sovereignty. In the words of the Report, "we believe that NORAD is being drawn into a central place in the strategies of the current US Administration for fighting a protracted nuclear war."⁸

The NDP proposes, if elected, to replace the current agreement:

We will negotiate before 1991 a new agreement, shorn of any links to ballistic missile defence, with the United States, to devise -- under Canada's leadership and management -- improved peacetime surveillance and an improved warning system in the event of crisis or war. We will extend Canada's own monitoring and surveillance of our Arctic coastal areas with the best available technology -- to the limit of our political, technical and financial capacity.⁹

In response to a question in the House of Commons on the implications of Canadian withdrawal from NORAD, Defence Minister Beatty stated:

The effect of such a policy would be to cost Canada any influence

⁷ Ibid..

⁸ NDP International Affairs Committee, Canada's Stake in Common Security, April 1988, p. 23.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

in setting alliance policy for arms control or defence. It would drive up the cost to Canada of air defence of North America by some \$5 billion.¹⁰

In his speech before The Canada Conference III on 7 February 1988 in Vancouver, Liberal Party leader John Turner stated his position on the NORAD alliance:

...I strongly believe that Canada must maintain its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD), and commit itself to becoming a more active participant in their discussions.¹¹

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¹⁰ Commons Debates, 21 August 1987, p. 8296.

¹¹ The Right Honourable John Turner, "Building the Canadian Nation: Sovereignty and Foreign Policy in the 1990's," 7 February 1988, p. 5.

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19. CANADA-US: SPACE STATION

Background

In his State of the Union address in January 1984, President Reagan announced the beginning of a United States project to build a space station, and invited the allies to participate. In response, the Canadian Government commissioned studies on the potential costs and benefits of participation in the project, and on 30 March 1985 it announced its commitment in principle. Similar commitments by the 13-member European Space Agency (ESA) and Japan have promised to make the project the largest international space venture ever undertaken.

The space station would be built, in space, over a period of two years, and would be expected to be operational by 1994.

The Canadian contribution to the project would consist of construction of a Mobile Servicing Centre (MSC), to service the instruments and payloads of the station, aid in the deployment and retrieval of satellites and aid in the construction of the station itself. In return for this contribution, Canada would receive preferred access to all of the station's facilities.

The ESA is developing an orbiting laboratory for the station, as well as two free-flying spacecraft. A laboratory for space biology research, and an unpressurized facility for space experiments, would be developed by Japan.

In 1986, the cost of the space station was estimated at \$12 billion, of which the United States would contribute \$8 billion, the ESA about \$2 billion, Japan \$1 billion and Canada approximately \$800 million.

On 7 April 1987, in a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that the United States should be prepared to undertake the space station project alone rather than accept any limitations that would preclude unilateral US decisions to use it for military activities. This brought international negotiations on the project to a temporary halt while the US Departments of Defense and of State moved to settle the dispute.

More recently, the estimated costs of the space station have increased well beyond the earlier projections. Current estimates now range from \$14-\$30 billion (US) for the total programme. Canadian Minister of State (Science and Technology) Frank Oberle confirmed in March 1988 that Canada's costs had risen to \$1.2 billion--a 50% increase over earlier estimates.

Current Canadian Position

On 9 December 1987, after more than a year of negotiations, Canada and the United States concluded a Memorandum of Understanding detailing Canada's role in the space station, and the conditions under which it would participate. Included in the text of the memorandum is a provision allowing for Canadian withdrawal from the project, and for reimbursement of any money it has spent, if the United States uses the station for military purposes unacceptable to Canada. The agreement would govern the operations of the space station for 30 years. Minister of State (Science and Technology), Frank Oberle, commented:

... the space station will perhaps be the single largest repository of new technologies and ideas that will be generated in the early part of the next century. It is

critically important. ... it is important to us that the concept on which the invitation to Canada was based is maintained. It is important that it remain a civilian and peaceful exercise. We shall not have it any other way.¹

Referring to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the Minister continued:

We have this assurance and I can further assure ... that the MOU that has now been negotiated will provide additional safeguards to ensure that our strong position in this area is respected.²

The agreement was then submitted to Cabinet for consideration.

The rising costs of Canada's contribution to the space station prompted the Cabinet to consider money-saving measures. The options reportedly considered included: scaling down the commitment so as to bring it in line with the cost originally anticipated (ie. \$800 million); paying the extra money and proceeding as planned; or pulling Canada out of the project entirely.

On 21 April 1988 Robert de Cotret, Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion and Minister of State for Science and Technology, and Frank Oberle, Minister of State (Science and Technology), announced increased funding of \$388 million, for a total of \$1.185 billion, for Canada's role in the design, development, operation and use of the Space Station to the year 2000. In an overview of the project, Mr de Cotret noted:

...I will be informing our international partners that Canada has confirmed its investment in the Space Station project, a venture which will extend human reach beyond our planet. As our

¹ Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, p. 11739.

² Ibid..

contribution... Canada will design and build the mobile servicing system, an intelligent roving robot which will play a critical role in the construction and operation of the orbiting space center. Our investment, in dollar terms, will be \$1.2 billion to the turn of the century. This will pay the cost of developing hardware and state-of-the-art technologies to build the system and include programs to help apply these technologies on earth and to prepare Canadians to exploit the R&D facilities aboard the Space Station. It will also cover Canada's share of the ... operating costs.³

In return for its investment, Mr. Oberle observed, Canada would receive 3 per cent use of all Space Station facilities, including those of other partners; and be entitled to provide Space Station crew members (the equivalent of one astronaut for a six-month period every two years)⁴. Mr. de Cotret went on to state that almost all of the money would be spent in Canada, largely in industries and universities. This would create a technology base for the future, while producing an estimated \$5 billion in spinoffs and 80,000 person-years of employment. The Minister also noted that all regions of the country would share in the benefits of the program.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

On 14 December 1987, Liberal member William Rompkey commented on the Memorandum of Understanding reached between the United States and Canada on the Space Station:

³ Speaking Guide for Mr. de Cotret, 21 April 1988.

⁴ Speaking Notes for Mr. Oberle, 21 April 1988.

⁵ Speaking Guide for Mr. de Cotret, 21 April 1988.

We in the Liberal Party have taken the position all along that Canada should participate in the space station only if it is used for peaceful purposes and only if there is no military use of that space station. There is still no confirmation that that has been agreed to. There is still no confirmation that the Government has reached agreement with the Americans that there will be no military use.⁶

Later, Mr. Rompkey asked the Minister of State (Science and Technology) Frank Oberle:

How can the Minister have a commitment not to participate in military use of the space station and at the same time have a money back guarantee if they do? Does that not reflect equivocation, doubt and uncertainty? When is a decision going to be made one way or the other; yes it is going to be military or, no, it is not?⁷

Responding to the question, Mr. Oberle noted:

I did not say that we will walk away and get our money back, "if" ... The fact is I was in Washington last week to look at the text which had been negotiated and to remove a couple of minor irritants that had to be discussed at a higher level. The military aspect has not changed from the time the President and our Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) agreed to cooperate with this enterprise.⁸

Elaborating further, the Minister stated:

What I think the Cabinet will be considering will be a participation in line with the invitation. It will be a civilian peaceful exercise. We have built into this concept of a dispute

⁶ Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, p. 11734-35.

⁷ Ibid., p. 11742.

⁸ Ibid..

mechanism, ... and we have built certain safeguards into the MOU, which I will be recommending to Cabinet, that would permit us in the event - never mind militarization, which would be one aspect - that we do not like the management regime agreed to by the Europeans and Japanese, if we do not like any aspects of this thing later on, to perhaps sell our assets to other partners. It may well be a situation where we get this thing up there and the cost becomes so horrendous we can no longer participate.⁹

Concerning costs, NDP member Michael Cassidy commented on the likelihood of the Canadian contribution escalating to about \$1.3 billion:

What is instructive about that is that that is equal to the total space program that has been enunciated for the course of the next 13-15 years. On top of all that, the carrying and operating costs for Canada's participation in the space station are estimated to be a possible \$30 million a year. That is more than is currently being spent on all of the space science in Canada. That, too, raises some very serious problems. This one prestige project ... is quite profoundly distorting Canada's space program.¹⁰

Cassidy also speculated upon the prospect of military use of the space station. Criticizing the Canada-US Memorandum of Understanding, he stated:

What has the Minister got? He has an agreement in the Memorandum of Understanding ... that, if the Americans try to do something that is too overtly military in the space station, then we can ask them to buy us out. Is that not ridiculous? In other words we have not got the specific commitment Canada should have sought and insisted upon, that before we participated ... the Americans clearly and unequivocally promise they will not use the space station as a part of the Star Wars program.¹¹

⁹ Ibid..

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 11743.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 11744.

On 21 April 1988, NDP member Howard McCurdy asked Prime Minister Brian Mulroney for assurances that additional funds for the project would not be taken out of the \$1.3 billion that the Government had committed to fundamental research, largely to be conducted in universities, in January 1988. In addition, Mr. McCurdy asked for some indication of where the extra money would in fact come from. In response, Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

The large increase of investment in science and technology will go the education route, in substantial measure. It will, with the blessing of the universities, go for the Canada Science Scholarships.¹²

On 19 May 1988 Liberal Member David Berger raised the issue of the distribution of economic benefits arising from Canada's participation in the Space Station. Referring to Quebec's share of the benefits, Mr. Berger stated:

On several occasions [the] Government has formally promised that Quebec would get 35 per cent of the economic spin-offs derived from our participation in the American Space Station. According to the figures obtained from the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion and Science and Technology, Quebec will get only 25 per cent of the spin-offs.¹³

He then asked the Prime Minister if he could explain:

...why the Government does not live up to its commitment to provide Quebec with 35 per cent of the economic spinoffs?¹⁴

¹² Commons Debates, 21 April 1988, p. 14695.

¹³ Commons Debates, 19 May 1988, p. 15628.

¹⁴ Ibid..

On behalf of the Prime Minister, Mr. Bernard Valcourt, Minister of State for Small Businesses and Tourism, and for Indian Affairs and Northern Development, replied:

The avowed purpose of the Canadian government which has been expressed on many occasions, is to make sure that Quebec will get 35 per cent of all economic spin-offs resulting from Canadian participation in the space program, including RADARSAT, MSAT and the Space Station. That is the position of the Canadian Government.¹⁵

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For a discussion of Canadian participation in the Space Station and Canada's space programme in general, see: Commons Debates, 14 December 1987, pp. 11734-11746.

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¹⁵ Ibid..

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20. THE DEFENCE BUDGET AND THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

Background

Total planned budgetary expenditures for the Canadian Government in 1988-89 equal \$132.25 billion. Of this, \$11.1 billion will be spent by the Department of National Defence (DND). In addition, as agreed through a ministerial review, the DND will receive a further \$60 million in 1988-89 towards construction of a second batch of Canadian Patrol Frigates. The total defence budget estimates of \$11.2 billion represent a real growth of 2.7 per cent over the 1987-88 forecast expenditures of \$10.55 billion. With a 3.3 per cent inflation rate factored into the calculation, Canada's 1988-89 defence budget equals 8.4 per cent of the total Canadian budget, remaining equal to that of 1987-88. The \$200 million deferral from the defence budget in 1987-88 was restored to the 1987-88 defence budget estimates in February 1988.

Personnel costs represent the largest component of the current defence budget, at over 40 per cent. The next largest component--about 26 per cent of the main estimates--is capital expenditures. Five major equipment acquisition programmes--the Canadian Patrol Frigate, Low Level Air Defence, the Tribal Class Destroyer Update and Modernization, CF-18 fighter aircraft modernization, and the North American Air Defence system update--account for approximately 50 per cent of the capital expenditures (see Defence--Major Equipment Acquisitions section).

A new system for establishing defence budgets has been agreed to within the Government, involving a base two per cent yearly increase along with additional funding to be determined in annual Cabinet review. This method was announced in the June 1987 Defence White Paper. Its purpose is to allow

for long-term planning in the Department's budgetary process over the next fifteen years, particularly with major equipment procurement in mind. The first five-year plan provides \$1.4 billion for the patrol frigates above the guaranteed 2 per cent growth rate. This is broken down as follows: 1988-89, \$60 million; 1989-90, \$175 million; 1990-91, \$411 million; 1991-92, \$367 million; and 1992-93, \$387 million.

Current Canadian Position

Questions have been raised among defence critics and analysts as to the adequacy of the agreed-upon financing formula for covering the costs of the programmes outlined in the White Paper. The Canadian Business Council on National Issues, for example, has stated the need for an increase in the defence budget of three per cent after inflation in order for Canada to meet its commitments.¹ It also notes that informal estimates suggest a minimum requirement of four per cent real annual growth.

In an interview by Canada's Defence News Bulletin, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty explained the Government's predicament:

Every single aspect of government spending is finding itself under very tight constraints today, and will for the foreseeable future, at least until the debt-to-GNP ratio is reduced -- which could be into the early '90's. As a consequence, there are tremendous pressures on every dollar that is available for the government to spend. It's as simple as that. There must be a continuation of the political will to re-equip the armed forces.²

¹ Globe & Mail, 14 October 1987.

² The Wednesday Report (Canada's Defence News Bulletin), Vol. 1, No. 16, 23 September 1987, p. 3.

In fact, the White Paper's architects are reported to have assumed at least a five per cent annual budget increase after inflation.³

The Defence Minister, however, is optimistic about the funding formula agreed upon:

We've reached an agreement on a formula for financing which I think is good and fair. It gives me sufficient certainty to be able to go ahead and launch the White Paper and retains for Cabinet the ability to regulate the pace at which various large, capital projects come on-line.⁴

Mr. Beatty does not discount the possibility of changes in the procurement programme in the future:

We'll have a rolling five-year plan adjusted annually. It will allow us each year to push the horizon out another year to talk about what new capital programs we should be getting into during that period. It will also mean that as we report to Parliament on our estimates there will be a fine-tuning of the White Paper. I expect that over the next fifteen years we will see developments taking place -- for example, in arms control -- that could substantially affect our procurement.⁵

Another policy area which received attention in the White Paper and over the past year was the Reserves. Decisions were made to increase the size of the Reserves by 2000 members in 1988-89, raising the level to approximately

³ James Bagnall, "Beatty's Doctrine," Financial Post, 16 November 1987, p. 45.

⁴ David Cox, "Sovereignty and Security: Canada's New Defence Policy," Canadian Business Review, Autumn 1987, p. 9.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

23,000. The Reserves were also granted pay increases averaging 4.5 per cent for the Primary Reserve Force. Budget estimates for the Reserves equal approximately \$419 million for 1988-89, up from \$398 million in 1987-88. DND plans to have an established Primary Reserve Force of about 65,000 members by the year 2003. In addition, a Supplementary Reserve Force of 25,000 is planned by 1992. While no firm amount has been budgeted for equipment in the Reserve revitalization programme, the cost has been estimated at \$1.9 billion over the next fifteen years.⁶ Lt.-General James Fox has stated that the cost of tripling the number of Canada's Reserves over the next 15 years will be approximately \$9.2 billion.⁷

Finally, DND is also looking to acquire a replacement for Canada's main battle tank, the Leopard I. It has been estimated that this will cost approximately \$2.4 billion. Procurement would begin in about four years.⁸

Parliamentary Comment

Before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Defence Minister Beatty was asked whether in addition to the two per cent floor rate, DND would require \$50 billion from now to the year 2002. Mr. Beatty responded that it was impossible to put firm figures on the cost. He continued:

But as we indicated in the White Paper, we cannot finance the White Paper on two percent real growth. We indicated that as

⁶ John Best, "Excitement over belief that new era dawning for reserve forces," Ottawa Citizen, 24 June 1988, p. E3.

⁷ Globe and Mail, 2 May 1988, p. A4.

⁸ John Best, "New, Stronger Commitment to NATO's Central Region in Germany," Ottawa Citizen, 24 June 1988, p. F1.

major capital projects come on stream I would be going back to my colleagues on an annual basis with our forecast expenditures, and we would be seeking bumps above the line.... This is what they did in the case of SRP-2 [frigates]. We got roughly 60 percent of the cashflow for SRP-2 put above the line....⁹

In a question from NDP member Derek Blackburn, Mr. Beatty was asked what the total cost of the White Paper would be. He responded:

I can tell you what the financing formula we are talking about would generate in terms of funds. We are talking there about between \$180 billion and \$200 billion over the course of the next 15 years. That is purely mechanical extrapolation of the financing formula over where we stood.¹⁰

Mr. Blackburn further queried whether the Defence budget would be over the line every year. He also referred to documents estimating the potential spread of the White Paper's procurement costs between \$182.3 billion and \$238.86 billion. Mr. Beatty stated:

All this depends on what we have above the line and the rate of procurement we are looking at. In the case of the submarines, for example, the \$8 billion we are talking about there is spread over 27 years. It goes well beyond the planning period.¹¹

When pressed on whether some programmes may have to be sacrificed for others, Mr. Beatty reaffirmed the Government's commitment to the White Paper: "The government has signed on for it. They have said they approve of it and they believe it is appropriate in terms of acquisitions during that period."¹² With the frigate funding as a precedent, the Minister

⁹ SCND Proceedings, Issue No. 30, 23 March 1988, p. 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 20.

¹² Ibid., p. 21.

voiced his approval of the funding system: "It has been very helpful...in setting a useful example to be followed, I think in terms of procedure."¹³

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¹³ Ibid., p. 21.

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Cross References

Defence--Major Equipment Acquisitions

NATO

Canada-US: NORAD

21. DEFENCE--MAJOR EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

Background

The Department of National Defence (DND) has been involved in a number of major equipment acquisition projects for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) over the past year. These include both projects which have come about as a consequence of the Defence White Paper, issued in June 1987, and projects which preceded the White Paper.

On 16 April 1986, the DND announced the awarding of the contract for a Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system for the CAF. The Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium received the contract of \$1.138 billion (1987 dollars) to provide the CAF with its air defence anti-tank system (ADATS), with expected delivery beginning in October 1988. Through the contract the CAF will acquire 36 ADATS and 20 35mm twin guns with 10 accompanying fire-control systems. The system will be deployed at CAF bases at Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, West Germany as well as with the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, whose current role is to be ready for deployment in Norway in the event of crisis (this obligation is scheduled to cease in November 1989, at which time the CAST will be assigned to the defence of the European Central Front). The LLAD system is being manufactured in St. Jean sur Richelieu, Quebec, and is scheduled for completion in 1991.

Though a programme for the CAF to acquire a replacement for its heavy truck fleet had begun in 1983, the recent White Paper's reference to the current shortfall in logistic support added greater impetus to awarding a contract. On 5 February 1987, Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick announced that the team of Urban Transportation Development Corp. (UTDC) Inc. of Kingston, Ontario--85 percent owned by Lavalin Industries Ltd.--and Styr-Daimler-Puch of Austria would fill an order for 1,122 heavy trucks. Over \$310 million

(1987) has been budgeted for the purchase. The trucks will replace the current fleet of 800 five-ton trucks, 40 percent of which were acquired between 1953-63. The remaining 60 percent were built in 1975-76.

The truck programme was not without controversy, as some of the short-listed contenders for the contract sought to better their standing by offering regional industrial benefits. UTDC itself suggested that some assembly may take place in Nova Scotia. The three short-listed consortia not chosen included: Montreal-based Bombardier Inc. with Oshkosh Truck Corp. of Wisconsin; Canadian Kenworth Co. of Mississauga, Ontario with Saab-Scania AB of Sweden; and General Motors of Canada Ltd. with MAN of West Germany. Bombardier Ltd. pledged to establish a manufacturing plant west of Calgary, Alberta, and GM offered to assemble some trucks in Nova Scotia. The DND used load capacity, durability, logistics support and the ability of the truck to manoeuvre on steep gradients as measures to evaluate the contestants. The new trucks will commence service in the CAF in Spring 1989.

On August 30, during a visit by French Prime Minister Chirac, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would purchase the French ERYX short-range, anti-armour weapon. The purchase will take place over 10 years and cost approximately \$200 million. The weapons will enter service in 1990.

Also contained in the White Paper was a commitment to purchase six new Aurora Long-range Patrol Aircraft (to supplement Canada's current fleet of Aurora and Tracker aircraft), and a commitment to replace Canada's main battle tank, the Leopard I. The main contenders for the tank replacement programme, estimated to cost \$2.4 billion, include the American M1A1, the German Leopard II, the British Challenger II, and the French LeClerc. Procurement of the new tanks would begin in about four years.

Recently, the greatest emphasis in major equipment acquisition has been on modernizing Canada's naval forces. The first element of the modernization is the Tribal [class destroyers] Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP), announced prior to the White Paper in May 1986.

TRUMP consists of a mid-life update for Canada's four DDH 280 destroyers, which entered service in 1972-73. The destroyers will receive new command, control, communication, and combat systems. The new combat systems will provide defence against air and anti-ship missile attack as well as the ability to defend other ships. The total estimated cost of the TRUMP is \$1.7 billion (1987). Work on the first destroyer, the HMCS Algonquin, began in November 1987 and is scheduled for completion by mid-1989. The modernization of the HMCS Iroquois begins in November 1988. This work is being done by Marine Industries Limited (MIL) of Montreal at their Davie Shipyard in Lauzon, Quebec. Litton Systems Canada Ltd., the prime contractor, has yet to award the sub-contract for modernizing the second batch of two ships, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Huron. The last ship's modernization is to be completed by August 1992.

The Canadian Patrol Frigate programme was initiated in 1983 for the procurement of six ships. Total estimated cost for the programme is \$4.9 billion (1987), with the St. John Shipbuilding Limited and Marine Industries Ltd. of Montreal building three frigates each. The first of the new ships, HMCS Halifax, was launched in May 1988. Work began on the second and third ships, the HMCS Ville de Québec and HMCS Vancouver in May, and December 1987, respectively. The final ship is to be delivered by 1992.

The Government announced approval of the second phase of the Ship Replacement Programme, to build six more frigates, in December 1987. Whereas the first frigate contract was split between two companies, St. John Shipbuilding was awarded the contract to build the entire second batch of

frigates. These ships should enter service by 1996.

In August 1986, the Government granted approval for the Department of National Defence to enter into the project definition stage for a new shipborne aircraft (NSA). The NSA would replace Canada's current fleet of 35 Sea King helicopters, which entered service in 1963. Two helicopters were in contention for the project: the Anglo-Italian EH-101, and the French Aerospatiale As-332 Super Puma. On 5 August 1987, DND announced its choice of the EH-101 helicopter. The project definition phase is now proceeding. This involves settling contractual arrangements and determining whether or not the helicopter can meet Canadian requirements. Between 28 and 51 aircraft are to be purchased, at an estimated cost of between \$1.8-\$2.8 billion (1987). E.H. Industries (Canada) Inc. is owned jointly by Westland Helicopter of Britain and the Agusta Group of Italy. A team formed by EHI consisting of Bell Helicopter Textron of Mirabel, Quebec, Paramax Electronics and Canadian Marconi of Montreal, IMP Group of Halifax, and Sikorsky Aircraft of Stratford, Connecticut is handling the project. The NSA's primary functions are anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship surveillance and targetting. Its secondary roles consist of search and rescue, medical evacuation, troop transport and communications. The project definition is to conclude by the end of 1989.

On 3 March 1988, DND announced the acquisition of two mine counter-measure (MCM) auxiliary vessels. These will serve mainly as training vessels for the naval reserve and are expected to come into service in late 1988. The ships to be acquired are as yet unspecified. A large programme to acquire 10 - 20 MCM vessels is also under consideration.

The greatest attention in relation to defence acquisitions has been focussed on the Government's plan to acquire 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), as outlined in the Defence White Paper. The Government's cost estimate for

this project is \$8 billion, to be spread over a 27-year programme life-span. The vessels will replace Canada's three diesel-propelled Oberon class submarines currently in naval service.

Two classes of submarines are being considered for the purchase: the British Trafalgar class SSN, designed by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.; and the French Rubis/Amethyste-class SSN, designed by Société de Navigation Atomique (SNA). The characteristics of the two submarines vary considerably. The Trafalgar-class vessel is nearly twice the size of the Rubis/Amethyste SSN. Its maximum speed (submerged) is 32 knots, compared to 26 knots for the French vessel. The British submarine carries a crew of 97, while the French has a crew of 66. The British vessel requires weapons-grade fuel (defined as uranium enriched above 20%), whereas fuel for the French design is less than 10% enriched. Another important difference is in the price of the two contenders. The Trafalgar design is estimated to cost \$450-500 million each, compared to \$320-350 million for the Amethyste/Rubis. As a result of its size, however, the British vessel is able to carry more detection and stealth-enhancing equipment, required for the performance of anti-submarine, coastal patrol and surveillance duties. The British submarine also has experience operating in the Arctic, of prime importance to the role Canada expects of its SSNs.

A complicating factor in the decision-making process concerns two international agreements. One, a 1959 agreement between Canada and the United States, restricts the transfer of nuclear-related technology. This agreement would have to be amended, requiring US Congressional approval, if Canada chose to purchase the British submarine design. Second is the 1958 agreement between Britain and the United States governing the transfer of American nuclear technology. Under this agreement, Britain must obtain the consent of the United States before British nuclear submarines can be purchased by Canada. The French vessel is under no such restrictions.

In May 1988 it was announced that five Canadian companies interested in receiving the prime contract for the submarine project had joined forces to form the Canadian Submarine Consortium. The five include: Marine Industries Ltd., Litton Systems Canada Ltd., Lavalin Inc., the SNC Group, and Halifax-Dartmouth Industries Ltd.. Three other firms are competing for the contract: Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., Paramax Electronics Inc., and Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. with Rockwell International of Canada Ltd..

The Government expects to choose its preferred design by mid-1988, and is planning to begin replacing the Oberon submarines in 1996.

Current Canadian Position

In announcing Cabinet approval for procuring six more patrol frigates on December 8, 1987, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty stated:

This is the first concrete example of the implementation of the White Paper... Canadian sailors are recognized as being among the best in the world. Giving them these state-of-the-art ships to match their abilities will dramatically increase Maritime Command's operational effectiveness and serve Canada well into the next century.¹

Supply and Services Minister Michel Côté explained the rationale behind the awarding of the contract to Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (SJSJL):

As a result of the original contract for the first batch of six

¹ DND, News Release, 18 December 1987, p. 2.

frigates, SJSL and Paramax have established the necessary resources and infrastructure to construct the frigates and supply the high technology combat systems at an economical price and within the required timeframe. We intend to take advantage of this opportunity to provide our navy with the additional ships it needs so badly.²

In a letter published in the Ottawa Citizen on 9 December 1987, Mr. Beatty addressed a number of issues concerning the acquisition of SSNs. These included the function of the submarines, their operational guidelines, and cost. Critics have suggested that the submarines' role is not well-thought-out and that the costs are under-estimated.

The Minister wrote that the vessels' purpose was to patrol Canada's three oceans and, in the event of hostilities, to "keep enemy warships and submarines as far as possible from our shores and from allied shipping routes, military convoys, and other Canadian and allied interests."³ Hybrid nuclear/diesel-electric submarines represented too great a risk, due to their unproven technology, to be a viable alternative for Canada's submarine fleet.

In answer to the charge that Canada's submarines would inevitably become involved in the United States' maritime strategy, Mr. Beatty stated:

Canada's submarines enjoy the benefits of close cooperation with the navies of our allies... That coordination will continue... It is preposterous to suggest that, because we will be equipping the Canadian Navy with a high performance vessel, we will inexorably be committing those vessels to the dictates of some other nation's

² Ibid..

³ Ottawa Citizen, 9 December 1987.

operating philosophy.⁴

The \$8 billion estimate for the programme, Beatty explained, included the price of the vessels' shore-based support infrastructure and training facilities. Over the 27-year life of the project this would amount to approximately \$300 million per year, representing about 3 percent of the total annual defence budget and 10 percent of the annual capital equipment budget.

The SSNs would provide Canada with "leading-edge" military technology to contribute to the protection of Canadian sovereignty. The Minister declared: "The essential issue is that Canada must have the ability to detect and track foreign submarines in Canadian waters--a capability we do not now have." The submarines would perform under "precise rules of engagement", as determined by the Government under the prevailing circumstances.

The Government summed up its position on recent procurement projects for the navy as follows:

These new submarines, together with the frigates, helicopters and long-range patrol aircraft, will provide Canada with a credible, balanced mix of forces essential to permit our navy to perform its maritime tasks.⁵

⁴ Ibid..

⁵ Defence Update, 1988-1989, p. 10.

Parliamentary Comment

Considerable Parliamentary comment occurred over the past year on the issues of the patrol frigate programme and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.

In regard to the frigate programme, controversy arose over the distribution of shipbuilding contracts. Mr. Gabriel Fontaine, Progressive Conservative member from Lévis, suggested that the Department of National Defence obtain hard evidence to prove the prime contractor's claim that it would cost \$80 million more per frigate to share the contract.⁶ He also questioned relying on a single contractor as a supplier of defence equipment:

"...strategically, technically, and economically, there is not a single country where the armed forces rely on a single supplier. We should certainly not be the first!"⁷

After the contract had been awarded to Saint John Shipbuilding Limited, Mrs. Shirley Martin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Works, defended the Government's rationale:

We have two primary objectives which guide our [shipbuilding] policy, the rationalization of our shipbuilding industry and regional development. The awarding of the frigate contract to Saint John Shipbuilding proves the Government's commitment to these objectives.⁸

⁶ Commons Debates, 5 November 1987, p. 10775.

⁷ Ibid..

⁸ Commons Debates, 28 January 1988, p. 12411.

She indicated that portions of the contract would be carried out in other regions, including approximately \$800 million in Montreal by Paramax Electronics for design, construction and integration of weapons-control systems. She went on to describe the regional benefits of the frigate project:

Calculated over the entire life of the 12-ship project, the breakdown is slightly different: 37 percent to Atlantic Canada; 33 percent to Quebec; and 30 percent to Ontario and Western Canada. Over the course of the next nine years, the construction of the six patrol frigates will represent the equivalent of 14000 person-years of employment, with more than half the jobs going to workers in the Atlantic region alone where employment opportunities are most welcome.⁹

On 1 June 1988, Liberal Member Brian Tobin asked the Acting Prime Minister whether he was aware of correspondence between Saint John Shipbuilding and Paramax "indicating numerous defaults by Paramex [sic] in meeting its contractual obligations"? Mr. Tobin also asked whether regular audits of the frigate programme had been conducted. The Honourable Stewart McInnes, Minister of Public Works, replied that he was indeed aware of the allegations, and added:

The audit for 1986 has been completed. We are half way through the audit for 1987, and to date no irregularities or dissatisfaction have been uncovered. We are monitoring the situation closely. We are happy with the progress of the contract.¹⁰

In further questioning the next day in the House, Mr. Tobin made reference

⁹ Commons Debates, 28 January 1988, p. 12411.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 1 June 1988, p. 15978.

to internal company documents he possessed which revealed the company's contract awarding process:

The documents...make clear that Paramax awarded contracts worth in excess of \$100 million, without tender or a competitive bidding process, to affiliates of its U.S.-based parent company, Unisys. Why has the Government approved of such an uncompetitive process that would eliminate competition and therefore eliminate potential savings to the taxpayer?

Minister of Supply and Services Otto Jelinek responded:

...because of the subcontract being a fixed contract, nothing went outside the rules and regulations of the contract with the primary contractor, Saint John Shipbuilding, in any way, shape or form.¹¹

Many issues have been raised in regard to the Canadian nuclear-powered submarine acquisition programme. On 19 November 1987, Liberal member Doug Frith asked to what extent Canada had entered into negotiations with the United States in order to transfer SSN technology. Associate Minister of National Defence, Paul Dick, responded:

...It is not our responsibility to talk to the United States about transferring that technology. It is the responsibility of the British Government to see if it can get agreement from the United States in order to transfer that technology.

The fact is that we have another option, which does not depend on the United States at all, which is a very active option, that is, looking at the nuclear-powered submarines made by France.¹²

¹¹ Commons Debates, 2 June 1988, p. 16061.

¹² Commons Debates, 19 November 1987, pp. 10965-66.

Mr. Derek Blackburn of the NDP raised the question of sovereignty, its relation to the role of the submarines and their procurement.

I wish to know if the Minister could explain where the logic lies in a defence program where we have virtually to beg for a transfer of technology from the United States through the United Kingdom to Canada, in order to protect the very sovereignty in our Arctic that the United States objects to and refuses to accept?¹³

Mr. Dick replied:

...I thought the defence critic for the New Democratic Party was aware that part of our commitment to NATO is to have surveillance on the submarines of other countries which are in our quadrant. We can hardly do that if we have a submarine that moves a lot slower than theirs.

The reason we must have a submarine of equal capability is to maintain our commitment to NATO and to assure our own security and sovereignty.¹⁴

On 23 November 1987, Liberal member George Baker questioned the French submarine, given its lack of ice-strengthening and the fact that it is not currently designed to accommodate the Mark 48 torpedo Canada has chosen to use in the submarines.

In response, the Honourable Harvie André, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, assured the House that Canada's choice would have to meet CAF specifications:

¹³ Commons Debates, 19 November 1987, p. 10966.

¹⁴ Ibid..

They would have to be modified to enable them to come through Arctic ice and to operate in the Arctic environment. Both are within the technical capabilities of current design.¹⁵

The question of the cost of the submarine programme was also raised repeatedly throughout the year. A number of statements criticized the Government's estimates of \$7-8 billion as being inconsistent and too low. On 18 November 1987, Liberal Party Member Douglas Frith addressed the Defence Minister:

The Minister's own Department has changed the original \$5 billion numbers upward to what is now estimated to be between \$7.5 billion and \$8 billion. Consultants to the British Navy estimate the cost of the programme at \$11.25 billion. Would the Minister explain the discrepancies between all of the numbers, and which numbers is the Department now using?¹⁶

Paul Dick, Associate Minister of National Defence, responded:

The difference, translated into Canadian dollars, has been the exchange rate differences as the dollar has been going down and the pound has been going up. That is the only difference that has been going on.

There is an additional expenditure [to the SSNs themselves] of which we estimated about \$2 billion for the infrastructure. We have been consistent on that all the way through.¹⁷

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 23 November 1987, p. 11062.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 18 November 1987, p. 10926.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 10926.

The Associate Minister then stated that the public figures were the accurate figures for the "construction and implementation" of the submarine programme. He indicated that costs such as future fuel recycling could not be applied to these amounts.¹⁸

The Government's estimates of the costs of the SSN programme were attacked from many quarters, both within Canada and internationally. On 11 March 1988, Mr. Dan Heap of the NDP referred, in a general sense, to these criticisms:

The Government has discovered that the subs in fact need shore bases. It appears that it left that out. Shore bases cost money. So the total project cost now, according to independent critics which the Government does not answer in any detail, is somewhere between \$10 billion and \$15 billion. Those are the costs.¹⁹

On a separate occasion, in response to a question in the House, Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick defended the Government's estimates against criticisms by an American analyst by stating:

We have done our calculations based on our economic models, based on prices in Canada, not on prices in the United States....We do not take our advice necessarily from Americans on our sovereignty and security; we take it from Canadians.²⁰

In a letter to the editor in the Globe and Mail on 2 May 1988, Rear Admiral John Anderson, Chief of the Submarine Acquisition Programme, wrote:

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 10926.

¹⁹ Commons Debates, 11 March 1988, p. 13663.

²⁰ Commons Debates, 2 May 1988, p. 15020.

Our cost estimates have included maintenance, refit, operating, training and support facilities. We have also addressed the costs associated with Canadian construction and industrial support. The basis of our assessments has been data provided by the two contending nations, France and Britain. We recently validated our earlier estimates. Our conclusion: for the \$8 billion forecast, we can acquire 10 to 12 submarines plus the necessary infrastructure.²¹

As the debate progressed, however, the issue of cost resurfaced on several occasions. On 6 June, Minister of Finance Michael Wilson was asked by Liberal Party Member Lloyd Axworthy to explain his earlier statement that he did not know the precise cost of the submarine programme. Mr. Wilson replied:

What we are facing right now is a decision on the country of origin for the submarine purchase. We have a fairly good idea of the cost of this program at this point. It is not until you can get into the detailed discussions, which come only after you make the decision on country of origin, that you are able to define the cost of the program with the degree of precision that would be necessary before a final decision is taken. That is the position we are in right now.²²

On 20 June, NDP Member Nelson Riis referred to a statement made by Rear Admiral John Anderson, head of the submarine acquisition programme, indicating that the \$8 billion amount for the project excluded a number of key components. These included, for example, anti-ship missiles, communication equipment and nuclear fuel. Defence Minister Beatty responded by stating:

²¹ Globe and Mail, 2 May 1988.

²² Commons Debates, 6 June 1988, p. 16159.

...it is not our intention to acquire anti-ship missiles. Were we to do so, however, they would replace the Mark 48 torpedo we are buying for the submarines and an anti-ship torpedo would cost less money than a Mark 48 torpedo.

He continued:

Second, with respect to fuel fabrication, we do not intend to fabricate it in Canada although we will have the ability to load the fuel in Canada....

...and that is included in the \$8 billion figure. Third, with respect to the VLF communications with the submarines, these submarines will be capable, as are our three Oberon Class submarines today, of receiving these messages. At the present time we use allied communications systems. We have taken no decision on whether to build our own or to continue to use allied communications systems. If we do, we would take that into consideration and it would come off the \$8 billion figure.²³

The same day, Liberal Party Member Len Hopkins asked the Defence Minister how the programme cost was divided between infrastructure and submarines. Mr. Beatty replied:

Whether it is \$3 billion and \$5 billion or \$4 billion and \$4 billion, it adds up to \$8 billion, which is equal. The exact ratio will depend on the exact model of submarine which is chosen.²⁴

The nature of the role Canada's nuclear-powered submarines would play in allied strategy was also a contentious issue during the past year. Critics have argued that Canada's submarine force could become involved in the US

²³ Commons Debates, 20 June 1988, p. 16592.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 16593.

forward maritime strategy, perceived by some as being provocative and destabilizing. Liberal defence critic Douglas Frith raised the issue in the Standing Committee on National Defence on 3 February 1988. Rear Admiral Anderson replied that Canada did have some barrier patrol responsibilities in the North Atlantic through NATO:

...at a certain stage of alert we have committed certain forces to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). He would then exercise operational control over our units. But the command of the submarine is still handled by a Canadian--in fact, working to very specific Canadian guidelines.²⁵

M.P. Derek Blackburn pursued the question of the Canadian maritime strategy:

...if we are talking about Arctic or the Arctic region or the Arctic responsibility for Canada, are we talking about an independent Canadian maritime command commitment, or are we talking about a shared commitment with SACLANT?

General Manson (Chief of Defence Staff, DND) responded:

Because these vessels are not in service and will not be for another nine years, we have not...come to any arrangements with NATO or with the United States regarding the command, control, and employment of nuclear submarines when they finally arrive on the scene.²⁶

On 14 June 1988 NDP Member Bill Blaikie commented on the submarines and their strategic role:

Nuclear technology or, for that matter, any technology, is not the

²⁵ SCND Proceedings, 3 February 1988, p. 12.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

way to responsible or independent action for global survival. Only policy can do that and, unfortunately, instead of adopting a non-provocative defence posture designed to ensure Canadian security without threatening the security of our superpower neighbours, the Government's proposal will tie Canada even closer to the war-fighting strategies of the United States and to the insecurity for the human race that such thinking involves.²⁷

Another concern raised in the House of Commons was the possible environmental risk posed by the submarines. NDP Member Lynn McDonald requested that an environmental assessment of the submarine project be conducted, with particular reference to the Arctic. Mr. Dick responded that no known leaks of radioactive material had occurred on either French- or British-designed submarines, and Canada intended to maintain a high level of expertise in handling the nuclear power systems. Further, the nature of the submarines' operating areas--the oceans--would make an environmental assessment difficult.²⁸

For criticisms of the proliferation implications of the SSN programme, see the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation" section of this Guide.

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²⁷ Commons Debates, 14 June 1988, p. 16419.

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Cross References

The Defence Budget and the White Paper on Defence
Nuclear Non-Proliferation

22. NATO

Background

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.¹

In the years immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Allies set up machinery for collective defence, and extended membership to include Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. By the mid-1950s they were facing a more varied Soviet challenge and recognized that progress on European and other issues required efforts to strengthen Western unity, solidarity and co-operation. A committee of "Three Wise Men" established in 1956 recommended ways of improving political consultation and led to improvements which helped NATO to face up to the difficulties and opportunities of the following decade: Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure, the question of the control of nuclear weapons, and negotiations on arms control focussing on such questions as nuclear non-proliferation.

¹ NATO Information Service, NATO and Warsaw Pact Comparisons, Brussels, 1984, p.1.

In 1967, faced with a changing strategic situation, NATO carried out a review of its policies and issued a report entitled: "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report indicated that the basic policy of NATO is to pursue the two objectives of defence and detente, and stated that the aim of all members countries is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

The record of East-West relations over the last twenty years has been a mixed one, but nonetheless NATO has continued to pursue better relations with the East whenever that was possible. In the early 1970s it supported establishment of the SALT I Treaty, the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and the launching of negotiations on European security and conventional force reductions. A period of stagnation following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in the early 1980s, has recently given way to renewed hopes for improvements focussing on the INF Treaty and the prospect of new negotiations on conventional military stability and progress on other arms control issues.

At the same time, NATO has continued to give attention to the requirements of Western cohesion and defence. The Atlantic Declaration of 1974 reaffirmed the commitment of all members to the Treaty and clarified further their responsibilities in such fields as political consultation. Defence improvements and force modernization programmes have also continued, together with work on defence planning, infrastructures, communications, crisis management procedures and similar tasks.

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in the Alliance. Composed of the representatives of the sixteen member countries, it meets at the level of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors).

Ministerial meetings, attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and so on, are held twice a year or more, while the Council in permanent session meets once a week or as often as required. Special meetings of Heads of Government are also held at particularly important junctures in Alliance affairs.

Under the Council, there is a range of committees and commands, such as the Political Committee, the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Atlantic. The Secretary General of NATO is the civilian head of the organization, and he chairs the Council and other such key bodies as the Nuclear Planning Group.

At present, Canada's military commitments to NATO consist of:

- a mechanized brigade group of about 4,100 men, stationed in Lahr, Germany;
- 3 squadrons of tactical fighter aircraft plus related maintenance and headquarters elements with 1 Canadian Air Group at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen;
- other headquarters and support elements in Lahr;
- the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group, based in Canada and committed to reinforcing northern Norway when required in time of crisis;
- 2 Rapid Reinforcement fighter squadrons, also committed to North Norway;
- a battalion group committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)), and a fighter squadron committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air) (AMF(A)), for deployment to NATO's Northern Region. (Both the battalion group and the fighter squadron are stationed in Canada. The latter is one of the two squadrons already

committed to Norway);

- other land, air and maritime forces stationed in Canada are designated to contribute to the Allied defence of north America, to assist in the allied naval defence of the North Atlantic and other waters, to provide reinforcements for Europe in time of crisis or war.

Canada also provides training facilities for NATO troops on Canadian territory. Shilo, Manitoba is used by West German forces for tank training, while the British Army employs facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying. In December 1986, the Government announced that the Royal Netherlands Air Force would be making similar use of the Canadian base at Goose Bay. The effects of these low-level flying exercises on the environment and the lives of native peoples in the area have prompted some concern. At present, the Federal Environmental Review Committee is conducting a study on this issue, and expects to table it in the Spring 1989.

In 1986, the last of the new assignment of CF-18 fighters were deployed to the Canadian Air Group in West Germany, replacing ageing CF-104 aircraft. Following through on a commitment made in 1985, Canada has increased its forces in Europe by about 1,500. Currently, a total of about 7,000 Canadian Armed Forces personnel is stationed there.

Canada's air base at Goose Bay has been under consideration as a possible site for NATO's new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre (NTFWTC). While a site at Konya, Turkey, was recommended by NATO officials in September 1986, Canadian officials were successful in convincing NATO to postpone a final decision on an NTFWTC site until a more in-depth analysis can be carried out. The Canadian Government is currently spending \$93

million to expand the Goose Bay facility.² As yet, no final decision has been made on the location of the NATO site.

Current Canadian Position

On 15 January 1987, in an address to the Empire Club in Toronto, Minister for National Defence, Perrin Beatty, outlined the rationale for Canadian membership in NATO. Mr. Beatty stated:

We are not in NATO and in Europe today simply out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada. There can be no doubt that the defence of Western Europe continues to be critical to the defence of the Canada we wish to preserve.³

As was stated in the Defence White Paper of June 1987, the Canadian Government intends to relinquish its CAST commitment to north Norway, assigning the brigade to a role in West Germany instead. Noting that Canada's commitment to the defence of two different areas of Europe exceeded its capabilities, the White Paper went on to point out that the CAST commitment faced particularly severe problems:

The force requires some weeks to reach Norway, making timely deployment questionable, and it cannot make an opposed landing. Moreover, once deployed, it would be extremely difficult to reinforce and resupply, particularly after the start of

² Commons Debates, 1 March, 1988, p.13265.

³ Perrin Beatty, "Address to the Empire Club," Disarmament Bulletin, Winter-Spring 1987, p. 28.

hostilities....If these commitments in northern Norway were to be met fully and effectively, the deficiencies cited above would have to be rectified. This could only be done at great cost....The Government has concluded that consolidation in southern Germany is the best way to achieve a more credible, effective and sustainable contribution to the common defence of Europe.⁴

On 24 June 1988, the creation of a composite NATO force designed to replace Canada's CAST commitment to northern Norway was announced at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Contributing to the force will be the United States, West Germany, Norway and Canada. According to Defence Minister Perrin Beatty, Canada's contribution will consist of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, based in London, Ontario - an infantry unit of about 1200 personnel.⁵ Previously slotted for the defence of either Norway or Denmark, in future it will be committed exclusively to northern Norway. In turn, Belgium has offered to replace Canada in the role it previously filled in defence of Denmark.

The two squadrons of Rapid Reinforcement fighters which Canada had assigned to the defence of northern Norway will also be shifted to southern Germany. These squadrons are presently being converted from CF-5 to CF-18 aircraft, and the first was scheduled to be earmarked for deployment on the central front in June 1988. The second squadron will be operational in 1989. Both are based in Canada, but intended to reinforce Canadian forces in Germany in time of crisis.⁶

As a result of these changes in Canada's land and air forces, this country

⁴ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 61.

⁵ DND, News Release 65/88, 24 June 1988.

⁶ DND, Defence Update: 1988-89, March 1988, p. 14.

will have a "division-sized force" in Central Europe during a crisis. Equipment for the CAST brigade will be pre-positioned, and new tanks purchased. Negotiations are currently underway to provide Canadian forces with a small logistics base in Europe. Canada is also consulting with the Federal Republic of Germany to expand facilities used by Canadian forces, and to better ensure for their adequate support in wartime.⁷

Parliamentary Comment

Comment on the Government's decision to shift Canadian Forces commitments from northern Norway to the central front in West Germany intensified in late March and early April 1988. This was followed by indications that two former high-level defence officials had advocated that the opposite course be taken. In March, former Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff, General Gerard Thériault was reported to have stated before a conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs that Canada's CAST commitment to Norway was a "valued asset," while its forces in Central Europe meant "next to nothing."⁸ The General reportedly advocated that Canada should have pre-positioned equipment in Norway rather than increased its commitment to Central Europe. This was followed in April by stories in the press indicating that former Defence Minister Erik Nielsen had supported a similar policy in work on an earlier version of the Government's Defence White Paper.⁹

⁷ Ibid., p.15.

⁸ Ottawa Citizen, 28 March 1988, p. A4.

⁹ Gwynne Dyer, "Europeans torpedoed Tory plan to withdraw NATO troops," Ottawa Citizen, 14 April 1988, p. A1.

Noting these revelations, NDP Member Derek Blackburn made several remarks in the Commons. On 30 March 1988, Mr Blackburn referred to Gen. Thériault's comments, stating:

Last year I took a lot of flak for suggesting that keeping a small band of Canadian troops in West Germany was a waste of money. In fact, I was called a neutralist, isolationist, soft on communism, radical....Now someone has had the courage to challenge so-called conventional thinking. This time that someone is a man who spent his entire life defending this country.¹⁰

On 19 April 1988, Mr. Blackburn referred to the Nielsen story. Defending NDP policy on NATO, he commented:

...I will debate any conservative cold warrior on his or her bleak policy to fuel the...arms race, but I cannot stomach duplicity. When the Minister of Defence (Mr. Beatty) has the nerve to call our proposals costly, dishonest, and cowardly, I must draw the line. Didn't he read last week's newspapers? We found that it was Conservative Defence Minister Erik Nielsen who first proposed to pull Canada's troops out of Europe.¹¹

On 29 March 1988, in testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence, Canada's present Chief of the Defence Staff, General Paul Manson, was asked by Conservative Member Stan Darling for his opinion of Gen. Thériault's remarks. General Manson replied:

I agree with General Thériault on a great many things but I must say I do not agree with him in his contention that Canada should have retained its commitment to the north flank. My reasons... are reflected very closely in the way the White Paper is worded on

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 30 March 1988, p.14272.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 19 April 1988, p. 14610.

this subject. It is well known why the Government chose to transfer that commitment from the north flank of Europe to the central region. There are many arguments that have been made for and against this move....The fact remains that there was a commitment...that Canada could not sustain adequately....Sustaining it once it was there meant that commitment really could not be upheld in a way that I, as Chief of Defence Staff, would consider militarily viable.¹²

During the same hearing, Mr. Robert Fowler, Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy in the Department of National Defence, also commented on Gen. Thériault's remarks. Responding to a query by Liberal MP Douglas Frith about the existence of a "Thériault Plan", Mr. Fowler stated:

I have not ... heard of anything called the "Thériault Plan." I have heard from General Thériault the kinds of views he expressed in [the press] article. He has expressed publicly a preference for having retained the CAST commitment to the north flank, perhaps, but not necessarily at the expense of the other European commitments. It is not quite clear whether he would have sacrificed all the other European commitments to doing that one right or not.¹³

In reply to Mr. Fowler's statement, Mr. Frith remarked that a Canadian General at SHAPE headquarters had indicated to him that Thériault's ideas had "gone beyond just talk."¹⁴

On 4 March 1988, Liberal Party Member Len Hopkins introduced a motion in the House concerning Canada's participation in, and support for, NATO. The motion read:

¹² SCND Proceedings, 28 March 1988, p. 6.

¹³ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁴ Ibid..

That this House recognizes the pivotal role that NATO continues to play in mutual security and defence and in further progress in arms control and disarmament and, therefore, reaffirms its commitment to continued Canadian participation in and active support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a primary instrument of Canadian defence policy.¹⁵

Mr. Hopkins then proceeded to criticize the Government's defence policy in broad terms.

Responding to the motion, Associate Minister for National Defence Mr. Paul Dick remarked that, while he would like to support the motion, failure of the Liberal Member to speak to its substance prevented him from doing so.¹⁶

NDP Member Derek Blackburn opposed the motion on different grounds. He stated:

Unfortunately, NATO has failed to date to come to grips with the issue of arms control and disarmament. It has pursued consistently aggressive, deep strike policies. That is not what the world wants. The world does not want the superpowers to be backed up by their two treaty organizations egging them on, pushing them on to greater sophistication in the means of destruction they have at their command. What we need, and what we can do for ourselves, is to pursue the defence of North America in conventional terms....¹⁷

The debate on the motion also gave rise to criticism of the Government's

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, pp. 13400-01.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 13405.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 13427.

policy on NATO by Liberal Member Andre Ouellet. Mr. Ouellet stated:

It should... be emphasized that two different concepts of NATO are involved here: the militaristic approach of the Tory Government, and the peaceful and responsible approach of the Liberal Party. The Government has insisted on the need for a strong Canada that is capable of defending itself. We agree but the Liberal Party recognizes that in the world today, a defence policy based on defence, not on offence, is a legitimate part of a comprehensive approach. We feel that as a member of NATO, Canada should continue to do its fair share but also continue to express its views on peace in a multilateral context.¹⁸

In April 1988, after conducting a review of its defence policy, the NDP released a report entitled "Canada's Stake in Common Security." The report qualified the proposal for Canadian withdrawal from NATO presented in the Party's July 1987 policy paper on defence by stipulating that an NDP Government would not undertake such action during its first term in office.¹⁹

The NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional military balance was also the object of comment in the House. On 21 September 1987, in the wake of the news regarding the possibility of a superpower agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), Conservative Member Reginald Stackhouse asked Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty:

Will the Minister advise the House what consideration NATO members are giving to closing the conventional arms gap between the Warsaw

¹⁸ Ibid., p.13431.

¹⁹ Canada's Stake in Common Security, Report by the International Affairs Committee of the New Democratic Party of Canada, 16 April 1988.

Pact and NATO?²⁰

Mr. Beatty replied that the INF agreement--although very significant--did not deal with other areas of concern in the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. In his words:

...left untouched were a number of important areas, such as conventional imbalances between East and West where the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact maintain an advantage of two or three to one at the present time in chemical weapons and a range of other areas. We are hopeful that progress can be made in these areas.²¹

Mr. Stackhouse referred to the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance again on 23 February 1988, observing that the task of redressing the current imbalance of conventional weapons in Europe was a top priority for the Canadian Government and for NATO as a whole.²²

On 4 March 1988, Liberal MP Len Hopkins referred to the state of the European military balance in introducing a motion reaffirming Canadian support for, and participation in, NATO:

The Soviet nuclear and conventional power is strong, and European free countries cannot deal with it alone. As the nuclear threat is reduced, so must the conventional arms threat be reduced. Certain elements of the Armed Forces in the Warsaw Pact outnumber NATO forces by three to one. Therefore we cannot remove the nuclear protection while leaving the European continent at the mercy of an overdose of conventional power.²³

²⁰ Commons Debates, 21 September 1987, p. 9140.

²¹ Ibid..

²² Commons Debates, 23 February 1988, p. 13069.

²³ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, p. 13401.

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The Defence Budget and the White Paper on Defence

23. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION

Background

Peacekeeping may be defined as the employment, under the auspices of a recognized international authority, of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining the peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. While peacekeeping operations are concerned mainly with supervision and control, observer missions are smaller in scope and limited to the monitoring and reporting of any cease-fire violations.

In light of the inability of the Security Council to use the enforcement measures granted to it by the UN Charter, the UN continues to sponsor peacekeeping operations to maintain international peace and security. A number of observer missions were created in the late 1940s along the India-Pakistan border and in the Middle East following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In 1950 the General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution granting it the authority to recommend specific measures deemed necessary to maintain international peace. That same year, following the outbreak of hostilities between North and South Korea, a Security Council resolution sponsored by the United States in the absence of the Soviet Union led to the creation of a unified military command to counter the North Korean offensive. However, this action was unprecedented and has never been repeated. The first large-scale UN peacekeeping operation was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), established to supervise the cease-fire following the 1956 Suez crisis. Since that time the UN has fielded ten other peacekeeping and observation missions in the Congo, Cyprus, the Middle

East and Indonesia.

In addition to participating in all UN peacekeeping missions, Canada has also contributed to five non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control, created in 1954 to oversee the cease-fire in Indochina; its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision, established in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria, created to supervise the 1968 elections; the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, established in 1979 to observe the elections in Zimbabwe; and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, responsible for overseeing the application of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. One hundred and forty Canadians, committed to this task since March 1986, provide the MFO with air transportation by helicopter for both troops and civilian observers.

Canada currently participates in three UN peacekeeping operations. One of these is the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) which monitors and supervises the cease-fire between Israel and Syria along the Golan Heights. Two hundred and twenty Canadians provide logistics, communications and other technical services. In addition, since 1954 Canada has contributed 22 officers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), a permanent mission created in 1948 to monitor and maintain the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and to supervise the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. Canada also participates in the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 575-member Canadian contingent is responsible for policing the cease-fire and resolving disputes between the opposing factions in a sector containing the capital, Nicosia. The mission is financed through voluntary contributions by UN members, although in reality the troop-contributing countries bear the major portion of the cost before being reimbursed for their expenses. Canada is also active in the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan

(UNMOGIP), supplying the air transportation required for rotating the Group's headquarters on a periodic basis between Srinagar and Rawalpindi. In addition, a Canadian attaché is posted to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea. Finally, Canada is also participating in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), created in May 1988 to oversee the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Nine hundred and sixty-two members of the Canadian Armed Forces were posted at various points around the world in 1988. The Government of Canada does not consider peacekeeping to be an end in itself, but rather that it is important to create an environment in which solutions to conflict may be found. The Government sees peacekeeping as an interim measure in the resolution of regional conflict and is continuing to call for effective multilateral financing of operations to ease the burden on troop-contributing countries, especially with regard to the UNFICYP. The Defence White Paper tabled in the summer of 1987 outlined the criteria the Government uses to determine whether it should participate in peacekeeping operations:

The Government's decision will be based upon the following criteria: whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to Canada's participation in the operation; whether the arrangements are, in fact, likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term; whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canadian participation will jeopardize other commitments; whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants; and whether participation is adequately and equitably

funded and logistically supported.¹

Within the UN itself there is disagreement on a number of issues concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, the use of force by UN peacekeepers and the financing of UN missions. The question of financing is particularly contentious; some countries refuse to pay for any operation not established by the Security Council, while others fail to make payments on time. Consequently, some UN peacekeeping operations are incurring large deficits, and troop-contributing countries have generally borne most of the financial burden.

Current Canadian Position

New events since the tabling of the Defence White Paper have reinforced Canada's commitment as a peacekeeper. First, Canada's relations with the Central American countries took on a new dimension following their signature of the Arias Peace Plan in August 1987. Canada again made offers of assistance, this following up on previous indications that it would be willing to participate in control and verification operations should a pact be reached.² In a newspaper article in the 17 November 1987 edition of the Ottawa Citizen, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark repeated Canada's willingness to provide practical help with the implementation of the Plan, indicating that this assistance could take the form of help with peacekeeping procedures and with the security mechanisms that would be needed as a cease-fire, an amnesty and the suspension of outside military

¹ DND, Challenge and Commitment, 5 June 1987, p. 24.

² See especially: DEA, Communiqué No. 154, 10 August 1987.

aid were implemented.³ In recent years Canada has provided Central American governments with information on peacekeeping operations and the problems surrounding verification of peace plans in a regional context. In April 1988, the five signing countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica) requested that Canada, Spain and West Germany be responsible for determining the mechanisms required to establish a peacekeeping force, but as yet no formal invitation has been extended. The entire process continues to be shrouded in uncertainty: the Central American countries are slow in respecting the terms of the agreement and may not be willing to grant the required authority to the three proposed peacekeeping countries.

With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Canada has undertaken new commitments in the area of international observer missions. Five Canadian officers are members of the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), consisting of 50 observers from 10 countries and responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Geneva accord signed on 14 April 1988. Canada has not, however, committed itself to participating in any peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan. Should the need arise, UN forces would occupy a position between the Communist regime in Kabul and the numerous Muslim groups that have yet to cease their fighting. Certain criteria must be satisfied before Canada will participate in such an operation: the antagonists must agree to a ceasefire, accept the terms of the Geneva accord and request the UN to oversee an end to the hostilities. Finally, the UNGOMAP operation will set a precedent in that for the first time the Soviet Union is accepting UN intervention in a conflict in which the Soviet Union is itself involved.

³ Clark, Joe, "Canada hopes it can help Central America find peace", Ottawa Citizen, 17 November 1987.

Parliamentary Comment

Some members of the House of Commons expressed their points of view on the signing of the Arias Peace Plan and Canada's offer of technical assistance to put the Plan into effect. NDP member Pauline Jewett supported Canadian participation in the Central American peace process and asked External Affairs Minister Joe Clark if he was "now prepared to consider increasing Canada's permanent diplomatic presence in the region, up to and including establishing an embassy in Managua?". Mr. Clark responded that he was not prepared to do so at that time.⁴

Two other NDP members, Jim Manly and Bill Blaikie, stated that it was important that the Government of Canada condemn the funding of the Contras by the United States, claiming that the funding constituted a major obstacle to the peace process in Central America.⁵

On 2 December 1987, Joe Clark reported to the House of Commons on his recent trip to Central America. He spoke of the "complexities of the region", including the deep suspicion among the Governments of the signing countries, "which are complicated further by the extension to Central America of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union". Stressing the "practical challenges of designing and operating verification and peacekeeping mechanisms", Mr. Clark indicated that "Canadian expertise would be available for all or part of that work, if the five Presidents agreed unanimously that they wanted Canadian help."⁶

4 Commons Debates, 12 and 17 August 1987, pp. 7971 and 8118.

5 Commons Debates, 1 and 15 October 1987, pp. 9580 and 9991.

6 Commons Debates, 2 December 1987, pp. 11410 and 11411.

Finally, Canada's participation in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan gave rise to opposing reactions on the part of two Conservative MPs. While Dave Nickerson saw the UN request as "a tribute to the professionalism and experience of our Armed Forces",⁷ fellow MP William C. Winegard stated: "I cannot think of a more dangerous role for our armed forces to play than to be on site in Afghanistan before a complete cease-fire has been negotiated."⁸

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⁷ Commons Debates, 2 May 1988, p. 15010.

⁸ Commons Debates, 19 April 1988, p. 14611.

SECTION III - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

24. CENTRAL AMERICA

Background

No military solution to the conflicts raging in Central America appeared likely in 1987 and 1988; in each of the civil wars, neither the government forces nor the rebel groups were able to win a decisive victory. Only the contras, waging an armed struggle against Nicaragua's Sandinista government with military and logistical support from the United States, conducted major military operations in 1987, primarily in the central regions and on the Atlantic coast, which intensified the Nicaraguan conflict.

The Central American Peace Plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize, was the highlight of 1987. This was the first time leaders of the five Central American countries--Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras--agreed in principle to comply with a process aimed at bringing peace to the region. After several months of negotiations, the "Arias Plan" was signed on 7 August 1987 by the five presidents, at Esquipulas, Guatemala. The plan essentially requires a national reconciliation with opponents, a cease-fire within the existing constitutional framework, democratization in each country, efforts to halt foreign aid to insurgents, a commitment to provide no assistance to groups aimed at destabilizing other governments, free and democratic elections, measures to help refugees return home and joint efforts to guarantee obtention of international

economic aid.

Implementation and verification of the planned measures are obviously the main obstacles facing the signatories, as was evident at the summit held in San José, Costa Rica on 15 and 16 January 1988. The progress achieved in democratization has been quite small, despite certain steps in this direction by Managua. In brief, the Peace Plan is far from achieving all of its objectives. Talks between the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador and their respective opponents to negotiate a cease-fire have yet to produce serious results. However, after intermittent negotiations between the Sandinista government and guerilla representatives, and after the United States Congress decided in February 1988 to suspend military aid to the contras, the parties agreed on 24 March 1988 to observe a 60-day truce. Peace talks between the Sandinistas and contras have continued since; the guerilla representatives have demanded political changes such as greater freedom as a condition for stopping the war.

Canada has always openly supported peace efforts in Central America, particularly those of the Contadora group. Although it has never publicly condemned US activities in Central America, the Canadian government has voiced opposition to third-party intervention in the region.¹ At the 41st and 42nd sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of a resolution urging the United States to comply with the June 1986 ruling of the World Court that US military aid to the contras violated international law, and that Washington should definitely cease these actions. Ottawa has often given Central American governments information on peace-keeping operations and the problems that may arise from verification of regional agreements aimed at ending hostilities. Canadian economic aid in the region is another important

¹ DEA, Statements and Speeches, 15 September 1986.

aspect of Ottawa's policy toward Central American countries (Honduras is the main recipient).

Current Canadian Position

Canada has repeatedly shown its support for the Central American Peace Plan. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark has indicated that if asked, Canada might agree to take part in control and verification of an accord. Since the Peace Plan was signed by the Central American leaders, Ottawa has increased its offers of assistance, as reflected in a passage from a speech delivered by Mr. Clark on 22 September 1987 to the 42nd session of the United Nations General Assembly. He mentioned that:

Canada supports the initiatives of the Central American presidents. We are prepared to provide our expertise mechanisms which, once peace is possible, can help it endure. The disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict, but Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us.²

When the Secretary of State for External Affairs visited Central America in November, representatives of private development aid organizations openly denounced the Canadian Government's attitude in the region as too closely linked to the US position. They also criticized Canadian aid to Nicaragua as inadequate. Mr. Clark's visit followed an announcement a few days earlier that Canada would resume bilateral economic aid to

² DEA, Statements 87/49, 22 September 1987. See also the News Release(s) of 10 and 16 August 1987, published by DEA.

Guatemala, after a six-year interruption.

Upon returning to Canada, Mr. Clark addressed the House of Commons on 2 December on the Central American peace process. In reporting on his tour of the region, Mr. Clark noted that general conditions of unanimity and authority are required if Canada is to participate in any peace-keeping operation. He also voiced his opposition to the idea that because of the special circumstances in Central America, Canada must abandon the principle of not using its aid for political purposes, since Canadian aid "has been designed to help the poorest, to help the most needy." Turning to the program of bilateral aid to Guatemala, Mr. Clark stated his belief that sufficient progress had been made in the area of human rights under the democratically elected government of President Cerezo to justify a resumption of aid. On the issue of whether Canada's Central American policy should be more oriented toward public criticism of US aid to the contras, Mr. Clark said that:

I believe that such a policy would reduce, and not increase, whatever real influence we might have in Washington on this question. It could, in addition, impede our ability to play other, more active roles in support of the peace plan. The five Governments of Central America are in no doubt about the difference between Canadian and US policy, and our conduct should be guided by what makes us most effective in Central America itself.

In closing, Mr. Clark noted that,

The real issue in Central America is not Marxism, nor is it death squads, nor even is it the abuse of human rights. Those are symptoms. The root problems are economic and social, and Central America needs peace to resolve them.³

In March 1988, after Nicaraguan troops crossed into Honduran territory and after additional US troops were despatched to Honduras, Mr. Clark expressed his concern over these developments. After noting that the presence of US forces only served to increase tensions, he called on "all parties to the dispute to settle their differences at the bargaining table rather than on the battlefield."⁴

The Special Committee on the Central American Peace Process published its first report in July 1988, after completing a tour of the region. This Committee, composed of five Members of Parliament, was formed to study how Canada could play a constructive role in the Central American peace process. The report contains recommendations on verification of a cease-fire agreement, human rights, economic aid and consolidation of Canada's diplomatic presence in the region. The Committee believes Canada should help mobilize the international community to support peace, democracy and development in the region.

Parliamentary Comment

The Canadian Government's failure to formally condemn US aid to the contras has drawn frequent criticism in the House of Commons since the

³ Commons Debates, 2 December 1987, pp. 11409 to 11413.

⁴ DEA, News Release No. 063, 18 March 1988.

summer of 1987. Some MPs have also called for a more active Canadian diplomatic presence in Central America, to encourage the peace process in this region, and increased Canadian aid to Nicaragua has been suggested as well.

Following Mr. Clark's statement on Central America in the House on 2 December 1987, Lloyd Axworthy (Lib.) and Bill Blaikie (NDP) voiced their reactions. Mr. Axworthy disagreed with the analysis of the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Central America's problems were primarily economic and social. According to Mr. Axworthy, "the problem has been the sense of imperialism, colonialism, or domination under which they have lived." The Liberal Member also deplored the fact that we still have no "policy as to how Canada will organize its various economic, diplomatic and political initiatives to meet the historic significance and the historic challenge that greets us in that region of the world." He added that Canada should denounce US aid to the contras and tell the United States to lift its economic embargo on Nicaragua. Finally, Mr. Axworthy agreed that Canada should take the initiative and proceed with reconstruction plans for Central America.⁵

NDP Member Bill Blaikie termed Mr. Clark's analysis of superpower relations and Canadian interests in Central America timid. He argued that the Minister should have "had some sharp words of protest to register against the attacks on Canadians and Canadian-sponsored projects," which, he added, were perpetrated by people with US support. Mr. Blaikie also rejected the claim that both superpowers have identical commitments in the region, and noted that in Mr. Clark's statement, "with respect to burden of proof, [...] a much harder case is made against Nicaragua than some of the other countries." In his view, this reveals

⁵ Commons Debates, 2 December 1987, pp. 11413 to 11415.

"an over-all willingness to be critical of those elements in Central America which might irritate the Americans." Finally, Mr. Blaikie noted that resumption of aid to Guatemala constituted "a political act" that would have political repercussions regardless of what Mr. Clark said.⁶

On 3 February 1988, just as the United States Congress was voting on the issue of contra funding, Bill Blaikie asked Prime Minister Brian Mulroney if he would inform the Congress of his objection to continuing aid. Mr. Mulroney replied:

...is the Member of the NDP actually suggesting that we as a Parliament insinuate ourselves into the deliberative rights of another sovereign parliamentary body? The Parliament of Canada would react very strongly if anybody tried to tell us what to do. I am offended by the suggestion of the NDP that we impose our will, or seek to, on the Congress of the United States.⁷

On 21 March, in reply to a question from MP Bill Blaikie on whether the Canadian Government would criticize the deployment of US troops in Honduras, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark explained:

If you are interested in peace in Central America, we can work towards peace. If you are interested in simply attacking the United States on every opportunity, you can do that too, but that will not move peace forward.⁸

On 25 March, following the announcement of a truce in Nicaragua, NDP Member Jim Manly questioned Mr. Clark on the possibility of setting up a

⁶ Ibid., pp. 11415 to 11417.

⁷ Commons Debates, 3 February 1988, p. 12580.

⁸ Commons Debates, 21 March 1988, p. 13957.

special development aid program for this country. Mr. Clark first pointed out that the Arias Plan covered all five countries in the region, not just Nicaragua, and that it was also important to settle the other conflicts in the region. He then noted that Canada would be willing to take steps to promote development, but that he preferred "to do that in the region as a whole as a result of the Arias Plan."⁹

On 5 May, MP Jim Manly again asked Mr. Clark whether Canada was willing, as part of its participation in the peace process, to contribute to a reconciliation fund designed to promote the repatriation of thousands of Nicaraguans now living inside Honduras, as recommended by a peace mission that had just returned to Canada. Mr. Clark explained that he had not yet had an opportunity to study this mission's report, but that he did intend to do so.¹⁰

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⁹ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14140.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 5 May 1988, p. 15168.

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25. THE MIDDLE EAST

Background

Since 1987 important changes in the Middle East have put increasing pressure on the moderate Arab states, Sunni Moslem for the most part, to reconsider certain aspects of their foreign policy. For instance, at a time when the Iran-Iraq conflict is in danger of spreading, the Arab monarchies of the Gulf are experiencing a growing need to re-evaluate the Iranian threat. Moreover, Israel's repeated incursions into south Lebanon and the measures it has taken to crush the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which began at the end of 1987, have left a number of observers skeptical as to the holding of an International Conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict, currently under study.

The Arab League Summit held in Amman, Jordan, from 8 to 11 November 1987, was an important event. In contrast to preceding years when the Arab-Israeli conflict was the major point of discussion, the Amman summit concentrated on the Iran-Iraq war, with special emphasis on the Iranian threat to security in the Persian Gulf. A number of Arab countries decided to re-establish diplomatic ties with Egypt, which had been isolated from the Arab world following the Camp David Accord in 1979. In fact, the summit reflected a different attitude on the part of Arab moderates who, faced with new conditions resulting from strategic changes, decided to adopt a new order of priority.

Iran-Iraq

Since 1987 the fighting between Iran and Iraq has largely been

concentrated in the southern area near the border. Bombing raids against civilian targets and attacks against oil tankers in the Gulf increased, while Iraq made repeated use of chemical weapons against the Iranian population. As a result of the escalation in the naval war, the United States and five other Western countries deployed air-sea forces in the Persian Gulf to insure, according to Washington, the free passage of merchant shipping. These operations led to a number of clashes between American and Iranian forces. The most tragic event occurred on 3 July 1988 when a U.S. warship shot down a civilian Iranian airliner over the Gulf, killing all 290 people on board. Lastly, Iran finally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, adopted in July 1987 and calling for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the opposing forces to international boundaries, an exchange of prisoners and the commencement of peace talks. Iran's decision to accept the resolution and observe an eventual ceasefire came after it had suffered major military setbacks.

Lebanon

The year 1987 in Lebanon was marked by violent fighting between the Palestinians and the Amal Shiite Moslem militia group, which during the year broke off its attacks against certain Palestinian camps in West Beirut, and by the war in the south opposing the Hezbollah Shiite group and the south Lebanese Army, supported by Israel. In February 1987, Syrian troops entered Lebanon and now occupy more than a third of the country. The Syrian intervention generated a temporary easing of tension between the various factions. In 1988, there has been intense fighting south of Beirut between the Amal militia, supported by Syria, and the Hezbollah group, backed by Iran. Syrian and Iranian representatives met in May in an effort to negotiate a ceasefire.

Israel and the Occupied Territories

The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the resulting military intervention by Israel hold an important regional dimension, as attention is once again being focused on the Palestinian question and the future of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. In January 1988, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar published a report strongly urging the international community to persuade Israel to respect the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories. Among the Arab nations, Egypt and Jordan were careful not to impose political or economic sanctions against Israel. The use of violent counteroffensive measures by the Israeli army was the subject of heated debate within Israel itself. At the beginning of 1988, American Secretary of State George Shultz travelled to Syria, Jordan and Israel on a negotiation mission to present a plan for a political solution to the issue of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories. In April, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Syrian President Hafez al Assad met in Damascus to discuss a number of issues, including the problems in the occupied territories. Both leaders rejected the Shultz peace plan.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has always insisted on the importance of reaching a negotiated settlement to the Iran-Iraq conflict and supported Security Council Resolution 598, adopted on 20 July 1987. In recent years Canada has condemned the attacks on cities, the use of chemical weapons and the harsh treatment of prisoners of war. In a speech given at the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark referred briefly to the war between Iran and Iraq. Among his statements was that " (...) Security Council Resolution 598 reflects welcome

political will and unanimity in the Security Council, and the Secretary-General is to be commended for his patient, persistent mediation. The Secretary-General's mission was not as successful as we all had hoped (...). (...) Canada would fully support the implementation of the axiomatic second half of Resolution 598, the application of sanctions."¹

Following the U.S. attack against two Iranian oil drilling platforms in the Persian Gulf in April 1988, a Department of External Affairs news release stated that "(...) Canada fully supports the efforts of our allies to protect international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The information available to us indicates that the U.S. action (...) was fully warranted in support of this objective."²

On 18 July, Canada and Iran agreed to resume normal diplomatic relations, undertaking to exchange ambassadors. The Government of Canada wished to emphasize "that this development, which it welcomes, reflects the significance it attaches to relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, a nation of major importance in the Middle East, in view of the consequences of the Islamic Revolution and Iran's strategic position and role on the international scene."³ Ottawa had closed its embassy in Tehran in 1980.

With respect to Lebanon, Canada has repeatedly supported calls for its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ottawa did, however, transfer its embassy to Damascus, Syria, in July 1985 to insure the safety of its diplomatic personnel. Despite pressure exerted by

¹ SSEA, Statement 87/49, New York, 22 September 1987.

² DEA News Release, No. 089, 18 April 1988.

³ DEA News Release, No. 152, 18 July 1988.

Lebanese authorities and Canadians of Lebanese descent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs remains steadfast in his refusal to reopen the Canadian mission in Lebanon until an acceptable level of security can be guaranteed. In February 1988, External Relations Minister Monique Landry announced a five million dollar payment to the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO). The money will be used for aid to Lebanon.

As to the Arab-Israeli conflict, on 4 October 1987, Joe Clark gave a speech at a dinner in honour of Saudi Arabian Foreign Affairs Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal Al Saud. During his remarks Mr. Clark stated:

Although our two countries might not agree on the details of an approach to a solution, it must be emphasized that both Canada and Saudi Arabia are committed to policies which would guarantee the right of all nations in the region to live at peace within secure and recognized boundaries. We also support a homeland for the Palestinians within a clearly defined territory, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (...) Canada will continue to support wholeheartedly the leaders of those countries who are committed to the search for peace with honour, and who are prepared to take the risks required to achieve a just and lasting settlement.⁴

On 2 December 1987, Charles V. Svoboda, member of the Canadian delegation to the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, explained Canada's voting rationale on the resolutions regarding the Palestinian question. The delegation abstained "on the resolution contained in document L.34 concerning the Division for Palestinian Rights. (The Canadian delegation had adhered to) a negative vote on similar resolutions in past years (...)." According to Mr. Svoboda, this change in position reflects a "concern for the tragic plight of the Palestinian people" and demonstrates the Canadian delegation's understanding and sympathy for the

⁴ DEA Statement, 87/53, Ottawa, 4 October 1987.

individual and collective rights of the Palestinian people. Mr. Svoboda went on to state that:

As regards the PLO itself, we once again wish to recall that, while we do not recognize the organization as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people we do see it as an important element in Palestinian opinion. As such, we value effective communications with the PLO.

With respect to the draft resolution calling for the holding of an international peace conference on the Middle East (L.40), the Canadian delegation again abstained, most notably because of its reservations "about certain of the provisions of resolution 38/58C which is again referred to, and which in our view prejudices the outcome of negotiations." Among other concerns, the delegation had some concrete reservations as to the impartiality and effectiveness of a Preparatory Committee that was the fruit of Security Council negotiations, given that two of the permanent members had either broken off or never established diplomatic relations with one of the states directly involved. Mr. Svoboda also indicated that Canada does not believe that an international conference is a substitute for direct talks between the parties to the dispute.⁵

On 27 January 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark

welcomed the UN Secretary General's analysis of the situation in the occupied territories, expressed appreciation for the realistic and practicable measures for the safety of their population and for the report's emphasis on the need to find a political solution to the current situation.

⁵ News Release, No. 56, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 2 December 1987.

He added that

Canada would be prepared to join with other contracting parties to (the Geneva) Convention in an appeal to the Government of Israel to apply its provisions to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Violations of the Geneva Convention, including human rights abuses and settlements, are unacceptable and damaging to the peace process.⁶

The legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in 1987 to force the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) observer mission in New York was opposed by Canada, Ottawa considering the law to be contrary to the United States' obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. In a statement made to the UN on 29 February 1988, Stephen Lewis, Canada's ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, noted that "the host government is under a legal obligation to allow the PLO to maintain its United Nations office." Speaking on behalf of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Mr. Lewis indicated that "if it proves necessary, the procedure for dispute settlement, set out in the Headquarters Agreement between the UN and the host government could be utilized."⁷

Finally, a speech on 10 March 1988 by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark to the Annual Conference of the Canada-Israel Committee gave rise to a good deal of controversy. Mr. Clark focused on the violence in the occupied territories and condemned the actions of Israeli forces against the Palestinians. He stated that the recent human rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza were totally unacceptable and, in many cases, illegal under international law. Mr. Clark went on to say that

⁶ DEA News Release, No. 029, 27 January 1988.

⁷ DEA News Release, No. 051, 29 February 1988.

(...) we call on Israel's political leaders to show vision, compassion and the strength to make the decisions required to ensure that Palestinians are treated more humanely (...)" . Finally, he observed: "Part of our concern about the situation in the occupied territories comes from the realization that it gives rise to intense positions that could pit Canadians against one another."⁸

Parliamentary Comment

The Iran-Iraq conflict has been the subject of a number of comments in the House of Commons since the end of summer 1987. On 20 October 1987, Conservative MP Bob Corbett asked Joe Clark what role Canada would be assuming to help bring a swift end to the Iran-Iraq war. Mr. Clark responded:

The most effective role that Canada can continue to play is to continue to urge the members of the Security Council of the United Nations and, most important, the Secretary General, to work toward the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598.⁹

On 21 January 1988, Liberal MP Aideen Nicholson spoke out on the effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the civilian populations. She observed:

Every effort must be made internationally to stop the sale of arms to Iran and to use all peaceful means to bring an end to

⁸ DEA Statement, 88/18, Ottawa, 10 March 1988.

⁹ Commons Debates, 20 October 1987, p. 10187.

this tragic situation.¹⁰

On 22 March, following fresh allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq struggle, Joe Clark called for a UN-conducted investigation.¹¹ On 25 March, Liberal MP Andre Ouellet asked Mr. Clark what he had done to convey Canada's disapproval of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf. The Secretary of State for External Affairs replied that

...yesterday we called the Iraqi ambassador to express serious concern and disapproval with respect to action related to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. We also told the Iranian Government about our contact with Iraq. We did raise the issue at the United Nations. The Iraqi signed the United Nations protocol and can be expected to honour their commitment.¹²

On 25 March, NDP Member Bill Blaikie questioned Mr. Clark on what measures he was planning to take to condemn Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Kurdistan region and to bring the two sides to agree to a ceasefire. Mr. Clark stated: "We have made the strongest possible representations to the Ambassador of Iraq and will be following these up through other channels." Mr. Blaikie continued, emphasizing:

One of the opportunities the Minister has (...) is to take a leading role in getting the world community to put (an) arms embargo on both (Iran and Iraq).

Mr. Clark agreed, but pointed out that the problem consisted not in

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 21 January 1988, p. 12142.

¹¹ Commons Debates, 22 March 1988, p. 14013.

¹² Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14133.

calling for an embargo but rather in implementing one.¹³

On 4 and 5 July, a number of MPs expressed their deep concern over the incident involving the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner by a U.S. warship. Liberal MP Chas. L. Caccia was critical of the "unwarranted presence in the Persian Gulf of the U.S. fleet engaged in a role that endangers more the seeking of peace in that region than it prevents war". NDP member Jim Manly was of a similar opinion and stated: "A common security framework for the Persian Gulf must be pursued, rather than mutually antagonistic military postures." For his part, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy asked Acting Prime Minister John Crosbie (International Trade Minister) if the Government intended to request an emergency session of the UN Security Council and a special meeting of ICAO to investigate the tragic incident. Mr. Crosbie replied:

We will take a position and exercise our responsibilities as members of ICAO or as members of the United Nations if and when the matter comes before either of those bodies. We will then support what seems to be the correct and best course of action to take in the interests of humanity and the interests of Canadians. (...) We are not a party immediately involved in this incident. We will do what is best for the international community of nations when this matter comes forward and is brought to the attention of these bodies by the countries immediately involved.¹⁴

The Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the uprising in the occupied territories, gave rise to a number of comments in the House. On 2 February 1988, NDP member Howard McCurdy asked the Prime Minister if he was willing "to use his good offices to expedite the holding of a (...) peace conference on the Middle East." Acting Secretary of State for

¹³ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, pp. 14134 and 14135.

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 4 July 1988, pp. 17011, 17014, 17015 and 17016.

External Affairs Pat Carney reminded the House that Mr. Clark had stated that the Government was ready to examine how Canada could contribute to finding a solution acceptable to all parties involved. She added that "we already participate in the region through our peace-keeping forces and through development assistance."¹⁵

On 9 February, Liberal MP Sheila Finestone emphasized the need "for direct negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict" that is ravaging the West Bank and Gaza Strip. She completed her remarks by adding: "I urge all parties to refrain from further aggression and to work towards an environment in which a negotiated settlement can be found. The U.S. peace plan may be such a starting point."¹⁶

On 26 February, NDP member Bill Blaikie stated his hope that Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would soon put an end to their violent actions. He also underlined the fact that there "has not been a Canadian position elucidated with respect to many of the difficult questions which must be asked about (a peace) conference." International Trade Minister Pat Carney replied that the Secretary of State for External Affairs had stated Canada's position in the House of Commons on a number of occasions.¹⁷

On 14 March, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy wanted to know if the Prime Minister had approved of the final version of the External Affairs Minister's speech on the Middle East and if the speech expressed "explicitly (...) the position of the Prime Minister and his Government

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 2 February 1988, p. 12529.

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 9 February 1988, p. 12776.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 26 February 1988, p. 13175.

on the (...) matters taking place in the Middle East?" Mr. Clark replied, asserting that the statements made to the Canada-Israel Committee did reflect the policy of the Government of Canada.¹⁸

The same day Conservative MP Reginald Stackhouse asked Mr. Clark if the Government had informed U.S. officials of its position on the Shultz peace plan. The Secretary of State for External Affairs stated:

Canada has expressed clearly and unequivocally our support for the initiatives being taken by the United States Secretary of State. As the House will know, they are based upon the principle of territorial compromise in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. That requires movement by both sides.

To that end, among other initiatives in which we might have some influence, I have instructed Ambassadors for Canada in countries in the Middle East, and in countries that might have some influence upon Palestinians, to encourage Palestinian leaders vigorously to recognize formally and declare formally their acceptance of the independence and territorial integrity of the State of Israel.¹⁹

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¹⁸ Commons Debates, 14 March 1988, p. 13697.

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26. NORTH AFRICA

Background

Western Sahara

The conflict in Western Sahara persists despite feverish diplomatic activity by North African countries since 1987. The Saharan conflict, which has accounted for about 100,000 deaths since 1975, pits Morocco against the Polisario Front, supported by Algeria. Polisario members are demanding independence for Western Sahara, which has been occupied by Morocco since the end of Spanish colonial rule. The United Nations is still attempting to organize a referendum on the future of this territory, but although the parties to the conflict favour this initiative, they have placed various conditions on their participation. In 1987, a joint mission of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) visited Western Sahara and the bordering states in an attempt to find a political solution to the conflict, but failed to achieve any satisfactory results.

In the interim, Polisario guerillas have intensified assaults on Moroccan troops, and occasionally inflicted heavy damage. In April 1987, Morocco completed its sixth "wall of defence", a line of barbed wire fences linking a series of fortified positions, to prevent guerilla infiltrations. This wall, which is close to the border with Mauritania, led to protests by that country, which fears the conflict will spill over its border. Despite the withdrawal of its troops from Western Sahara in 1978 and its subsequent neutral stand, Mauritania is increasingly affected by rebel attacks.

On 4 May 1987, a tripartite summit of Morocco's King Hassan II, Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia marked the start of ongoing talks between Algiers and Rabat, with a series of high level meetings. In March 1988, Algeria and Morocco resumed diplomatic relations, after a 12-year break caused by Algeria's decision in 1976 to recognize the Democratic Saharwi Arab Republic (DSAR) proclaimed by the Polisario Front. The thaw in relations, achieved with Tunisian assistance, nurtured hope for a settlement in the Saharan conflict, although no clear solution is yet in view.

Libya-Chad

Another serious conflict in North Africa has involved Libya and Chad since 1980, primarily due to Libyan military intervention in domestic strife in Chad. This war took a new turn in 1987 as Chad's government forces, with the support of most rebel factions in the country, won several victories over Colonel Qaddafi's forces. A series of offensives by Hissène Habré's troops north of the 16th parallel (a line drawn in 1983 by France, dividing the country into the Libyan controlled North and the Chad government controlled South) enabled N'Djamena to retake several major cities (such as Fada, Ouadi-Doum and Faya Largeau) while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, which had to retreat toward the northern border. In August, government forces briefly captured the Aozou strip, a border region in northern Chad controlled by Libya but claimed by both countries, and even entered Libyan territory a short time later, reaching the Maatenes-Sara air-land base. In September, Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia and of the Organization of African Unity, mediated a cease-fire between the two sides. The dispute over the Aozou strip was then submitted to international arbitration.

Chad receives logistic and military assistance from France and the United

States. In 1987, it was learned that supplies from both countries to the Republic of Chad included Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Approximately 1,200 French soldiers are stationed in Chad and are involved in such operations as air defence.

Despite Chad's victories, peace is still not in sight and sporadic battles continue, especially along the Sudanese border. N'Djamena suspects a Libyan offensive in eastern Chad due to the presence of Libyan troops in the Sudan. Tripoli will probably renew efforts to unite the various guerilla groups and resume fighting.

Current Canadian Position

Canada maintains an attitude of strict neutrality toward the situation in Western Sahara, opting for a policy of non-interference and non-indifference. Ottawa encourages the ongoing mediation efforts of United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar aimed at settling the conflict, and places great hope in the fact that all parties involved have proposed, either in the United Nations or elsewhere, that a referendum be held in Western Sahara. Two Canadians participated in the UN technical mission conducted in the fall of 1987 to gather the information needed to hold such a referendum.

Canada abstained from voting on the resolution concerning Western Sahara passed by the 41st and 42nd sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 and 1987. This resolution (93 for, 0 against and 50 abstentions at the 42nd session) called on the two parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a cease-fire that would create the necessary conditions for a referendum. In

explaining its abstention on both resolutions, Canada pointed out that "its neutrality should not be seen as a sign of indifference toward this deplorable situation." [translation] It also urged the parties involved "to continue to use every available means at their disposal to move as quickly as possible toward a solution that is mutually acceptable and enjoys the credibility of the international community." [translation]

Canada has no established policy on the Chad-Libya conflict.

Parliamentary Comment

The conflicts in North Africa have not been raised in the House of Commons since summer 1987.

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27. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Background

While 1987 saw an intensification of the wars ravaging southern Africa, 1988 has been marked by the continuing search for a settlement to the armed conflicts by all parties involved, who seem to be in favour of negotiation. There are serious obstacles, however, which must be overcome.

It is possible that the diplomatic activity seen in the area since the beginning of 1988 has been the result of the absence of a clear military victory by any of the combatants and the extreme cost of the intervention by South Africa in a region stretching from the northern provinces of Mozambique, along the borders of Botswana and Zimbabwe, to the central Angolan plateau.

Angola and Namibia

At the centre of the talks was the war in Angola. The various parties in the area are faced with a new state of affairs, including the repeated negotiations between U.S. and Angolan officials on the withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Angola. In January 1988, Luanda accepted for the first time the principle of a complete withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the southern African conflict. A major component of this framework is the independence of currently South African-controlled Namibia. Other recent developments include the 3 and 4 May 1988 conference in London of U.S., South African, Cuban and Angolan representatives, direct talks between Angola and South Africa nine days later in Brazzaville and another

upcoming meeting of officials from the four countries. The London conference saw the South African delegation formally accept the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia in exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban forces. Talk of any kind of peace formula leading to "national reconciliation" in Angola is, however, premature. In early June there was even speculation that the negotiations had reached an impasse, but the talks continued thanks to the efforts of American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker. The major issues are the timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban troops, U.S. and South African military aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group and the pullout of South African forces from Angola.

Although there is widespread speculation about a political settlement to the Angolan conflict, fighting continues. Despite intense clashes and the increased involvement of Cuban and South African troops in the battle for the key city of Cuito Cuanavale, which began following the large-scale, September 1987 offensive by Angolan forces against UNITA rebels in the southeast, there has been no clearcut victory by any side. It must be pointed out that Angola is now much better equipped with sophisticated radar systems, surface-to-air missile batteries and advanced Soviet fighters.

Mozambique

With Mozambique being involved in a struggle with the South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) rebel group since 1975, the political and economic situation continues to be a cause for great concern given the immense number of victims of the war and successive famines. Despite the assistance of troops from both Zimbabwe (10,000 soldiers) and Tanzania, the Mozambique Government controls only the

cities, while roughly 20,000 rebels command the rural areas. Moreover, Zimbabwe is becoming increasingly alarmed at the spreading of the conflict into its territory. As well, since 1987 a number of Western countries have sided with the nations in the region and increased their economic and military assistance to the Chissano Government. With regard to military operations, RENAMO suffered a major defeat in March 1987 when it was forced to withdraw from the Zambezi River valley, thereby losing its control over the area.

South Africa

The chances of political change in South Africa are slight. The May 1987 parliamentary elections saw President Botha's National Party returned to power with fifty-four per cent of votes cast, which means a comfortable seventy-four per cent majority. Opposed to any kind of racial reform, the Conservative Party now forms the official opposition, having increased the number of seats held from seventeen to twenty-two. Despite strikes by black workers in some industrial sectors, the spontaneous uprisings in the townships of 1985 and 1986 have tapered off since 1987 owing to the Botha Government's declaration of a state of emergency and adoption of even more restrictive measures. Clashes between the Pretoria Government and the African National Congress (ANC) continued.

Ethiopia - Somalia

In April 1987, Ethiopia and Somalia resumed negotiations toward a settlement of their dispute over Ogaden, the territory at the root of the 1977-1978 Somali-Ethiopian war. Talks were held despite a border attack by Ethiopian troops in February. In April 1988, both countries agreed to resume diplomatic relations, withdraw their troops from the border area and curb subversive activities against each other.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has attempted to assist those countries affected by the conflicts in southern Africa. One example of this is Ottawa's acceptance in 1977 to be a member of the Contact Group, a body comprising five Western countries and established by the UN to find a solution to the problem of the South African occupation of Namibia. In addition, Canada annually provides roughly 140 million dollars in economic aid, chiefly through the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), to front-line states such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. The SADCC is composed of "a regional organization of nine southern African states committed to accelerated economic development and reduced dependence on South Africa through increased regional integration and self-reliance."¹ While Canada gives assistance to the front-line states and helps them ensure their security, Ottawa refuses to provide any direct military support. Finally, since 1961, when the Diefenbaker Government declared its opposition to apartheid, Canada has repeatedly condemned South Africa for its racist policies and has gradually, especially since 1985, imposed limited economic sanctions against Pretoria (see the 1986-1987 Guide).

Since the summer of 1987, Canada has received visits from Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, and Reverend Allan Boesak, President of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Canada also hosted the October 1987 Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver, where once again much of the discussion was focussed on South Africa.

¹ Intervention of Pierre Blais, Minister of State (Agriculture), Commons Debates, 19 October 1987, p. 10160.

In a 22 September 1987 speech at the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, Joe Clark asserted that the sanctions imposed against Pretoria had been effective from both an economic and psychological point of view. By introducing additional restrictions on individual rights, Pretoria has fostered a greater mobilization of South Africans intent on obtaining reforms. Mr. Clark also stated:

We are at a critical stage in the campaign to end apartheid. (...) The pressure against apartheid must continue and increase, and the challenge, in the United Nations and elsewhere, is to find peaceful and effective means to build that pressure. It is not enough to ask others to act.²

The same ideas are found in the final communiqué from the Vancouver Commonwealth Conference. The document also refers to reinforcing the efforts of the front-line states to counter the South African policies of destabilization and destruction³, as well as increasing in various ways the assistance provided to victims of apartheid in South Africa. To achieve these objectives, the Commonwealth heads of state established a special committee of eight foreign affairs ministers to be chaired by Mr. Clark.

In a 10 November 1987 news release, Mr. Clark "called on the Government of the Republic of South Africa to act quickly to release political prisoners who remain in detention for opposing apartheid". He also called for an end to the state of emergency.⁴

² Statements and Speeches, DEA, 22 September 1987.

³ Communiqué, The Okanagan Statement on Southern Africa and Programme of Action, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Vancouver, 1987.

⁴ News Release, No. 209, DEA, 10 November 1987.

In a 19 November statement to the regular meeting of the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly, Canadian representative Walter McLean made several observations, including that "(t)he Government of South Africa must recognize the inevitability of change (...) before time runs out", this alluding to pressure being exerted both inside and outside the country. Mr. McLean also underlined the difficult conditions in Namibia and Mozambique, two countries that are victims of South African policy.⁵

A number of resolutions dealing with the apartheid policy of the South African Government were introduced during the same session. Canada voted in favour of the resolution calling for concerted international action to eliminate apartheid (Resolution A/42/L.32) and co-sponsored the resolution for the creation of a UN special allotment fund for South Africa (Resolution A/42/L.36). A consensus emerged on the latter resolution. On other issues Canada either voted against or abstained. Chief among Canada's reservations were: the reference to armed resistance in the resolution on assistance to liberation movements (L.26) and the resolution concerning the work program of the Special Committee Against Apartheid (L.30); accusations levelled against specific countries (L.28 and L.29); and the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa (Resolution L.31, calling for an oil embargo, and Resolution L.28).⁶

Canada also abstained on the Namibian resolutions for procedural reasons related to its participation in the Contact Group, which practices neutrality in such matters. The Canadian delegation stressed that the intransigence of South Africa on the question of Namibia, the creation of a so-called interim government and the setting of conditions for the

⁵ News Release No. 54, New York, 19 November 1987.

⁶ "Explanation Of Votes, Item 33: Apartheid", 20 November 1987.

implementation of Resolution 435, reflected a defiance of the principles on which the UN was founded.⁷

In February 1988, Joe Clark repeatedly condemned "...the South African Government's imposition of draconian new restrictions on the political activities of 17 anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa". He indicated that "these measures will limit severely if not totally prohibit political activity by a number of the most important groups engaged in non-violent opposition to apartheid and in providing support to its victims."⁸

In a House of Commons speech on South Africa on 2 March 1988, Joe Clark stated that it was the wrong time for Canada to sever diplomatic ties with that country. Closure of the embassy in Pretoria would deprive Ottawa of a valuable source of information and would adversely affect Canada's aid program of roughly five million dollars per year. Mr. Clark continued:

(...) if we were absent from Pretoria we would have more difficulty mounting an aid program in Namibia, more difficulty advancing Canadian and Commonwealth (...) interest in South Africa, and no ability to demonstrate within South Africa itself our solidarity with anti-apartheid leaders." With respect to economic relations, he indicated that Ottawa is reviewing two aspects of its policy: "First, to see if there are new economic measures which Canada might take effectively alone. Second, to encourage broader action, particularly by countries who prize democracy, in specific response to South Africa's multiple assaults upon freedom

⁷ "Question of Namibia, Explanation of Vote", presented by C.V. Svoboda, member of the Canadian delegation, 6 November 1987.

⁸ See especially News Release(s) No. 048 and No. 050, DEA, 24 and 26 February 1988. One of these was drafted in the name of the Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.

during the last week.⁹

Parliamentary Comment

In the House of Commons on 9 September 1987, Liberal MP Roland de Corneille asked Mr. Clark if he was going to attempt to obtain a comprehensive agreement on sanctions from all Commonwealth states. Mr. Clark replied:

The position of the Government is very clear on the question of sanctions. We believe they are effective economically and, more importantly, psychologically. We naturally believe that they would be more effective if they were more universal. (Mr. Clark responded to a second question by Mr. de Corneille.) We are prepared, if necessary, if other measures do not succeed, to disrupt, to end, economic and diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa. It should be understood that to do that would take us out of influence on the pressures to try to bring an end to apartheid. We do not think it is yet the time for Canada to take itself out of influence on ending apartheid.¹⁰

The following day Opposition Leader John Turner also asked, the question this time being put to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, if Canada was going to sever all relations with South Africa and impose full economic sanctions before the end of the year "unless the Government of that country takes concrete and visible measures to put an end to the apartheid regime?" Key to Mr. Mulroney's response was that: "We are trying to do two things: maintain ever more sustained pressure on South Africa and, second, make consequential radical changes in the apartheid

⁹ Speeches, 88/17, DEA, 2 March 1988.

¹⁰ Commons Debates, 9 September 1987, pp. 8776 and 8777.

system (...)."11

On 17 September, Mr. de Corneille again addressed himself to Mr. Clark, asking if he shared the views of Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal, who stated that Canada and the other Commonwealth countries "will have to provide more than army boots if they are serious about the security needs" of the front-line states. The central element of Mr. Clark's response was that "(...) there has been in Canada for some time a reluctance to become involved in what is traditionally called military aid. We do have the MTAP program that has very limited application. I do not think there would be much support in Canada for going beyond that kind of program (...)."12

On 22 September, Mr. de Corneille brought a motion to force the Canadian Government to take steps to strengthen Mozambique's economy and internal stability, asserting that the humanitarian aid currently being provided by Canada is insufficient. He added: "The amount of money given to Mozambique is pitiful compared to some of the other front-line states." Benno Friesen, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, stated that "the Government of Canada is well aware of the grave situation in Mozambique" and stressed that this year the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) will again spend approximately thirty-three million dollars in Mozambique.¹³

On 3 November, NDP member Howard McCurdy asked Mr. Clark what Canada's reaction was to the attack that very day by South African forces against

11 Commons Debates, 10 September 1987, p. 8823.

12 Commons Debates, 17 September 1987, p. 9047.

13 Commons Debates, 22 September 1987, pp. 9222 and 9223.

targets in Angola. The Secretary of State for External Affairs responded:

We have condemned and continue to condemn the aggression of South Africa with respect to Angola. We believe that the occupation of Namibia, as the Hon. Member knows, is illegal. We believe that that question should be resolved in accordance with the Security Council resolution with which the Hon. Member is well acquainted. It is part of a pattern of violence in South Africa that will continue so long as the apartheid system remains in place.¹⁴

In 1988 a number of Liberal and NDP members stood in the Commons to call for a break in economic and diplomatic ties between Canada and South Africa. The Conservative Government maintained its position as stated in the 2 March 1988 address to the House.

On 25 March 1988, Liberal MP Andre Ouellet questioned Mr. Clark on Canadian aid to Mozambique given the current famine and fact that the bilateral assistance program unveiled in January will not begin before late 1989. Mr. Clark replied that he was prepared "to consider any means likely to help us provide assistance as soon as possible." Mr. Ouellet went on to remind Mr. Clark of the constant efforts of South Africa to destabilize the Mozambican Government, a policy which according to Mr. Ouellet only adds to Mozambique's problems.¹⁵

On 29 March, Mr. Ouellet again spoke out, this time concerning South African border raids into neighbouring countries, especially a recent attack against Botswana. He stated:

¹⁴ Commons Debates, 3 November 1987, p. 10682.

¹⁵ Commons Debates, 25 March 1988, p. 14132.

I urge the Canadian Government to condemn this incursion into Botswana and to increase its pressure on the South African Government to end its menacing raids on neighbouring south African countries which, unlike South Africa, are trying to develop along non-racist lines.¹⁶

In a 2 May 1988 statement on the political dimension of the food shortage in Ethiopia, Conservative MP Reginald Stackhouse observed:

(...) Canada's ambassador to Ethiopia has finally recognized that country's food crisis has a political component. Drought is not its only cause. (...) It has always been partly due to the Marxist militaristic oppressive regime of that country. The dictatorial Dergue has been determined to turn Ethiopia into a massive collective farm even if that has reduced food production. It has spent 46 per cent of its resources on weapons while its people have gone hungry. It is now preventing food supplies from reaching two million people in the rebel held North. Canada has condemned the use of food supplies as an instrument of political policy. It is time and more than time that we condemned this action in Ethiopia.¹⁷

Finally, on 27 June, Conservative MP Alan Redway referred to a demonstration organized by the Eritrean Canadian community in Ottawa "(...) in support of emergency relief and Eritrean self-determination and in opposition to Ethiopian aggression and the massacre of civilians by Soviet supplied napalm and cluster-bombs." Mr. Redway stated:

I call upon the Minister for External Relations (Mrs. Landry) to send emergency relief directly to Eritrea on an urgent basis and call upon the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Clark) to demand that the Ethiopian Government stop using Soviet napalm and cluster-bombs on women and

¹⁶ Commons Debates, 29 March 1988, p. 14237.

¹⁷ Commons Debates, 2 May 1988, p. 15011.

children.¹⁸

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¹⁸ Commons Debates, 27 June 1988, p. 16806.

28. SOUTHERN ASIA

Background

Southern Asia underwent major change in 1987 and 1988, highlighted by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

The Soviets had been saying for more than a year that they would be willing to pull out of Afghanistan under certain conditions. On 8 February 1988, Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan in less than 10 months, starting on 15 May 1988, provided the United States and Pakistan refrained from any interference or intervention in Afghan affairs. He added that this withdrawal was not linked in any way to the type of government in power in Kabul. This announcement was followed by negotiations in Geneva between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union which led to the signing of an agreement on 14 April providing for repatriation of the Soviet expeditionary corps between 15 May 1988 and 15 February 1989 (at the latest). The Afghan resistance rejected this agreement and announced that it would continue its struggle until the communist regime in Kabul had been overthrown. The accord covers only the "foreign" aspects of the conflict and does not address the internal struggles. It does not require an end to Soviet military aid to the Kabul government or to US military assistance to Pakistan and the resistance.

The Soviet Union announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan during 1987, at a time when the Afghan Mujahideen had considerably strengthened their military capability, mainly through an

increase in arms shipments (primarily from the United States), as well as through progress in coordinating local military activities and evidence of greater professionalism in some regions.¹ Most of Moscow's military operations during the year were defensive and achieved little success.

The departure of Soviet troops, however, does not solve the problems of achieving peace within Afghanistan and choosing a government capable of running the country. The failure of the "policy of national reconciliation" introduced at the end of 1986 by President Najibullah and Moscow, which called for creation of a coalition government, but with the Afghan Communist Party (PDPA) still firmly in control, and the split between the various resistance movements, suggest the possibility of a prolonged civil war.

India-Pakistan

Antagonism between India and Pakistan grew with Pakistan's continuing efforts to manufacture nuclear arms, India's acquisition of new types of military equipment and clashes between armies of the two countries in the mountains of Kashmir. However, military manoeuvres by both countries in border areas in early 1987, resulting in troop build-ups on both sides, almost reached the flashpoint. The climate of tension was successfully contained and the incident was settled after a visit to India by Pakistan's President Zia-ul Haq. In April 1988, the New York Times reported that Pakistan had conducted a test of a medium-range surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. In February, India had also tested a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 240 km,

¹ Strategic Survey 1987-1988, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1988, p. 135.

capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to several major cities in Pakistan.

India-China

The eighth session of Sino-Indian talks on the border problem was held in November 1987, against a background of charges by both sides of border violations and unjustified troop build-ups in border zones. These negotiations closely followed the uprising of nationalist partisans in Tibet. The Soviet union exerted pressure on New Delhi to settle its differences with Pakistan and China, and Mr. Gorbachev raised this issue during his visit to India in November 1987.

Sri Lanka

Finally, civil unrest and the many other internal problems besetting India did not prevent Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi from intervening in the armed conflict in Sri Lanka between the Colombo government and the Tamil minority. Indian forces entered Sri Lankan territory twice, on 3 and 4 June 1987, to provide material assistance to Jaffna, a northern city with a Tamil majority. A cease-fire agreement was signed on 29 July 1987 by India's prime minister and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. New Delhi immediately sent 15,000 troops to Sri Lanka to monitor observance of the agreement. The number of Indian troops grew to 40,000 by the end of the year and 80,000 in April 1988.² This agreement gives the Tamils certain powers that enable them to exercise control in areas where they form the majority (primarily in northern Sri Lanka), but stops short of declaring these territories independent, which would jeopardize Sri Lankan unity. This "political solution" has little chance of success, because of

² Canadian-Asian Working Group on Human Rights, April 1988.

opposition by both the Sri Lankan majority and the main Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Indian peace-keeping forces have also engaged in bloody confrontations with the same group they are supposed to protect, the Tamil separatists.

Current Canadian Position

In recent years, the Canadian government has repeatedly condemned Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and human rights violations committed there by Soviet and Afghan forces. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and Canada's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, have made statements to this effect on various occasions. Canada supplies more than \$20 million a year in aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In an address to the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly in October 1987, Mr. Lewis again denounced the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, calling this a testing ground for glasnost.³ In November and December, Canada supported two resolutions on Afghanistan passed by the General Assembly (A/42/L.16 and A/42/803/Add.1). The first called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and urged the parties involved to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict; the second expressed the General Assembly's concern over human rights abuses committed by Afghan authorities with the support of foreign troops, and urged the parties in the conflict to apply the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

³ News Release No. 51, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, 9 November 1987.

After an agreement was signed for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Mr. Clark made a statement on 8 April 1988 praising this initiative, but expressing concern over the lack of negotiations in Geneva to achieve a cease-fire and halt arms shipments to the warring factions. Mr. Clark also voiced dismay that no agreement had been reached to form a government in Afghanistan acceptable to the Mujahideen. He added "...that the outcome of the Geneva process is only the first stage in creating conditions that will bring eventual peace to Afghanistan."⁴

Following the Geneva accord, Canada, which had stated its willingness to assist the United Nations in peace efforts in Afghanistan, agreed to provide five officers for the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) that would oversee application of the provisions contained in the accord.

In Canada's relations with India, the situation in the Punjab was of special concern to Ottawa because of activities by a militant minority of the country's Sikh community. In the first week of March 1988, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark sent a letter to several provincial premiers regarding the activities of three Sikh organizations in Canada. This letter asked the premiers to avoid attending meetings or participating in activities that might inadvertently sanction the separatist objectives of these groups. In response to criticisms raised by some Members of Parliament and to the tabling of a motion by Liberal MPs, Mr. Clark addressed the House on 10 March, explaining again the reasons for his actions and noting in particular that "...the activities of a small group of Sikhs in Canada constitutes one of the most serious

⁴ DEA News Release, No. 076, 8 April 1988.

threats which Canada faces today."⁵ On 15 May 1988, speaking at a dinner to honour the visit of K. Natwar Singh, India's Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark stated:

The trouble in India creates tension in Canada--tension that can explode into violence even here. [...]the peace of the Sikh community in Canada is threatened by the violence in Punjab. The security of relatives is threatened. And, tragically, a tiny group of Canadians of Sikh origin abuses their rights, in Canada, by counselling or pursuing terrorism in India, or supporting separatism there. The majority of Canadians of Sikh origin work tirelessly and fearlessly to ensure that moderate views prevail in the Canadian community. This Government, encourages those moderates, and opposes extremists who abuse Canadian law and traditions. But the connections between the Punjab and Canada are personal and profound. It is much more difficult to encourage moderation in Canada while violence continues in Amritsar and elsewhere. Among the urgent issues we share in common is the need to bring peace and justice to the Punjab, and we pray that occurs.⁶

Parliamentary Comment

On 29 October 1987, Conservative MP Lloyd R. Crouse tabled the report of an official Canadian Parliamentary delegation that visited Pakistan in September. On this occasion, he spoke of the annual food aid program for refugees living in Pakistan, introduced by Canada three years earlier. Mr. Crouse pointed out certain changes that could be made to this aid

⁵ SSEA, Statement 88/19, 10 March 1988.

⁶ DEA, Statements 88/28, 15 May 1988.

program.⁷

On 3 March 1988, Leader of the Opposition John Turner questioned Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on his letter to the provincial premiers regarding certain Sikh organizations in Canada. He asked, "Will the Minister explain to the House why he has chosen to condemn and boycott all members of these organizations for the alleged actions of a few?" Mr. Clark replied:

Some members of those organizations seek legitimacy in Canada by identifying themselves with prominent Canadians and some of them have engaged in or promote violence in Canada and elsewhere. Those are activities which should not appear to be condoned by Canadian authorities. As the Right Hon. Leader of the Opposition well knows, some members of the Canadian Sikh community do not feel free to speak on these matters. The Government has a duty to help Canadians live their lives in peace and in freedom. We are going to do that.⁸

On 27 May 1988, Liberal MP André Ouellet hailed the Soviet departure from Afghanistan:

Secretary General Gorbachev is to be commended for his decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, and we hope the Soviet authorities have learned a lesson from this unfortunate experience. Yesterday, Vietnam, today Afghanistan. Let us hope the superpowers will understand they should influence the peoples of this world through their outstanding

⁷ Commons Debates, 29 October 1987, p. 10535.

⁸ Commons Debates, 3 March 1988, pp. 13367 and 13368.

achievements in science, medicine and the arts, not with bayonets.⁹

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⁹ Commons Debates, 27 May 1988, p. 15843.

29. EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Background

China - Soviet Union and the Indochina Conflict

The recent improvement in Sino-Soviet relations has influenced the foreign policy of some countries in East and Southeast Asia since 1987. With the much-talked about July 1986 speech in Vladivostok by Mikhail Gorbachev on the new shape of Soviet foreign policy in Asia as a background, talks between China and the Soviet Union on the border dispute resumed in February after nine years of silence. Discussions on the normalization of political relations between the two countries continued.

With regard to the border area, the withdrawal of a Soviet mechanized infantry division, completed in June 1987, is one of the most concrete steps to have been taken in the wake of the Vladivostok speech. Other developments include the agreement between China and Mongolia on measures designed to enhance mutual confidence, the reduction in the number of Chinese troops along the China-USSR border and the Kremlin's decision to eliminate 100 SS-20 medium range missiles stationed in Asia. Moscow and Beijing (Peking) continued their discussions on the border conflict involving the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. In 1987 the two countries agreed that the Amur River would be used for transportation and trade and hydro-electric projects. Despite the progress made, some portions of the border continue to be in dispute, most notably the sector near Khabarovsk.

In the area of Sino-Soviet talks to normalize relations, the major point of focus was the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. China, one of the members of the anti-Vietnamese coalition, wants the Soviet Union, an ally of Vietnam, to put increased pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea, a country it has occupied since 1978 and from which it has promised to withdraw by 1990. Since 1987 both Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) have shown signs of a willingness to reach a political settlement to the conflict. An example of this has been Vietnam's efforts over the past year to stimulate a resumption of talks between the PRK and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). At a December meeting in Paris, Prince Sihanouk, one of the leaders of the CGDK, the main opposition group, and Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the pro-Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh, attempted to set out a process for national reconciliation. A second meeting between the two was held a short time thereafter. While no concrete results were achieved during these talks, they did give rise to hopes for the future. Other proposals for resolving the conflict which continue to be under discussion include those put forward by Indonesia in its mediation efforts, as well as the "framework of negotiation for a political settlement of the Cambodian problem" adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981. In October 1987, during its 42nd session, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces from Kampuchea. The resolution, voted on in the UN since 1979, had never before been adopted with such a strong majority (117 voting in favour, twenty-one against, including Vietnam and the Soviet Union, with sixteen countries abstaining).

There were repeated clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese forces along the border, and it is estimated that this fighting has resulted in at least 30,000 deaths since 1979. Thailand and Laos have also been

involved in border clashes, each accusing the other of interfering in its internal affairs. A far more positive development was the normalization of relations between China and Laos at the end of 1987, with both countries pledging to improve relations and exchange ambassadors.

Japan - Soviet Union

Despite the fact that Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific cannot ignore the interests of Toyko, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be strained, as they have been since the end of 1986. Widely cited as the greatest obstacle to an improvement in relations is the territorial dispute over the islands north of Hokkaido seized by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War and over which Japan claims sovereignty. In addition, Moscow is less than pleased about Japan's participation in the Star Wars defence program. In light of the weakening of the United States and the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific, Japan's declared intention, made public in 1987, of assisting in insuring the stability of the South Pacific constituted a major diplomatic initiative. This followed Japan's formal decision in January to increase the ceiling on defence spending by 1 per cent.

East Timor

Finally, the dispute between Indonesia and Portugal over East Timor continues to be a diplomatic burden for Jakarta. A former Portuguese possession, East Timor declared independence in 1975 but was subsequently invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces. Indonesia now considers East Timor part and parcel of its own territory. While this issue is the subject of intense debate in Portugal, there is little chance of direct negotiation between the two parties. In the fall of 1987, during the

42nd session of the UN General Assembly, it was decided for the fifth consecutive year that the East Timor question would not be part of the agenda.

North Korea and South Korea

Since 1987 North and South Korea have been unable to agree to terms necessary for a resumption of the bilateral talks broken off in January 1986. None of the proposals put forward by either of the parties has been acceptable to the other. On the eve of the Olympic Games to be held in Seoul in September 1988, the only development giving rise to any hope of improvement in relations between the two countries was the July 1988 declaration of Roh Tae Woo, the President of South Korea. However, the North rejected all elements of the declaration. Most notable among President Roh's proposals was a formula for economic free trade and cultural exchanges between the two countries.

Current Canadian Position

Canada is one of the members of the anti-Vietnamese coalition along with China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), certain west European countries and the United States. In 1979, following the Vietnamese invasion, Ottawa suspended its aide to Vietnam and in 1982 recognized the CGDK. Canada supports peace efforts such as those made by the ASEAN countries and once again co-sponsored in October 1987 the UN resolution on the situation in Kampuchea. Ottawa also provides financial support to the non-Communist elements of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Finally, the Government of Canada gave tens of millions of dollars in aid to Indochinese refugees in first asylum countries and has

welcomed more than 100,000 of these refugees as immigrants to Canada. Some observers condemn Canada's position on Vietnam as being too closely linked to that of the United States, the ASEAN countries and China. These observers call for a Canadian policy in the region which is more specific and less passive.

On 14 October 1987, the day during the 42nd session of the UN General Assembly on which the Kampuchea resolution was tabled, Canadian MP John Bosley made a declaration on the situation in that country. After strongly condemning the permanent occupation by a foreign power and reminding the Assembly of the suffering of the Khmer people, Mr. Bosley stated that:

(...) there can be no realistic basis for a solution until Vietnam is committed to an early withdrawal of its troops. Vietnam must soon make such a commitment or stand convicted of the same imperialism of which it used to accuse others. For our part, Canada continues to support ASEAN in its attempts to find the appropriate lasting political solution - one that will bring the Khmer people what they deserve - peace and justice, prosperity and freedom - one that will avoid both occupation and atrocities.¹

With respect to the Korean question, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark welcomed the July 1988 declaration made by the President of the Republic of Korea, Roh Tae Woo, proposing to improve exchanges between North and South Korea. Mr. Clark indicated that "We strongly support the restoration of the dialogue between North and South Korea which is critical to easing the tension on the Korean peninsula."²

¹ News Release, No. 33, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 14 October 1987.

² DEA News Release, No. 146, 11 July 1988.

Parliamentary Comment

The countries of East Asia and the Pacific discussed above were not the subject of any interventions in the House of Commons.

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30. HUMAN RIGHTS

Background

The International Charter on Human Rights is the foremost international legal instrument on human rights. It comprises : the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol. Other instruments aimed at protecting human rights are the Helsinki Final Act adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for the countries of Europe and North America, and numerous conventions related, for example, to the rights of women, the rights of refugees, and those regarding labour, racial discrimination and torture.

Government adherence to international human rights standards is monitored by UN agencies, particularly the General Assembly (Third Committee), the UN Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Committee and the International Labour Organization. Adherence to the Helsinki Final Act is monitored through the periodic meetings of the CSCE. There are also procedures established to respond to alleged human rights violations.

Canada has adopted legislation to protect human rights within its boundaries, namely the Canadian Bill of Rights, enacted in 1960, the Constitution Act on Human Rights (1977), and the Constitution Act comprising the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). Since human rights come under provincial jurisdiction, the Federal Government has worked with the provinces (which have also passed their own legislation) to formulate Canadian policies in this field. The twenty-four international instruments which Canada has ratified include

the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Ottawa ratified in 1987.

In its 1986 annual report, Amnesty International has once again referred to human rights violations by many governments around the world. The report gives details of the organization's research in 129 countries responsible for these violations. It addresses the issue of refugees who are often forced to leave their countries to avoid persecution. This fact is quite evident in many regions of the world; there are refugees in exile in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, America and Europe. Amnesty International's report underscores that governments have become more restrictive toward those who seek political asylum due to their increasing numbers and to pressing economic conditions. Amnesty International is concerned that host states, particularly in Europe and North America, tend to consider asylum requests as unfounded. It contends that governments have the obligation to ensure that legitimate political refugees seeking asylum are not turned back. Nevertheless, Amnesty International points out that even though humanitarian actions towards refugees are vital, they can have only limited success as long as the human rights violations, underlying this massive wave of refugees, are not stopped.¹

Current Canadian Position

In a speech given at the Technical University of Nova Scotia on 23 August 1987, the Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark referred to the Human Rights issue. He pointed out : "(...) Canada, of course,

¹ Amnesty International Report 1987, London : Amnesty International publication, 1987.

cannot impose our standards on the world, but we can act to seek respect for the standards the United Nations has established, and the obligations freely entered into in the Helsinki Accord." Clark added:

We are increasingly factoring human rights consideration into our aid and development policies, while taking care not to penalize the very people whose human rights are being abused.²

A news release issued by the Canadian Government on 13 November announced Ottawa's intention to establish a centre for international cooperation for the promotion of human rights and the development and strengthening of democratic institutions. Its primary focus will be co-operation between Canada and developing countries, and it will be known as the "International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development".³

On 9 December, Mr. Joe Clark announced the election of a Canadian, professor Peter Burns, to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, under the provisions of the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Since last summer, certain aspects of Canada's policy regarding human rights have been controversial. First, Bills C-55 and C-84, debated in Parliament and still pending Senate approval, have raised questions in the country. They aim to bring major changes to the immigration laws by making requests for political asylum subject to tighter control. Second, following a six-year ban, Ottawa renewed its economic assistance to Guatemala in the fall of 1987. This reversal was due to Guatemala's

² DEA, Statement 87/44, 26 August 1987.

³ Government of Canada, News Release, 13 November 1987.

return to civilian government. Ottawa's decision was strongly criticized by human rights advocates in Canada and Central America who allege that the human rights situation in Guatemala has not at all improved.

Moreover, Canada has been elected to a three-year term at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The election took place on 26 May at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, in which one third of the seats of the Commission were filled. The Commission is the key coordinating and policy-making body in the human rights field in the United Nations system. Canada last served on the Commission between 1976 and 1984.⁴

Finally, on 21 June 1988, the House of Commons Committee on Human Rights published a report entitled "Human Rights behind the Iron Curtain", in which it noted that "The countries behind the Iron Curtain have not lived up to the international obligations to which they have subscribed."⁵ Following public hearings held throughout the country during fourteen months, the report underscores that freedom of religion and national minorities rights remain very restricted in these countries; it condemns the USSR, Romania and Czechoslovakia for limiting freedom of movement and making emigration and family reunification very difficult, if not impossible.

Parliamentary Comment

Several members of parliament maintained that despite glasnost there are

⁴ DEA, News Release, No. 111, 27 May 1988.

⁵ "Human Rights Behind the Iron Curtain", First Report of the Standing Committee on Human Rights, June 1988, p. 4.

still many instances of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and that the Canadian Government should remain vigilant. Alluding to the absence of political freedom in that country, many participants called on the Soviet Government to "set the captives free" and to discharge its commitments under the Helsinki Accord.⁶

On 13 October 1987, Conservative Member Reginald Stackhouse, Chairman of the House of Commons Committee on Human Rights, indicated that, according to an Amnesty International report, thirty-three of the forty-nine countries in the Commonwealth were guilty of serious human rights violations. Having cited these countries, Stackhouse added :

Clearly human rights ought to be on the agenda of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Vancouver, and clearly we need an ongoing program here. Some of the offending countries receive Canadian development assistance. The Canadian Government will do right to use the leverage of its assistance programs to gain justice for people unable to secure it for themselves.⁷

Other members also condemned El Salvador, South Korea, Haiti, Israel and Ethiopia and Singapore for abusing human rights.⁸ On 2 November 1987, Mr. Reginald Stackhouse brought to the attention of the House that Ethiopia, to which CIDA has given \$20 million in bilateral aid so far, is responsible for human rights violations "which are patently systematic,

⁶ Common Debates, 15 September 1987, p. 8948, 20 October 1987, p. 10178.

⁷ Common Debates, 13 October 1987, p. 9909.

⁸ Common Debates, 28 August 1987, p. 8575; 30 October 1987, p. 10569; 10 December 1987, p. 11672; 19 January 1988, p. 12050; 25 February 1988, p. 12123, and 26 February 1988, p. 13169, 22 June 1988, p. 16704.

gross and continuous". According to him, the Canadian Government, prior to its new and renewed aid programs to Ethiopia, should insist that the Ethiopian Government come up to at least minimum standards with regard to human rights. He pointed out that the Government's response to the report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, which argued that human rights and overseas development assistance should always go together, was "that human rights concerns must be fully integrated into Canada's development policies."⁹

Lise Bourgault, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, replied :

We have raised these issues on a number of occasions with the Ethiopian authorities and, if need be, we will keep on doing so. We see the adoption of a new Constitution as a major event, since it amounts to a formal commitment to respect human rights in Ethiopia.

She also expressed her disappointment that a general amnesty for all political prisoners in Ethiopia was not announced on the day the new Constitution for the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was proclaimed.¹⁰

On 4 March 1988, NDP member Jim Fulton raised the issue of the rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. Noting that Canada has many treaties with its aboriginal first nations, he asked Mr. Joe Clark to support the proposed evaluation by a subcommittee to the United Nations Human Rights Commission of the legal status of treaties between aboriginal groups in Canada and aboriginal groups and other governments around the world.

⁹ Commons Debates, 2 November 1987, p. 10655.

¹⁰ Ibid..

Mr. Clark replied:

(...) Canada is trying to ensure that the legitimate questions relating to agreements affecting indigenous people apply to all the indigenous people of the world, not only those indigenous people who happen to have a treaty relation with the government of their country.

Speaking again, Mr. Fulton stated that Mr. Clark officials were arguing, in Geneva, that there were not any treaties between Canada and the first nations of this country. He asked:

(...) why will the Minister and his Government not stand up at the international level and defend what is in Canada's Constitution under section 35 which states that the treaty rights of aboriginal people of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed?

Mr. Clark replied:

In the United Nations and elsewhere we are seeking to ensure that the activities which are undertaken by that commission apply to the range of relations between aboriginal people and their Governments - not limited in Canada, not limited to Canada.¹¹

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¹¹ Commons Debates, 4 March 1988, pp. 13412-13413.

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31. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Background

International terrorism has remained a major policy issue for Western governments in recent years. This attention was largely the result of a general increase through the early to mid-1980s in the number of terrorist incidents, both internationally and in the Western nations. While the number of dramatic terrorist incidents has declined since then, terrorism is still widespread and attention to the issue has been maintained, in part, through the development and use of counterterrorist measures.

Common forms of terrorism include airplane hijackings, kidnappings, hostage-takings and bombings. Several groups are well-known internationally as being responsible for perpetrating terrorist activities.

In response to the wave of terrorist incidents in 1985, which included the Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacking and the Air India flight mid-air bombing, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a landmark resolution on terrorism on 9 December 1985. The resolution "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed."¹ After repeated US entreaties for concerted action on terrorism, the European Economic Community agreed, on 28 January 1986, to ban all arms sales to states clearly implicated in supporting terrorism.

¹ UNGA Fortieth Session Resolutions, Resolution 40/61, pp. 607-609.

In early 1986 Libya became the focus of Western and particularly of US concern over terrorism. US-Libyan hostilities peaked with the bombing of a discotheque in West Berlin on 5 April 1986 and US retaliatory attacks on two Libyan cities on 14 April.

At the conclusion of the Tokyo Economic Summit on 5 May 1986, the heads of government of the seven leading Western industrialized countries (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany and the United States) released a joint statement strongly condemning international terrorism, urging determined national and international action to combat it, and pledging to take strong measures against states supporting it. These commitments supplemented those entered into by Western governments in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 1978.

At meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the foreign ministers have repeatedly condemned terrorism and expressed their resolve to combat it jointly. At the May 1986 meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, the ministers "resolved to work together to eradicate this scourge and urge[d] closer international co-operation in this effort."²

In September 1987, the United States government, under pressure from members of Congress, ordered the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to close its Washington office. The move was designed to show disapproval of the elements in the PLO that favour using terrorist methods. In December, Congress approved the closing of all offices of the PLO in the US, including the observer office at the United Nations. This move, according to the UN, would violate the US commitment under a 1947 agreement not to impose restrictions on people invited to the UN

² NATO Press Service, Final Communique, No. M-DPC-1(86)15, 22 May 1986.

headquarters in New York, thus running counter to international law.

The UN General Assembly approved its legal committee's recommendation against closing the mission, by a vote of 145 to one. Israel was the lone dissenting vote, with the United States not participating.

Subsequently, the UN held a special session to challenge the anticipated order to close the PLO office. The session voted 143 to one in favour of the need for binding arbitration, and 143 to zero on asking for a world court advisory opinion on whether the US was obliged to enter into arbitration. Despite this, as well as US State Department efforts to prevent implementation of the Congressional action, on 11 March 1988 the US Justice Department gave the PLO until 21 March to close its mission. On 29 June a US Federal judge ruled that the Government could not force the PLO to close its office. The Justice Department was studying the ruling and stated that it would make a decision about further proceedings as soon as possible.

Terrorist incidents of note in 1987-88 included the continuation of hostage-takings in Lebanon, the victims being mainly American, French and British nationals.

In other major incidents related to the Middle East, on 5 April 1988 a Kuwait Airways jumbo jet was hijacked on a flight from Bangkok to Kuwait. The hijackers demanded the release of 17 Shiite Moslems imprisoned in Kuwait, but this was not accepted. Two passengers were killed in the ordeal. The siege ended 15 days later, while the airplane was located in Algeria.

On 16 April 1988 Abu Jihad, the PLO's military commander and Yasser Arafat's top aide, was assassinated in Tunis. The assassination was widely reported to have been undertaken by Israeli agents.

Terrorist incidents also occurred involving the Irish Republican Army. On 30 October 1987, Western security forces captured a Panamanian-registered ship sailing from Libya to Ireland, carrying 150 tons of arms and munitions. Three of the ship's crew were identified as IRA members. Although Libya denied it, British, Irish and French officials were convinced that the cargo was Libyan-supplied. The capture of the ships involved American, French, British and Irish security forces.

On 3 March 1988, three IRA members were shot in Gibraltar by British agents. Their funerals in Northern Ireland sparked a series of incidents including a grenade-throwing attack at the burial of the three IRA members on 16 March and the killing of two British soldiers at a later funeral.

A mysterious incident involving a North Korean saboteur occurred on 29 November 1987, when a Korean Air Lines jet exploded near Burma. The North Korean agent confessed to the planting of a bomb aboard the jet. The confession, however, raised many questions as to who else was involved and their motives.

Many Western officials have been pleased with the gains made in counterterrorist measures over the past two years. Improved coordination among Western security forces, harsher penalties and more strict travel regulations - including airport security and visa requirements for example - are believed to have reduced the effectiveness of terrorist efforts.

Current Canadian Position

Canada has not been immune to terrorist attacks. In March 1985 a guard was killed at the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. A bomb which exploded at Narita airport, Japan, and the bomb which may have destroyed the Air India jetliner on 22 June 1985, are believed to have been planted in Canada. On 25 May 1986 an attempt was made to assassinate Punjabi Minister Malkiad Singh Sidhu on Vancouver Island, allegedly by four members of the Sikh community.

The Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations recommended, in its final report, that airport security and border control be improved to deal with terrorism in Canada. It also recommended that the Government "work through the United Nations" by, for example, striving "to get support for a UN Security Council resolution to deny countries harbouring terrorists the right to invoke their sovereignty to prevent international action."³ Canada has strongly condemned international terrorism on several occasions, including External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1985 and through the Tokyo (May 1986), Venice (June 1987) and Toronto (June 1988) Economic Summits.

In January 1988 Canada and the United States issued a Joint Declaration on Counterterrorism, establishing a Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism to meet annually, or more often if required.⁴ On 9 February 1988 an 81-nation Diplomatic Conference was held at the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal. The result of a Canadian initiative aimed at deterring and

³ SJCCIR, Independence and Internationalism, 1986, pp. 63-64.

⁴ DEA News Release No. 008, 11 January 1988.

punishing the perpetrators of unlawful acts of violence at airports, it adopted a protocol to this effect, filling a gap in the international legal regime. Previously, only acts conducted on aircraft, not in airports, had been covered by international law.⁵

Parliamentary Comment

The status of the Canadian investigation into the 23 June 1985 Air India disaster sparked comment in the House of Commons. The Government was questioned by Liberal Party Member Mr. John Nunziata on whether it could explain the various aspects of the investigation, including the erasing of wiretap tapes. The Solicitor General, James Kelleher, stated that he could not disclose any information that might jeopardize the outcome of the matter. Mr. Kelleher denied charges that the Government had bungled the investigation and attempted a cover-up:

I can tell the Honourable Member and the House that this is the most extensive investigation the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have undertaken. Shortly after the incident, there were more than 200 officers working full-time on the case, at all times since then there have never been less than 50 officers working on the case. That is the situation today.⁶

On another issue, on 17 January 1988, it became public that Mahmoud Mohammed Issa Mohammed, a convicted Palestinian terrorist, was living in Canada. The issue was raised extensively in the House of Commons, although mainly in regard to its implications for Canadian immigration

⁵ DEA, News Release No. 046, 24 February 1988.

⁶ Commons Debates, 15 December 1987, pp. 11806-7.

policy. The Honourable Benoit Bouchard, Minister for Employment and Immigration, stated that despite Mohammed's presence, Canadian security was never jeopardized as the RCMP were aware of his whereabouts "the same day or day after this individual entered Canada."⁷

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Appendix 1

Canadian Treaty Obligations*

The Geneva Protocol of 1925

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).

Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

United Nations Charter

Signed: 26 June 1945.

Ratified: 9 November 1945.

Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

North Atlantic Treaty

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

* in the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.) Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.

Ratified: 28 January 1964.

Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

Outer Space Treaty

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof). Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.
Ratified: 17 May 1972.
Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

Biological Weapons Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction).

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.
Ratified: 18 September 1972.
Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

ENMOD Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques).

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.
Ratified: 11 June 1981.
Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Inhumane Weapons Convention

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects).

Signed: 10 April 1981.
Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.
Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Assistance for Nuclear Accidents

(Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency).

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport).

Signed: 22 September 1980.

Ratified: 21 March 1986.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

The Antarctic Treaty

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material).

Acceded: 4 May 1988.

Entered into force: 4 May 1988.

Appendix 2**The Canadian Armed Forces****1. Personnel (summer 1988)**

Regular Forces	87,299
Primary Reserve	25,404
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	35,891
Civilian Strength	37,929
	<u>186,523</u>

<u>Command</u> ¹	<u>Regulars</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Maritime	12,240	3,244	7,257	22,741
Mobile	20,185	19,458	5,815	45,458
Air	23,957	966	7,887	32,810

¹ Major commands only; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

2. Functional and Regional Commands**Command**

Maritime

Headquarters

Halifax, Nova Scotia

Mobile	St.-Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, F. R. Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

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3. Naval Forces - Maritime Command, Fleet Strength

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Patrol Submarines	3
Destroyers	4
Frigates	16 (3 reserve)
Replenishment Ships	3
Tanker, Small	1
Research Vessels	3
Patrol Vessels/Training Ships	7
Gate Vessels	5
Reserve Tenders	14
Tugs	14
Auxiliaries	25
	<hr/> 95

4. Land Forces - Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tanks	114 Leopard C-1
Armoured Fighting Vehicles - Reconnaissance	175 Lynx
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	195 Cougar
Armoured Personnel Carriers	1090 M-113 269 Grizzly
Artillery (Howitzer)	44 Model 44 [L-5] pack 105 mm) 189 towed 105 mm 50 M-109 Self-Propelled 155 mm
Anti-tank Weapons (TOW)	
Recoilless Rifles	787 Carl Gustav 84 mm
Anti-tank Guided Weapons	151 Tow
Air Defence	
Guns	57 L-40/60 40 mm
Surface-to-air Missiles	111 Blowpipe

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE 19 JULY 1988

5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Fighter	58 CF-116 (Freedom Fighter)
	118 CF-18D (F/A-18A/B Hornet)
Electronic Countermeasures	3 CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20)
	3 CC-144 Challenger
Maritime Reconnaissance	18 CP-140 Aurora
	19 CP-121 Tracker
Transport	28 CC-130E/H Hercules
	5 CC-137 (Boeing 707)
	7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan
	7 CC-138 Twin Otter
	12 CC-115 Buffalo
	56 CT-133 Silver Star
	124 CT-114 Tutor
	22 CT-134 Musketeer

Type (Helicopters)

Anti-Submarine Warfare	35 CH-124 Sea King
Observation	58 CH-136 Kiowa
Transport	40 CH-135 Twin Huey
	6 CH-147 Chinook
Search and Rescue	14 CH-113/A Labrador/ Voyageur
	9 CH-118 Iroquois
Training	14 CH-139 (Bell 206)

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6. Canadian Forces Europe

a. Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) - Headquarters: CFB Lahr, F. R. Germany

Unit Formation	Unit Name	Base
Armoured Regiment	The 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)	CFB Lahr
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1st Battalion, Royal 22 nd Regiment	CFB Baden- Soellingen CFB Lahr
Artillery Regiment	1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	CFB Lahr
Engineer Regiment	4 Combat Engineer Regiment	CFB Lahr
Helicopter Squadron	444 Tactical Helicopter Squadron	CFB Lahr
4 Air Defence Regiment	128 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Baden- Soellingen
	129 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Lahr
Headquarters & Signal Units	4 Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters and Signal Squadron	CFB Lahr
Support Units	4 Service Battalion	CFB Lahr
	4 Field Ambulance	CFB Lahr
	4 Military Police Platoon	CFB Lahr
Communications Units	CFE Communication Group Headquarters	CFB Lahr
	Communication Squadron	CFB Lahr
	Communication Squadron	CFB Baden- Soellingen

b. Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) - Headquarters: Lahr, F. R. Germany

Fighter	409 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden- Soellingen
	439 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden- Soellingen
	433 Tactical Fighter Squadron	CF-18	CFB Baden- Soellingen

Headquarters Unit
Support

Headquarters 1 CAD
1 Air Maintenance Squadron

CFB Lahr
CFB Baden-
Soellingen

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE 20 JULY 1988

Sources In addition to interviews with staff of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), the following sources were consulted for this Appendix:

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Appendix 3

Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to the Present

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution	Missions UN ¹	Other
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1948	22	22	298	S&O	
United Nations Military Observer Group India- Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-79	27	Yes ²	102-39	S	
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)	Korea	1950-54	8,000	-			PK
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)	Korea	1953-	2	-		0	
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-74	133	-		ICSC S	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1)	Egypt	1956-67	1,007	-	6,373-3,378	PK	
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-59	77	-	591-375	0	

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution	Missions	
						UN ¹	Other
Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo (Zaire)	1960-64	421	-	19,828	PK	
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea (West Irian)	1962-63	13	-	15,761	S	
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-64	36	-	189-25	0	
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	575	6,411-2,345	PK	
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Dominican Republic	1965-66	1	-	3	0	
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India-Pakistan Border	1965-66	112	-	96-78	0	
Observer Team (NTN)	Nigeria	1968-69	2	-		0	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 2)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-79	1,145	-	6,973-4,031	PK	

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution	Missions UN ¹	Other
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973-	278	-			IC 0
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel- Syria (Golan)	1974-	220	220	1,450		0-
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978-	117	-	7,000-5,773		S-
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Egypt- Israel	1982- (1986)	140	140	2,700		O&F
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Afgha- nistan Pakistan	1988	5	5	50		0

(1) O-Observation, S-Supervision, PK-Peacekeeping

(2) Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)

Source: Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, Proceedings, 18 March 1988 (updated from conversations with DEA officials).

Appendix 4

Public Opinion

Canadian public opinion in relation to arms control, defence policy, and regional conflict issues was measured through many polls conducted between July 1987 and July 1988. The results of these polls have been summarized below and categorized under the subject headings of Canadian Defence Policy; Canadian Foreign Policy; and International Affairs.

Canadian Defence Policy

A survey conducted between June and September 1987, commissioned by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), touched upon a number of issues related to Canadian defence policy. The poll, conducted by Longwoods Research Group, comprised a total of 1,015 respondents. On the question of the size of Canadian defence forces, it asked: "From what you know or have read, do you think Canadian defence forces should be larger, about the present size, or smaller?" The poll found that 63 per cent felt that the forces should be larger, 33 per cent about the present size, and 5 per cent, smaller.

On a related issue, 23 per cent of respondents believed that Canada should increase the size of its armed forces in Europe; 49 per cent felt that the present size was about right; 10 per cent felt that their size should be reduced; and 19 per cent believed that all Canadian military forces in Europe should be withdrawn.

A Gallup poll in August 1987 found that 57 per cent of 1,040 Canadians thought that Canada should maintain troops in Europe with NATO, while 26 per cent thought that the troops should be brought back to Canada, and 16 per cent were undecided. About half, or 49 per cent, of those surveyed approved of government proposals to increase defence spending, with 34 per cent disapproving, and 17 per cent unsure.

In May 1988, Angus Reid Associates Inc. polled 1,501 Canadians on behalf of the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA). The poll asked the following defence-related question:

The federal government has recently announced a policy calling for an increase in defence spending of approximately \$185 billion over the next twenty years. Some people think this money is necessary for Canada to expand our military capabilities and improve our security. Other people think it would be better to spend this money on improving our social services in areas like health care and education. What do you think?

The survey found that 31 per cent of respondents believed that the money was needed for the military, 60 per cent would rather spend it on social services, and 9 per cent were unsure.

The most controversial aspect of the 1987 Defence White Paper, the decision to purchase 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), also received attention from pollsters during the year. A poll of 1,520 Canadians conducted from 3 to 17 May 1988 by Environics Research Group Ltd. for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD), stated:

The federal government plans to buy a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear-propelled submarines at a total cost of at least \$8 billion.

Asked if they approved, Canadians responded as follows:

strongly approve	:	9 per cent
somewhat approve	:	23 per cent
somewhat disapprove	:	24 per cent
strongly disapprove	:	35 per cent
don't know	:	8 per cent

Canadian Foreign Policy

A wide range of questions related to Canadian foreign policy were posed over the course of the past twelve months.

Canadians were surveyed a number of times on the issue of unarmed cruise missile tests being conducted in Canada. The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security poll asked the following:

The Reagan Administration recently decided to exceed the limits for nuclear weapons as set out in the SALT II agreement. Given that Ottawa has allowed testing of cruise missiles in Canada on the understanding that the United States would continue to pursue arms reductions with the Soviet Union, should the Canadian government now refuse permission for further tests or not?

Over two-thirds of respondents, 68 per cent, believed that Canada should refuse further testing, while 32 per cent believed that further testing should be allowed.

On 20 January 1988 the Canadian Peace Alliance set up ballot boxes in 32 Canadian cities and towns to ask Canadians: "Do you agree that we should stop testing the cruise and start testing what we can do for world peace?" According to a Canadian Press article in the Ottawa Citizen, of the 8,655

respondents, 7,288 or 84 per cent felt that testing should be stopped. The remaining 16 per cent believed that it should continue.

A Gallup poll of 100 Canadians conducted from 2 to 5 March 1988 found that 54 per cent of those surveyed believed that Canada should halt testing, while 38 per cent believed that testing should be allowed. The remaining 9 per cent did not know.

On the issue of whether Canada should become a nuclear weapon-free zone, the CIIPS poll found that 57 per cent of respondents felt that it should, and 43 per cent that it should not. In a related question, the Canadian Peace Alliance poll posed the following:

Another military issue that people talk about is whether or not Canada should allow foreign warships that are nuclear armed to enter Canadian waters and dock at our ports. In your opinion, should Canada allow nuclear armed foreign warships to enter Canadian waters or should Canada refuse them?

Approximately two-thirds, 67 per cent, felt that Canada should not allow foreign warships, while 27 per cent felt that it should. Six per cent were unsure.

An Angus Reid Associates poll conducted in Spring 1988 surveyed both American and Canadian views on the issue of Arctic sovereignty. Having been read a brief paragraph describing the Canadian and American positions concerning the Northwest Passage, 53 per cent of 1,000 Americans polled thought that the US should respect the Canadian position. Less than half that number, 25 per cent, thought that the US should ignore Canada's position, while 22 per cent were unsure.

Having outlined the issue to 1,510 Canadians, Angus Reid asked what approach Canada should take in settling the Arctic sovereignty question. In

response, 16 per cent thought that Canada should establish a greater military presence in the Arctic to deter and confront the US, if necessary; 69 per cent favoured the continuation of diplomatic and political pressure; 12 per cent felt that Canada should drop the matter and allow American access; and 3 per cent were unsure.

Questions of a more general nature concerning Canadian foreign policy were also asked. In the CIIPS poll, Canadians were asked how much influence they thought Canada has on the course of world events. Four per cent of respondents felt that Canada had a great deal of influence, 32 per cent some influence, 52 per cent very little influence, and 12 per cent no influence at all.

A poll commissioned by the North-South Institute surveyed 1,210 Canadians in October 1987. Asked the most effective method for increasing Canada's influence internationally, 31.5 per cent believed that Canada should speak out more often on international issues, 6.2 per cent thought that Canada should increase the size of its armed forces, 10.4 per cent felt that Canada should spend more on aid for developing countries, and 48.7 per cent thought that Canada should put more emphasis on its economic and trade power. Less than 1 per cent chose other options, while 2.4 per cent did not know.

The North-South Institute's poll also asked: "In countries where there are serious abuses of human rights, do you think Canada should mind its own business or protest in some way?". Those feeling that Canada should protest amounted to 68.2 per cent of respondents, while 29.3 per cent stated that it should "mind its own business," and 2.5 per cent did not know.

On the issue of South Africa, 9.7 per cent of those polled believed that Canada was doing too much to help end racial policies; 37 per cent believed

too little; 39.9 per cent believed the right amount, and 13.4 per cent did not know.

International Affairs

The North-South Institute's survey asked respondents to rank some general issues as very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important. The highest portion of respondents, 98 per cent, identified pollution and environment as either very important or somewhat important. Apartheid and human rights ranked fifth, with 87 per cent support; accidental nuclear war eighth, with 83 per cent; erratic US foreign policy eleventh, with 80 per cent; regional wars twelfth, with 76 per cent; and Soviet aggression thirteenth, with 61 per cent describing it as an important issue.

The CIIPS poll asked how much confidence Canadians had in the ability of the US to deal wisely with present world problems. Three per cent of respondents had very great confidence, 34 per cent considerable, 46 per cent little, 13 per cent very little, and 4 per cent had none. Asked which situation posed the greatest threat to world peace, 5 per cent of Canadians identified Soviet actions on the international scene, 8 per cent US actions, 27 per cent the superpower arms race, 29 per cent the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries, 27 per cent the Middle East conflict, and 4 per cent conflicts elsewhere in the world.

A March 1988 Gallup poll found that 34 per cent of 1,035 polled had very great or considerable confidence in the US ability to deal wisely with world problems, while 57 per cent replied that they had little or very little confidence. Another 4 per cent stated they had no confidence at all, and 5 per cent answered that they did not know. This compared to previous Gallup

results from January 1986 in which 47 per cent of respondents had either very great or considerable confidence in US abilities.

Turning to regional conflict issues, 38 per cent of 1,020 respondents in a November Gallup poll supported US military action to protect shipping in the Persian Gulf. Nearly a quarter, 24 per cent, urged tougher American action against Iranian attacks, while 27 per cent believed that the US should withdraw completely.

In regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, a February Gallup poll found that Canadian opinion in favour of Israel had decreased, as compared to a similar 1982 poll. Of 1,028 questioned, 12 per cent were sympathetic to Israel, and 14 per cent to the Palestinians. Ten per cent had sympathy for both sides, while the majority--64 per cent--chose neither, or had no opinion. In 1982, 17 per cent had been sympathetic to Israel, and 13 per cent to the Palestinians.

In April 1988 The Reid Report, published by Angus Reid Associates, asked the question: "Based on whatever you might have seen about the current situation in the Israeli-occupied territories, who do you feel deserves more of the blame for the current increased tensions--the Israeli government or Palestinian groups such as the PLO?" Of 1,517 polled, 20 per cent felt that the Israeli government deserved more blame, 21 per cent identified Palestinian groups, 24 per cent chose both, and 35 per cent were unsure. Asked whether Canada should play a role or take a firm position on the issue, 44 per cent believed that it should, 46 per cent saw no real point in taking a stand, and 10 per cent were unsure.

Concerning arms control, a Gallup poll taken in January 1988 found that Canadians welcomed the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of 1,033

polled, 18 per cent felt that the Treaty went "a long way towards the maintenance of world peace," while 56 per cent saw it as "a small but significant step."

N.B. For a more detailed analysis of the CIIPS/Longwoods opinion survey, see Don Munton, "Where Does Canada's Security Lie?", Peace & Security, Winter 1987/88, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 2-3; and Don Munton, Peace and Security in the 1980's: The View of Canadians, CIIPS Working Paper, January 1988.

Appendix 5**Strategic Nuclear Balance****United States**

	launchers	warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
ICBMs				
Minuteman II	465	1	1.20	465
Minuteman III	210	3	0.17	630
Minuteman III 12A	300	3	0.33	925
				(25 spares)
MX	45	10	0.30	450
SLBMs				
Poseidon C3	265	10	0.04	2650
Trident C4	400	8	0.10	3200
Bombers				
B-52 G	167			
B-52 H	96			
B-1B	99			

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: US Forces and Capabilities (Revised edition) (forthcoming, Spring 1989).

Strategic Nuclear Balance

Soviet Union

	launchers	warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11	420	1	1.00	420
SS-13	60	1	0.60	60
SS-17	130	4	0.75	520
SS-18	308	10	0.50	3080
SS-19	350	6	0.55	2100
SS-24	20	10	0.50	200
SS-25	126	1	0.55	126

SLBMs

SS-N-6	256	1	1.00	256
SS-N-8	286	1	0.80	286
SS-N-17	12	1	1.00	12
SS-N-18	224	7	0.20	1568
SS-N-20	100	10	0.50	1000
SS-N-23	64	4	0.25	256

Bombers

Bear A	24
Bear B/C	30
Bear G	45
Bear H	60

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. IV: Soviet Nuclear Forces (forthcoming, Winter 1989).



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The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution



The Guide

1989

THE GUIDE
**TO CANADIAN POLICIES ON
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,
DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
1989**

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PREFACE

The Guide is a survey of major developments in international peace and security over the past year, and of Canadian policy statements and Parliamentary debates in that field. I believe it provides an invaluable tool for all Canadians who wish to keep abreast of the many events and changes going on in today's world. It also serves as a compendium and reference volume for speakers, researchers and others who need accessible, reliable information on Canada's contributions to global affairs.

This fourth edition of *The Guide* covers the year 1988-1989, focussing on areas specified in the mandate of the Institute. It deals first with such questions as the continuing arms control and disarmament efforts between East and West, the impact of the federal budget on defence spending and planning, and developments in various regional conflicts in the Middle East, Central America, and elsewhere. All the points examined relate to important items on international or Canadian peace and security agendas.

The Guide helps its users keep track of critical developments in the search for nuclear arms control and conventional force reductions in Europe. It follows the prospects for new agreements on chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and explains the threats to international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. It provides a record of recent developments in conflicts in Lebanon, South East Asia and elsewhere.

In many sections, the record surveys international developments before concentrating on Canadian Government policies and Parliamentary exchanges. In other cases, the spotlight is primarily on Canada, focussing on questions like sovereignty in the Arctic, the defence and surveillance of North American airspace, defence equipment programmes, and peacekeeping.

For those readers in this country and elsewhere who wish to trace the development of Canadian policies on international peace and security last year, and to judge Canada's performance over that time, I trust that you will find this fourth annual edition to be as useful as the preceding ones.



Bernard Wood
Chief Executive Officer

INTRODUCTION

The Guide is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period between mid-July 1988 and mid-July 1989, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to identify a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

The Guide is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category--conflict resolution--has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under five headings, as follows:

Background provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1988 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary for an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

Current Canadian Position is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies recent developments in Canadian policy.

Parliamentary Comment is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

Current References is designed for the most part to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

Further Reading contains a limited number of earlier references which the reader may wish to consult for more detailed background.

Developments on the national and international scene have led to a number of changes in this year's *Guide*. The number of main entries has been reduced from 31 to 28, by dropping the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces basket of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (due to ratification of the INF Treaty in June 1988); "Disarmament and Development" (marking the 1987 UN conference on this subject); "The Third UN Special Session on Disarmament" (which ended in June 1988); and "Canada-US: Space Station" (given the conclusion of the relevant negotiations on this subject). A new entry on "The Canadian Defence Industry" (focussing on defence industrial preparedness) appears in the Defence Section, while the entry on "Arms Transfers," previously found in the Defence Section, has been shifted to the Arms Control and Disarmament Section. Finally, the inauguration in Vienna in March 1989 of two new sets of negotiations concerning European arms control has brought a change in the titles of two entries: "Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE)" becomes "Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)," and "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR)" becomes "Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)."

The individual entries were researched and written by Johanne Di Donato, Peter-Gizewski, and Michael Holmes, all of the Institute's Research Division. Ms. Di Donato was responsible for entry numbers 12 and 20-27; Mr. Gizewski for numbers 3, 5, 8-11, 13-14, and 19; and Mr. Holmes for numbers 1-2, 4, 6-7, and 15-18. In addition, Nancy Smyth, a student intern from Carleton University, contributed entry number 28 on "International Terrorism."

Two new appendices have been added to this year's *Guide*. The first, on "Canada's Role in the UN," includes a brief explanation of the UN structure dealing with security issues, together with Canada's record in voting on resolutions of the General Assembly's First Committee and the Security Council. The second new appendix, "Recent Political Disturbances in China," summarizes Canadian responses to the troubles arising from the Chinese Government's crackdown on the democracy movement in early June 1989. The other appendices have been updated from last year's versions. Michael Holmes was responsible for Appendices 1, 4, and 6; Peter Gizewski for numbers 2 and 5; and Johanne Di Donato for numbers 3 and 7.

Eva Bild of the Institute's Public Programmes Division copy-edited the manuscript and managed the publication of *The Guide*. Doina Cioiu, Administrative Assistant of the Research Division, continued in her role as "midwife" of *The Guide*, providing invaluable editorial and technical assistance. Thanks are also due to Roger Hill, Director of Research, for his comments on the manuscript; to Denis Bastien of Sogestran Inc., for the translation; to the staff of the Institute Library, and to Sylvain Lemieux, computer systems expert, for their indefatigable and creative support.

We welcome comments on *The Guide's* utility and format, as well as suggestions for improvement. All such communications should be addressed to me at the Institute.

Ron Purver
Editor

SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

I. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

BACKGROUND

On 8 January 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), the discussions were divided into three distinct negotiations, involving: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defence and space weapons.

Significant progress was made in the NST with the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington on 8 December 1987. The Treaty banned all US and Soviet land-based INF missiles (those with ranges of between 1000 and 5500 km). For the Soviet Union this meant the destruction of 1846 missiles; for the United States, 846. Short-range INF, namely SS-12/22 and SS-12/23 missiles on the Soviet side and Pershing 1A missiles on the American, were to be destroyed within eighteen months of the ratification of the Treaty. Long-range INF, including SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles (stored, but never deployed) on the Soviet side and Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on the American, were to be destroyed within three years of ratification. The instruments of ratification were exchanged by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Moscow Summit on 1 June 1988.

Both sides began inspecting each other's bases and factories to verify the information contained in the Treaty in July 1988. On 1 August the Soviet Union destroyed the first of its missiles, four SS-12s, while the US began destruction of its Pershing IIs on 8 September. By mid-June 1989 the Soviet Union had destroyed 977 missiles and the US, 320. Generally speaking, both the US and the Soviet Union were satisfied with each other's record of compliance with the Agreement.

Success in the remaining two areas covered by the NST has been more difficult to achieve. No official name has been selected for the group dealing with strategic nuclear arms, though it is often referred to by the name of the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START, which ended without agreement in December 1983, was preceded by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I (1969-1972) and II (1972-1979). Each of these negotiations dealt with intercontinental, strategic nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are generally defined as those weapons capable of reaching the territory of one superpower from that of the other (specified in SALT II as those with a range in excess of 5500 km).

When the new START negotiations began on 27 March 1985, the opening positions of both sides demonstrated little change from those taken in the previous talks. By the end of the first round of the new negotiations (23 April 1985), the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze on the nuclear arsenals of both sides, a reduction of strategic

offensive arms by one-quarter as an opening move leading to deeper mutual cuts, and a ban on all cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. The United States had suggested limits of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, 400 heavy bombers, and 850 ballistic missile launchers.

At their 19 to 21 November 1985 Summit in Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to fifty percent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, together with effective measures of verification.

On 15 January 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev made a public statement outlining a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Reductions would occur in three stages over a fifteen-year period, culminating in a universal accord to prevent such weapons from coming into existence again.

At the second Summit meeting between the two leaders, in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 11 and 12 October 1986, the Soviet Union proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons over a ten-year period. The United States proposed the elimination of all ballistic missiles within ten years. There was agreement that in the first five years each side would reduce to 6000 their strategic warheads and to 1600 their strategic launchers. The summit talks broke down, however, over the issue of strategic defence, which the Soviets linked to any possible accord on offensive arms.

Some limited progress on the strategic forces issue was made at the 7 to 10 December 1987 Washington Summit. At its close, the superpowers agreed on the following points: a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive arms; a 6000-warhead ceiling with no more than 1600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers; a sub-ceiling of 4900 ICBM and SLBM warheads; a fifty percent cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs to 154, with ten warheads each; a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs at fifty percent of the Soviet level current at that time; a separate ceiling (outside the 6000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and certain methods of verification of an accord. In addition, the two sides agreed on the "counting rules" for determining how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each type of ballistic missile.

Some hope existed that an accord could be reached in 1988, though many officials were pessimistic. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Moscow in late May for their fourth summit, but it was clear some time in advance that a START agreement would not be reached at the meeting. Verification, counting rules and sub-limits continued to be major stumbling blocks on the way to an accord.

The tenth round of the talks began on 12 July 1988 and closed on 16 November. Little progress was reported and a number of critical issues remained in dispute, including:

- the numerical limits on SLCMs, as well as their verification, given the difficulty in differentiating between nuclear and conventionally armed missiles;
- the question of warhead sublimits, with the Soviets willing to agree to the US proposal for an ICBM warhead sub-limit of 3300 only if a sublimit of 3300 also applies to SLBM warheads;

- counting rules for ALCMs, with the US proposing ten per bomber, regardless of the number an aircraft is capable of carrying, and the Soviets wanting to count the maximum number each type of bomber is equipped to carry;
- the US demand for a ban on mobile ICBMs, unless adequate ways of verifying their numbers can be found;
- the US proposal not to count ALCMs with ranges of under 1500 km (while the Soviets insist on using the SALT II definition for long-range ALCMs of 600 km);
- the question of heavy ICBM modernization, which the US wants banned; and
- the Soviet insistence on making conclusion of a START agreement contingent upon a Defence and Space Arms agreement, while the US argues against such linkage.

The two sides have agreed that the reductions will take place over seven years. The US has called for cuts to be carried out in a phased manner with intermediate ceilings by agreed dates, while the Soviet Union has supported cuts in two phases, with agreement to hold subsequent negotiations for additional reductions as a condition for signing an accord.

Initially, the talks were set to begin again in mid-February 1989. In December 1988, however, President-elect Bush stated that the negotiations needed to be postponed while his new Administration developed its arms control policies and directions. During this review, a number of decisions were made that would affect the negotiations. In February President Bush named Richard Burt as his chief arms control negotiator for the START talks. This was followed by Mr. Bush's plan to pursue development of both the MX and Midgetman mobile missiles. While this plan faces considerable Congressional opposition, the Bush Administration believes it may strengthen the United States' position at START for limiting mobile missiles. Finally, shortly before the beginning of the new round of talks, the US announced that it would seek to negotiate and implement verification measures for an agreement before completing a new strategic arms treaty.

The superpowers agreed in May to resume negotiations in June. On 19 June the eleventh round began. In early July, US scientists sponsored by the Natural Resources Defense Council, inspected a Soviet warship to demonstrate that the presence of nuclear-armed cruise missiles could be verified. The United States Government was invited to participate in a similar exercise but declined, contending that the tests proved nothing of significance.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Reduction of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals remains one of the Canadian Government's main arms control priorities. In his opening statement to the United Nations First Committee on 17 October 1988, Ambassador Douglas Roche referred to the issue:

...the Washington-Moscow Summits of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have dramatized the progress made by the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics in improving their relations, particularly in the area of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. With the INF Treaty, the superpowers are destroying an entire class of nuclear weapons. An agreement to destroy a considerable number of strategic weapons is in sight. Obviously, the two superpowers have a long road still ahead of them. But the point is: they have already travelled a long way. This is the reason there is fresh hope today in the disarmament field.¹

The next day in a speech delivered at Carleton University in Ottawa, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark referred to specific action the Canadian Government had taken in regard to START:

In the context of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Canada has advocated the negotiation of effective limits on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, weapons which could increasingly threaten us directly, as intercontinental missiles do now. We are pleased that at the Washington Summit there was agreement to tackle this problem.²

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 4 May 1989 in the House of Commons, Liberal Member Mr. Joseph Volpe raised the issue of the deployment of US mobile missiles. He stated that about one-half of the 50 MX rail-mobile missiles would be stationed near the Canada-US border. During a crisis, he argued, these missiles might be moved closer to and even into Canada. Mr. Volpe called on the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs to "... seek public assurances from the United States that Canadian territory will not be used for the deployment of this mobile nuclear weapon system. The Canadian Government must not allow the security and sovereignty of its people to be compromised."³

¹ Opening Statement by Ambassador Douglas Roche, Chairman First Committee UNGA 43, 17 October 1988, p. 2.

² "Sovereignty in an Interdependent World," Notes for Remarks by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Carleton University, Ottawa, 18 October 1988, p. 7.

³ *Commons Debates*, 4 May 1989, p. 1304.

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Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Arms (DST)

2. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (DST)

BACKGROUND

The Defense and Space Talks began in Geneva on 27 March 1985, as part of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NST also deals with long-range strategic nuclear weapons control (see the NST:START, Chapter 1 of *The Guide*). The aim of the Defense and Space Talks is to prevent an arms race in outer space and in strategic defences. This issue has drawn considerable attention since the announcement by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or, as it is often referred to, Star Wars).

SDI aims to provide defence against incoming ballistic missiles. At present, it calls for research, development and testing of new weapon technologies, many of which would be based in outer space. These weapons may include "exotic" technologies such as lasers and particle beams, as well as more conventional anti-satellite (ASAT) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons. Naturally, there is a close link between this project and the status and future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States in May 1972.

The ABM Treaty was the result of increased interest in anti-ballistic missile defence, on the part of both the US and USSR, throughout the 1960s. In the United States, the ABM issue sparked a prolonged public debate, centred on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that ABM deployments might destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, requires that both sides remain vulnerable to attack (thereby preventing aggression by either one).

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide ABM defence and limits each to two ABM deployment areas, later amended on 3 July 1974 to one area. Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with questions of interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of 88 to 2.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research into ballistic missile defence. In 1976, the US dismantled the ABM system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviet Union has kept its ABM deployment around Moscow.

In his March 1983 announcement, President Reagan stated that the United States would pursue a new programme, SDI, aimed at providing a defence which would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Although he initially stated that SDI was only a research programme and would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration adopted a "new" interpretation of the Treaty which would allow the US to carry out tests and development of systems previously considered prohibited by it.

This new interpretation, also known as the "broad" interpretation, would allow the testing and development of ABM systems based on new physical principles and would

prohibit only their actual deployment. The Reagan Administration stated that it believed this broad interpretation to be legally valid.

The interpretation of the ABM Treaty has, therefore, become an issue of considerable debate, centring on how ABM systems based on new technologies are dealt with by the Treaty. The key to the debate lies in Article V of the Treaty which states that:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Proponents of the broad interpretation maintain that the systems and components referred to in Article V are defined by Article II. The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as part of the definition of a system in Article II, according to this interpretation, means that *only* systems based on 1972 technology (current at the time the Treaty was signed) are banned. This would mean that systems based on new technology in the basing modes listed were not affected.

The narrow interpretation holds that Article V clearly bans *all* sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems and components, whether they are based on 1972 technology or not. The phrase "currently consisting of" was used in Article II only to demonstrate the functional nature of the definition, not to exclude future technologies.

The Soviet Union has stated that it believes the narrow interpretation to be the only valid interpretation of the Treaty. Indeed, until 1985 this was the only interpretation held by the United States. The Soviets have stood by this position at the Defense and Space Talks, insisting that the testing of ABM systems and components must be restricted by the traditional interpretation. The general approach of the United States at the Defense and Space Talks consists of discussing the effects of the relationship between offence- and defence-based systems on the strategic balance, negotiating a smooth transition from an offense-dominated to a defence-dominated military structure, and resolving concerns over possible Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. Specifically, the United States has stated that it will not conclude any further strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union until the Soviets dismantle a radar site at Krasnoyarsk, which Washington insists is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

Both sides have used the 10 December 1987 Joint Statement from the Washington Summit as the basis for an agreement in negotiations that have taken place since. At Washington, they agreed to have their negotiators work out "...an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time." Intensive discussions on strategic stability were to begin not later than three years before the end of the specified non-withdrawal period. Failing agreement in these discussions, each side would be free to pursue its own course of action once the non-withdrawal period was over. The general wording of the Joint Statement, however, left open the question of the narrow versus the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

At present the United States has not specified a time-period for non-withdrawal, though its proposals from the Reykjavik Summit suggesting that the period last until 1996

coupled with an agreement on START, and its May 1987 proposal suggesting 1994, are still on the table. The Soviet Union has put forward a nine- to ten-year proposal.

On 15 January 1988, at the ninth round of the NST talks, the Soviets tabled a draft protocol to the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. During the ten-year non-withdrawal period suggested in the proposal, testing of ABM systems and components would be restricted by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have insisted on this as a quid pro quo for any START agreement.

The United States rejected the Soviet-proposed Protocol, arguing that a START Treaty should not be tied to restrictions on SDI. On 22 January 1988, the United States presented a draft treaty intended to provide a basis for a transition to a defence-oriented military structure by allowing for development, testing, and deployment of advanced missile defences.

On 22 April 1988, during a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, the Soviets presented a new draft agreement. However, they have refused to develop a Joint Draft Treaty text, as proposed by the US.

From 24 to 31 August 1988 the third ABM Treaty Review Conference took place. Prior to the Conference, attention was focussed on whether or not the US would charge the Soviet Union with a "material breach" of the Treaty, as possible justification for an American withdrawal from it. Shortly before the beginning of the Conference, however, the United States announced it would postpone its decision until later. The Review Conference ended, unlike its two predecessors, without a joint statement reaffirming the Treaty's aims and purposes. In a related development, in May 1989 the Soviet Union offered to dismantle its Krasnoyarsk radar installation if the United States agreed to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The offer was refused by the US, however.

The tenth round of the NST ended on 16 November 1988 with no significant progress on the question of defence and space weapons. As a result of its strategic review in early 1989, the Bush Administration declared that it would take a somewhat different approach to the issue of SDI than did the Reagan Administration. This involves a more limited view of what to expect from SDI and lower appropriations for research. In May, the head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Lieutenant General George Monahan Jr., stated that certain parts of the programme, including study of a new tracking satellite, a ground-based interceptor rocket, and an orbiting laser, will be delayed for two years.

The programme is now envisaged to have three phases. Phase one, involving sensors and kinetic energy interceptor technologies, could require a decision on deployment within four years. Phase two would involve directed energy weapons, and phase three would include more advanced weapons. The cost of developing and deploying phase one has been estimated at \$69 billion. Since its inception, approximately \$17 billion has been spent on SDI.

Funding for SDI has been reduced by President Bush from that planned by the Reagan Administration. For fiscal year 1990, requests for SDI funds were reduced from \$5.6 billion to \$4.6 billion; funding requests for the next five years were reduced from \$41 billion to \$33 billion. Priority has shifted within SDIO from developing a system of large satellites from which up to ten interceptor rockets each would be launched against

incoming warheads, to a system called "Brilliant Pebbles," involving thousands of smaller space-based rockets.

The eleventh round of the negotiations began on 19 June 1989.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In the past four years the Government of Canada has declared both that it is in favour of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and that it is not prepared to become involved in government-to-government participation in the SDI programme.

On 26 March 1985, Canada and the other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger reassured the US allies that they were to be included in the benefits the SDI programme may offer and in the decision-making process. He also invited them to become participants in the research stage of the programme, insofar as they were allowed under the limits of the ABM Treaty.

On 7 September 1985, after internal Government study and a set of public Parliamentary hearings, Canada refused the offer of government-to-government participation in the research programme but left open the possibility that private companies could compete for SDI contracts. Of the allies contacted by the US, five nations--the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan--have signed Memoranda of Understanding involving SDI research participation.

The Canadian Government has repeatedly expressed its belief that while it does not want to get involved directly in SDI research, it is only prudent to have some such research pursued in the West. This view was elaborated by External Affairs Minister Clark on 5 March 1987, following a meeting with Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to President Reagan on arms control issues. Having expressed Canadian support for continued US adherence to the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Mr. Clark stated:

Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security....Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern.

He went on to say:

Canada has expressed its support for the Strategic Defence Initiative research program as a prudent measure in light of significant similar Soviet activity in the field of ballistic missile defence. We believe, however, that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces....[The] SDI program should continue to be pursued within the current restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.¹

¹ Department of External Affairs *Statement* 87/14, 5 March 1987, p. 2.

Assurances from Mr. Shultz that at that point the US considered premature any decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence were welcomed by the Canadian Government.

In a speech before a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City in May 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that strategic defences must meet criteria that had been outlined previously by Mr. Nitze--cost effectiveness, survivability, and affordability--along with two other criteria: "extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike" and "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process...."²

By the end of 1988, Canadian industry had received six SDI-related contracts worth about \$1.6 million (US dollars).³

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

During the past few years, questions have been raised in Parliament over Canadian Government involvement in these contracts. In November 1987 the issue of the involvement of the Canadian Commercial Corporation as a prime contractor for an SDI contract was raised in the House. It was argued that the CCC, as a Crown Corporation was an agent of the federal Government, and that its involvement therefore ran counter to the Government's commitment not to participate in SDI projects. The Government responded that the purpose of the CCC was to act as an agent for Canadian companies and that its involvement was limited to this purpose.⁴

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² Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address before the North Atlantic Assembly," 23 May 1987, p. 3.

³ John G. Roos, "Half of SDIO Contracts Open to Allies; Work Focuses on ATBM Research," *Armed Forces Journal International*, vol.126 no. 7 (February 1989), p. 36.

⁴ *Commons Debates*, 16 November 1987, p. 10829. See also Chapter 21, "Canada - US: Research on the Strategic Defence Initiative," in: David Cox and Mary Taylor (eds.), *A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1986-87*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987, esp. pp. 140-143.

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3. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BACKGROUND

The use of chemical weapons during the First World War led the international community to increase its efforts to eliminate them. Such efforts were also extended to the related problem posed by the prospect of biological agents being used as weapons of warfare. By 1925 these initiatives resulted in the signing of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare."

The Protocol's failure to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, however, led to a growing recognition of the need for more comprehensive restrictions. This goal has been actively pursued in various United Nations disarmament bodies, particularly during the last twenty years.

By 1971, the difficulties of concluding a single agreement banning both chemical and biological weapons led to a decision in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to consider them separately. Progress in the area of biological weapons control soon followed, producing a convention signed in 1972 which came into force three years later. Considered the first international agreement requiring actual disarmament measures, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of bacteriological or poisonous weapons, and calls for the destruction of existing stocks. As of 1 January 1988, the Convention had been signed by 136 states and ratified by 110 of them.

The BWC has been subject to two review conferences aimed at ensuring its effectiveness, in 1980 and 1986. Among the concerns addressed at both conferences were the ability of the Convention to cover potential weapons developments made possible by new technologies, such as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA); the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxin agents, together with the possible weapons applications of such research; and problems of verifying compliance with the Convention.

Such issues were highlighted by a stream of allegations beginning in the mid-1970s concerning the development and use of biological and toxin weapons by the superpowers and their Allies. Particularly noteworthy were charges that the Soviet Union and its allies had used toxin weapons in South East Asia (i.e., yellow rain), and the inability to establish the facts conclusively.

In an attempt to strengthen the BWC further, the final declaration of the Second Review Conference included a new arrangement allowing any state to call a meeting of an advisory group of experts, if a problem arises concerning application of the Convention. It also requires the signatories to begin work on measures to prevent or reduce any "ambiguities, doubts and suspicions concerning bacteriological activities and to improve international cooperation on the peaceful uses of microbiology." Specific measures included the exchange of information concerning research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases. In order to elaborate precise procedures for such exchanges, an Ad Hoc Group of scientific and technical experts, from the states parties, met in Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987. The 1986 Review Conference had

also requested that states send information to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The second such exchange of information began in the fall of 1988.

A ban on chemical weapons has been on the UN agenda since 1968. Yet progress has materialized only recently. In 1980, the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. By 1983, this Group had developed a consensus document identifying elements of a comprehensive treaty, and had outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

An important step in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons was taken by the United States in 1984 when it tabled a draft treaty providing for verification by challenge inspections (i.e., short-notice, mandatory inspections of plants suspected of cheating). That year also saw general agreement that the destruction of existing chemical weapon stockpiles should be subject to systematic international inspection, although disagreement persisted over the particular inspection procedures to be used.

Concern over chemical weapons has been fed by recent allegations of their use. Since 1980, the UN Secretary General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988 Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons--this time against its own Kurdish population. A UN investigation of the alleged attacks was undertaken between 17 March and 4 April 1988. On 26 April, the UN Secretary-General presented a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action.

In the meantime, after a hiatus of eighteen years, the United States renewed its production of chemical weapons in December 1987. Such plans gained momentum in the wake of US statements alleging continued Soviet production of chemical weapons. In the fall of 1987, for instance, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, chief US delegate to the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, cited US estimates indicating that there were fourteen to twenty chemical weapon-production sites on Soviet territory whose whereabouts Moscow refused to disclose. Plans for the production of a chemical weapon deterrent also continued in France.

More recent evidence of the development and production of chemical weapons has surfaced in the Third World. On 25 October 1988, US Director of Central Intelligence William Webster announced that Libya was building a chemical warfare complex at Rabta, forty miles southwest of Tripoli. According to US State Department officials, the plant, once completed, would be capable of producing nerve gas as well as large quantities of mustard gas. While Libya denied the charges, and maintained that the facility was a pharmaceutical plant that it would "open to the world when completed," US accusations and presentation of evidence to the contrary mounted during subsequent months. Such evidence also indicated that the technology used in the development of the Libyan facility was acquired from companies in both West Germany and Japan. West German, US and Indian companies were also linked to the development of a chemical weapons capability by Iran.

In Geneva, negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have moved closer to agreement on the definition of chemical weapons and on procedures for their destruction. Detailed provisions have been elaborated on the verification of declarations of existing stocks and

the closure and elimination of production facilities, while useful work has also been done on the guidelines for an international inspectorate. On 11 August 1987 the USSR tabled a proposal on compulsory on-site inspection which came close to that put forth by the United States in 1984. The Soviet proposal accepted the concept of challenge inspection of all chemical weapon facilities with no right of refusal. It also provided for the entry of inspection teams within forty-eight hours of a challenge (previously the Soviets had insisted on the right to veto requests for challenge inspection, and did not require that inspections be so timely).

Additional headway toward a Chemical weapons ban was made in October 1987, when representatives of forty-five nations visited a Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, on the Volga River south of Moscow. The foreign delegations were shown nineteen different types of chemical munitions and a mobile complex used for their destruction. Bilateral talks between the superpowers also resulted in visits by US officials to a Soviet facility for the destruction of chemical weapons at Chapayesk, and by Soviet officials to a US chemical weapon facility at Tooele, Utah, in November 1987. Moreover, in December 1987 the Soviet Union declared that its chemical weapons stockpile consisted of no more than 50,000 tons of poisonous agent, all located on Soviet territory.

From 7 to 11 January 1989, over 140 nations participated in a Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris. The conference was intended to focus attention on the horrors associated with chemical weapons' use, the dangers posed by their existence and proliferation, and the outstanding issues to be addressed in achieving a chemical weapons ban. During the five days of deliberations, the total number of states to have declared non-possession of chemical weapons increased to over sixty, eleven states added their signatures to the Geneva Protocol (increasing the number of signatories from 129 to 140), and three additional states announced their intention to sign in the near future. The Final Declaration of the Conference stressed four points: 1) the commitment of the participants not to use chemical weapons and to condemn their use (thus reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol); 2) the necessity and urgency of concluding a chemical weapons ban, and for all states to accede to it upon its conclusion; 3) the need for states to exercise self-restraint and act responsibly until such time as a comprehensive ban entered into force; and 4) full support for the UN as a forum for exercising vigilance with regard to the prohibition on chemical weapons use and, in particular, for the role of the Secretary-General in investigating alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Some participants at the Conference charged the Western nations with practicing a double standard by trying to halt the proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World while at the same time developing new generations of such weapons themselves. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq and Libya demanded that the conferees recognize their right to possess chemical weapons as long as Israel possessed a presumed nuclear capability. Both superpowers rejected such arguments.

On 8 January 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced at the Paris Conference that the Soviet Union would soon complete work on the Chapayesk facility for the destruction of chemical weapons, and that elimination of Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons would begin immediately thereafter. He added that representatives of interested countries would be invited to visit the facility once it went into operation. US officials welcomed the Soviet move, but added that Moscow was "simply playing catch up"

with the routine US practice of destroying obsolete chemical weapons stocks.¹ Moreover, they stressed that it was unclear whether the Soviet initiative was militarily significant, given the huge chemical weapons arsenal they believe the Soviets to possess.²

On 15 February 1989, in response to the involvement of a West German company in construction of the alleged Libyan chemical weapons facility at Rabta, the Federal German Cabinet announced approval of revised export controls, more fully to guard against the sale of materials that could be used in the production of chemical weapons capabilities in the future. West German officials also noted that their Government would seek an early meeting of the Australia Group (i.e., nineteen chemical-manufacturing nations--including Canada--who have attempted to strengthen controls on chemical exports) to urge all members to adopt similar measures, and would press for the adoption of similar measures by the European Community.

Recent progress at the CD has been evident in the near doubling of non-member participants involved in the chemical weapons negotiations, and in the submission of reports by more than twenty-eight states, to date, concerning inspections of their respective chemical industries (i.e., National Test Inspections). Nevertheless, several issues require further attention. These include: a definition of chemical weapons; verification difficulties, given the ease with which such weapons can be manufactured; the cost, size and scope of an international monitoring agency; the procedural details for instituting challenge inspection; and the problem of ensuring the broadest possible participation in a chemical weapons convention.

Canada has signed and ratified both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Since the conclusion of the BWC, Canada has shown great interest in the elaboration of verification measures to strengthen its enforcement. Canada was an active participant at the *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts held in Geneva in March and April 1987 in accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the second review conference of the BWC. There, Canada contributed to a better understanding of the utility of adopting criteria relating to disease outbreaks, as well as containment standards for research facilities.³

Successive Canadian governments have also sought to help define and promote a chemical weapons convention, as well as to ensure its effective verification. Indeed, the conclusion of such a ban constitutes one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament of the present Canadian Government. Prominent among Canada's initiatives have been its submission to the CD of various working papers relating to a chemical weapons ban.⁴

1 Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets to Start Trimming Arsenal of Chemical Arms." *New York Times*, 9 January 1989, p. A8.

2 *Ibid.*, p. A1.

3 "Biological Weapons: Successful Conference Outcome." *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 10.

4 See, for instance: Canada and Norway, *Proposal for An Annex to Article IX Concerning Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons*, CD/766 (2 July 1987); and Canada, *Factors Involved in Determining Verification Inspectorate Personnel and*

Canada has also produced a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, in 1985; sponsored three investigations of alleged Soviet use of toxin weapons in South East Asia;⁵ and presented to the CD a series of compendia on chemical weapons negotiations comprising documents from its ongoing sessions. On 31 August 1988, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, presented the latest compendia of such material, comprising documents from the 1987 session, to the CD.⁶ Finally, the Canadian Government has actively expressed its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, most recently in the Iran-Iraq War.⁷

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Mr. de Montigny Marchand discussed the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban at the CD on 4 August 1988. Noting that the goal of a chemical weapons ban was clearly in sight, he warned that "recent and repeated use of such weapons increasingly raised the danger that they would appear as effective weapons of war."⁸ On the negotiations themselves, Mr. Marchand expressed Canada's satisfaction at the "workmanlike and unpolemical approach" that delegations were pursuing. He went on to state that one of Canada's primary concerns in developing an agreed regime for the phased destruction of chemical weapons was to ensure that the process did not diminish the national security of states, during the ten-year destruction period following the treaty's entry into force. Nevertheless, the Ambassador noted, Canada opposed proposals put forth by nations (such as France) supporting the production of "security stocks" of chemical weapons during the

Resource Requirements, CD/823 (31 March 1988).

⁵ *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, November 1985; Butler, G. C., *Report on the Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia* (Memo to External Affairs), 2 December 1981; Shiefer, H. B., *Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia* (A Report to the Department of External Affairs), Ottawa, 1982; Norman, J. J., and Purdon, J. J., *Final Summary Report on the Investigation of Yellow Rain Samples from Southeast Asia*, Ottawa, Defence Research Establishment, February 1986; Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1986 Session*, Ottawa, June 1987; and Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons-Final Records (PV)*, 1986 Session, Ottawa, June 1987.

⁶ CD/865, 31 August 1988.

⁷ Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué* No. 068, 25 March 1988.

⁸ CD/PV 471, 4 August 1988, p. 16.

chemical weapons destruction period.⁹ Mr. Marchand added that Canada at present was devoting a major research effort in the area of an international inspectorate and the related national authority for the Convention.¹⁰

The Ambassador discussed other outstanding issues concerning the provisions of a chemical weapons ban. Canada, he stated, believed that a chemical weapons convention need not include provisions of extraterritoriality regarding chemical industries.¹¹ Mr. Marchand expressed support for the concept of multilateral exercises for the development and testing of procedures for inspecting chemical industry facilities. However, he referred to preliminary surveys of the chemical industry in Canada indicating that, depending upon the thresholds ultimately to be agreed, Canada might not possess any commercial facilities subject to routine inspection under the convention.¹²

Finally, Mr. Marchand remarked that, while it was for any chemical weapons convention to ensure that the information required for its effective implementation was provided by the chemical industry, parties must take due account of the latter's legitimate concern for the protection of commercially sensitive data. The Ambassador called for closer examination of the actual ways in which such information could be protected, noting that Canada was currently considering various approaches and hoped to present further views on the subject in future discussions.¹³

On 18 October 1988, the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Yves Fortier addressed the First Committee of the General Assembly on the issue of a chemical weapons ban:

For many, including the Canadian Government, the progress in these negotiations must seem frustratingly slow. But in our judgement, this is not because of a lack of serious effort and intent on the part of participants in the negotiations. Rather it reflects the genuinely difficult technical and legal issues involved, particularly in relation to various aspects of the verification provisions of the treaty under negotiation.¹⁴

The verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention was the topic of a conference hosted by the Strategic Studies Programme of the University of Calgary on 21 to 24 October 1988. Sponsored by the Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs, the conference drew together a small number of experts from the US, the UK, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada to consider the lessons that might be learned from the operation of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguard systems for the verification of a chemical weapons ban. In general, it was

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué* No. 42, 18 October 1988, p. 5.

concluded that the IAEA could offer significant and valuable insights for chemical weapons verification. The lessons derived would, however, be limited to issues of general approach rather than detailed application, in large part owing to significant differences between the nuclear and chemical industries.¹⁵

On 7 December 1988, at the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored three resolutions on chemical and biological weapons. Resolution 43/74A called for strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol and a continuation of efforts by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of his Group of Experts, to develop further guidelines and procedures for investigations into accusations of use.¹⁶ Resolution 43/74B expressed satisfaction with the adoption of procedures for the exchange of information in accordance with the second review conference of the BWC, and the fact that the second such exchange was currently underway. It also called upon states that had not yet participated in such exchanges to do so, and requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance where required to facilitate implementation of the relevant parts of the final declaration. The Resolution concluded by calling upon all states to ratify or sign the Convention if they had not yet done so.¹⁷ Finally, Resolution 43/74C urged that efforts be intensified and that increased time be devoted to the negotiation of a Chemical Weapons Convention.¹⁸ All three Resolutions were adopted by consensus.

In December 1988, the Government released a report entitled *Research Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence Within The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*. Written by Mr. William H. Barton, Chairman of the Board of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the study was undertaken in response to concerns raised last summer about nerve gas testing at Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta (for more information, see Chemical and Biological Weapons, Chapter 4 in the 1987-1988 edition of *The Guide*). The report concluded that all research, development and training activities undertaken by the Department of National Defence were for purposes of self-defence, that this constituted the most prudent course for Canada, and that it was consistent with the international obligations undertaken by the Canadian Government. In addition, the study noted that all such activities were conducted in a professional manner, and posed no threat to public safety or to the environment. Nevertheless, it went on to list sixteen recommendations aimed at improving management, control and public understanding of the chemical and biological self-defence programme. These recommendations included: the tightening of safety procedures and physical security arrangements at Defence Research Establishment, Suffield (DRES) and Defence Research Establishment, Ottawa (DREO); reducing the number of outdoor tests at

¹⁵ "University of Calgary Workshop on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall-Winter 1988), p. 5. See also James Keeley, *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Occasional Papers* No.1, September 1988.

¹⁶ UNGA Resolution 43/74 (A), 7 December 1988.

¹⁷ UNGA Resolution 43/74 (B), 7 December 1988.

¹⁸ UNGA Resolution 43/74 (C), 7 December 1988.

the Suffield base; and insuring that all future testing procedures be conducted in accordance with the new Canadian Environmental Protection Act.¹⁹

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark addressed the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons on 8 January 1989. Noting that a ban on chemical weapons "will not happen overnight" and "will require reliable means of verification," the Minister nonetheless observed that great progress had been made in the negotiation of a global, comprehensive and verifiable agreement.²⁰ He called upon the conference itself to condemn the use of chemical weapons, reaffirm the Geneva Protocol while calling on additional states to adhere to it, and strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use.²¹

Canada, he stated, does not intend to develop, acquire or stockpile such weapons, unless they are used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its Allies. The Minister further observed that Canada was applying its obligations under the Protocol, to parties and non-parties alike, and had adopted a firm policy of non-production to help achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. He added that Canada had already advised other nations of the destruction of the bulk, useable chemical warfare agents it had stockpiled during the Second World War. With regard to the BWC, Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's 1970 declaration that it had never had any biological or toxin weapons and did not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future.²²

Noting that only the United States and the Soviet Union had admitted their production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, Mr. Clark called upon other countries possessing chemical weapons to adopt a similar spirit of openness. Finally, he turned to the subject of the Convention itself. Here, he pointed out that the verification of a chemical weapons ban would be complex, expensive and intrusive. Until such time as a verifiable ban could be achieved, however, there was a need for self-restraint.²³ Mr. Clark concluded:

...the elimination of chemical weapons from the face of the earth is not merely a pragmatic necessity. More than a common sense assessment of our security interests is involved. The issue touches on our sense of ourselves as human beings....surely it is the responsibility of governments to seek to limit our capability to inflict abhorrent cruelties and punishments on each other. Chemical weapons use, inevitably involving civilian as well as military victims,

19 Department of National Defence, *Research Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: A Review by William H. Barton*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 December 1988.

20 "Banning Chemical Weapons for All Times." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall-Winter 1988), p. 3.

21 *Ibid.*.

22 *Ibid.*.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

only provokes revulsion. Chemical weapons must be banned. We owe our citizens no less. Let us get on with the task.²⁴

On 9 January 1989, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced the appointment of a full-time Defence Science Counsellor for chemical arms control negotiations as part of Canada's Permanent Mission to the CD, in order to "enhance Canada's contribution to concluding an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons."²⁵

Later that month, Mr. Beatty announced the Government's response to the Barton Report. On 25 January 1989, he stated that he had accepted all sixteen of the recommendations made in the report and had directed that they be implemented without delay.²⁶ In addition, the Minister announced that "in the interest of an open disarmament dialogue," he would be inviting officials of the Soviet Union to visit the Defence Research Establishment, Suffield. The purpose of the visit, Mr. Beatty explained, was to allow the Soviets to view the facilities, observe the process Canada used to destroy chemical agents, and share information on related technical issues.²⁷

On 7 March 1989, Ambassador to the CD de Montigny Marchand announced that Canada was preparing a working paper examining the cost implications of establishing an international inspectorate for a Chemical Weapons Convention.²⁸ The Ambassador also announced the distribution to the CD of the latest in Canada's series of compendia on chemical weapons (covering the 1988 CD session), as well as the study prepared by the Department of External Affairs' Verification Research Programme dealing with lessons provided by the IAEA for verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention.²⁹ Finally, he stated that Canada would soon be joining those member states that had conducted, or planned to conduct, test inspections of their national chemical industries. Results of these tests, he promised, would be provided as soon as they became available.³⁰

On 14 July 1989, Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight announced that a delegation from the Soviet Union had accepted the invitation to visit DRES.³¹ The

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁵ Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 9 January 1989.

²⁶ Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 25 January 1989, p. 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*.

²⁸ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament." 7 March 1989, p. 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³¹ Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 14 July 1989.

delegation, consisting of ten scientists and technical experts from the working levels of the Soviet government and military, arrived for their tour of Suffield on 16 July 1989.³²

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 24 August 1988, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty touched upon the issue of chemical weapons in discussing Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Recalling criticism voiced earlier in the summer regarding Canada's research, development and training in chemical and biological defence, Mr. Beatty stated:

That work is strictly defensive in nature and we continue to press for a complete ban world-wide on chemical and biological weapons. But until that day arrives, sending Canadian peacekeepers in an area where chemical agents have been used underscores the need for Canadian Forces to be prepared to work in a chemical warfare environment and, in particular, it underscores the need for our research establishments to develop even more effective devices to protect our personnel....if [w]e did not have adequate training for our Canadian Forces personnel, and if we did not have adequate equipment...we would not have been able to deploy our troops to this region. It would not further the cause of peace to have us unable to send Canadian troops to this region. This is why this work is so important for Canada. I can report to the House that we have issued chemical detection devices, gas masks, and protective clothing to our troops.³³

Throughout September 1988, questions were raised in the House concerning the issue of chemical weapons testing on human subjects at Suffield during the 1960s. While Defence Minister Beatty maintained that there was no indication that participants in the tests had suffered any lasting effects from them, the issue prompted demands in the House for more detailed information concerning the extent of such testing and the individuals involved.³⁴

On 22 September 1988, NDP Member Jim Fulton discussed the case of an individual who had allegedly suffered serious medical problems as a result of his participation in nerve gas tests at Suffield.³⁵ Calls for a public enquiry into the issue of nerve gas testing soon followed.³⁶ Responding to the criticism, Mr. Beatty pointed to the Barton study on Canada's research and training in chemical and biological defence as evidence of Government initiative on the issue. Moreover, the Minister gave assurances in the House that the Government would conduct follow-up studies of those individuals identified as having participated in such tests, and that additional efforts were being undertaken to

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, p. 18803.

³⁴ *Commons Debates*, 21 September 1988, pp. 19478-19479.

³⁵ *Commons Debates*, 22 September 1988, p. 19530.

³⁶ *Ibid.* See also: *Commons Debates*, 23 September 1988, p.19575.

identify and locate others who may have been involved.³⁷ On 27 September 1988, a toll-free telephone service was established by the Department of National Defence to aid in the Government's search for such individuals, and to better enable the public to obtain information about nerve gas testing at Suffield.³⁸

On 14 December 1988, NDP Member Jim Fulton cited recent statements made by a retired Canadian Army veteran indicating that in 1947, the Canadian Army had dumped shells containing mustard gas in the Pacific Ocean.³⁹ While Defence Minister Beatty and other DND officials had responded to such claims initially by stating that "no record of such an operation existed," additional evidence had led to admissions by Colonel Conrad Mialkowski, Assistant Director General for Research and Development at National Defence Headquarters, that such dumping did in fact take place about 160 km off the coast of British Columbia.⁴⁰ Expressing concern over the Government's handling of the issue, Mr. Fulton stated:

This is a very serious matter. The Minister of National Defence advised that there were no records. Senior people in his Department advised that there were no records. When they were caught by the media,...ex-servicemen and Members of Parliament, suddenly there are records. Suddenly they claim they know exactly where the mustard gas is located, exactly when it went there and how it got there and so on.⁴¹

Mr. Beatty replied:

... we have been unable to locate anywhere in the Department of National Defence... any record of surplus stocks being dumped over 40 years ago in the Pacific.... I indicated to the Hon. Member's researcher... that if he had any evidence whatever suggesting that this was the case, we would welcome it being brought forward. That continues today.⁴²

Mr. Beatty then noted that reports of the dumping had been found in the *Victoria Times-Colonist* newspaper of the period, and that Colonel Mialkowski had made his statement about the incident based on that source.⁴³

³⁷ *Commons Debates*, 21 September 1988, pp.19478-19479; 22 September 1988, p.19530; and 23 September 1988, pp. 19568 and 19572.

³⁸ Department of National Defence *News Release*, 26 September 1988, and *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1988, p.19776.

³⁹ "Army Dumped Chemical Arms: Report," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 December 1988, p. C18.

⁴⁰ "Forces Admit Mustard Gas Dumped Off B.C.'s Coast," *Vancouver Sun*, 14 December 1988.

⁴¹ *Commons Debates*, 14 December 1988, p. 57.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

On 25 April 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie emphasized the need for a treaty banning chemical weapons. Referring to an incident in Soviet Georgia in which "poisonous gas" had been used with fatal effect against demonstrators,⁴⁴ he told the House:

Unfortunately, it seems that the world is on a slippery slope to increased tolerance of chemical warfare, as we learned to our horror when Iraq employed chemical warfare on its Kurdish population in surely one of the most desperate acts in recent history. There has been much talk of the need for a treaty to ban all such chemical weapons, as well there should be. It is certainly needed, not just to prevent nations from using chemicals against each other but also to protect their own citizens. We urge the Government to actively promote such a Treaty.⁴⁵

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44 *Commons Debates*, 25 April 1989, p. 914.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Verification

4. CANADA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

BACKGROUND

Nuclear Weapon-free Zones (NWFZs) consist of defined geographic areas in which the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Various types of NWFZs exist and have been proposed since the 1950s. They have been supported as a means to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a confidence-building measure (CBM) in the pursuit of regional security, as well as constituting steps in a progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Two NWFZs for populated areas have been established by international agreement: the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, establishing Latin America as the first such zone in the world; and the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone. The latter, negotiated by the thirteen members of the South Pacific Forum, bans the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons in their area. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. The Treaty has encountered problems, in that only two of the five nuclear weapons states, China and the Soviet Union, have signed the relevant Protocols. France, which maintains an active nuclear testing programme in the region, is opposed to the zone, so are the United States and the United Kingdom, which have both expressed reservations over the Treaty's symbolic importance as a precedent allegedly incongruent with their national interests.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Balkan states, the South Atlantic, the Nordic states, the Mediterranean, and South East Asia. Most of these efforts have been made in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, with interest in them varying over time. Two areas which have received considerable international attention recently include the Arctic--stimulated by the Soviet Union's October 1987 initiative (please see Arctic Sovereignty and Security, Chapter 13 of *The Guide*), and South East Asia--through the efforts of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). At their December 1987 summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to intensify efforts for a Southeast Asia NWFZ given the example of New Zealand and improved US-USSR relations. The US has stated its strong opposition to the concept, however.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones whenever they are considered feasible and likely to promote stability in an area. Although the creation of such a zone is not judged a satisfactory alternative to having the countries involved ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can make a significant contribution to preventing the

spread of nuclear arms and increasing regional security in the absence of NPT ratification. At the two special sessions of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, Canada supported the final declarations encouraging the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.

The Canadian Government's stance remains unchanged. It is prepared to study such proposals on a case-by-case basis but it believes that to be effective, any proposals must meet certain requirements: the zone must apply to a defined geographic area; it must be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most of the countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers; it must not give an advantage to any state or group of states; it must contain adequate treaty assurances and the means to verify that countries abide by their commitments; and it must not permit the development of an independent nuclear explosive capability in the area.¹

At the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in 1988, Canada voted in support of related resolutions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in the Middle East (adopted without a vote), Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in South Asia, Denuclearization of Africa (Part A--Implementation of the Declaration), Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (adopted without a vote), and Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic. Canada abstained on Denuclearization of Africa (Part B--Nuclear Capability of South Africa).

As a result of Canada's NATO membership, it has always been opposed to the establishment of such zones in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans. The Government believes that the establishment of zones in these areas would cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent and expose certain areas to the risk of Soviet attack, without making a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon-free status for Canada. Although Canada does not possess nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory, Canada is a member of NATO which, as already indicated, relies on a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone, it is maintained, would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.²

Despite this position the local authorities in approximately 170 municipalities across Canada have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario, and the Northwest Territories have each declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately sixty percent of the Canadian population resides in locally declared NWFZs.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Proposals to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone have been put forward in the House of Commons on several occasions. The New Democratic Party (NDP) has been a strong supporter of Bills declaring Canada a NWFZ. In the past it has put forward

¹ Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones," *Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer-Fall 1986, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*

motions, for example, calling for a prohibition of "the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada, [and] the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms," while calling on the Government to "encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world to undertake similar action."³

On 12 April 1989, NDP Member Svend Robinson introduced Bill C-233, an Act to declare the Canadian Arctic a nuclear weapon-free zone. He stated:

At a time in which historic breakthroughs are being made in the struggle for peace and disarmament, I believe that this would represent a small step on the course toward disarmament. The Bill would declare the Canadian Arctic to be a nuclear free zone. Hopefully, ... this would be part of a global initiative to declare northern zones in the USSR, in Canada, in Scandinavia, and elsewhere to be nuclear weapons free zones, as the first step on the road toward a nuclear weapons free Canada, and indeed, a nuclear weapons free world.⁴

On 30 May, in recognition of International Disarm the Seas Week, NDP Member Bill Blaikie addressed the issue of military activity in the oceans. As the number and type of exercises and activities increase, he argued, instability and the potential for disaster grows. He stated:

The Canadian Government has virtually ignored the Pacific in this regard. The French continue nuclear testing in the South Pacific, US led naval exercises such as PACEX in the North Pacific expand, and visits by American warships to British Columbia harbours increase in number and duration.

Canada, as a Pacific nation, must begin addressing the dangers posed by militarization of the Pacific and promote regional co-operation in disarmament.

Indeed, we must act urgently to disarm all our oceans to preserve the integrity of the environment and maintain peace for future generations.⁵

On 8 June NDP Member Lynn Hunter raised the issue of nuclear waste in the Pacific Ocean resulting from the dropping of a nuclear bomb by a US Air Force bomber in 1950. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark replied that the Government was aware of the incident, and remarked that where there were nuclear weapons there were going to be accidents. Canada, he said, had to accept this as a price for deterrence:

There is also an issue in this country as to whether Canada should continue a practice, in place for some long time, of supporting North Atlantic Treaty Organization arrangements by allowing foreign ships to dock occasionally at Canadian docks. We have decided that it is in the interest of the deterrence

3 *Commons Debates*, 31 August 1987, p. 8627.

4 *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 401.

5 *Commons Debates*, 30 May 1989, p. 2320.

which is at the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to allow that kind of practice.⁶

The Liberal Party at its 1986 Convention declared itself in favour of the establishment of a NWFZ for Canada, but not at the expense of Canada's Alliance obligations.

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5. NUCLEAR TESTING

BACKGROUND

In the 1950s, the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban all forms of nuclear testing. While efforts to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) proved unsuccessful, the negotiations bore some fruit with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. As of January 1988, the Treaty had 116 states parties, although two nuclear weapons states--France and China--have yet to sign.

Further progress on the limitation of nuclear testing came when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) in 1976. The former limits underground nuclear testing to 150 kt, while the latter does the same for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions." Neither the TTBT or the PNET has, however, been ratified by the US Senate.

Efforts to achieve more ambitious limitations on nuclear testing continued when the Carter Administration reopened trilateral negotiations on a CTB in 1977. Although some headway was made in developing a draft treaty, strong domestic political opposition in the United States ensured that progress was limited. These negotiations ceased with the advent of the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, later extended three times. Yet the Soviet initiative failed to prompt the United States to take similar action, or to resume negotiations on a CTB. Soviet testing resumed on 28 February 1987. The US Congress has put forth proposals seeking a moratorium on nuclear tests above one kiloton, but these have never been accepted by the Administration.

The Reagan Administration maintained that, although it regarded a total ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective, the need to ensure weapon reliability and national security required continued testing. In addition, the Administration contended that progress on a CTB could be achieved only in stages: first, by securing more stringent monitoring provisions for the TTBT and the PNET; then, by negotiating intermediate limitations on testing; and finally by pursuing a total ban as part of a broad, effective disarmament process.

While the Soviets initially opposed the US government's approach to limits on nuclear testing--favouring instead immediate negotiations on a total ban--the prospects for accommodation began to brighten by the summer of 1986. In July of that year, the two sides resumed talks on testing at the expert level in Geneva. By summer 1987, the Soviets had largely acceded to the US position on how negotiations toward a CTB should proceed.

On 17 September 1987, the two sides agreed to begin "full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing" before 1 December 1987. The negotiations would begin by searching for mutually agreeable procedures for verifying the TTBT and the PNET. On 9

December 1987, during the first round of talks, Robert Barker, head of the US negotiating team, announced plans to hold joint nuclear test explosions in order to calibrate equipment to help in verifying any future limits on testing. The Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) would also aid in settling differences between the superpowers regarding their preferred methods for monitoring the size of atomic tests. The Soviets prefer to rely on seismic devices, while the United States prefers the Corrtex system of hydrodynamic measurements. The Soviets have, however, agreed to negotiate on-site hydrodynamic methods as a step toward a CTB.

At the Moscow Summit on 28 May to 1 June 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted that substantial progress had been made on a new protocol to the PNET. They instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously work on this Protocol, as well as to complete a protocol to the TTBT as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment had been conducted and analyzed. In the meantime, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the JVE, and reached an agreement on its conduct, allowing each side to measure the yield of an explosion conducted at the other party's test site using both teleseismic and hydrodynamic yield measurement methods.¹ On 17 August 1988 stage one of the experiment was undertaken at the Nevada site. The experiment was concluded with the detonation of a nuclear device at Semipalatinsk on 14 September 1988. Both US and Soviet officials judged the tests to be successful.

During a meeting in Washington with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on 21 and 22 September, US Secretary of State Shultz stated that the Reagan Administration hoped to complete the verification protocols to the TTBT and the PNET and submit them to the Senate for ratification before the Administration left office in January 1989. One week later, President Ronald Reagan signed the FY89 military spending bill, which included a directive to the US Department of Energy to undertake a Nuclear Test Ban Readiness Program in order to ensure the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal should nuclear testing become prohibited in future.

By the end of 1988, work on the protocol for a PNET had been substantially completed. Progress on a protocol for the TTBT has been slower, due to the complexity of the negotiations and the US insistence that it be permitted to use Corrtex to monitor all tests above 75 kt. Resumption of the talks is expected following the Bush Administration's review of the negotiations.

Additional efforts to limit nuclear testing have been made in multilateral forums. In 1983, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) established a CTB working group. Now called the Ad Hoc Committee, the group has been unable to agree on a programme of work and has not met since 1983.

Despite the inability of the CD to agree on a mandate for the CTB working group, the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE)--a CD body charged with developing a global system of seismic monitoring--met in Geneva from 7 to 18 March 1988. Building on its work of the previous year, the Group continued to develop the conceptual design of a modern, international, seismic data exchange system, and reached agreement on the functional specifications of a global system. In addition, the Group agreed to undertake

¹ "U.S., Soviet Union Sign Joint Verification Experiment Agreement." *Department Of State Bulletin* (August 1988), p. 67.

experiments aimed at evaluating tasks proposed for the data exchange centres. The Group's report was presented to the CD in late August 1988. In the meantime, the large-scale data exchange experiment had commenced. The experiment is directed at refining the design of the seismic data exchange system before it is negotiated and established within the framework of a treaty.

Since 1985, resolutions in the UN General Assembly sponsored by the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) with the support of Eastern bloc countries have called for converting the PTBT into a CTB. On 5 August 1988, this initiative received added impetus when Mexico, Yugoslavia, Peru and Sri Lanka asked the PTBT's Depository States to convene an amending conference. Under Article II of the PTBT, the Depository States are required to call a conference if one-third of the Treaty's signatories so request.

By spring 1989 the proposal had received the requisite support. The Depository States are currently considering the date on which the conference will be convened.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Further limitations on nuclear testing have been a priority item on the Canadian Government's agenda, a CTB remaining one of its six major goals in arms control and disarmament during 1988 and 1989. Canada has contributed to this goal in various ways in the recent past. In 1986, the Government approved the sum of \$3.2 million in order to upgrade a seismic array station in Yellowknife as a contribution toward test ban verification. Modernization of the facility, which may constitute a prototype for other international stations will be completed by September 1989. In 1985, the Government awarded a grant to the University of Toronto for further research on the use of regional seismic data for verification of a CTB. Canada also hosted a technical workshop on seismic verification of a CTB in October 1986. Attended by forty-three representatives from seventeen countries, the workshop produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. The workshop's proceedings were tabled by Canada in the CD on 28 April 1987.²

On 23 August 1988, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canadian Ambassador to the CD, discussed the importance of a CTB in Canadian policy. Noting the progress achieved in the negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union on the improvement of the verification measures for the TTBT and PNET, Mr. Marchand remarked that the ratification of these treaties would constitute a useful step toward the widely shared objective of a CTB.³ As for the ongoing effort to convert the PTBT into a CTBT, he noted that the procedure had little chance of achieving the goals foreseen for it. Consequently, it was Canada's view that direct negotiations were the only practical means of achieving a test ban that was both comprehensive and genuinely verifiable.⁴ The Ambassador also expressed Canada's disappointment that an agreement had not been reached on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, and added that work should continue toward its

² CD/753, 28 April 1987.

³ Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament, 23 August 1988, pp. 2-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

achievement. Finally, Mr. Marchand noted the slow but steady progress made by the Group of Scientific Experts on attaining a worldwide seismological network for verifying an eventual nuclear test ban treaty. Pointing to the Group's appointment of Mr. Peter Basham, a Canadian, as coordinator of the ongoing large-scale data exchange experiment, the Ambassador announced that Canada would further contribute to the project by hosting a technical workshop at Yellowknife in September 1989.⁵ The workshop, he continued, would mark the official opening of the modernized seismic centre at Yellowknife, and would provide participants with an opportunity to evaluate the progress made on data exchange and to discuss outstanding problems.⁶

The Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in December 1988 passed three resolutions regarding a CTB. Resolution 43/63 (A) called upon the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a CTB, comprising two Working Groups--one on compliance and verification, and another on content and scope. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 136-4-13, with the United States, Britain, France and Yemen voting against it, and Canada abstaining.⁷ Later, however, Yemen advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour of the Resolution. Resolution 43/63 (B) called for the convening of a conference to amend the PTBT by converting it into a CTB. This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 127-3-21, with the United States, Britain and France once more voting against the Resolution and Canada again abstaining.⁸

Finally, Canada co-sponsored Resolution 43/64, which called on the CD to initiate substantive work and for the nuclear weapon states to agree to "appropriate verifiable interim measures on nuclear testing." It also called on the CD to set up an international seismic monitoring network, and to investigate other measures to monitor and verify compliance with a CTB. This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 146-2-6, with France and the United States in opposition.⁹

In December 1988, a Department of External Affairs briefing note addressed the Canadian Government's position regarding the proposal for converting the PTBT into a CTB. It stated:

In the Government's view, a PTBT Amendment Conference, instead of focusing on ongoing efforts where real prospects for progress exist, would be a waste of time and resources as well as an irresponsible misuse of multilateral arms control and disarmament (ACD) mechanisms. Its certain failure could undermine confidence in the multilateral ACD process itself. Indeed, the use of the terms of the PTBT to try to achieve a CTBT, a procedure the original parties to the PTBT are not prepared to support, and which was never the intent of the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ UNGA Resolution 43/63 (A), 7 December 1988.

⁸ UNGA Resolution 43/63 (B), 7 December 1988.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

PTBT, could well lead some nations to be even more sceptical of future multilateral ACD treaties for fear they might be similarly misused.¹⁰

On 7 March 1989, Ambassador de Montigny Marchand addressed the issue of a nuclear test ban in the CD again, observing that, ultimately, responsibility for "real movement" towards such a ban resided with the nuclear weapons states.¹¹ These states, he noted, must be persuaded that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing was in their national security interest. He also pointed out that they had a key role in determining the possibilities for the creation of verification measures "in which we all can have real confidence." Consequently, the Ambassador stressed the importance of the superpower bilateral dialogue and the JVE continuing and making progress toward further test limitations. In the meantime, he noted that other states strongly in favour of a CTB, such as Canada, "must do what they can to advance this process."¹²

After reviewing past Canadian contributions toward verification of a nuclear test ban, an area where Canada long considered it could make a contribution of "genuine national worth,"¹³ the Ambassador discussed the PTBT amendment issue. Recognizing that an amending conference would be convened, Mr. Marchand questioned its value as a means of achieving its intended objective:

It is evident that amendment of a PTBT as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear states who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come into effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear powers are parties to the treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as CTB verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada... see little benefit in such an exercise.¹⁴

The Ambassador went on to note that the Canadian Government remained convinced that direct negotiations constituted the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. In addition, he suggested that the CD might make its

¹⁰ "Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference," Department of External Affairs, *Briefing Note*, 22 December 1988.

¹¹ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament," 7 March 1989, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an Ad Hoc Committee.¹⁵ Canada, he added, would welcome the beginning of such work on the basis of the mandate proposed by Czechoslovakia in August 1988.¹⁶

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 30 May 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie raised the issue of nuclear testing in a statement marking International Disarm the Seas Week. After criticizing Canada and its allies for failing to address the proliferation of military activity at sea generally, Mr. Blaikie cited the "failure of the Canadian Government to address such activity in the Pacific," including French nuclear testing.¹⁷

On 7 April 1989, Liberal Member Warren Allmand raised the PTBT amending issue. Noting that the number of states required to convene such a conference had recently been attained, Mr. Allmand stated:

It is incomprehensible that the Canadian Government remains opposed to this progressive move which would open the doors to further dialogue on the reduction of nuclear arms. To doom negotiations to failure before they have begun is very unwise. We must do all we can to rid the world of life-threatening nuclear arms now, and our Government should encourage and support the amendment conference which would bring us closer to this goal.¹⁸

NDP Member Bill Blaikie raised the issue again on 25 April 1989. Addressing External Affairs Minister Clark, he stated:

The Minister will know that a Conference has...been triggered, thanks to the appropriate number of signatures being gathered at the UN, to reopen the whole matter of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Something on which the Government of Canada has also been taking the wrong position. I am asking the Minister today whether his Government is prepared to reconsider the position it has been taking on this and actively promote the arrival at a comprehensive test ban treaty.¹⁹

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.* For additional official comment on a nuclear test ban and the issue of a PTBT amending conference see: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs Department of External Affairs, Canada before the Conference on Disarmament," 20 June 1989, pp. 10-11.

17 *Commons Debates*, 30 May 1989, p. 2320.

18 *Commons Debates*, 7 April 1989, pp. 217-218.

19 *Commons Debates*, 25 April 1989, pp. 922-923.

Mr. Clark replied:

...agreeing to that particular proposal to the comprehensive test ban negotiations would not in fact move that process forward...it would be another empty gesture That is not enough in foreign policy. What one has to do is try to follow concrete proposals, often in alliance with our allies, that will in fact achieve substantial reduction.²⁰

On 2 May 1989, Progressive Conservative Member Ross Stevenson discussed Canada's role in promoting a CTBT:

The Government and the people of Canada support nuclear disarmament, Now Canada is playing a leading role in the study of seismic detection of underground tests of nuclear weapons. Dr. Peter Basham, an Energy, Mines and Resources seismology expert, is chairing a group of international scientists from 25 different nations around the world working on seismic verification and developing a world-wide system of rapid data exchange in support of a test ban. This is one of the significant contributions that Canada is making in increasing the hope and confidence of achieving a workable test ban and nuclear disarmament.²¹

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²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, p. 1195.

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6. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CCSBMDE)

BACKGROUND

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the European security environment have been negotiated in three main fora: in Helsinki, through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); in Stockholm, through the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE); and currently in Vienna through the Negotiations on CSBMs.

The Helsinki Final Act was negotiated by the thirty-five-nation CSCE between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975. The thirty-five participating nations were roughly divided into three main groupings: the sixteen NATO members, the seven Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries.¹ The Final Act contained three "Baskets" of issues: Basket I--Questions relating to Security in Europe; Basket II--Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment; and Basket III--Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.

In Basket I, the thirty-five participants agreed, among other things, to voluntary observance of limited confidence-building measures, designed to further such objectives as reducing the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities. The measures agreed to were: prior notification of major or other military manoeuvres; exchange of observers; and prior notification of major military movements.

CSCE Follow-up meetings have been held in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983), and Vienna (1986-1989). The Madrid Follow-up meeting established the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), also commonly referred to as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which began in Stockholm on 17 January 1984. The aim of this conference was to build upon the CBM process begun in Helsinki and "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." These measures were to be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space", to be militarily significant, politically binding, and adequately verifiable. As the type of CBMs to be negotiated were strengthened from those agreed to in Helsinki, the word "security" was added to describe them.

¹ The nations involved in the CSCE process were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

On 22 September 1986, after almost three years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in Stockholm. The terms of the Accord, effective 1 January 1987, included the following: notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be given forty-two days in advance; host states must extend invitations to foreign observers to attend manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 men; each state has the right to request a ground and/or aerial inspection of any military activity raising doubts about compliance with agreed CSBMs, although no state is required to submit to more than three such inspections per year; aircraft for aerial inspections will be chosen by the mutual consent of the parties involved, and inspectors will furnish the monitoring equipment and specify the flight path of the aircraft in the suspected area; and calendars outlining the schedule for military activities subject to prior notification in the following year are to be exchanged by 15 November. Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 or 75,000 troops must be given by 15 November, one and two years in advance, respectively. Finally, the signatories agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or political independence of other states in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.²

Compliance with the Stockholm Agreement since its establishment has been considered satisfactory by all involved. In the first year of the Agreement's implementation, 1987, NATO gave notice of nineteen exercises and the Warsaw Pact gave notice of twenty-five. Nine of NATO's exercises and eight of the Warsaw Pact's exercises were observed. None of the five NNA exercises notified was observed. Five challenge inspections occurred in 1987, two by NATO and three by the Warsaw Pact.

In 1988 NATO gave notice of thirteen exercises while the Warsaw Pact gave notice of twenty-one. Eight of NATO's and seven of the Warsaw Pact's exercises were observed. NATO conducted seven challenge inspections and the Warsaw Pact conducted six. The NNA gave notice of three exercises, all of which were observed. None of the NNA nations has yet conducted an inspection under the terms of the Stockholm Agreement.

For 1989, NATO forecast eleven exercises, of which seven were planned to be of observable size. The Warsaw Pact forecast seventeen exercises, with seven planned to be of observable size. The NNA forecast three exercises, of which two were planned to be observable.

The question of how to follow up the Stockholm Conference was on the agenda of the third CSCE Follow-up meeting in Vienna, which began on 19 November 1986. The working group on security discussed a proposal for two distinct negotiations on conventional arms control: one, expanding the CSBM regime agreed to in Stockholm; and the second, held within the CSCE framework but being autonomous and involving only the twenty-three nations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, to deal with enhancing security and stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces. It was expected that these latter talks would replace the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks (see Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Chapter 7 of *The Guide*).

² Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Document of the Stockholm Conference On Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 1986, pp. 1-20.

The concept of having two distinct conventional security negotiations had been first outlined in the NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1986.

On 17 January 1989, the thirty-five nations involved agreed to establish follow-up talks to the Stockholm Conference. The new Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, related but not linked to the CFE negotiations, began on 9 March 1989. Prior to the start of the negotiations, on 6 March, the Western nations issued their opening proposal. It included twelve specific measures under the following three broad headings:

- 1) **Transparency about military organization:** three measures under this heading included the regular exchange of military information on forces on land in the negotiation zone and major weapons deployed in the zone. This information would be subject to random evaluation through unannounced visits by participating states.
- 2) **Transparency and predictability of military activities:** the six measures under this heading basically extended those measures agreed to in Stockholm. They included enhanced information proposals for the annual calendars and notifications, improvements to observation guidelines (that is, more detailed briefings, better maps, etc.), lowering the observation threshold to activities involving 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, improvements to inspection guidelines by increasing the number of inspections allowed and shortening the period between inspection requests and access for the inspectors to the area, among other things, and lowering the thresholds for longer notice of large-scale activities to those involving 50,000 troops.
- 3) **Contacts and Communication:** three measures under this heading included improved access to government officials for accredited personnel dealing with military matters, development of better communication links for transmitting information related to the Agreement, and encouragement of better treatment and access for media representatives.

In addition, NATO proposed an exchange of views on military policy, ideas, capabilities and doctrine.

The Warsaw Pact made a detailed proposal of thirty-six measures divided into five parts. Part One contained five constraining measures, limiting exercises, redeployments, or concentration of armed forces to 40,000 troops; the number of troops engaged in a series of activities taking place in close proximity to 40,000; the number of notified exercises, involving a maximum of 40,000 troops, to be conducted simultaneously in one state, to three; the number of exercises with more than 25,000 troops to be conducted annually in any participating state, to two; and the duration of notifiable military activities to fifteen days.

Part Two contained sixteen measures addressing air and naval forces. It included, for example, limits on the number of ships involved in naval exercises and the duration of such exercises, as well as notification of naval redeployments of certain sizes (with similar measures applicable to air forces); notification of air exercises involving more than 150 aircraft or 500 sorties; and observation of naval exercises involving more than twenty-five ships or 100 aircraft.

Part Three included three measures to "develop and amplify" the measures agreed to in Stockholm. These involved lowering the thresholds for notifications and observations;

improving observation conditions; and providing better information in the annual calendars.

Part Four proposed sub-regions in which specific CSBMs would apply. Finally, Part Five proposed such measures as the establishment of a centre for the reduction of the danger of war and prevention of surprise attack, and the discussion of military doctrine.

Romania also put forward a set of proposals in the first round of talks.

Following the end of the first round, Western negotiators felt that some positive and common ground existed between the proposals. However, the West maintained its position that exercises involving naval or air forces alone, should not be included in the talks, as they were not included in the mandate. The East's proposals for limiting the numbers and types of exercises were characterized as being unacceptable owing to the East's numerical and geographic advantages. NATO maintains that the large training exercises it conducts and the better training it provides for its troops helps to offset the numerical advantages of the Warsaw Pact. Constraints on this training, without corresponding reductions in force levels, would result in greater advantage to the Warsaw Pact.

Two Working Groups were formed in the second round: the first, to examine information, verification, communications and consultation; and the second, to consider constraining measures, notification, observation and calendar questions. Negotiations are continuing over a Western proposal to establish a third Working Group on developing an independent seminar on military policy and doctrine.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

At the conclusion of the Vienna Follow-up meeting, on 19 January 1989, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark declared:

The Vienna Concluding Document is a welcome milestone in East/West relations and in the evolution of Europe. It reflects and builds on recent changes. It makes significant strides in all the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada is proud to have played a role in formulating some of its key elements.

In regard to CSBMs particularly, he referred to the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement and its effect on the establishment of future negotiations:

Since 1986, we have seen gratifying progress on adherence to both the letter and the spirit of Stockholm. We now have the confidence to believe that we can further increase transparency and predictability in military affairs. We wholeheartedly support the establishment of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures to build upon the work of the Stockholm Conference.³

At the opening of the new negotiations on 7 March 1989, Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins referred to the effort that had led to the negotiations.

³ Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/03 (19 January 1989), p. 2.

Through this arduous and protracted effort, she stated: "No arms control undertaking has ever started off on a firmer footing than the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures...."⁴ She continued by saying that the signs for an agreement were encouraging. The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement and its implementation presented reason for optimism. Regarding the latter she remarked:

Canadian soldiers are among those who have been inspected and observed, and have themselves participated in observations. These observations have contributed materially to the heightened sense of confidence which now exists; they have helped entrench such important gains as the right to on-site inspection.

The pattern of observation and contacts among military personnel that has been established is unprecedented in both its nature and scope. A great opportunity exists to enhance this new climate for trust and cooperation. We must build carefully and well on this foundation.⁵

Canada has sent observers to every exercise attended by the West.

On 7 June 1989, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Patrick Boyer, told the House of Commons:

...this Vienna concluding document represents an historic milestone in the process of the Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe [sic]. The document contains new and expanded commitments in the fields of military security, human rights and contacts, and humanitarian and economic co-operation. Taken together, these Vienna provisions for which Canada negotiated hard, and to which Canada is firmly committed, will help to move the European and North American states toward greater levels of mutual security and co-operation.⁶

The first Canadian challenge inspection of a military exercise was announced on 13 June 1989. The forty-eight-hour inspection was to take place in Czechoslovakia beginning on 14 June. The announcement stated that, given Canada's interest and recognized expertise in the field of verification, NATO Ministers believed Canada could contribute constructively to the CSBM process by conducting such an inspection.⁷

In an issue separate but related to the subject of CSBMs, the Canadian Government reported its involvement with the United States in developing and proposing the "Open Skies" plan made public by President Bush on 11 May 1989. Essentially, a confidence-building measure would allow short-notice overflights of North American and European territory by unarmed aircraft as a means to enhance arms control verification and improve transparency between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Following President Bush's

⁴ Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/09 (7 March 1989), p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶ *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1989, p. 2717.

⁷ Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 138 (13 June 1989), p. B2.

announcement of the proposal, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that Canada had suggested that the United States consider the plan. He declared: "This concept symbolizes the West's commitment to transparency and serves as a clear reminder of our interest in both arms control and peaceful co-operation with the East."⁸ Quoted in an article in the 5 June 1989 *New York Times*, Mr. Clark stated:

An open skies agreement would be a positive political act of opening a nation's activities to detailed, intrusive monitoring--a symbolic opening of the doors. It could be a clear, unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions are not aggressive.

Open skies would let all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact participate fully in arms control verification and monitoring.⁹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The issue of confidence- and security-building measures was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.

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Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

7. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

BACKGROUND

Negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe have been conducted in two main fora: the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna; and the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna.

The MBFR talks began in 1973. The aim of the talks was to reduce the level of conventional forces in a Central European zone covering the territories of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Direct participants included the eleven NATO and Warsaw Pact nations with troops stationed in these countries--the above seven, plus the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Eight nations, known as "flank states", were indirect participants in the talks. These consisted of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Italy, and Turkey from NATO; and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania from the Warsaw Pact.

The MBFR talks showed some progress through the 1970s, including an agreement in principle in 1977 to reduce each side's forces in the region to 900,000 air and ground personnel with a 700,000 sub-ceiling for ground forces alone. Between 1977 and the conclusion of the talks on 2 February 1989, however, the talks were stalemated largely over the issues of the number of troops each side had stationed in the area and the methods that would be used for verifying any troop reductions.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO's positions centred on achieving parity with the Warsaw Pact in military manpower; agreeing on effective verification measures to ensure Treaty compliance; allowing for geographical asymmetries, given the greater distance to the central front from North America and the UK; and requiring collectivity in force reductions--enabling deployments of troops from one nation to substitute for those of another while remaining under the overall manpower ceiling. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, opposed collectivity and pushed for national sub-ceilings on force levels; equipment, in addition to manpower, reductions; and verification measures less intrusive than those proposed by the West.

A long-standing dispute in the negotiations raged over the size of existing force levels, with the West counting 230,000 more Warsaw Pact troops than officially declared by the East.

The political atmosphere surrounding the talks has changed in recent years for a number of reasons. First, in April 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to expand the "zone of reductions" to the "entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals." Subsequently, in June 1986, the Warsaw Pact suggested troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over the next two years, with ultimate reductions of 500,000 on each side by the early 1990s. The Soviets suggested that negotiations on these proposals could take place in an expanded MBFR forum (including countries not already involved), a forum related to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) (see Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Chapter 6 of *The Guide*), or a new forum altogether. In May 1986, NATO formed a High

Level Task Force (HLTF) as a steering body for the review and development of Western positions on conventional arms control.

Second, in September 1986, the first stage of the CCSBMDE concluded with an agreement signed in Stockholm. There was hope that the success of these talks in creating a more open and predictable security regime in Europe would carry over to the MBFR negotiations.

Third, the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), in December 1987, signalled a new sense of optimism about European arms control in general.

In December 1986, the North Atlantic Council issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. It recommended two distinct negotiations: one, to expand upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security-building measures; and the second, to establish conventional stability at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. The former would be for all CSCE participants while the latter would be restricted to the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In February 1987 the Conventional Mandate Talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO began with the aim of drafting a mandate for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. At the time, these negotiations were referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). On 10 January 1989, agreement was reached on the mandate for the new talks, at which point their formal title became Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The mandate stated the following as the objectives of the talks:

...to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

It stated that these objectives would be achieved through such militarily significant measures as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions and equal ceilings. Measures would be pursued step by step and for the whole area of application, from the Atlantic to the Urals, allowing for regional differentiation to redress disparities, if necessary.¹

Following the decision to open the first round of the new negotiations in March, the participants decided to conclude the MBFR talks. On 2 February 1989, the forty-seventh and final round of the latter ended without agreement.

Prior to the agreement on the CFE mandate, a series of significant events established the groundwork upon which the talks began. On 25 November 1989, NATO released a report entitled *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*. The document

¹ United States, Department of State, *"To Strengthen Stability and Security": CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*. Washington: United States Information Agency (March 1989), pp. 4-5.

summarized the conventional forces balance in Europe, demonstrating a Warsaw Pact numerical advantage in each of the categories listed, including: main battle tanks (51,500 vs. 16,424); armoured infantry fighting vehicles (22,400 vs. 4,153); artillery (43,400 vs. 14,458); other armoured vehicles (71,000 vs. 35,351); anti-tank weapons (44,200 vs. 18,240); air defence systems (22,400 vs. 10,309); helicopters (3,700 vs. 2,419); combat aircraft (8,250 vs. 3,977); armoured vehicle launched bridges (2,550 vs. 454); and personnel (3,090,000 vs. 2,213,593). These figures excluded stored equipment.

On 8 December 1988, at the United Nations, General Secretary Gorbachev announced unilateral cuts in the Soviet armed forces of 500,000 troops, 8,500 artillery pieces, 800 aircraft, and 10,000 tanks within two years. Fifty thousand troops and 5,000 tanks would come out of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany by 1991. Six tank divisions in these countries would be disbanded. Mr. Gorbachev also stated that the remaining forces in Eastern Europe and the Western portion of the Soviet Union would be reorganized into defensive formations.

The following day, NATO issued its own proposal for arms reductions. The tank holdings of each alliance would be limited to 20,000, with no one nation allowed more than 12,000. Equal limits were also proposed on all other weapon categories, at levels slightly below those assessed for Western forces in NATO's November 1988 report. As with tanks, no single country would be permitted more than thirty percent of the total holdings of both alliances in any category of weapons systems. Other elements of the proposal included specific limits on stationed forces, and sub-limits within particular zones to avoid a concentration of forces.

In the two months following Mr. Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions, a number of other Warsaw Pact nations made similar moves. East Germany announced cuts of 10,000 troops, including six armoured regiments, 600 tanks, and fifty fighter planes to take place by the end of 1990. Czechoslovakia stated that over the next two years it would reduce army combat units by 12,000 troops, while phasing out 850 tanks, 165 other armoured vehicles, and fifty-one combat aircraft. Poland, which stated it had cut two motorized rifle divisions totalling 15,000 troops in the past two years, announced it would further reduce its forces by 40,000 troops, 850 tanks, 900 artillery pieces, 700 armoured vehicles, and eighty combat aircraft. Hungary planned to cut its forces by 9,300 troops, 251 tanks, thirty armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 430 artillery pieces, six missile-launching pads, and nine interceptor aircraft. Finally, Bulgaria announced that by the end of 1990 it would reduce its forces by 10,000 troops, 200 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, twenty planes, and five ships.

On 30 January 1989 the Warsaw Pact, for the first time ever, released its own assessment of the European military balance. In general, it judged that much more parity existed between the two alliances than was indicated by NATO figures. NATO was estimated to have a higher total troop strength than the Warsaw Pact (3,660,200 vs. 3,573,100) and more combat helicopters (5,270 vs. 2,785), anti-tank missile launchers (18,070 vs. 11,465), and large surface ships (499 vs. 102). The Warsaw Pact was credited with more tactical combat aircraft (7,876 vs. 7,130); tactical missile launch systems (1,608 vs. 136); tanks (59,470 vs. 30,690); infantry fighting vehicles (70,330 vs. 46,900); artillery pieces (71,560 vs. 57,060); and submarines (228 vs. 200). Different counting rules and definitions were responsible for most of the discrepancies between the two alliances' assessments. For example, NATO figures did not include ship-borne naval aircraft, ships, naval personnel, or stored materiel.

Despite these problems, however, a sense of optimism surrounded the talks as their opening drew nearer. On 6 March the two sides met to outline and add more detail to their initial negotiating positions. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze set out the Warsaw Pact's proposal, consisting of three stages. In the first stage, lasting two to three years, each alliance was to reduce its personnel and conventional arms—including tactical fighter aircraft, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, combat helicopters, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars—by ten to fifteen percent below the lowest levels currently held by either side. The second stage, again lasting two to three years, would involve further reductions of twenty-five percent in these categories, as well as cuts in battlefield nuclear arms. In the final stage, each side's forces would be given a strictly defensive character and agreements would be reached limiting all other categories of arms.

British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe presented the West's proposal, adding detail to the plan outlined in December. As noted above, each side would be allowed 20,000 tanks with no single nation having more than 12,000. Ceilings of 16,500 artillery pieces and 28,000 APCs were proposed. Each side could station no more than 3200 tanks, 1700 artillery pieces, and 6000 armoured personnel carriers outside national territory in active units. For example, tank deployments in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland, would be restricted to 8000 by regional sub-limits.

In sum, key areas of agreement between the two sides included the setting of equal limits on critical weapons (tanks, APCs, and artillery), the general size of reductions envisaged, and the need for stringent verification measures. Important differences also existed, however. These included the Soviet proposals for partially demilitarized zones along the East-West border and limits on aircraft; their specification of follow-up reductions in arms and troops; and their view of the relationship of naval forces to the negotiations.

Both alliances tabled their formal proposals on 9 March, the opening day of the negotiations. The first round of talks ended just two weeks later, on 23 March.

The second round of talks began 5 May and ended 13 July. On 25 May the Warsaw Pact, in a major shift, accepted the NATO principles of ceilings on any one country's forces, on foreign deployment, and within three sub-zones. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact proposed reductions in each alliance to 20,000 tanks, 28,000 APCs, 24,000 artillery pieces, and 1,350,000 troops. Strike aircraft would be limited to 1500, and helicopters to 1700. Reductions to these levels would occur over six years, from 1991-1997, after which the alliances would begin a twenty-five percent reduction in remaining forces.

At the NATO Summit on 29 May, President Bush outlined a new four-point proposal: firstly, agreement on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna on tanks, APCs, and artillery, with all withdrawn equipment to be destroyed (recognizing that questions of definition remained to be solved); secondly, fifteen-percent reductions in helicopters and land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-Urals zone, with withdrawn equipment again being destroyed; thirdly, a twenty-percent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces and a ceiling on US and Soviet air force and ground personnel stationed outside national territory within the zone of approximately 275,000, with all withdrawn forces being demobilized; and fourthly, negotiation of such an agreement in six to twelve months, aiming to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Most important was the Western acceptance of reductions in air forces and troop strength. At the NATO Summit

it was agreed that a draft agreement based on this proposal would be tabled by the third round of the talks, scheduled to begin 7 September.

The Warsaw Pact characterized the Bush proposal as positive, and agreed that a treaty was possible as early as 1990.

On 12 July, ahead of schedule, NATO announced further details of the Bush proposals dealing with aircraft. These included limiting each side to 5700 combat aircraft and 1900 combat helicopters. The former category would include those designed primarily for air-to-ground bombing and air-to-air fighting operations. NATO indicated it had about 6700 such aircraft while the Warsaw Pact possessed approximately 9600. Major differences between the two alliances on defining the types of aircraft to be included in any agreement remained, however.

The next rounds of the talks were scheduled for 7 September to 10 October, and 10 November to 21 December.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

The Government of Canada, with its NATO Allies, supports the goal of conventional force reduction to the lowest levels commensurate with security and stability. At the time of the release of NATO's basic opening position for the talks on 8 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark observed that:

...taken together with President Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions and restructuring of Soviet conventional forces, the Statement by Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance indicates that both sides are moving with dispatch toward serious negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. I think the conditions for productive negotiations toward maintaining stability at lower levels of conventional forces have never been better.²

Despite Mr. Clark's apparent optimism, however, in a speech delivered on 13 January 1989 he firmly supported the need for Canada and its allies to maintain their vigilance in dealing with the Soviet Union and its allies: "One lesson which history has taught us on numerous occasions is that negotiation based on mutual respect for each other's strength often succeeds. Negotiation from weakness cannot." He emphasized this point further by stating:

Prudence demands that we examine each new Soviet proposal with a careful eye to see how it affects our own vital interests. Prudence requires that we in the West remain clear-headed about what our most cherished ideals of peace, political freedom and respect for human rights really mean. Prudence demands that we maintain a credible military and political defence of these values.

² Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 245 (8 December 1988), p. 1.

Canada, as an ally, must continue to honour its obligation to make a contribution to the defence of the West. This will require active participation in NATO forces.³

At the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna on 19 January, Mr. Clark pledged that Canada would play a full role in the conventional arms control negotiating process, seeking imaginative solutions to complex problems. He also mentioned briefly the valuable role the MBFR talks had played in preparation for the upcoming discussions:

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe. Much of what has been learned from the successes and failures during the many years of these talks will prove useful in the new negotiations.⁴

In her speech to mark the opening of the new negotiations on 7 March 1989, Associate Defence Minister Mary Collins suggested that the new Soviet concept of "reasonable sufficiency" intimated a shift in Eastern strategy and a growing appreciation for the West's defensive military approach. Ms. Collins placed particular emphasis on verification measures, noting:

It will not be sufficient to work toward agreement on reduction measures and subsequently to attempt to devise verification measures. It will be necessary to examine closely the verification implications of all proposals under negotiation to ensure that compliance with agreements *can* be verified.

She continued:

In Canada, we will devote considerable resources to this aspect of the negotiations; we have in the past shared the results of our research with the international community. We hope that other nations will devote similar efforts to these important issues. In both negotiations, Canada will be active in devising means to ensure the reliable verification of any agreement.⁵

Following President Bush's proposal of 29 May 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney indicated his approval: "I think it is an impressive proposal worthy of serious consideration."⁶

³ Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/02 (13 January 1989), p.5.

⁴ Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/03 (19 January 1989), p. 2.

⁵ Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/09 (7 March 1989), pp. 4-6.

⁶ Patrick Doyle, "Canadians Claim Credit for Selling U.S. Arms Plan." *The Toronto Star*, 30 May 1989, p. 14.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The issue of conventional arms control in Europe was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

8. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

BACKGROUND

International efforts to control nuclear proliferation date back to the mid-1940s, during the initial stages of the development of the first atomic bomb. In 1943, allied governments, including the United States and Britain, met in Quebec and concluded agreements aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear technologies to states other than the US and the UK. In 1945, the United States, Britain, and Canada signed an Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy which foresaw the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

While more ambitious international efforts aimed at preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons were initially frustrated, some success was eventually achieved with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1956. Under the aegis of the UN, the IAEA's function, as defined in the Agency's statute of 1957, is "to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity," as well as "ensure that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its operation and control is not used to further any military purpose." Although not exclusively devoted to the task of curbing proliferation, the IAEA has contributed significantly to this goal through the application of safeguards and inspections to ensure that states not divert nuclear energy, material and facilities used for peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons. At the end of 1986, the Agency had concluded 164 safeguards agreements with ninety-four states.

Chief among existing international non-proliferation measures is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Evolving out of a 1961 UN General Assembly Resolution, the Treaty was signed on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970. It contains provisions for quinquennial reviews of its operation, and is due for renewal in 1995.

The NPT contains provisions to be followed both by existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Thus, Article I of the Treaty declares that each NWS "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In turn, under Article II, non-nuclear weapon states agree not to receive and not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives or other nuclear explosive devices; and agree to accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Nuclear weapons states parties agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information and assistance to their non-nuclear counterparts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, all states party undertake not to provide fissile material, or equipment used for processing or producing it, unless under IAEA safeguards.

Finally, under Article VI, nuclear weapon states party to the NPT agree to undertake to pursue negotiations "on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict, effective international control."

Although viewed by some as an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, only three of the states possessing these weapons--the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union--have actually signed the NPT. France and China--as well as suspected or "near" nuclear weapon states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa--have all yet to accede to the Treaty. So far, however, India is the only non-signatory NNWS known to have exploded a nuclear device. The explosion took place in 1974, and was described by the Indian Government as intended "for peaceful purposes only." On 3 October 1988, Saudi Arabia became the latest state to accede to the Treaty.

One obstacle to further accession to the NPT has been the long-held view among some states that it is discriminatory. Not only does it allow nuclear weapon states to maintain their arsenals while refusing the right of acquisition to others, but it requires the latter to open their facilities to the IAEA while the former are not required to do so. Nevertheless, as of June 1989, 141 states were party to the Treaty.

Three review conferences have thus far been held on the operation of the NPT. At the first review, in 1975, expressions of concern were voiced by the neutral and non-aligned nations regarding the failure of the NWS to halt the arms race. These states called for an end to underground nuclear testing, large reductions in nuclear arsenals, and a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear counterparts. Agreement by the NWS to make a greater effort to address these concerns was reflected in the Final Document.

The second review conference in 1980 was less successful than its predecessor. This was in large part due to the fact that since 1975, none of the demands of the neutral and non-aligned states had been met. Although some agreement was reached on safeguards for peaceful nuclear programmes, no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals ("vertical" proliferation). In fact, no final declaration, nor any reaffirmation of support for the Treaty, was issued from the review's proceedings.

The failure of the NWS to make substantive progress in the area of vertical proliferation resurfaced as the key issue at the most recent review in 1985. Indeed, in the five years separating the third review from the second, no major arms control measure of any kind had been achieved. A Final Declaration was, however, adopted by consensus. In it, the participants expressed the conviction that the NPT was essential for international peace and security, and reaffirmed their support for the Treaty and its objectives.

The Declaration also expressed the deep regret of all but some participants (i.e., the United States and Britain) over the failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban, and called on nuclear weapon states parties to resume trilateral negotiations, as well as to participate actively in the CD, to achieve it.

On 25 October 1988, informal meetings by parties to the NPT during the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly led to a decision to hold the fourth review conference in July and August 1990. The meetings also resulted in the establishment of a preparatory committee for the conference. The committee, of which Canada is a member, began preparations for the review from 1 to 5 May 1989 in New York. During the first meeting, it was decided that the Review would be held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. Two additional preparatory committee meetings (11 to 18 September, 1989

and 23 April to 4 May 1990), are scheduled to be held prior to the Review Conference.

Canada has always played a leading role in the quest for strict non-proliferation measures. While Canada assisted the US in the development of the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II, it was also the first nation to forego the option of developing them despite possession of the capacity to do so. One of the three states participating in the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy in 1945, Canada also took part in the negotiation of the IAEA, its statute, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime has been articulated as one of the six specific arms control goals of the Canadian Government.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Present Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation is based on changes introduced by Ottawa in 1974 and 1976, imposing tighter controls over nuclear exports.

Under this policy, nuclear cooperation will be allowed only with those non-nuclear weapon states that have made a general commitment to non-proliferation by either ratifying the NPT, or accepting full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Moreover, Canada will export nuclear materials only to those states (both nuclear and non-nuclear) which have undertaken to accept, in a formal agreement, a number of additional requirements designed to minimize proliferation risks. Such states must assure that Canadian-supplied nuclear items (e.g., nuclear material, heavy water, nuclear equipment, and technology) will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices. In addition, they must be willing to accept fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguard functions. These fallback safeguards include controls over the re-transfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items, and the reprocessing of spent fuel of Canadian origin.¹ Since 1976, these requirements have been negotiated with the United States, Euratom, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

In 1978 Canada also began work on an extensive programme aimed at developing and improving the verification mechanisms of the NPT. This initiative, known as the Canadian Safeguards Research and Development Programme, was designed to assist the IAEA in the development of safeguards systems for CANDU reactors. Work under this programme, which received a five-year budget of approximately \$11 million, is reported to be well-advanced.²

On 28 July 1988, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark strongly reaffirmed Canada's support for the NPT. Recalling that July marked the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty, Mr. Clark noted that it continued to be of major importance, providing for legally binding commitments to prevent nuclear proliferation and the facilitation of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

¹ Department of External Affairs, "Canada's Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," 1985, p. 13.

² "Canada's Role in Verification," *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Supplement, Summer-Fall 1987), p. 3.

Moreover, the Minister noted, the NPT set out a guiding framework for the reduction of nuclear arsenals.³

Mr. Clark emphasized that Canada was not only an early party to the Treaty but also an advocate of universal adherence to it. Expressing concern over the fact that a number of states with advanced nuclear capabilities had declined to accede to the NPT, the Minister pointed out that in June he had instructed Canadian embassies to inform those states who had not yet ratified the Treaty of the importance Canada attached to all states becoming full parties to it.⁴ Mr. Clark also expressed satisfaction with super-power developments in the area of nuclear arms control and disarmament; developments in conformity with the objectives of the NPT. Recognizing that deep reductions in nuclear arsenals constituted a central Canadian objective, the Minister stated that efforts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons were equally important. Expressing the hope that significant progress toward both goals would materialize before the 1990 Review Conference, Mr. Clark concluded by praising the past contributions of the NPT to non-proliferation, and noting that it would continue to represent a vital factor strengthening international security in future.⁵

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 7 June 1989, Liberal Member Sheila Copps raised questions pertaining to Canada's export of nuclear technology and its obligations under the NPT. Referring to remarks made by the Minister of Energy in *Science and Government Bulletin* concerning the sale of CANDU reactors, Ms. Copps stated:

... the Minister of Energy said that in his attempt to sell the CANDU reactor he was going to review all the regulations regarding the sale of nuclear elements out of Canada, including a review of Canada's position in the 1970 (NPT) treaty.... To quote the Minister he said...."Some people are putting China forward as a potential area for sales. Obviously the NPT becomes an issue."⁶

Ms. Copps then asked the Minister if he would renounce the "dangerous policy review" he had undertaken, particularly in light of the recent political turmoil in China.⁷ Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Jake Epp replied:

... the article to which the Hon. Member referred and subsequent articles which have been written deal with the examination of the AECL's work. The regulations refer to the joint partnerships that the AECL at the present time has difficulty entering into. At no time did I refer to the NPT to say that I

³ Department of External Affairs *Communique* No. 160 (28 July 1988), p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁶ *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1989, p. 2710.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2711.

am reviewing it, or that we will lessen it. When I referred to Canada and the NPT, obviously until China signs the NPT specifically for CANDU reactors or any other nuclear technology Canada could not co-operate.⁸

In a supplementary question, Ms. Copps asked:

[w]ill the Minister not categorically reject any review of Canada's participation in the NPT? Does he not understand that the sale of nuclear reactors should...depend on the economic and political stability of the countries involved? How could he make a statement like this?⁹

The Minister replied:

Obviously in view of what has happened in China, before there would be any decision taken on the AECL or CANDU reactor whether it is the present situation or China's adherence to the NPT, I raised the NPT for exactly that reason. Until the Chinese will conform to the NPT, obviously, Canada with its policy would not be able, and should not be able, to sell AECL or nuclear technology.... In terms of review, I said it is with respect to the manner in which AECL functions, not review of the NPT, Canada's adherence to the NPT, or that Canada will force anyone who buys nuclear technology from Canada to conform to the NPT.¹⁰

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9. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

BACKGROUND

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. Two years later, one hundred and twenty-five countries, including the US and the Soviet Union, signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any weapons of mass destruction in space, and also prohibits military bases, installations, or fortifications; weapons testing of any kind; and military manoeuvres on the moon and other celestial bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars. Under Article V of the Treaty, the parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, *space-based*, or mobile land-based" [emphasis added]. The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 urged that further agreements be developed to reserve outer space for solely peaceful purposes.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, as well as the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons. Repeated calls by the Soviet Union for a renewal of negotiations proved unsuccessful. Then, in 1983, the Soviet Union announced that it was unilaterally halting all ASAT testing. Two years later, the US Congress imposed a moratorium on tests in space of the F-15 ASAT, and in late 1987, funding for the weapon was cancelled by the US Air Force, in large part due to its high costs and limited capability. In 1988, an effort to impose a more permanent ban on ASAT testing was launched by some members of Congress. Congressional supporters of ASAT succeeded not only in blocking a ban, but also in ending the moratorium imposed in 1985. Recent budget statements by the Pentagon call for increases in spending on ASAT research and development for FY 1990, and each of the armed services is currently considering different systems developed under the Strategic Defense Initiative.

"Prevention of an arms race in outer space" has also been on the agenda of the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. It was not until 1985, however, that the forty nations represented on the Conference were able to reach a consensus on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the subject. It was agreed that in addition to

studying the issues involved in such a ban, the Committee should also study existing treaties and international law relating to outer space along with any proposals concerning the issue. During 1986 the CD re-established the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its examination of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1986 mandate has been continually re-established ever since.

In April 1988 the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD, concluding that "the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space." The report also recognized the need to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime in order to enhance its effectiveness. Finally, it called for strict compliance with existing multilateral and bilateral agreements.¹

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems":

I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.²

In 1982, as a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper in the CD outlining the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.³ The following year, Canada initiated a national research programme on the problems for verification which were likely to arise from the possible dual nature of many space systems.

In 1985 the Canadian delegation at the CD tabled a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at the CD."⁴ This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, Canada has been conducting a research project on verification called "PAXSAT A," studying the feasibility of developing a system of satellites capable of verifying arms control agreements in outer space. "PAXSAT A" involves space-to-space remote sensing, with satellites used to identify the purpose and

¹ Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/833, 25 April 1988.

² Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau, "Technological Momentum the Fuel That Feeds the Nuclear Arms Race: An Address...to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, June 18, 1982," *DEA Statements and Speeches* No. 82/10, p. 5.

³ CD/320, 26 August 1982.

⁴ CD/618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 July 1985.

function of other space objects. A second project, "PAXSAT B," is a feasibility study of the use of satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing to verify agreements on conventional forces. Canada presented its analysis of PAXSAT to the CD in April 1987.

In May 1987, Canada held a workshop at the McGill Centre for Research of Air and Space Law in Montreal. A cooperative effort between the Centre and the Department of External Affairs, the workshop was to "provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space." Thirty-nine officials, including eleven ambassadors representing thirty-five nations, were present. In 1988, Canada presented three working papers at the CD dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The papers dealt with terminology; a proposal for the strengthening of state practice under the 1975 UN Registration Convention (which requires, among other things, that parties to it furnish information to the Secretary General concerning the general function of space objects launched); and a retrospective review of recent significant political, technical and military developments in outer space.⁵

On 13 June 1988 at the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

The prevention of an arms race in space remains a major goal of Canadian policy and a matter which concerns us all. Canada will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes.⁶

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 26 July 1988, Canadian Ambassador de Montigny Marchand addressed the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Mr. Marchand noted the Government's recognition of the increasing importance of the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space, and the need for the CD to play a greater role in this area.⁷ He then outlined four guidelines for such a role: efforts at the CD must enhance stability rather

⁵ See Canada: *Working Paper on the Use of Certain Terms Relating to Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/OS/WP.27 (8 August 1988); Australia and Canada, *Strengthening State Practice Under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*, to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of satellites, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission, CD/OS/WP.25 (18 August 1988); and Canada, *Arms Control and Outer Space: A Retrospective Review: 1982-1987*, CD/OS/WP.26 (8 August 1988).

⁶ "Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to UNSSOD III," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer 1988, p. 6.

⁷ "Ambassador Marchand Addresses CD on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Summer 1988, p. 14.

than detract from it; should be based on existing arms control measures for outer space; and should be considered with a view to maintaining the division of labour between the CD and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). Moreover, negotiations in the CD must complement superpower talks on space issues.⁸

Mr. Marchand went on to emphasize the importance of defining the types of military activities that might be legitimately conducted in space.⁹ In addition, he identified the use of multilateral data exchanges on the military functions of space objects as one area in which practical progress could be made to increase the transparency of space activities. In this regard, the Ambassador suggested that efforts be made to strengthen the 1975 UN Registration Convention for space objects:

What we are suggesting...is that states party to the registration convention examine the possibility of taking their reporting responsibilities much more seriously and go beyond the requirement to disclose the 'general function of space objects' to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of a satellite, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission or both. What we are in fact suggesting is the strengthening, for arms control purposes of the application of the Convention.¹⁰

Mr. Marchand added that assuming states parties to the Convention could reach an understanding and agree in future to provide information on the military or civilian nature of space objects at the time of registration, this would enable those space powers that are not parties to the Convention to accept General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961, which called on all states to provide information on their space objects. He also noted that strengthening the Convention might even pave the way for the preparation of a code of conduct in outer space as advocated by France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany in the CD in 1985.¹¹

On 29 September 1988 Canada, along with Japan and the European Space Agency (ESA), signed agreements in Washington to participate in the US piloted-space station. Canada's contribution to the station includes a mobile servicing centre to cost an estimated \$1.2 billion. Deployment of the station is scheduled for 1995. The "Intergovernmental Agreement" signed on 29 September gives each member state the right to decide on the military uses of its own contribution to the station.¹²

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

11 *Ibid.*

12 "Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station," Article 9, paragraph 8, p. 9, in : Ministry of State for Science and Technology, *Space Station Documents*, 29 September 1988.

On 18 October 1988, in a statement before the First Committee at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier discussed Canadian policy on the prevention of an arms race in outer space:

Canada has made major contributions to those discussions, which we think have contributed usefully to clarification of the issues involved. We will continue to do so. Clearly, the negotiations between the USA and USSR in this area are of crucial importance and should be supported. Continued strict compliance with existing relevant treaties, including the ABM Treaty, remains critically important. Equally clearly, this is a subject area of legitimate multilateral concern and decisions on whether additional legal measures may be required are of broad international interest.¹³

On 7 December 1988, the General Assembly passed Resolution 43/70, calling on the CD to give priority to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, and to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this question. It also called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their negotiations on this issue. The Resolution passed by a vote of 154-1-0, with Canada voting in favor of the motion and only the US opposed.¹⁴

In January 1989, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs released its latest compendium of final records and working papers from the CD. The volume includes all such materials on the outer space question for the sessions of the CD held in 1988.¹⁵

Ambassador de Montigny Marchand discussed the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the CD again on 7 March 1989. Suggesting that the Committee might have been "overly selective" in its focus on this issue in the past, he noted that the terms "international security" and "uses of space" were of particular importance and worthy of "greater conceptual thought--as was the relationship between them."¹⁶

In this regard, he explained that international security related not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space, but also to the maintenance of a stable, controlled relationship between the two major space powers. Work in the CD aimed at enhancing rather than detracting from stability, and complemented the bilateral negotiations between the two major space powers. At the same time, while space activities in the past had been dominated by the two major space powers, the situation was changing rapidly. One challenge facing the "multilateral disarmament world," he continued, would

¹³ Department of External Affairs, *Press Release* No. 42, 18 November 1988, pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ UNGA Resolution 43/70, 7 December 1988.

¹⁵ Department of External Affairs, *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space - Final Records and Working Papers 1988*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, January 1989.

¹⁶ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament," 7 March 1989. p. 6.

be not only to put technological developments in space to good use, but more important, to arrive at a common understanding of what "good use" in fact is.¹⁷

Such issues, Mr. Marchand observed, underlined the need for the Ad Hoc Committee (once established) to devote much greater attention to the basic framework involved in the use of space: to strengthen the current regime, to agree on definitions of key terms, to clarify the issue of stability and thus set up a solid foundation to guide work in the future. Specifically, the Ambassador reiterated Canada's previous suggestions for the improvement of state practice under the 1975 UN Registration Convention as "a helpful confidence-building measure (CBM)."¹⁸

Concluding, Mr. Marchand expressed disappointment at the failure of the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. Nevertheless, he observed that Canada regarded the attention given the issue as a hopeful indication of a shared desire to seriously examine what is involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and to work together in pursuit of that objective. Finally, he announced the completion and distribution to the CD of Canada's latest Outer Space compendium, adding his hope that it would serve as a useful working tool and point of reference for future use.¹⁹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In a statement in the House on 29 September 1988, Mrs. Suzanne Duplessis, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of State (Science and Technology), announced the Government's intention to sign the agreement formalizing Canada's participation in the space station. Mrs. Duplessis added:

For Canadians this project will create spinoffs totalling \$5 billion, create 80,000 person-years and provide a unique opportunity to participate in a project with some of the most daring technology in the world.²⁰

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²⁰ *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1988, p. 19767.

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10. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS

BACKGROUND

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. During World War II it was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons from Port Radium in the Northwest Territories. Canada continued to provide uranium and plutonium for the weapons programmes of the United States and Britain for twenty years, although it renounced any intention of developing its own atomic weapons. In 1965, Canada's uranium export policy was altered when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announced that, henceforth, Canadian uranium exports would be used for peaceful purposes only.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ushered in greater restrictions on the uses of nuclear material internationally. In addition to agreeing not to develop nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty, are required to submit to full safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over their nuclear programmes. In turn, those nuclear-weapon states, party to the Treaty, agree to work toward halting the proliferation of their own arsenals ("vertical" proliferation), and are required to co-operate with their non-nuclear counterparts in the development of the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

India's explosion of its "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 served as the harbinger of change in Canadian policy on the export of nuclear material and equipment. After the Indian Government admitted that the plutonium used in its "device" had been produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, Canada suspended all nuclear cooperation with India, and later that year announced more stringent safeguards on its nuclear exports.

Natural uranium is not classified as a strategic material. A blend of uranium 235 (U235) and uranium 238 (U238), natural uranium contains less than one percent U235--a quantity too low to generate a nuclear explosion.

Approximately eighty percent of the uranium exported from Canada goes to the United States, Great Britain and France. There it is enriched for use in light-water nuclear reactors. Because these reactors require uranium with a three-percent concentration of U235, the natural uranium must be enriched to this level by increasing the percentage of U235 isotope. Elaborate and expensive, the enrichment process was, until recently, confined to those countries possessing nuclear weapons programmes, as only they could afford the cost of such large operations.

The Canada-United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1955 and most recently renewed in 1980, stipulates that uranium of Canadian origin cannot be used for military purposes. Similar conditions govern uranium exports to Britain and France under the Canada-Euratom Agreement (1978).

Since enrichment plants have both civilian and military uses, the separation of materials for either application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large "pot" and is not kept separate according to the country of origin or its intended use. In a letter to NDP Leader Ed Broadbent in October 1985, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the enrichment plant, the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally - accepted notion of fungibility.¹

After the uranium is enriched to the required three-percent concentration of U235, the depleted uranium (which still contains small amounts of U235) is stored. Depleted U238 can be used in military reactors to breed plutonium--a substance which itself can be used to make nuclear weapons. U238 also constitutes an important element of hydrogen bombs, providing fifty percent of their explosive power.

Following the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the Canadian Government announced that no uranium of Canadian origin could be enriched or reprocessed without Canada's prior consent. In January 1977, Canada halted uranium shipments to both the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan after two years of negotiation failed to produce their agreement to the Canadian stipulations. Although Japan consented to abide by the clause soon afterwards, the EEC remained intransigent. It was not until 1980 that an agreement was signed allowing sales to the EEC, with consultation on a case-by-case basis.

Western European countries purchasing uranium from Canada occasionally have arranged for both its enrichment, and its subsequent retransfer to one of Canada's nuclear partners, by the Soviet Union. This practice has been taking place for several years with the complete knowledge and prior consent of the Canadian Government, which has judged it to be fully consistent with Canadian nuclear export and non-proliferation policy.

Greater formalization of this arrangement was established with the signing of the Canada-USSR Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on 14 October 1988. The Agreement stipulates that Canadian uranium shipped to the USSR "... shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device or other military purpose."² It also provides for the direct exchange of information between the parties on the transfer of Canadian uranium into and out of the Soviet Union.³ The Agreement reflects the desire on the part of both governments to ensure a thorough non-proliferation regime.

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, constitutes another key component of nuclear weapons. It is generally found as tritiated water. Its importance is based on its high rate of fusion with deuterium and the large quantity of high-energy neutrons released as a result. The fusion of the two elements produces ten times as many neutrons

¹ Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

² "Canada/USSR Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," DEA News Release No. 223 (14 October 1988).

³ *Ibid.*.

as fission for the same amount of energy release. Tritium is thus crucial for boosting the energy released in nuclear explosions, allowing designers to build smaller and lighter weapons. In fact, boosting--and therefore tritium--is now considered an essential aspect of most US nuclear weapons.

Each year, approximately 0.5 kg of tritium is used for civilian purposes such as phosphorescent lights and fusion experiments, while approximately 11 kg are used for military purposes. Tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year. With regard to nuclear weapons, this requires that their tritium supply be replaced from time to time.

Continued production of the tritium required for the US nuclear stockpile, however, has become an issue of increasing concern. In August 1988, the sole tritium-producing facility in the US--the thirty-eight-year-old Savannah River plant in South Carolina--was closed due to safety and management problems. The costs associated with repairing the facility are estimated at close to \$1 billion over a ten-year period. Even if repaired, however, the plant is not expected to operate with the power required to produce the tritium necessary for US needs.

Canadian CANDU reactors use heavy water to control the nuclear reaction. The heavy water--containing deuterium--captures neutrons from the main reaction chamber, converting deuterium to tritium. This process is peculiar to CANDU reactors, and therefore more tritium is produced as a by-product by the CANDU reactors than by any other type of reactor.

For health and safety reasons, the tritium by-products of CANDU reactors require removal. Ontario Hydro has constructed a tritium recovery facility at Darlington, Ontario. The facility, which opened in October 1988, is capable of producing an estimated 2.5 kg of tritium per year. However, technical problems have precluded regular operation of the facility, and the plant was shut down for repair in late February 1989. Resumption of operations is not expected before the fall of 1989.

Ontario Hydro is currently considering whether to market the tritium that will eventually be recovered at the Darlington facility. Tritium sells for approximately \$15 million per kilogram on the international market. In September 1988, a report produced by the Ontario Premier's Council on Technology urged this course as one way of making Ontario Hydro more profitable.⁴

Plans announced by the Federal Government in October 1988 for Canada's participation in an international research project aimed at building a fusion reactor for the production of nuclear energy have sparked additional interest in tritium production. The reactor--called ITER--will involve the cooperative efforts of the US, the Soviet Union, Japan and the European Community, and will take approximately ten years to build. Ottawa is considering the possibility of having the facility built in Canada. Once built, ITER will require an estimated 30 to 75 kg of tritium--an amount which could be supplied in full by the Darlington facility.

Tritium is not classified as a nuclear material by the IAEA, and is therefore not subject to international safeguards. It possesses a relatively short half-life and thus

⁴ Robert Sheppard, "Canada to Join Nuclear Fusion Project," *Globe and Mail*, 1 October 1988.

would create problems for IAEA monitoring. Given its use for weapons purposes, and the potential dangers associated with its transport, the possibility of Ontario Hydro marketing the material has sparked considerable concern, from both peace activists and environmentalists.

At present, Ontario Hydro has yet to make a final decision on the sale of tritium. Nevertheless, Provincial Energy Minister Bob Wong remarked on 14 February 1989 that any such exports would have to be contingent on guarantees that the tritium sold would not be put to military use.⁵ Nor, he added, would sales be allowed without securing assurances that Canadian tritium would not be acquired in order to free other sources for military use.⁶

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada continues to require that its uranium exports be used for non-explosive purposes, pursuant to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and in keeping with its nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Canada's policy on the sale of tritium and tritium-related technology is governed by a set of guidelines issued on 14 March 1986. The guidelines reflect Canada's policy that tritium exports "not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."⁷ Tritium exports are permitted only to states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or to states which have undertaken equivalent non-proliferation obligations acceptable to Canada and for the specified end-uses elaborated in Canada's guidelines.⁸

In November 1988, at the UN General Assembly, Canada once again introduced a resolution (43/75K) entitled "Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes." The Resolution noted that such a prohibition would be an important step in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as halting and reversing the arms race. It therefore requested that the CD pursue its consideration of the question of an adequately verifiable cessation and prohibition, and that it keep the General Assembly informed of that consideration. The Resolution passed by a vote of 144-1-7, with only France in opposition.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Neither the issue of uranium exports nor that of the export of tritium has been raised in the Commons this year.

⁵ "Critics Alarmed Over Possible Sale of Tritium," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 February 1989, p. A16.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ "Tritium-Related Exports," Atomic Energy Control Board, *Notice 86-5*, 14 March 1986. p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

11. VERIFICATION

BACKGROUND

Verification is now recognized as a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreements in any of these sectors. However, two important developments have occurred since the end of summer 1987: talks have resumed on verification of nuclear testing after an eight-year hiatus, and the Soviet Union and the United States have signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF). The INF Treaty contains certain innovative provisions on verification that could set a precedent for future disarmament and arms control agreements.

Over the years, Canada has acquired solid expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. Following the United Nations' First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which stressed the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in disarmament agreements, the Canadian Government announced in 1983 the launching of an Arms Control Research Programme, which now has an annual budget of \$1 million. This Department of External Affairs programme involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector and includes such projects as studies of problems that arise in international negotiations, creation of specialized technical training programmes and organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Programme focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities include a \$3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station in Yellowknife, to be completed by September 1989; two studies given to the UN Secretary-General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and working papers on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the verification of a future Convention on Chemical Weapons. Canada has also undertaken a feasibility study of two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to the verification of multilateral arms control agreements, known as PAXSAT. PAXSAT 'A' investigated the use of space-based remote sensing for arms control in outer space, while PAXSAT 'B' was concerned with verifying conventional arms control agreements.

In 1985, at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada's UN delegation initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 "on all aspects of verification," which was passed by consensus. The Resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures," and urged them "to communicate to the Secretary-General [...] their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques [...] and on the role of the United Nations in the field of

verification." The Resolution was called "a historic breakthrough," since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.¹

Carrying out the requirements of this Resolution, in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General, and subsequently published, *A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification*. This publication, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, despite the fact that bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will likely continue to be of paramount importance in this context.

In 1987 and 1988, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document containing sixteen principles on verification. The Group also held discussions on procedures and techniques and on the role the United Nations might play in verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. This last point was the subject of a speech by Mr. Roche on 12 May 1988, in which he listed certain roles the UN could play with regard to verification:

- development of internationally recognized standards on arms control and disarmament verification;
- creation of a verification data base, especially to assist negotiators;
- provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to regional arms control negotiators, on request;
- research into structures, procedures and techniques for verification; and
- on a responsive basis and with the consent of the parties to an arms control or disarmament negotiation or agreement, potential involvement in the formulation and execution of verification provisions of specific agreements.²

At the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament in June 1988, Canada and the Netherlands submitted a paper on the role the United Nations might play in verification. The two countries proposed in particular that a UN Group of Experts conduct a thorough study of this subject, to serve as a key international document on future UN activities in this field.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 3 May 1988, at the UN Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Roche made reference to recent progress in, and the importance of, verification in arms control and disarmament. He stated:

Since last year there have been major developments with respect to the issue of verification, both in a bilateral framework and a multilateral one. The

¹ Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, *News Release*, No. 62, 22 November 1985.

² *Intervention on the Role of the United Nations in Verification by Canadian Representative at UNDC, Verification Working Group*, United Nations, 12 May 1988.

innovative verification provisions of the INF Agreement, the continuing discussions between the USA and USSR on verifying a nuclear test ban, and the challenge inspections conducted pursuant to the Stockholm Document, are all examples of such developments. Verification remains at the very heart of the arms control and disarmament process: for without agreement on effective verification measures there can be no meaningful arms control or disarmament.³

On 23 August 1988, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), announced that Canada would be hosting a technical workshop on seismic data exchange for verification of a nuclear test ban.⁴ The workshop, to be held at Yellowknife in September 1989, will focus on remaining obstacles to a worldwide seismological network for verifying such a ban.

On 18 October 1988, in a speech to the First Committee at the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly, Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier addressed the possible role of the UN in verification:

The Canadian Government...firmly believes that the United Nations can have a significant role in promoting and facilitating effective verification. We have therefore examined closely and in a positive spirit various proposals which have been made for a UN role in verification.... Our central concern is to ensure that the UN can acquire an appropriate role in verification which will strengthen the arms control and disarmament process by facilitating the conclusion and implementation of agreements and will enhance the authority and credibility of the United Nations system.⁵

In October 1988, the Strategic Studies Programme of the University of Calgary hosted a conference on verification of a chemical weapons ban. Sponsored by the Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs, the conference examined the extent to which International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards could serve as a model for the verification of chemical weapons.⁶

On 7 December 1988, at the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored Resolution 43/81B calling upon the UN Secretary-General to initiate

³ Speech by the Ambassador for Disarmament to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, 3 May 1989.

⁴ Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament, 23 August 1988, p. 3.

⁵ "Ambassador Fortier Stresses Hope", *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Fall-Winter 1988, p. 11.

⁶ "University of Calgary Workshop on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Fall-Winter 1988, p. 5. See also: James Keeley, *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Occasional Papers* No. 1, September 1988.

a Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification. The study would identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament; assess the need for improvements in existing activities; explore and identify other possible activities; and provide specific recommendations for future actions by the United Nations in this regard. The Group's report would be submitted to the Forty-fifth Session of the General Assembly in 1990.⁷ The Resolution passed by a vote of 150-1-0, with the United States opposing the motion.

That same month, a Department of External Affairs briefing note addressed the Canadian Government's position regarding the notion of an international verification organization (IVO) and the link between such a body and the UN. It stated:

Canada advocates a realistic and step-by-step approach to the establishment of IVOs, including those that would employ the UN. Costly schemes to create verification bodies with all-encompassing responsibilities, some of which go beyond the limited function of verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, are inappropriate. Verification should be primarily a treaty-specific activity. While useful work may be done to study verification as a general process and to discuss general principles, the implementation of verification is fundamentally dependent on the specifics of a treaty context. For the foreseeable future, the most effective way of organizing the specialized expertise necessary for verification will be through treaty-specific organizations. Under current international conditions an IVO with responsibilities for several ACD agreements is unlikely to [be] a realistic possibility.⁸

The opening session of the Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification was held from 13 to 17 February 1989. Composed of authorities from over twenty countries, including Canada, the Group dedicated its first session primarily to organizational matters and the preparation of a draft outline of the Group's report. Fred Bild, Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister of External Affairs for Political and International Security Affairs, was elected chairman. Three more sessions were scheduled, with the fourth to end with the completion of the report.⁹

Speaking to the CD on 20 June 1989, Mr. Bild discussed the importance of verification in Canadian arms control policy:

...verification and transparency are two subjects that have formed a central part of the Canadian Government's approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament. They are central elements in building confidence and consensus. It will come as no surprise... that verification ranks high in our priorities. Canada has endeavoured through its verification research programme to contribute in an effective way to the very foundation of arms control. Some of the studies we have initiated have looked at technical problems associated with various methods of verification, while others have sought to clarify the

⁷ UNGA Resolution 43/81B, 7 December 1988.

⁸ "Establishment of a UN Verification Organization," Department of External Affairs, *Briefing Note*, 22 December 1988, p. 3.

⁹ "Work Begins on S. G. Studies," *Disarmament Times* (April 1989), p. 1.

conceptual basis of verification, bearing in mind that much will depend on the type of arms control and disarmament to be verified.¹⁰

Turning to work in progress on the UN's role in verification, Mr. Bild welcomed the fact that the Group of Experts had accepted the sixteen verification principles agreed to by consensus at the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1988, as the foundation of its work. He went on to state:

As one might well expect, the exact nature of our recommendations cannot be determined at this early stage. But progress so far has been good, and I remain optimistic that we shall produce a report that is technically competent, politically realistic and one which will strengthen the multilateral arms control process and the United Nations itself.¹¹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The subject of verification was not raised in the Commons this year.

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Nuclear Testing

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

BACKGROUND

A previous steady decline in the global arms trade was reversed by an increase of nine percent in 1987. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global trade in major weapons was valued at approximately US \$35.1 billion (all figures are in 1985 US dollars), up from US \$32.3 billion in 1986.¹ The Institute attributes the 1987 increase to "sudden" US and Soviet deliveries of fighter aircraft ordered in the early 1980s. However, it also predicts that with a scarcity of new orders, future deliveries will decline.²

There was also a marked increase in the value of arms sales to Third World countries; these countries continue to be the biggest recipients of conventional arms. In 1986, the value of weapons delivered to developing countries was US \$21.3 billion. By comparison, in 1987 the value increased to US \$24.7 billion--accounting for seventy percent of the total global market of arms imports.³ The leading importer of major weapons in the Third World is the Middle East, with 1987 transfers estimated at US \$11.5 billion. It is followed by South Asia (US \$6.1 billion), the Far East (US \$2.4 billion), South America (US \$1.9 billion), Sub-Saharan Africa (US \$1.8 billion), North Africa (US \$479 million), Central America (US \$316 million) and South Africa (US \$8 million).⁴ Among individual countries, India ranked as the world's leading arms importer in 1987 with purchases estimated at US \$5.2 billion. It was followed by Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria and Angola.⁵

The largest exporters of major weapons to the developing countries are the USSR (US \$9.7 billion), the USA (US \$5.9 billion), France (US \$3.2 billion), the UK (US \$1.65 billion) and China (US \$1.04 billion). These leading exporters together account for over eighty percent of all global deliveries.⁶ For China, it was the first time that it was one of the world's five largest arms exporters to developing countries.⁷

The Soviet Union (US \$12.3 billion), the US (US \$11.5 billion) and three NATO countries--France (US \$3.6 billion), the UK (US \$1.8 billion) and West Germany (US \$1.4

¹ *SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook, 1988*. London: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 176.

² *Ibid.*.

³ *Ibid.*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁷ *Ibid.*.

billion)--were the world's top exporters of major weapons to all countries.⁸ China followed West Germany with 1987 transfers valued at US \$1.04 billion. However, China's sales were made exclusively to the Third World. The Soviet Union continued to lead as the main exporter of major arms to the Third World, while US arms transfers were divided almost equally between the developing countries (US \$5.8 billion) and the industrialized world (US \$5.7 billion).⁹ In 1987, the US ranked first among exporters of major weapons to industrialized countries. The remaining market was divided among a large number of smaller suppliers, including increasingly large numbers of Third World manufacturers.¹⁰

Significant growth occurred in 1987 in the "gray" and "black" markets in weapons, marked publicly by the US "Iran-Contra" affair and the Swedish "Bofors" arms sales to Iran. "Gray market" sales, defined as "officially approved exports from governments which do not want to be associated with their actions," were approximately US \$2 billion in 1987.¹¹ In the smaller area of illegally acquired arms technology, the "black market," "consisting mostly of small transactions that violate the laws of the nation from which they originate," has begun to thrive in the Third World.¹²

Arms transfer controls by exporters, whether through regulation, creation of a world arms register, or any other means, have often been considered but never effectively enacted by members of the United Nations. In 1977, US President Carter imposed unilateral restrictions on American arms exports. This action was followed by the Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) talks with the Soviet Union. These talks, however, soon broke down.¹³

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada continues to be a minor player in the global conventional arms market. In 1987, Canada ranked fifteenth as a major weapons exporter with global deliveries valued at US \$139 million. The greater portion (US \$102 million) of these deliveries was made to the industrialized world. In the same year, Canada imported weapons from industrialized countries in the amount of US \$677 million.¹⁴

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 177.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 190. See also: pp. 175 and 190-95.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 192.

13 Keith Krause, *The International Trade in Arms*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 28 (March 1988), pp. 7-8.

14 SIPRI, *supra* note 1, pp. 177 and 179.

However, the value of military goods produced by Canada in 1987 was approximately CDN \$2 billion, of which about CDN \$1.3 billion was sold to the United States and about CDN \$530 million went to all other countries.¹⁵

Canadian military exports are primarily in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Since Canadian firms manufacture few complete weapons systems, most exports consist of components, despite Ottawa's continued efforts to develop a more broadly-based domestic defence industry. Canada's policy on military exports has not changed since Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced revised guidelines on 10 September 1986, aimed at regulating Canadian exports.¹⁶ This policy prohibits military exports to countries that seriously or persistently violate human rights, "unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population," to countries under UN Security Council sanctions, and countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities. Restrictions also apply to exports of civilian strategic equipment to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and countries where there is a risk the goods will be re-routed to these destinations.

The biggest recipient of Canadian defence and defence-related goods is the United States, with whom Canada has had a Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) since 1959 that gives Canadian firms privileged access to the US military market.¹⁷ (Canada and the US also have a Defence Development Sharing Agreement (DDSA)). However, protectionists in the US Congress have tabled trade bills in the Senate and House of Representatives that would place restrictions on purchases of foreign defence goods in order to promote US products. Despite the free trade agreement, these measures may well affect existing Canada-US agreements on military trade, such as the DPSA and the DDSA.

The idea of developing an international arms trade register under the auspices of the United Nations surfaced once again in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Foreign Relations (the Simard-Hockin Report) of June 1986. The Report recommended that Canada should strive to convince other nations to support the proposals for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions.¹⁸ On 21 October 1987, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs James Taylor told a conference in Hull that Canada supports the idea of an arms register. His address included the following statement:

¹⁵ John Kohut, "Overseas markets are not easy targets." *Globe and Mail*, 10 October 1988, pp. B13 and B17.

¹⁶ For a full overview of the new policy, see: "Export Controls Policy." Department of External Affairs *Communiqué* No. 155 (10 September 1986).

¹⁷ Krause, *supra* note 13, pp. 6-7.

¹⁸ Hockin, Tom (MP) and Senator Jean-Maurice Simard, *Independence and Internationalism*. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, June 1986, p. 145.

It is perhaps instructive in this regard to note that despite repeated UN resolutions scarcely more than 20 states register with the UN their levels of military expenditure. Canada is one of the few countries that does so.¹⁹

Mr. Taylor also listed the current obstacles to such a measure, especially the type of information to be provided and the range of goods to be declared. He pointed out that some countries might refuse to be included on such a register for security reasons, since this register would contain virtually all information on a country's military strength, and might be used by a potential enemy. Finally, he explained that the problem of the arms trade could not be solved until the insecurity of some countries, which is often the result of flawed international security mechanisms, has been addressed.²⁰

Begun in 1983, the biennial Armed Forces Training Technology Exhibition (ARMX) held its 1989 exhibition in Ottawa from 23 to 25 May. The exhibition featured the latest military technology products of approximately 450 corporations from sixteen countries, including Canada. The sponsor of the event was the Toronto-based Baxter Publishing Co., publisher of the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins explained the role of ARMX-1989 to the House of Commons as follows:

...[T]he primary purpose of ARMX is to provide a forum in which training and technology needs of the Department of National Defence can be offered and shown.... The Government of Canada has identified its equipment needs from trucks to communications equipment, and ARMX provides the various companies with an opportunity to show their products and share their ideas.... ARMX gives Canadian companies...the opportunity to show what they have to offer to both exhibitors and to the Canadian Government.... Visitors from NATO countries are encouraged to look at Canadian capabilities to help them meet their NATO commitments.... We all know that the defence industry is a relatively small part of our national economy.... However, it certainly represents some of the most technologically sophisticated industries that we have. The high-tech industry is one of the ways for Canada to maintain a competitive position internationally.... The defence business is important to the economic viability of many of our high-tech communities.²¹

About 2000 demonstrators protested outside the grounds where ARMX-1989 was being held. A total of 145 people were arrested and charged with mischief when they staged a sit-down strike in an attempt to prevent the exhibition from opening. Ottawa's City Council voted to stop renting any municipally-owned property for future ARMX shows. It is widely anticipated that the 1991 exhibition will find a site elsewhere in Canada (for an explanation of the protests, see "Parliamentary Comment" below).

Canadian Government regulations require an export permit for the sale of military

19 Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Policy on Arms Control and Disarmament-Excerpts from Official Statements and Communication*, August 1988, p. 1.

20 Keith Krause, *The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Conference Report No.6 (October 1987), pp. 28-29.

21 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1981-82.

commodities to any country other than the United States. However, this permit does not cover subsequent sales or inclusion of the commodity in another product sold to a third party. There is no official Government reporting of either direct or indirect military commodity sales. Nevertheless, allegations surfaced in 1988-1989 that the Canadian Government was involved in the granting of export permits for sales of military commodities to governments involved in conflicts or known systematically to violate human rights. It was reported on 7 February 1989 that Zimbabwean Foreign Affairs Minister Nathan Shamayurira had claimed to have "hard information" concerning Canadian manufacturers violating the international arms embargo against South Africa by shipping arms to South Africa from third countries. The following day Shamayurira issued a statement denying he had made such an allegation.²² Regarding indirect military sales, it was alleged in the December 1988 issue of *The Ploughshares Monitor* that \$150-200 million worth of Canadian military commodities, or products that have military application, find their way each year into the hands of governments who are at war or who are severe human rights violators.²³

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

A lengthy debate took place in the House of Commons on 19 May 1989 concerning Canadian Government involvement in the ARMX-1989 exhibition. After the Associate Minister of Defence Mary Collins explained the purpose of ARMX-1989, NDP MP Dan Heap commented:

The Minister wants us to believe that they will not be dealing with weapons here. She also wants us to believe that Third World countries outside NATO will not be making purchases.... In that case, I wish she would explain why the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mr. Clark] has said that South Africa is welcome to come, a country which we are supposedly trying to discourage from murdering its own inhabitants. Yet we want them to come out and look at weapons with which they can kill their own inhabitants or maybe the people of Namibia.²⁴

Ms. Collins responded in part:

Less than 10 per cent of the exhibits at ARMX will focus on weapons or weapons related systems.... The remaining 90 per cent is goods and services for a whole variety of activities. Exhibits include such things as rubber life rafts and computer systems.... Let me deal finally with Third World countries. The

²² Patrick Nagle, "Canadian Firm Linked to S. African Arms Sale." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 February 1989; Patrick Nagle, "Zimbabwe Minister Says Canada Not Selling Arms to South Africa." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 February 1989; and Mary Nemeth, *et al.*, "Canada in a Hot Seat: Joe Clark Has a Showdown in Harare." *Maclean's*, vol. 102 no. 8 (20 February 1989), p. 21.

²³ "Indirect Military Sales to the Third World: Hidden Road to the Arms Market." *The Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 9 no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 13-15; and "Stricter Control Urged on Arms Components." *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 January 1989.

²⁴ *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1983.

Hon. Member's statement is absolute nonsense.... I am advised by the Minister [for External Affairs] that the organizers have assured us they have invited no South Africans to attend ARMX, including South African diplomats in Canada.²⁵

Later in the debate, Minister of State (Privatization and Regulatory Affairs) John McDermid stated:

A close examination of Canada's defence industry will reveal that we produce very little bellicose equipment. Those defence goods that we do produce have earned us an enviable reputation around the world for civil applications. One need only cite simulator technology, short take-off and landing aircraft, navigation systems and communication technology.²⁶

Liberal MP André Ouellet rose in the House to voice his concerns about ARMX-1989:

...[W]e clearly distinguish between the requirements and commitments of our Armed Forces within such organizations as NATO and NORAD on the one hand, and this profitable and scandalous effort to sell weapons to Third World countries. Therefore, I just cannot condone what has become of this arms bazaar, a private concern, and a very big one at that, for the promotion of those who want to make big bucks with the sale of military equipment.²⁷

Following an explanation of the Canadian Government position on export control policies, MP Dan Heap queried:

...[W]hen we sell goods to the United States...we do not know whether they will wind up sold or given by the United States to the Contras in Nicaragua, or to the Salvadoran army in El Salvador to strafe and bomb civilians.... It appears quite legal for those countries to do this because we have not required any statement from them about end use.... When the Minister talked about the restriction on exports to certain countries in certain categories, and spoke about countries with a persistent record of violence against their citizens,...he did not mention that the Government has refused to identify which countries are currently under that restriction. Therefore, it is impossible for us to evaluate how subjective or accurate the Government's identification may be.²⁸

Mr. McDermid replied:

...We have verification procedures.... [I]n a large number of cases the export permit must be reviewed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs himself. Once a permit is issued trained officials seek assurances that goods

25 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1983-84.

26 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1991.

27 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1988.

28 *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1992-1993.

are destined to bona fide clients and verify the veracity of those transactions. There is a follow-up, and we do keep an eye on those things.... It is not our intention to publish a list of countries which are affected by this policy. Such a list would be a cabinet confidence. I believe the identity of some countries is self-evident. Others may be of a more sensitive nature, and therefore it must remain within cabinet confidentiality.²⁹

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²⁹ *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, p. 1993. See also: 23 May 1989, pp. 2041-2042, 2043-2044 and 2047-2048.

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13. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

BACKGROUND

Successive Canadian Governments have attributed great economic and political value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system, a line of early-warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was initiated primarily by the United States, cooperative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed when a privately owned oil tanker, the *Manhattan*, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned with the threat to sovereignty and a possible increase in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*, 1970, which established Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. As late as 1969 considerable confusion seemed to characterize the Canadian Government's position on the precise nature of Canadian claims to the Arctic waters. After 1973, however, Canadian Governments were consistently claiming the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal, with no right of innocent passage through them.

At the Quebec Summit, in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW Line. Unlike the earlier system, which was largely manned and operated by US personnel, the NWS will be manned and controlled entirely by Canadians. (For more information, see NORAD, Chapter 15 of *The Guide*.)

Although the first nuclear-powered submarine operated under the Arctic icecap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is comparatively recently that both superpowers are believed to have initiated regular submarine patrols under the ice. This development has raised the prospect of the Arctic becoming an area of growing strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created dilemmas for the Canadian Government. As nuclear-powered submarines are particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively under the ice, their operation in the Arctic poses a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the region.

In August 1985, a more visible threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself with the voyage of the US Coast Guard vessel, the *Polar Sea*, through the Northwest Passage. The declared purpose of the voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska. The US Government failed, however, to request the Canadian Government's permission to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with

Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it nevertheless proposed that the voyage be made on a cooperative basis. To this end, the US Coast Guard provided information to its Canadian counterpart and took Canadian observers on board the vessel. Moreover, the US Government stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters.¹

The Canadian Government responded to the *Polar Sea* incident with a firm assertion of Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. On 10 September 1985, in a statement before the House of Commons, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said:

Only with full sovereignty can we protect the entire range of Canadian interests. Full sovereignty is vital to Canada's security. It is vital to the Inuit people. And it is vital to Canada's national identity. The policy of this Government is to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic archipelago and this applies to the airspace above as well. We will accept no substitutes.²

Mr. Clark announced several measures to better ensure the protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These included: an Order in Council establishing straight baselines (enclosing Canada's internal waters) around the outer perimeter of the Archipelago; the introduction of measures to extend the application of Canadian civil and criminal law to all offshore zones, including the Arctic (Bill C-104); an increase in the number of surveillance flights and in the level of naval activity in eastern Arctic waters; and the construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. The Government also indicated its willingness to have the sovereignty question referred to the World Court, by withdrawing its earlier reservations in this regard. Finally, it called for immediate discussions with the United States on all means of cooperation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty. Negotiations between Canada and the United States began soon afterwards.

In June 1987, Canada's Defence White Paper listed a number of additional sovereignty-related defence initiatives that the Government planned to undertake. These included: the ongoing modernization of the DEW Line radars; the upgrading of five northern airfields to accommodate fighter interceptors; an increase in the number of Aurora Long-range Patrol Aircraft; the modernization of the Tracker medium-range aircraft; an expansion of the Canadian Ranger force; the establishment of a Northern Training Centre for the Canadian Forces; and the planned deployment of fixed sonar systems for submarine detection in the Arctic passages. In addition, recognizing the Archipelago's potential as a viable passageway for submarines between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines of its own, partly because of their under-ice capability.

In a speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic become a zone of peace. Specifically, the Soviet leader called for negotiations aimed at scaling down militarization and naval activity in the Baltic,

¹ This was made clear in a State Department Press Guidance released on 14 June 1985, the day after the Canadian public was made aware of the impending transit.

² *Commons Debates*, 10 September 1985, p. 6463.

Northern, Greenland and Norwegian Seas (later extended to include the Barents Sea as well). Limitations on anti-submarine weapons, advance notification of major military exercises, and the banning of naval activity in international straits and shipping lanes were all proposed. President Gorbachev also called for multilateral cooperation in the development of Arctic resources, in scientific research, and in environmental protection. Finally, he raised the possibility of the Soviet Union opening to other nations the Northern Sea Route from Europe to the Far East.

On 6 October 1987, the Soviet draft text of a Soviet-Canadian agreement on Arctic cooperation was released by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. First proposed by the Soviets in early 1987, the provisions of the draft included: recognition of the rights of both countries to control pollution and govern navigation in the Arctic waters adjacent to their territories, provision for information exchanges on environmental, natural resource and navigation safety issues, and the extension of existing scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries.

On 9 December 1987, at a Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues in Tromsø, Norway, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark indicated the Government's desire to develop a comprehensive Northern foreign policy. He stated the elements of this policy as follows: 1) affirming Canadian sovereignty; 2) modernizing Canada's northern defences; 3) preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4) promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation. Enhanced security in the Arctic, according to Clark, would come from a step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. Finally, he noted that Canada's Arctic security was a direct function of Alliance solidarity and cohesion, the climate of East-West relations, and progress toward balanced reductions of nuclear weapons.³

On 11 January 1988, after two years of discussion, Canada and the United States signed a Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement (the "Icebreaker" Agreement). This Agreement seeks to facilitate navigation by the icebreakers of the two nations, and to develop cooperative procedures for this purpose. Under its terms, the United States pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers in waters claimed by Canada to be internal, will be undertaken with the consent of the Canadian Government.⁴ It goes on to state that nothing in the Agreement nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the two governments on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas, or their positions regarding third parties.⁵

³ "Speech by the Right Honorable Joe Clark to the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromsø, Norway, December 9, 1987." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 87/72.

⁴ "Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation." Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 010 (11 January 1988).

⁵ *Ibid.*

Describing the Agreement as "an important step for Canada in the North," Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated:

While we and the United States have not changed our legal positions we have come to a practical agreement that is fully consistent with the requirements of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic. It is an improvement over the situation which prevailed previously. What we have now significantly advanced Canadian interests.⁶

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 11 October 1988, Mr. Clark announced that the Canadian Government had given its consent to a US request under the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, to have the US Coast Guard icebreaker *Polar Star* transit the Northwest Passage. The *Polar Star* had sustained damage while assisting two Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers in US waters. Unable to continue on its westward journey from its location off the Alaskan coast due to extremely heavy ice conditions, the US vessel entered Canadian waters to refuel and effect repairs to its turbines.⁷ It then proceeded eastward through the Northwest Passage to exit the Arctic, as did the two Canadian icebreakers. The incident marked the first test of the "Icebreaker Agreement," and was viewed as a success by Government officials.⁸ During its voyage, the *Polar Star* operated in a manner consistent with the pollution control standards and other provisions of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and other relevant Canadian laws and regulations. US officials also assumed responsibility for costs incurred as a result of any pollution caused by the vessel during its transit.⁹

On 18 October 1988, in a speech at Carleton University, Mr. Clark reviewed Canadian Government actions in the North as well as "what we have done to reinforce our sovereignty in the North." He stated that the two issues were linked because the resolution of any competing claims would come in time through negotiations and international law.¹⁰ As such, he observed that Canada's claims would be judged by the actual things it has done to demonstrate use and control of its own North.¹¹

After outlining the steps Canada had taken over the years to strengthen its sovereignty claims in the North, Mr. Clark turned to the issue of northern cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Minister announced that in November 1988, a Canadian

6 *Ibid.*

7 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No.220 (11 October 1988).

8 "US Ship Allowed in Canadian Arctic," *Vancouver Sun*, 7 October 1988, p. A6.

9 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No.220 (11 October 1988).

10 Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (18 October 1988), p.1.

11 *Ibid.*

delegation would travel to Moscow for negotiations on an Arctic Cooperation Agreement.¹² This accord, he remarked, would provide for a broad range of exchanges in the scientific and environmental fields.¹³ He also acknowledged Mr. Gorbachev's publicly expressed concerns about air pollution in the Arctic, and noted that such concern should open doors for multilateral discussions on the problem of Arctic haze--a subject of great importance to Canada.¹⁴

The Minister also addressed the issue of President Gorbachev's security proposals for the Arctic region. Here, he stressed the importance of judging "what the Soviets are doing as well as what they are saying." In this regard, Mr. Clark observed:

The Soviet Union is the only Northern nation with an extensive and permanent deployment of nuclear weapons in the Arctic. In the North-Western quadrant of the Soviet Union, the Kola Peninsula boasts a military arsenal that is enormous... Even if the Soviet Union were to withdraw [its] armies, dismantle [its northern] fleet and destroy its ballistic missiles and bomber squadrons in the Arctic, that would not remove the threat to Canada. This would be one axis of attack but it is not of course, the only one given the threat from other Soviet bases, aircraft and naval forces. That threat can come from any direction--on, over or beneath the waters, including those of the Arctic Ocean.¹⁵

The Minister went on to comment that it would be a "great myth" to think that reductions of armaments in the Arctic would make North America or even the Canadian North safe. Rather, "...the threat to Western security is global." The reduction of Canada's northern defences, therefore, would do nothing to reduce the threat from global strategic weapons, and would in fact be destabilizing in that it could weaken deterrence.¹⁶ Mr. Clark concluded by stating that the place to address global problems of armaments was in the negotiations on arms control and disarmament underway in Geneva and Vienna. He also remarked that NATO Allies including Denmark and Norway agreed that Arctic security could not be dealt with in isolation; it was a NATO rather than a northern issue.¹⁷

In February 1989, the Government announced that negotiations with the Soviet Union on non-military cooperation had resulted in the initialling of an agreement. Designed to increase cooperation in the areas of scientific research, northern development, the environment and native people, it was expected that the agreement would be

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*.

signed by Prime Minister Mulroney and Soviet President Gorbachev during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow, scheduled for November 1989.¹⁸

The release of a new budget by the Government in late April 1989 brought with it the cancellation or curtailment of a number of programmes envisaged in the Defence White Paper as contributing to sovereignty protection in the Arctic. Cancelled were: 1) plans to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines; 2) the purchase of six additional Aurora long-range patrol aircraft; 3) plans to modernize two squadrons of older Tracker patrol planes; and 4) the purchase of thirteen to twenty-eight CF-18 jet fighters. In addition, the planned purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles designed to operate in the Arctic was cut by over fifty percent (to 400), and was expected to be delayed until at least 1995-1996.

In an interview, on 27 April 1989, Defence Minister Bill McKnight remarked that as a result of the budget cuts, Canada might in future be forced to place greater reliance on cooperation with its allies (i.e., the United States and Britain) for the protection of sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic.¹⁹ Commenting that "[t]here are better ways of defending northern sovereignty," the Minister added: "unfortunately we cannot afford those ways."²⁰

On June 1989, Defence Minister McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and Maritime Surveillance Aircraft for the Canadian Forces. To be called the Arcturus, the aircraft will be used primarily for military, environmental, maritime and Arctic surveillance, as well as for fisheries patrols.²¹ In addition, they will serve as a back-up for search and rescue. The aircraft are to be built to Canadian military specifications and share the same airframe and engines as the Aurora aircraft (although unlike the Aurora they will not be equipped with submarine-detection equipment), thus allowing significant savings in maintenance and training costs for both. Mr. McKnight described the purchase as "a cost-effective measure to address the need to effectively patrol Canada's coastline and enforce Canadian sovereignty."²²

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 16 September 1988, NDP Member Margaret Mitchell raised questions concerning the Government's plan to construct the Polar 8 Icebreaker. Speaking in the House, Ms. Mitchell noted:

In 1985 the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that a Polar 8 ice-breaker would be constructed to protect our Arctic sovereignty. Since then,

18 "PM to Visit Soviet Union in Late Fall," *Globe and Mail*, 18 April 1989, p. A1.

19 Paul Koring, "Defence of Arctic Left to Allies by Budget Cuts," *Globe and Mail*, 28 April 1989, p. A2.

20 *Ibid.*.

21 Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 30 June 1989, p. 1.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

British Columbia Members of Parliament and a number of Cabinet Ministers repeatedly have promised that the ice-breaker would be built equally in Vancouver and Victoria, a measure which is desperately needed to save our shipbuilding industry. Since the Deputy Prime Minister has been actively interested in this, can he tell us when construction of the Polar 8 ice-breaker will begin as promised repeatedly for the last three years?²³

In response, the then Minister of Supply and Services Otto Jelinek stated:

...the Hon. Member should know that the Polar 8 [is] in its definition phase. There have been...some ownership problems with the company. The program and the plan is to continue to look forward to the Polar 8 icebreaker being built both in Vancouver and Victoria shipyards and I believe that everything is going according to plan at this point in time.²⁴

After charging that problems with the Polar 8 were the result of underfunding by the Government, Ms. Mitchell reiterated the demand that the icebreaker be built equally in Vancouver and Victoria.²⁵ She then asked:

If there is a financial problem why does the Government not increase the subsidy? It really was underfunded as I understand it. Does the Minister not agree that a world class icebreaker which will do many practical things in our Arctic waters as well as deal with the sovereignty issue is far more important than wasting money on expensive nuclear subs?²⁶

The Minister replied:

...we do not need the Hon. Member to tell us that an ice-breaker is very important for our sovereignty. It is this Government which initiated that program.²⁷

The status of the Polar 8 was again raised in the House on 9 May 1989 by NDP Member Audrey McLaughlin. Recalling Government promises to begin construction of the vessel by Spring 1989, Ms. McLaughlin asked when, in fact, construction would commence.²⁸ Minister of Transport Benoit Bouchard replied that the Government was proceeding with the Polar 8 operation. He then added:

However there are two issues.... The first is the shipyard which is being processed at the present time. The other one is the problem of the design. A proposal has to

23 *Commons Debates*, 16 September 1988, p. 19332.

24 *Ibid.*.

25 *Ibid.*.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 19332-19333.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 19333.

28 *Commons Debates*, 8 May 1989, p. 1434.

be made to the Government which will be made. It is within...the first phase where we look at the design and the shipyard. After that we will go into the construction phase...logically...we are operating with the first phase and the second phase after.²⁹

In a supplementary question, Ms. McLaughlin referred to statements made by the Defence Minister to the effect that recent budget cuts might require Canada to depend on its Allies to help defend the Arctic. Commenting that the United States did not accept Canadian claims to sovereignty in that area, the Member asked:

Will the Minister confirm that what is really happening with the Polar 8 is that this Government is prepared to put our sovereignty in the hands of foreign interests?³⁰

Mr. Clark replied:

...that is absolutely false. I know that in order to be a candidate for the leadership of the New Democratic Party one has to go to the furthest edges of extremism. The Hon. Member should resist that temptation.³¹

That same day, Liberal Member Brian Tobin also questioned the Government's commitment to the construction of the icebreaker, asking the Prime Minister:

...what has changed in the Arctic that suddenly you can walk away from your pre-election promises?³²

Mr. Mulroney replied:

The Government indicated that this was a very important instrument for the assertion of sovereignty in northern Canada which had been lacking for many years.³³

On 16 December 1988, in a statement before the House, NDP Member Audrey McLaughlin raised the issue of pollution of the Arctic environment and the need for the negotiation of a treaty on Arctic pollution. She stated:

...uncontrolled use of pesticides, chemicals and toxic substances in the Soviet Union and Europe has brought pollution to the Arctic which threatens the food supply of the Inuit. Action is needed now. Canada must show leadership.... The source of

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Ibid.*

31 *Ibid.*

32 *Ibid.*, p. 1435.

33 *Ibid.*

pollution must be determined and removed. I call upon the Government to fulfill its commitment immediately to constitute the Canadian Polar Research Commission and to commence circumpolar negotiations for an Arctic Pollution Treaty.³⁴

On 21 April 1989, Liberal Member Joseph Volpe pointed to the importance of initiating discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting military activities in the Arctic. Recalling Mr. Gorbachev's October 1987 call for an Arctic zone of peace, as well as more recent statements to that effect by "a Soviet official in charge of disarmament,"³⁵ Mr. Volpe suggested that Canada consider exploring the prospects for Arctic arms control "...[d]uring upcoming talks between the Soviet Union and other nations."³⁶ He remarked:

Since the Government was foolish enough to allow the testing of sophisticated American cruise missiles and is even contemplating the purchase of nuclear submarines, Canada would be well advised to take part in those talks. Otherwise, the Soviets would be forced to intensify their military presence in the Arctic, thereby increasing the number of cruise missiles and Soviet nuclear submarines in that area. During the upcoming talks between the Soviet Union and other nations, the Canadian Government should strive to conclude agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.³⁷

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³⁴ *Commons Debates*, 16 December 1988, p. 138.

³⁵ The official to whom Mr. Volpe was referring was Mr. Yevgeni Golovko, Soviet deputy disarmament negotiator. On 4 April 1989 at a seminar held at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Golovko indicated Moscow's willingness to include the subject of Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula in discussions on an Arctic peace treaty with Canada. See Jonathan Manthorpe, "Soviet Official Offers to Discuss Kola Bases in Arctic Peace Bid." *Toronto Star*, 5 April 1989, p.A18.

³⁶ *Commons Debates*, 21 April 1989, p. 785.

³⁷ *Ibid.*.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

14. CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

BACKGROUND

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement establishing a procedure for the testing of US defence systems in Canada. Known as the "Canada/US (CANUS) Test and Evaluation Programme", the agreement is valid for five years, and was renewed automatically for an additional five-year period on 28 February 1987.

Covering only the testing of US systems in Canada, the agreement is not reciprocal. Under its terms, the United States can request testing of various systems, including: artillery equipment; helicopters; surveillance and identification systems; and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may, however, refuse any project, and no biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country. Furthermore, the agreement can be terminated on twelve months' notice.¹

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the programme. A steering group, charged with exercising authority over the programme itself, makes recommendations concerning which projects are acceptable to Canada. In addition, a coordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. At the beginning of each year, the United States submits a thirty-month forecast to DND, outlining the projects it wishes to see implemented in Canada. After review and ministerial approval, the Government informs the US of its approval in principle. US sponsors then submit a project proposal to DND. This is again reviewed, and when the proper authority is granted, a project arrangement is jointly developed. Signature of the latter, allows testing to begin. Cabinet approval may, however, be required for specific projects.

On 15 July 1983, the Canadian Government announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) to be conducted in Canada. The cruise missile is an unmanned vehicle propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. It can be sea-, ground-, or air-launched.

The Government's rationale for agreeing to the US request was that testing of the cruise missile guidance system was "linked intimately to Canada's security as a member of NATO and NORAD, and to Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament." Canadian territory was particularly suitable for such testing because it offered extensive stretches of uninhabited cold weather terrain similar to the attack routes into the Soviet Union. The tests generally take place during the first three months of the year in order to ensure that proper weather conditions exist. The Government made clear, however, that its agreement to allow such testing "...in no way changed Canada's own renunciation of nuclear weapons for our national forces."

The extension of cruise missile testing for a five-year period beyond the initial five-year term of the umbrella testing agreement was confirmed in 1987 when the Government did not give twelve months' advance notice of its intention to withdraw. The

¹ Department of External Affairs, "Testing of Defence Systems in Canada." *Background Notes*, 1983.

renewal, and the terms surrounding it, were made clear on 6 March 1987 in a statement to the House by the Associate Minister of National Defence:

The agreement has always been and still is, liable to termination at any time by either party giving 12 months' notice.... Either party can terminate a specific arrangement under the agreement - for example, cruise missile testing - at any time on one day's notice should imperative circumstances so warrant.... We have repeatedly stated our intention to carry on, and will do so, but this in no way precludes second thoughts should circumstances change.²

The first term of the umbrella testing agreement officially ended on 28 February 1988. Its renewal now extends the agreement to 1993.

Agreement to test the cruise missile has generated considerable public debate. Some Canadians have felt that it has compromised Canada's position on nuclear weapons and has contributed to the arms race. Concern has also been voiced regarding the potential harm which such tests could have on Canadian citizens and the environment, if anything went wrong. In announcing individual tests, however, the Canadian Government has assured Canadians that the flight of the cruise missile will never be closer than eight kilometres "to any built-up area."

To date, twelve tests of the AGM-86B Air-launched Cruise Missile have been carried out. These include one in 1984, three in 1985, two in 1986, three in 1987, and two in 1988. One test has thus far been carried out in 1989. Following several delays, due to unfavourable weather conditions, the test occurred on 30 January 1989. The missile was released over the Beaufort Sea by a US B-52 bomber, and later intercepted by Canadian CF-18 and US F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. The test was considered by military authorities to have been successful.

Criticism of the test was registered at a news conference held in Toronto, by members of Greenpeace, and federal Opposition parties. There, participants urged the Canadian Government to cancel the bilateral testing agreement in a gesture of support for improved superpower relations.³

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 13 January 1989, in a speech at the University of Calgary, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark discussed the Government's rationale for permitting cruise missile testing over Canadian territory. Mr. Clark stated:

Canada, as an ally, must continue to honour its obligation to make a contribution to the defence of the West. This will require active participation in NATO forces. It will require that we support the viability of the American strategic deterrent which underpins NATO's security. For example, we cannot shirk our responsibility to permit the continued testing of air launched cruise missiles

² *Commons Debates*, 6 March 1987, p. 3918..

³ Richard Hoffman, "Peace Movement Quiet as Cruise Tests Resume." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 January 1989, p. A5.

over Canada. These constitute an important part of that strategic deterrent, the part that assures that no attack could go unpunished.⁴

On 17 January 1989 Canada received a formal request from US authorities to amend the 1983 testing agreement in order to permit testing of an advanced version of the cruise missile in Canada. The Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM)--called the AGM 129A--is somewhat faster than the previous model tested in Canada, it incorporates "STEALTH" technology (i.e., reducing its radar signature), and possesses a longer range than its predecessor. Its possession of more advanced guidance technology also gives the missile greater accuracy.

News of the US request prompted considerable opposition from arms control analysts as well as peace and disarmament groups, many of whom expressed concern about the possible first-strike implications of the ACM. Such critics viewed approval of ACM testing as "a dangerous escalation of the arms race."⁵

On 1 February 1989, Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight announced Canada's agreement to allow the US to test the unarmed advanced cruise missile over Canadian territory. In making the announcement, the Minister remarked that cruise missile testing constituted "an important Canadian contribution to the effectiveness of NATO's strategic deterrent."⁶ Observing that Canada supported the pursuit of mutual arms reduction, Mr. McKnight went on to state that this process could only move ahead effectively if both sides were dealing from equivalent positions. He added that the Warsaw Pact already had a significant and impressive cruise missile capability, and that both superpowers were agreed that under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), improved cruise missiles would continue to form part of their future strategic inventories.⁷

Echoing Mr. McKnight's remarks, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark added that cruise missile testing would contribute to a climate "that will lead to balanced arms control."⁸ He also denied allegations that the Stealth cruise missile constituted a first-strike weapon capable of being used in a sudden attack on the Soviet Union. In this regard, Mr. Clark noted that the advanced cruise would require "something like six hours to reach Moscow from North America," and that it "would be visible" on Soviet radar screens.⁹

That same day, a Department of External Affairs publication stated that substantial improvements were taking place in Soviet cruise missile capabilities. Noting that many of

⁴ Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* 13 January 1989, p. 5.

⁵ Tim Harper, "New Cruise Missile Tests Fuel the Arms Race Critics Say." *Toronto Star*, 2 February 1989, p. A2.

⁶ DND *News Release*, 06/89, 1 February 1989, p. 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁸ *Supra* note 5, p. A2.

⁹ Iain Hunter, "Disarmament Groups Condemn 'Stealth' Cruise Missile Testing." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 February 1989.

these developments were "revolutionary," it went on to state that the Soviets had begun testing a number of supersonic (MACH 3) cruise missiles which were larger than currently existing US and Soviet ALCMs.¹⁰ The document also observed that the Soviet AS-19 cruise missile currently in production was supersonic and equipped with state-of-the-art Stealth technology.¹¹

Following a twenty-four-hour delay, due to poor weather conditions, the first test over Canada of the advanced cruise missile proceeded on 2 March 1989. In a "captive carry" test, the missile remained attached to a US B-52 bomber during its flight from the Beaufort Sea, down the Mackenzie River valley to Primrose Lake weapons testing range near the Canadian Forces Base at Cold Lake, Alberta. The test was successfully completed in a time of just under five hours.

Criticism of the testing of the ACM was heard from several quarters. Responding to the Government's decision in favour of the tests, Liberal External Affairs critic André Ouellet commented on 1 February 1989 that "Brian Mulroney has now replaced Margaret Thatcher as the most hawkish ally of the United States."¹² He added that "Canada should come forward, within NATO, and play a positive role in disarmament, not constantly being a carbon copy and convenient ally to the Americans."¹³ Similarly, NDP MP Dan Heap registered his party's opposition to testing of the ACM by noting: "[w]e can only lose by escalating the arms race."¹⁴ That same day, a coalition of peace groups organized by the Toronto Disarmament Network delivered an open letter opposing the tests to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Finally, in early March 1989, a series of anti-cruise demonstrations took place in cities across the country, in response to the first test of the ACM.

In mid-March 1989, documents were released under access to information legislation revealing that the Canadian Government had accepted liability ranging from twenty-five to 100 percent for accidents resulting from cruise missile tests in Canada as part of the 1983 umbrella testing agreement. A standard NATO arrangement, the documents called for Canada to pay twenty-five percent of damages, if the US was to blame for an accident, and an even splitting of damage costs if Canada shared some responsibility. In addition, Canada could claim damages against the US for damage of Canadian military property and, in the event that other federal property was damaged, would be required to agree with the US on an outside arbiter to divide damage costs.¹⁵ The documents also revealed

¹⁰ Department of External Affairs "Canada, Security Policy and Cruise Missile Testing." *Backgrounder*, 1 February 1989, p. 8.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Supra* note 5, p. A2.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Peter Calamai, "Canada Liable If Cruise Crashes." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 March 1989, p. A1.

that officials from at least four Department of National Defence directorates (finance, legal, air plans and military plans coordination) strongly opposed adoption of the liability arrangements.¹⁶

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 13 April 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie made reference to the testing of the advanced cruise missile in a statement in the House criticizing the Canadian Government's foreign and defence policy:

The Government is in danger...of being to the right of Thatcher and to the right of Reagan in the last few months of his presidency. One wonders, are we simply waiting for Bush to make up his mind so that Canadians will know where they stand in respect of east-west relations. Or is this an opportunity for us to show some leadership in relationship with our allies instead of merely assenting to whatever way the United States and NATO wants to use us, whether in Forward Armed Forces attack strategy...or testing the advance to Stealth Cruise missiles which many people contend could be used as a form of first strike weapon and therefore is destabilizing? Why do we have to be such uncritical participants in all of this?¹⁷

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¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. A2.

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15. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND (NORAD)

BACKGROUND

On 7 August 1957 the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis between Canada and the United States. It began operations on 12 September 1957, and was established formally by the two governments on 12 May 1958.

NORAD was the result of many years of continental defence cooperation between Canada and the United States, following the Second World War. Its purpose was to defend against air attack on North America, particularly by the Soviet bomber force. For Canada, a major concern from NORAD's conception was the effect it would have on Canadian sovereignty. NORAD's commander is an American, while a Canadian officer holds the Deputy Commander position.

The NORAD agreement, initially to last ten years, established an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over the forces of both nations and dedicated to continental defence. At the outset, the Command included both active and passive defence systems, with a joint fighter-interceptor force and a series of radar nets across the continent. These nets included the Pinetree Line, built in 1951, at 50° North latitude; the Mid-Canada Line, completed in 1954, at 55° North latitude; and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, completed in 1957, at 70° North latitude.

As the assessment of the threat evolved, NORAD's resources also changed. The development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in particular, lessened the need for bomber defence. By 1965, the ninety-eight detection stations of the Mid-Canada Line--the only system built, designed and financed solely by Canada--were deactivated. The number of DEW Line and Pinetree Line installations was reduced from seventy-eight to thirty-one and from thirty-nine to fifteen, respectively. From its height between 1958 and 1962 of nearly 250,000 (including 17,000 Canadians), the manpower available to NORAD had decreased to approximately 64,000 (including 6700 Canadians) in 1985. Canadian financial contributions have traditionally been about ten percent of the annual total of \$6.8 billion (in 1985 dollars).

The NORAD Agreement was first renewed in May 1968 for a period of five years. The renewed agreement included two changes: first, clarification that either party could nullify the agreement after review and one year's notice; and second, the insertion of a clause stating that the NORAD agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The 1973 renewal of the agreement was for two years only, to allow for re-evaluation of the strategic situation, in light of Soviet ICBM developments and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I).

The 1975 renewal recognized the changed strategic circumstances, namely a higher degree of mutual and stable deterrence and a less significant long-range bomber threat. The bomber early-warning function, together with some limited defence, nonetheless remained. In addition, to reflect the increased emphasis on ICBMs, NORAD was charged with providing space surveillance, as well as warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack, to ensure an effective response, should deterrence fail. These new tasks involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems, including the Ballistic

Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS), although Canada's involvement was quite minimal.

As a result of a continuing debate in Canada on NORAD and an impending election, the 1980 renewal was for a single year. In March 1981 the Agreement was renewed for five years with two important changes for Canada. First, in recognition of the changing nature of the arrangement and the threat it was meant to answer, the title was changed to North American *Aerospace* Defence Command [emphasis added]. Second, the 1981 Agreement also removed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) clause which had been inserted in 1968. Officials attributed this change to the fact that the United States did not have an ABM system at the time, as well as to the desire to avoid any suggestion that either Canada or the United States would breach the ABM Treaty. Some analysts have argued that the change was made so as not to preclude any future ABM possibilities.

In August 1984, with the coming into operation of two Canadian Region Operations Control Centres (ROCCs) at North Bay, Ontario, Canada took over full command and control of NORAD operations within its own airspace. Previously, a significant amount of Canadian airspace had been under the command and control of US facilities.

At the Quebec City Summit on 18 March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on an extensive modernization of NORAD's assets, known as the North American Aerospace Modernization Programme (NAAMP).

This includes the following:

- a system of four very-long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars (one in Alaska and three in the continental United States) to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to North America;
- a North Warning System (NWS), consisting of thirteen long-range (eleven in Canada) and thirty-nine short-range (thirty-six in Canada) radars located along the northern periphery of the continent, to replace the DEW Line;
- use of USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to supplement the NWS at times of alert;
- upgrading of forward operating locations (FOLs) and dispersed operating bases (DOBs) to accommodate fighter and AWACS aircraft; and
- improvements to the command, control and communications (C3) elements of the system.

The modernization programme will cost over \$7 billion, of which Canada will contribute twelve percent (about \$860 million). The programme is scheduled to be fully completed by 1994.

The Canadian commitment to the programme includes: meeting all the communication needs of the North Warning System; the integration of the radars with the ROCCs in North Bay, Ontario; the design and building of any new facilities required by the NWS in Canada; forty percent financing of the \$1.3 billion NWS system (a sixty/forty cost-

sharing ratio also applies to its operational and maintenance costs); managing the final stages of the programme after 1989; and complete operational control of the NWS in Canada upon its completion. Canada will also be involved, to a limited extent, in the manning of the OTH-B radars and the AWACS aircraft.

On 19 March 1986, Canada and the United States renewed the NORAD Agreement for a further five years, without any changes.

In March 1987, Canada announced five forward operating locations for NORAD fighter-interceptors : Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and Kuujuaq in Quebec. Canada and the US will share, equally, the cost of developing these sites, which will be fully operational by the end of 1993.

The first five long-range radars of the NWS, the westernmost of the Canadian-based ones, became operational in November 1987. Construction of the remaining six Canadian NWS long-range radars in the Eastern Arctic, Labrador and Baffin Island, was completed in November 1988. The first OTH-B radar, on the east coast of the United States, began to be tested in mid-1988 and is due to be operational by 1991. The west coast site is under construction, while planning and design continues on the mid-west and northern sites. Design of the thirty-nine short-range NWS radars of Phase II of the NWS is complete, and construction of this system is scheduled to begin in 1990. Installation of the first radar is to take place in 1991, with the entire system to be completed a year later than planned, by late 1993.

As revealed in the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada has also agreed to participate in the United States' Air Defense Initiative (ADI). This is currently a relatively small programme (US\$250 million spent from 1987 to 1989) concentrating on research into air defence technologies that offer the promise of reliable detection, tracking, and engagement of bombers and cruise missiles, particularly in light of the development of Stealth characteristics. Canada is also pursuing a \$50-million research and development programme of its own on space-based surveillance systems for the future. This project began in 1987 and will run for approximately seven years. Current studies aim at determining the feasibility of space-based radar with "look-down" capability for detecting low-flying objects. Canada and the United States are also negotiating an agreement for project definition of a cooperative, space-based surveillance system.

Finally, consideration is being given to the establishment of a Canadian Coastal Radar (CCR) system to complement the NWS and to fill in gaps on the east and west coasts which the OTH-B radars cannot cover. Deployment of this system will probably begin in the early 1990s.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

The Government remains fully committed to its membership in, and support for, NORAD. On 29 November 1988, on the occasion of the completion of phase I of the NWS, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty stated: "This latest milestone in the North Warning

System project offers Canada and the United States a much improved air defence capability and provides state-of-the-art equipment to assist in the protection of each nation's sovereignty."¹

One of the few areas in the Department of National Defence left untouched by cuts in the April 1989 budget was the NAADMP programme.

The NDP has long held a policy that it would cancel the NORAD Agreement if elected. This position was reaffirmed in its international security policy paper, *Canada's Stake in Common Security*, released in April 1988. The Liberal Party remains committed to maintaining the agreement.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The NORAD issue was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.

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16. THE DEFENCE BUDGET

BACKGROUND

On 5 June 1987 the Government tabled the Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*, in the House of Commons. The White Paper was intended to provide a new defence strategy for the Canadian Forces for the ensuing fifteen years. It stated that significant changes had occurred in the international environment since the previous White Paper on National Defence had been released in 1971. However, East-West rivalry remained the predominant feature of international affairs. Accordingly, one of the White Paper's main premises was the need to maintain Canada's support for the West and its contributions to the NATO and NORAD alliances.

The White Paper stated, however, that a "significant commitment-capability gap" existed in the structure of the Canadian Forces, the result of long-term inadequacy in defence spending. The Government decided that through consolidation of some of its commitments--namely Canada's forces earmarked for Europe--and an established long-term funding programme, the gap could be closed.

To accomplish this, the White Paper announced a new method for establishing the defence budget, based on annual increases of two percent real growth with additional funding to be determined in annual Cabinet reviews. The declared purpose was to allow for long-term planning, particularly with major equipment procurement in mind.

The White Paper listed a number of major equipment purchases planned for the fifteen-year period, including new tanks, nuclear-powered submarines, patrol aircraft, and communications systems. Most observers agreed that increases in the budget closer to five percent annual real growth were necessary to implement the procurement programmes.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

The 1989-1990 Canadian budget represented a watershed for the Department of National Defence (DND). The Canadian Government's overall fiscal restraint plan caused the planned budget for DND to be cut back severely. Total planned budgetary expenditures for the Canadian Government in 1989-1990 are \$142.90 billion. Of this, it is estimated that \$11.34 billion, or 7.94 percent, will be spent by DND. This is an increase of 0.9 percent over the 1988-1989 planned expenditures of \$11.24 billion.

The Department's share of the Government's deficit reduction programme for 1989-1990 is \$575 million, representing 37.2 percent of the total expenditure restraint measures of \$1.545 billion. For 1990-1991, DND's share of the restraint measures is estimated to be \$611 million, or 29.4 percent of the \$2.079 billion total. Over the next five years, it is expected that a total of \$2.7 billion will be saved through cuts to planned defence expenditures.

Much of the savings in the next five years is expected to come from cutbacks in capital acquisitions. This year's budget initiated this process by cancelling plans for Canada to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines (see Major Equipment

Acquisitions, Chapter 17 of *The Guide*). In addition, DND has declared its intention to reduce its operating expenditures by closing seven military bases in Canada, and reducing operations in seven others.¹ Initial DND figures estimate the cost of closing and reducing the bases to be \$153.5 million, compared to savings of \$3.3 billion over fifteen years. Reductions in the overall size of the Armed Forces have not been ruled out, while the revitalization and restructuring of the Reserves has been slowed down.

Although cuts to 1989-1990 DND programmes, as a result of the budget, have not been allocated definitively, it is estimated that outlays for personnel will be \$25 million less than expected, for operations \$100 million less, and for capital projects \$450 million less.

Personnel costs represent the largest component of the defence budget, at approximately forty-five percent. The next largest component--about twenty-four percent of the estimates--is capital expenditures. Five major equipment acquisition programmes--the Canadian Patrol Frigate (Phases I and II), the Low-level Air Defence system, the Tribal Class Update and Modernization and the Heavy Logistics Vehicle project--account for about sixty percent of capital expenditures.

The first five-year plan of the funding system established in the 1987 White Paper has also been altered. This plan was to provide \$1.4 billion for the patrol frigate programme, with \$60 million allocated for 1988-1989 and \$175 million for 1989-1990. The 1989-1990 Estimates, however, reduced this combined amount of \$235 million by \$60 million.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In his Budget Speech, Finance Minister Michael Wilson stated: "The basic parameters of the White Paper remain the defence policy of the government. In the current fiscal context, however, that policy will need to be implemented more slowly."² With the Budget's release, however, analysts and Parliamentarians alike questioned the credibility and future of the White Paper. NDP Member Derek Blackburn raised the issue in the House of Commons:

The Defence White Paper is in disgrace. The Defence Department is without direction. It is time to reassess all our priorities and ensure that our Armed Forces have the opportunity they need to properly serve the country and to protect its sovereignty. We owe it to those in our Armed Forces to produce a new White Paper.³

¹ The bases slated for closure include: CFB Sydney, Portage La Prairie, Holberg, Mont Apica, Barrington, Summerside, and London. The bases slated for reduction include: CFB Ottawa (North), Chatham, Penhold, Gander, Winnipeg, Moncton, and North Bay.

² Michael H. Wilson, *The Budget Speech: Delivered in the House of Commons by the Honourable Michael H. Wilson Minister of Finance, April 27, 1989*. Ottawa: Department of Finance, April 1989, p. 6.

³ *Commons Debates*, 1 May 1989, p. 1127.

The Government continued to maintain that its defence policy was intact. Defence Minister Bill McKnight reiterated Mr. Wilson's sentiment:

Obviously the goals in the White Paper will be achieved more slowly and, in some cases, less fully. We will keep our present forces in Europe. We will continue to provide the North American defence role in which we have been involved and we will continue to stand ready for peace-keeping missions around the world.⁴

The Defence Minister also declared that the financial means left to DND enabled it to continue modernizing the Canadian Forces: "...even if the rate of progress is slowed, the continued expenditure of over \$2 billion annually on capital equipment will continue to rebuild our Canadian forces."⁵

The Government was pressed to explain the overall approach chosen to implement the planned cutbacks. Questions of priorities, where the Government was going to decrease funding, and what effect that would have on DND functions, were raised. Reflecting their Party's support for Canadian withdrawal from the NATO Alliance, members of the NDP felt the Government should reduce its commitment to Europe. In the words of NDP Member Bill Blaikie:

Instead of working toward saving money by making Canadian troop reductions in Europe in the near future, preferably as part of a negotiated reduction in conventional forces by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Government has chosen to sabotage the economies of many Canadian communities like Portage La Prairie, Manitoba, which stands to be devastated by the elimination of its base.⁶

The Defence Minister maintained that Canada's contributions to peace and security were best made by concentrating on collective security within the Alliance. By closing uneconomical bases, Canada could maintain these commitments and properly equip its forces. In regard to reserves and personnel he stated:

We will continue to increase our reserves. It will be at a slower rate than identified, but with the commitment to using a total force concept it will be necessary to continue to create reserves around this country.

What has happened is that financial constraint will require us to find some personnel savings so that we have room for other expenditures.... There will be a slight reduction in our civilian and military personnel over the next five years.⁷

4 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1585.

5 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1585.

6 *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, p. 1192.

7 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1584.

The issue receiving the most attention, as a result of the defence budget, was the closing and reduction of bases in Canada. Members from both opposition parties questioned the rationale and need for these measures, especially in regard to the bases in Summerside, PEI and Portage La Prairie, Manitoba. Liberal Member Bob Kaplan raised the issue of whether various alternatives to closing bases in economically needy areas were considered.

It was noted that the closure of CFB Summerside represented a reduction of 3034 jobs, or 5.39 percent of total jobs in PEI.⁸

Members referred to statements in the 1987 Defence White Paper that defence spending was an important method of enhancing regional economic development. In light of these statements, both the fairness and the rationale of the base closures were questioned. In response, Mr. McKnight stated:

The people who have the ability and the requirement of the service and a commitment to this country, the men and women who serve in the military today...deserve more from the people of Canada than to be located in regions for economic development. What they deserve is the ability as Canadians to share the load in getting the debt down.

By restructuring the military, we hope to be able to bring into proportion the Operations and Maintenance and the personnel in order that we can provide the equipment necessary for the men and women who serve all Canadians.⁹

On another occasion Mr. McKnight explained that many bases in Canada existed because the size of the Canadian Forces used to be larger. As fewer military personnel are now in the Canadian Forces, fewer facilities are needed: "The simple fact is that those bases were opened when they were needed. When they are no longer needed because of changes in technology, resources and priorities, then the need to close them is as apparent as the need was to open them."¹⁰

Liberal Member Joe McGuire questioned the Government over a commitment made in 1980 by Defence Minister Gilles Lamontagne, that each province in Canada would have at least one regular forces base. As CFB Summerside is the only military base in PEI, he asked what had happened to that commitment. Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, replied:

Most of Canada's fleet of Tracker aircraft operate out of CFB Summerside along with a search and rescue squadron. The Trackers are now over 30 years old. Maintenance has become extremely costly and difficult.

By 1992...these aircraft will need to be re-engined to keep them flying. As well, the fuel they require aircraft will be obsolete.

⁸ *Commons Debates*, 16 May 1989, p. 1835.

⁹ *Commons Debates*, 5 May 1989, p. 1368.

¹⁰ *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1585.

For these reasons, along with fiscal restraints, the decision was made to retire the Trackers, which meant that there was no further purpose for CFB Summer-side but to close it.¹¹

On another point, Liberal Leader John Turner indicated that nine of fourteen base reductions were occurring in ridings held by the Liberal Party. He asked: "Are we supposed to believe that this is a coincidence...? Are Canada's military needs now being based on partisan considerations with no military rationale at all?" Ms. Collins responded: "...those decisions are made on the basis of the advice from the military on how we can meet our defence objectives most effectively with the greatest degree of cost efficiency...."¹²

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Major Equipment Acquisitions

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

17. MAJOR EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS

BACKGROUND

The austerity measures instituted by the Canadian Government in the 1989-1990 budget had a significant effect on both planned and ongoing defence equipment acquisition programmes. The need for the Department of National Defence (DND) to reduce planned expenditures by \$575 million resulted in the scaling back, rescheduling, postponement, or cancellation of a number of capital projects.

Projects Cancelled

Nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs): Perhaps most significant was the decision to cancel the ten to twelve SSNs called for in the 1987 Defence White Paper. The Government's cost estimate for this project was \$8 billion, to be spread over twenty-seven years. Two classes of submarines were being considered for the purchase: the British Trafalgar-class SSN, designed by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.; and the French Rubis/Amethyste-class SSN, designed by Société de Navigation Atomique (SNA).

The decision on which SSN to purchase was originally set to be made in early 1988. This would have led to the first vessel coming into service in 1996 to begin replacing Canada's three Oberon-class submarines. Analysis is now being undertaken to determine the best possible fleet mix that could be acquired within current budget restrictions. This may include the purchase of conventionally powered diesel electric submarines or possibly a hybrid design submarine.

Long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA): The White Paper commitment to purchase at least six new Aurora LRPA to supplement Canada's current fleet of 18 Auroras was cancelled. This purchase was estimated to cost \$450 million. On 30 June 1989, however, Defence Minister McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and maritime surveillance aircraft. These aircraft, to be called "Arcturus," share the same airframe and engines as the Aurora and will supplement the current Aurora fleet's duties. The total cost of the project will be \$260 million. The Arcturus differ from the Aurora in that they will not be equipped with submarine-detection equipment. They will have radar and long-range communication capabilities for surveillance, patrol, and search-and-rescue duties.

Tracker aircraft update: The planned \$300 million upgrading of the nineteen Tracker medium-range patrol aircraft in current service will not go ahead. These planes operate out of Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Summerside in surveillance and search-and-rescue roles. They will be retired by 1992.

CF-18A aircraft replacement: The planned acquisition of thirteen to twenty-eight CF-18A fighter aircraft to replace those lost through peacetime attrition was cancelled. DND was reportedly looking to purchase the aircraft from Australia to take advantage of its current F-18A production line. The F-18A is no longer produced in the United States, as it has been outdated by the F-18C/D models. Delivery of the last of Canada's original purchase of 138 F-18As took place in September 1988.

Unmanned airborne surveillance and target acquisition systems: This project for remotely piloted vehicle technology for land forces was cancelled. Less capable helicopters and ground observers will be used instead.

Projects scaled back

Night observation device--long-range: The purchase of 197 night surveillance devices, in addition to the 233 already planned, was cancelled.

CF-5 avionics update: The planned upgrade of fifty-six CF-5 aircraft to provide the Canadian Forces with a fully effective lead-in trainer for the CF-18 has been reduced. Essential flight safety avionics will be replaced, but head-up display systems will not be added to the aircraft.

Main battle tanks: White Paper plans to acquire up to 250 tanks were scaled back and delayed. Only those tanks currently in Europe, fifty-nine Leopard C1s, will now be replaced. Moreover, the project is on hold pending a decision to proceed with project definition at a later date. The main contenders for the tank replacement programme, originally estimated to cost \$2.4 billion, include the American M1A1, the German Leopard II, the British Challenger II, the French LeClerc and the Italian Ariete C1. Procurement of the new tanks was to have begun in about three years.

Northern terrain vehicles: A planned total of 820 new northern terrain vehicles for both NATO and northern territorial defence use, announced in mid-July 1988, was reduced to approximately 400. The project was originally to cost \$420 million and to last from 1988-1998. Implementation of this project now will not occur before 1995-1996. The northern terrain vehicles--Hagglunds BV 206--are to be built by Canadian Foremost Ltd. of Calgary in a joint venture with Hagglunds Vehicle AB of Sweden.

Electronic support and training systems: The planned number of new Challenger aircraft outfitted with systems for electronic warfare training was reduced from seven to a maximum of three.

Tactical command, control, and communications system (TCCCS): Plans to replace both combat radios and area communication systems were scaled back to include only radios and only for forces committed to the NATO European theatre. The project, announced 15 September 1988, was originally to cost \$81.7 million for project definition over its first five years. It was divided into three phases, including: radio systems, area communications systems, and automation systems. The radio system phase was estimated to cost \$1.3 billion for the purchase of 18,000 portable and vehicle radios. About thirty percent of the new radios were supposed to be assigned to the militia. The entire project, estimated to cost \$2.3 billion, was to be implemented over fifteen years. The contract for the radios is expected to be awarded in 1991.

Projects Rescheduled

Militia light armoured vehicles (LAVs): The project to acquire approximately 199 LAVs and twenty-two tracked vehicles for the militia has been delayed. Acquisition will not begin before FY 1990-1991.

Other

A number of other equipment acquisition programmes have been put on hold, as well, including the \$670 million light observation helicopter project--to replace Canada's current force of sixty-six CH-136 Kiowa helicopters--and the ERYX short-range anti-armour weapon programme, which was to cost approximately \$200 million over the next ten years.

Continuing Projects

The Government stated it will go ahead with purchases of Mine Counter Measures Vessels (MCMVs), shipborne aircraft to replace Sea-King helicopters, the Tribal [class destroyers] Update and Modernization Programme (TRUMP), patrol frigates, and its North American Aerospace Defence Modernization Programme (NAADMP). The Air Defence Anti-Tank system (ADATs) and the heavy logistics vehicle purchase are also being implemented as planned.

Mine counter-measures vessels: A programme to acquire twelve MCM vessels to be operated by the Reserves is underway. Total cost of the project is expected to be approximately \$750 million. Construction is to begin in 1992, with initial delivery about one year later. All twelve ships are expected to be completed by 1998. Currently, project definition is taking place. In June 1989, Defence Minister McKnight selected two prime contractors, Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. of St. Catherines and Fenco Engineers Inc. of Toronto, to conduct a one-year competitive contract definition for the vessels' construction. Each contractor received \$4.5 million. The ships will provide patrol and surveillance capabilities in addition to their mine counter-measure function.

Shipborne aircraft: In August 1986, the Government granted approval for DND to enter into the project definition stage for a new shipborne aircraft (NSA). The NSA would replace Canada's current fleet of thirty-five Sea King helicopters, which entered service in 1963. Two helicopters were in contention for the project: the Anglo-Italian EH-101, and the French Aerospatiale As-332 Super Puma. On 5 August 1987, DND announced its choice of the EH-101 helicopter. The project definition phase is now proceeding. This involves settling contractual arrangements and determining whether or not the helicopter can meet Canadian requirements. Between twenty-eight and forty-five aircraft are to be purchased, at an estimated cost of \$2.5 to 3.0 billion.

E.H. Industries (Canada) Inc. is owned jointly by Westland Helicopter of Britain and the Agusta Group of Italy. A team formed by EHI consisting of Bell Helicopter Textron of Mirabel, Quebec, Paramax Electronics and Canadian Marconi of Montreal, IMP Group of Halifax, and Sikorsky Aircraft of Stratford, Connecticut is handling the project. The NSA's primary functions are anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship surveillance and targeting. Its secondary roles consist of search-and-rescue, medical evacuation, troop transport and communications.

Only about one-quarter of the cost of the project is destined for the actual aircraft and its engines. The remaining three-quarters of the cost are earmarked for mission suite avionics, logistics support, training, and project management, etc.. EHI was supposed to have completed project definition, including its choice of engines the Canadian EH-101 would carry, by April 1989. It was unable to meet this deadline, however. Initial delivery of the aircraft was planned for 1994, though this may now be pushed back.

Tribal Update Modernization Programme: TRUMP, announced prior to the 1987 White Paper, consists of a mid-life update for Canada's four DDH 280 destroyers, which entered service in 1972-1973. The destroyers will receive new command, control, communication, and combat systems. The new combat systems will provide defence against air and anti-ship missile attack as well as the ability to defend other ships. The total estimated cost of the TRUMP is \$1.7 billion. Work on the first destroyer, the HMCS Algonquin, began in November 1987 and is scheduled for completion by spring 1990. The modernization of the HMCS Iroquois is well underway and is expected to be completed by fall 1990. The completion date has been extended to the high end of the eighteen to twenty-five-month range envisaged by DND for the Iroquois. This work is being done by Marine Industries Limited (MIL) of Montreal at their Davie Shipyard in Lauzon, Quebec. In Spring 1989, Litton Systems Canada Ltd., the prime contractor, awarded the sub-contract for modernizing the second batch of two ships, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Huron, to the MIL Davie Shipyard. These modernizations are to be completed by fall 1991 and late summer 1992, respectively.

Patrol frigates: The Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) programme was initiated in 1983 for the procurement of six ships. Total estimated cost of the programme, including a second batch of six additional ships ordered in December 1987, is \$8 billion. St. John Shipbuilding Limited and Marine Industries Ltd. of Montreal are building three frigates each (HMCS Halifax, Vancouver, Toronto and Ville de Québec, Regina, and Calgary, respectively) in the first batch. The first of the new ships, HMCS Halifax, was launched in May 1988. Work began on the second, third and fourth ships, the HMCS Ville de Québec, HMCS Vancouver and HMCS Toronto in May 1987, December 1987, and January 1988, respectively. Final delivery schedules for the six ships has slipped, resulting in a delivery date for the HMCS Halifax in spring 1990, a full year behind the schedule specified in the original 1983 contract. Delivery dates for the remaining five ships stand as follows:

2nd ship--September 1990
 3rd ship--April 1991
 4th ship--April 1991
 5th ship--October 1991
 6th ship--April 1992

Whereas the first frigate contract was split between two companies, St. John Shipbuilding was awarded the contract to build the entire second batch of frigates. These ships should all enter service by 1996. Possible design changes, including a lengthening of the second batch of frigates by ten metres, are being considered. DND has officially denied reports that the new frigates will be unstable owing to increases in weight that were not taken into account in the original design.

Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system: On 16 April 1986, DND announced the awarding of the contract for a Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system for the Canadian Forces. The Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium received the contract of \$1.14 billion to provide the Canadian Forces with thirty-six Air Defence/Anti-Tank Systems (ADATS) and twenty 35-mm twin guns with ten accompanying fire-control units. The Air Defence/Anti Tank Systems will be deployed at bases in Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, West Germany, as well as with the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, whose current role is to be ready for deployment in Norway in the event of crisis (this obligation is scheduled to cease 30 November 1989, at which time the CAST will be assigned to the defence of the European Central Front). Initial delivery of the twin guns to the Canadian Army in

Europe began in October 1988. The first ADATS were delivered in October 1988 and will arrive in Europe in fall 1989. The ADATS system is being manufactured in St. Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec, and is scheduled for completion in 1991.

Heavy logistics vehicle: Although a programme for the CAF to acquire a replacement for its heavy truck fleet began in 1983, the White Paper's reference to the current shortfall in logistic support added greater impetus to awarding a contract. On 5 February 1987, the then Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick announced that the team of Urban Transportation Development Corp. (UTDC) Inc. of Kingston, Ontario (eighty-five percent owned by Lavalin Industries Ltd.) and Styr-Daimler-Puch of Austria would fill an order for 1122 heavy trucks. Over \$310 million was budgeted for the purchase. The trucks, called the Percheron, will replace the current fleet of 800 five-ton trucks, forty percent of which were acquired between 1953-1963. The remaining sixty percent were built in 1975-1976. The first of the new trucks was delivered to DND in May 1989. A second batch of 1300 trucks was being considered for purchase in the 1990s but this has been put on hold as a result of the latest budget.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Despite the cutbacks noted above, in a speech delivered at ARMX, a defence exhibition held in Ottawa in late May 1989, Defence Minister Bill McKnight maintained that the Defence White Paper "was not dead." He indicated that most procurement projects were under review but the basic parameters were still in effect. Mr. McKnight declared:

We must sharpen our pencils, rewrite the project further work on our on-going force must find the most productive and efficient ways to now-scarce defence dollars and improve and streamline Departmental procedures.¹

Canada's commitments to NATO, NORAD, the Reserves, industrial preparedness, and its three coast lines would continue. In reference to naval forces, he stated: "We will proceed with a programme to deploy fixed acoustic sensors in our Arctic waters...." He continued by saying: "The naval staff are currently preparing alternatives to the SSN programme on an urgent basis. SSNs were the best vehicle for the task. We will now proceed to second best, and the Government will decide on a course that will permit the rebuilding of the navy into an effective force."²

Before the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence on 16 May 1989, the then Vice Chief of Defence Staff Lt. General John de Chastelain described the Army's situation in the wake of the new budget. He stated:

In large part the decision to place army projects on by circumstance--the capital contracted naval projects as well as the balance of almost completed army ones like the low-level air defence, the heavy trucks and ammunition.³

² Ibid., p. 2.

³ Senate, *Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence*, Issue no. 3 (16 May 1989), p. 3:8.

He explained that the total amount budgeted for Army projects over the next fifteen years was approximately \$18 billion. Of this total, approximately one-third would proceed, one-third was cancelled, and one-third was on hold. Twelve Army projects were proceeding, about thirty-five were delayed from one to four years, eleven are on hold, and ten were cancelled. In regard to the projects on hold, he stated: "All of these on hold projects have been de-scoped or reduced from the original full division requirement to the requirement to meet the readiness needs of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group [in Europe] alone."⁴

In announcing the procurement of mine counter-measures vessels, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty explained: "Above all, the project addresses a critical weakness in Canada's state of defence preparedness. We have taken an important step toward ensuring that we can protect our ports and coastal waters. In the process, we enhance our sovereignty and security, for current and future generations."⁵ Mr. Beatty also explained the role the Reserves would play in future coastal defence activities.

The role of the Reserves also figured prominently in the announcements made for the northern terrain vehicles and the TCCCS.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In the House of Commons, Liberal defence critic William Rompkey raised the issue of the equipment reductions resulting from the budget cuts. He referred to a statement made by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in May 1988 in Lahr, West Germany, that the Government would refit the Armed Forces, and went on:

...the Government has reneged on its commitment to increase Canadian land forces in Germany and supply them with tanks. How can the Minister square the statement of the Prime Minister made in Germany one year ago with the decisions taken in the last two weeks?

Mr. McKnight responded by saying that 2000 troops had been added since the last Liberal Government was in office and that more troops would be added this summer.⁶

Following the announcement of the plan to purchase northern terrain vehicles, former Liberal critic for National Defence Len Hopkins criticized the Government for allegedly pursuing an improper contract bidding procedure. He asked why companies other than Canadian Foremost Ltd. were not allowed to bid on the contract and why no tender was sought. The then Defence Minister Beatty responded by saying that Canada already had over 100 of these vehicles, making compatibility a concern, and that no other existing vehicle was available that met Canada's requirements. Mr. Hopkins pursued the issue by questioning the cost of the vehicles and suggesting that greater fairness in the tendering system would lead to better prices.

⁴ Senate, *supra* note 3, p. 3:9.

⁵ Department of National Defence, *News Release* AFN: 70/88 (25 July 1988), p. 3.

⁶ *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1601.

Mr. Beatty replied:

The Honourable Member is incorrect when he suggests there has been a tripling of the costs of these vehicles. The average cost of the vehicles purchased by the Department of National Defence was \$140,000 in 1984 dollars. The vehicles we are contracting for now in 1988-89 dollars are about \$170,000 a piece. The difference is the difference in exchange rates and inflation during that period. This is a very good deal for the taxpayers of Canada.⁷

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⁷ *Commons Debates*, 26 July 1988, pp. 17961-17962.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

18. THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

BACKGROUND

With the release of the White Paper on national defence in June 1987, renewed attention was drawn to the issue of Canada's defence industry. Prior to both the First and Second World Wars, this sector was not a major contributor to the economy. As Canada entered each war, however, the need to provide equipment and supplies for its armed forces was met through massive mobilization of Canadian industry for production of war materials.

In the early stages of World War Two, Canada and the United States recognized the need to combine their defence industry efforts in order to increase efficiency in production, and, thus, their ability to support the war effort and protect North America. Two agreements, the Ogdensburg Declaration (1940), which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), and the Hyde Park Declaration (1941), created the foundation for defence cooperation between the two countries. The PJBD was to administer the needs of an integrated continental defence of North America. The PJBD, on which Canada and the United States are equally represented, still exists today as a formal institution to oversee Canadian and US continental defence interests.

The interdependent nature of North American defence and the recognition that each nation's industry should concentrate on producing articles it was best able to provide, were fundamental principles agreed to in the above arrangements. Following the World War II, Canada and the United States maintained and enhanced these arrangements.

In 1959 the Defence Development and the Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DD/DPSA) were agreed to, creating improved market access for Canadian defence industries in the United States. Through signing the DD/DPSA, Canada recognized that its own defence market was too small to be able to support a defence industrial base for major weapon systems of its own. The agreements provided a means by which Canada could take advantage of its ally's large-scale defence production. By reducing barriers to the US defence market, Canadian industries became specialized and more secure secondary sources of defence materials and products.

Apart from these general agreements, over 200 bilateral defence and cooperative research and development arrangements exist between the two nations. Between 1959 and 1987, the total value of defence exports to the United States was \$13.490 billion, while the value of imports from the United States was \$16.422 billion.

In 1984 work began in Canada on an inter-departmental Defence Industrial Base Review involving the Departments of National Defence, Supply and Services, Regional Industrial Expansion, and External Affairs. The purpose of the Review was to determine current Canadian industrial capabilities to provide for Canadian defence needs under varying conditions of mobilization and to make recommendations addressing any deficiencies.

At the Quebec Summit in March 1985 between Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan, continental defence industrial cooperation was again given

prominence. The leaders pledged to work toward reducing barriers that existed in the North American defence market, improve the North American Defence Industrial Base (NADIB), and focus on industrial preparedness planning.

In May 1985 the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force was created to examine the issue and provide recommendations on the state of the defence industry in Canada and North America. The Task Force completed its study in November 1987. It recommended, among other things, that Canada include industrial preparedness planning in DND's equipment acquisition and life-cycle management processes; that defence dollars be put into industrial preparedness measures, as opposed to stockpiling of materiel which is more expensive; and that defence preparedness be viewed on a continental basis.

As a direct result of these initiatives, in March 1987 Canada and the United States signed a Letter of Guidance for the Charter of a North American Defence Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO). The purpose of NADIBO is to define ways to more effectively ensure complementary industrial support for North American security requirements. Much of its focus is to carry out peacetime industrial planning to ensure an adequate supply of equipment for the armed forces and sustenance of supply in times of crisis or war.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In the Defence White Paper the defence industrial base was given considerable attention. The White Paper declared the importance of maintaining and enhancing the defence industry in Canada as essential to support of both the Canadian Forces and those of our allies. It cited the need for Canada to cooperate with its allies, particularly the United States, in acquiring defence equipment and pursuing military research and development. It stated that the Government would pay greater attention to the long-term industrial implications of equipment purchases. The White Paper also noted the Government's intention to continue emphasizing industrial preparedness measures "to enhance the responsiveness of the defence industrial base."¹

Following the White Paper, a Defence Industrial Preparedness Advisory Committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the business community, banking, and universities. The Committee has consulted with the Minister of National Defence to generate proposals for strengthening industrial preparedness.

Canada has also signed nine Research, Development and Production Agreements with European nations, beginning with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 and now including Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and Belgium. Other defence industrial arrangements involving Canada also exist through the NATO Alliance.

By most measurements, the Canadian defence industry is relatively modest. Defence production accounts for less than one percent of Canada's gross national product and defence industries employ only 80,000 or 90,000 persons, or less than one percent of the workforce. The defence-industrial base is highly specialized with aerospace, electronics,

¹ Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, June 1987, p. 75.

communications, vehicles, and shipbuilding representing its primary areas of concentration. Recent efforts on the part of the Canadian Government and industry have served to enhance the industrial base in the areas of naval design, naval electronics, military pattern vehicles, small arms, light and medium helicopters, and engines. These efforts include, for example, focussing on procurement programmes, on industry, and on the establishment of new manufacturing facilities.

Approximately eighty percent of the Canadian defence industry's production is exported. As a result, the impact on the defence industry of the 1989-1990 Canadian defence budget cuts is expected to be relatively small.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no comment in the House of Commons on the issue of the Canadian defence industrial base during this reporting period.

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Major Equipment Acquisitions

Arms Transfers

19. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

BACKGROUND

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.¹

In the years immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Allies set up machinery for collective defence, and extended membership to include Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. By the mid-1950s they were facing a more varied Soviet challenge and recognized that progress on European and other issues required efforts to strengthen Western unity, solidarity and cooperation. A committee of "Three Wise Men", established in 1956, recommended ways of improving political consultation and led to improvements which helped NATO to face up to the difficulties and opportunities of the following decade: Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure, the question of the control of nuclear weapons, and negotiations on arms control focussing on such questions as nuclear non-proliferation.

In 1967, faced with a changing strategic situation, NATO carried out a review of its policies and issued a report entitled: "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report indicated that the basic policy of NATO is to pursue the two objectives of defence and detente, and stated that the aim of all member countries is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

The record of East-West relations over the last twenty years has been a mixed one. Nonetheless, NATO has continued to pursue better relations with the East whenever that was possible. In the early 1970s it supported negotiation of the SALT I Treaty, the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and the launching of negotiations on European security and conventional force reductions. A period of stagnation following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and the imposition of martial law in Poland in the early 1980s has recently given way to renewed hopes for improvements focussing on the INF Treaty, new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, and progress on other arms control issues.

At the same time, NATO has continued to give attention to the requirements of Western cohesion and defence. The Atlantic Declaration of 1974 reaffirmed the commitment of all members to the Treaty and clarified further their responsibilities in such

¹ NATO Information Service, *NATO and Warsaw Pact Comparisons*. Brussels, 1984, p. 1.

fields as political consultation. Defence improvements and force modernization programmes have also continued, together with work on defence planning, infrastructures, communications, crisis management procedures and similar tasks.

Increasingly significant has been the question of modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Over the past decade, successive NATO decisions have led to quantitative reductions in the Alliance's theatre nuclear capabilities. Not only have about 2400 short-range systems been eliminated, but, under the 1987 INF Treaty, a significant portion of NATO's medium-range capabilities as well. The desire to maintain a credible deterrent against Warsaw Pact forces, however, led to an Allied consensus that such reductions proceed in tandem with a commitment to modernize NATO's remaining short-range nuclear systems. This principle was asserted in 1983 at a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Montebello, Canada, and has been reaffirmed ever since in successive NATO communiqués. Modernization plans include replacing 88 Lance missiles currently deployed in Europe with an improved version. The question of follow-on systems will be dealt with by the Alliance in 1992.

Allied enthusiasm for modernization has varied, however. The United States and Britain have strongly endorsed such plans, contending that modernization of SNF is necessary to offset Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces and thus to ensure a credible NATO deterrent. Other Allies, particularly West Germany, have expressed unease with such plans on the grounds that an overwhelming proportion of the weapons involved are stationed on their territory and thus place their homelands at risk.

In April 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called for a postponement of a final decision on deployment of a follow-on to the Lance missile until after the West German elections in 1990, together with immediate negotiations on SNF. The United States and Britain, both favouring an early commitment to modernization and preferring to leave questions of SNF negotiation for the indefinite future, opposed the proposal. The Allied impasse was exacerbated by Moscow's arms control initiatives. On 12 May 1989, in an effort to increase momentum towards the removal of all theatre nuclear systems, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced the unilateral withdrawal of 500 short-range nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe.

In the weeks that followed, inter-allied bargaining resulted in some movement toward a compromise. By the beginning of the NATO Summit in Brussels, on 29 to 30 May 1989, Washington had acquiesced to Bonn's desire to postpone a final decision on the deployment of a follow-on to Lance, and had also put forth a plan to begin discussions with Moscow on short-range nuclear systems. However, questions of when negotiations would commence, the extent of the reductions envisaged, and when the Alliance would reaffirm the need for developing a follow-on to Lance, remained unresolved.²

On 29 May 1989, the opening day of the Summit, US President George Bush presented a four-point plan calling for a first agreement on force reductions at the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) within six months to a year, and complete implementation of such an accord by 1993. Allied compromise on SNF soon followed. Contained in a report adopted by the NATO Heads of Government, the consensus position asserted a willingness to hold negotiations with Moscow for "partial"

² "Compromise on Missiles Heads Off NATO Rift." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 5 (June-July 1989), p. 22.

reductions of SNF once cuts in CFE began. Actual reductions of short-range forces, however, would begin only after an accord had been fully implemented. As for Lance modernization, the Allies reasserted that nuclear forces should be "kept up to date," and added that the issue of a follow-on to Lance would be dealt with in 1992, in light of "overall security developments."³

On 6 July 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet short-range missiles would be reduced "without delay" if NATO agreed to negotiations on such systems. While the Soviet proposal seemed designed to force a reconsideration of the position adopted at the NATO Summit (i.e., that SNF negotiation could proceed only after a CFE accord), the Allied position remained unchanged.

NATO Decision-making

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in the Alliance. Composed of representatives of the sixteen member countries, it meets at the level of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors). Ministerial meetings, attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and so on, are held twice a year or more, while the Council in permanent session meets once a week or as often as required. Special meetings of Heads of Government are also held at particularly important junctures in Alliance affairs.

Under the Council, there is a range of committees and commands, such as the Political Committee, the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Atlantic. The Secretary-General of NATO is the civilian head of the organization, chairing the Council and such other key bodies as the Nuclear Planning Group.

Canada's Commitment

At present, Canada's military commitments to NATO consist of:

- a mechanized brigade group of about 4200 men, stationed in Lahr, West Germany;
- three squadrons of tactical fighter aircraft plus related maintenance and headquarters elements with one Canadian Air Division at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, West Germany;
- other headquarters and support elements in Lahr;
- the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group, based in Canada and committed to reinforcing northern Norway when required in time of crisis;
- two Rapid Reinforcement fighter squadrons, previously committed to Norway and now slotted for the central front;
- a battalion group committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)), and a fighter squadron committed to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air) (AMF(A)), for deployment to NATO's Northern Region. (Both the battalion group and the fighter squadron are stationed in Canada. The latter is one of the two squadrons also committed to the central front);

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 27.

- other land, air and maritime forces stationed in Canada and designated to contribute to the Allied defence of North America, to assist in the Allied naval defence of the North Atlantic and other waters, and to provide reinforcements for Europe in time of crisis or war.

The Defence White Paper of June 1987 announced the Government's intention to relinquish its CAST commitment to northern Norway and assign the brigade to a role in West Germany instead. The CAST commitment to northern Norway officially ends on 30 November 1989. On 24 June 1988, the creation of a composite NATO force to replace it was announced at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Contributing to the force are the United States, West Germany, Norway and Canada. Canada's contribution consists of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, based in London, Ontario--an infantry unit of about 1200 personnel.⁴ Previously slotted for the defence of either Norway or Denmark, it is now committed exclusively to northern Norway. In turn, Belgium has replaced Canada in the role the latter previously filled in defence of Denmark.

The two squadrons of Rapid Reinforcement fighters which Canada had assigned to the defence of northern Norway have recently been shifted to southern Germany. These squadrons are presently being converted from CF-5 to CF-18 aircraft. The first became earmarked for deployment on the central front on 1 June 1988, and the second on 1 June 1989. Both are based in Canada, but intended to reinforce Canadian forces in Germany in time of crisis.⁵

In 1986, the last of the new assignment of CF-18 fighters were deployed to the Canadian Air Group in West Germany, replacing aging CF-104 aircraft. Following through on a commitment made in 1985, Canada has increased its forces in Europe by about 2400. Currently, a total of about 7900 Canadian Armed Forces personnel are stationed there.

Training Facilities

Canada also provides training facilities for NATO forces on its territory. Shilo, Manitoba is used by West German troops for tank training, while the British Army employs facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British, Dutch and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying.

Since 1984, Goose Bay has been under consideration as a possible site for NATO's new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre (NTFWTC). A site at Konya, Turkey, was recommended by NATO officials in September 1986, but Canadian officials were successful in convincing NATO to postpone a final decision until a more in-depth analysis could be carried out. The Canadian Government is currently spending \$93 million to expand the Goose Bay facility.⁶ A detached operating base, designed by Air Command and completed at a cost of \$9 million, became operational in fall 1988. Also last fall, the NATO Fighter Training Centre Team conducted a resurvey of the base to update and

⁴ Department of National Defence, *News Release* 65/88, 24 June 1988.

⁵ Department of National Defence, *Defence Update: 1988-89*, March 1988, p. 14.

⁶ *Commons Debates*, 1 March 1988, p. 13265.

refine its data for making a decision on the Centre's location.⁷ NATO's Defense Planning Committee is expected to recommend a location for the base at its next meeting in November 1989, or at the following meeting in May 1990.⁸

The effects of low-level flying exercises on the environment and the lives of native peoples in the Goose Bay area have prompted considerable concern. During fall 1988, more than 200 Innu Indians were arrested while engaging in peaceful demonstrations protesting the low-level flights.⁹ Fuelling their objections to the overflights has been their claim to a large area of Labrador based on history and tradition, as no treaty has ever been signed with the Federal Government regarding the territory.

This claim was bolstered on 17 April 1988 when a Labrador judge dismissed public mischief charges against four Innu arrested during a protest at the Goose Bay base, on grounds that their behaviour indicated a "genuine belief" that the air base land belonged to them. The judge observed that "(t)hrough their knowledge of ancestry and kinship, (the defendants) ha(d) shown that none of their people ever gave away rights to the land, to Canada."¹⁰ The government of Newfoundland has launched an appeal of the decision, to be heard in St. John's on 3 October 1989.¹¹ The controversy has been compounded by the fact that the base constitutes the heart of the Goose Bay area's economy, currently employing about 1000 civilian and military personnel, with increases expected throughout 1989.¹²

At present, a Federal Environmental Review Committee is conducting a study of the impact of low-level flights and the proposed NATO base, but fears have been expressed that it will not be completed until after NATO's decision. Currently, military training at Goose Bay involves about 7000 low-level flights annually.¹³ Given a favorable NATO decision on the base, the frequency of such flights would increase to about 40,000 per year.¹⁴

7 Department of National Defence, *Defence 1988*, January 1989, pp. 52-53.

8 "NATO Base Environment Study Faces Time Crunch." *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 July 1989, p. A4.

9 Terry Gavin, "Natives Battle NATO." *Vancouver Sun*, 16 November 1988, p. C6.

10 Michelle Lalonde, "Innu Vow to Step Up Court Fights, Protests Against Military Flying." *Globe and Mail*, 17 April 1989, p. A7.

11 *Ibid.*.

12 "Dispute Between Natives and Military Over Jets Defies Solution." *Montreal Gazette*, 13 October 1988, p. B1.

13 "NATO Base Environment Study Faces Time Crunch." *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 July 1989, p. A4.

14 "Labrador's Innu and the Jets of NATO." *Globe and Mail*, 25 April 1989, p. A9.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 31 October 1988, in a speech at McMaster University, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark outlined the rationale for Canadian membership in NATO:

We are in NATO because a strong North Atlantic alliance serves the best interests of Canada. Obviously, the world has changed enormously since that western alliance was first put into place. But many of the conditions which led to the creation of NATO are the same today as they were in 1949. Europe is still divided between societies that are free and societies that are not. Canada is still vitally interested in protecting freedom, and advancing it, in Europe. The alliance across the Atlantic is still a powerful instrument to resist American instincts to isolation, and to encourage American co-operation within Europe, and co-operation by Europe with North America.... One thing that has changed is the direct threat to Canada is more terrible now, with strategic missiles. We are in the path between the superpowers. Changing our policy does not change our geography and, since we can't wish missiles away, we owe it to our own safety to maintain institutions which control them, or which bring their numbers down.¹⁵

The Minister added that, given Canada's immense landmass and its location, any attempt to defend and protect it, independent of others, would entail unbearable financial costs.¹⁶

In December 1988, a report on "burden-sharing" by NATO's Defence Planning Committee identified the percentage of gross domestic product Canada devoted to defence--2.17 percent--as being among the lowest in the Alliance.¹⁷ Although the document also praised Canada's planned improvements in its NATO commitments as outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper, and acknowledged its financial contributions as being among the highest in NATO, it cited Canada as one ally that should contribute more to the common defence.

The then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty acknowledged that the report was generally accurate regarding Canada's role in NATO. However, he added that the European Allies should be more sensitive to Canada's defence activities in North America. "NATO," Mr. Beatty stated, "...tends to measure what you do in Europe. Our position is that you should see the integrated whole.... NATO is a transatlantic alliance."¹⁸ Additional comment on the NATO report came from Robert Fowler, the then Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy in the Department of National Defence. While Mr. Fowler conceded

¹⁵ Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (31 October 1988), p. 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ See: *Enhancing Alliance Security: Shared Risks and Responsibilities Within the Alliance; A Report by NATO's Defence Planning Committee*. December 1988.

¹⁸ "Beatty: NATO Doesn't Grasp How Much Canada Gives." *Montreal Gazette*, 2 December 1988, p. A7.

that "Canada is at the bottom of the heap in terms of manpower," he noted that the size of the Canadian Forces had actually increased from 75,000 in 1975 to a current total of 87,000.¹⁹

On 4 April 1989, Joe Clark, Perrin Beatty and Associate Minister of Defence Mary Collins marked NATO's fortieth anniversary by praising the Alliance's contribution to world peace and the importance of Canada's role within it.²⁰ Later that month, however, the Government's new budget called for the postponement, rescheduling, or outright cancellation of a number of programmes to improve the Canadian Forces in Europe. Plans to purchase 13-28 CF-18 jet fighters were cancelled. The planned purchase of 250 main battle tanks was reduced in scope, and the project was put on hold. The acquisition of some 199 wheeled light armoured vehicles was put on hold until at least 1990-1991, while the planned purchase of 820 Northern terrain vehicles was cut by over fifty percent (to 400) and is expected to be delayed until at least 1995-1996.

The full impact of the budget on Canada's NATO commitments is still somewhat unclear. In the budget's aftermath, there was speculation that the Government would cancel plans for a "division-sized force" in Central Europe during a crisis.²¹ In May 1989, however, both Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Defence Minister Bill McKnight were reported to have insisted that the commitment to field a 10,000-strong division in West Germany remained steadfast.²² Nevertheless, on 24 May 1989 the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General John de Chastelain, noted that while such plans were "still in place, the previous plan to equip the division and indeed reinforce it over the years, was not."²³ General de Chastelain's remarks echoed more detailed testimony he gave eight days earlier to the Special Senate Committee on National Defence. At that time, he observed:

It had been planned that these forces, as presently equipped (i. e., 4 CMBG, 5eGBC and divisional headquarters), would be jointly tasked for operations in southern Germany with effect 1 December, that their re-equipment would take place over a period of years. That plan has had to be modified. Because of budget cuts, the acquisition of much new equipment for the division is no longer possible. But the intention to change 5eGBC's fly-over role from Norway to Germany... will nonetheless proceed. There, it, along with the resources of

¹⁹ Paul Koring, "Very Few Standing on Guard For Thee, NATO Figures Show." *Globe and Mail*, 1 December 1988, p. A14.

²⁰ Department of National Defence, *News Release* (4 April 1989), and Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (4 April 1989).

²¹ See, for instance, "1st Division Commitment to NATO Cancelled." *Canadian Defence Update*, vol.3 no.4 (May 1989), pp. 1 and 8.

²² James Bagnall "Cuts Cloud Canadian Role in NATO." *Financial Post*, 29 May 1989, p. 5.

²³ "1st Canadian Division Back On." *The Wednesday Report*, vol. 3 no. 21 (24 May 1989), pp. 2-3.

the in-place 4 CMBG, plus the divisional headquarters in Kingston, will be joined to form the combined forces which has already been agreed to with NATO.²⁴

Negotiations are currently underway to provide Canadian forces with a small logistics base in Europe. Canada is also consulting with the Federal Republic of Germany to expand facilities used by Canadian forces, and to assure their adequate support in wartime.²⁵

In April and May 1989, Canada played an active role in resolving the Alliance dispute over SNF. In the weeks leading up to the NATO Summit, Canadian officials pressed their US, British, and West German counterparts to accept a compromise supporting the principle of negotiations on the one hand, and modernization of a follow-on to the Lance missile on the other. Canada worked for acceptance of the concept of "partial" reductions, so as to foreclose a de-nuclearization of Europe--a major concern in Washington and elsewhere. According to one press report, the Canadian proposal called for negotiated reductions that would not exceed the minimum number of missiles required to offset the superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces.²⁶

Canadian efforts to help effect a compromise continued during the Summit itself. Speaking at a news conference on 31 May 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney credited External Affairs Minister Clark with having played a "key role" in the negotiations leading to the agreed NATO reference to the "partial" reduction of short-range nuclear forces. He observed that although the drafting of the final document had proven difficult, the terms of the compromise "came from Mr. Clark's pen."²⁷

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 4 April 1989, the fortieth anniversary of NATO, External Affairs Minister Clark paid tribute to the Alliance in a speech to the House. Mr. Clark acknowledged NATO as a "cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy" and praised it for providing forty years of uninterrupted peace.²⁸ That peace, he continued, was made possible through the Alliance's persistent commitment to the pursuit of adequate defences to deter aggression, the control and limitation of armaments, carefully negotiated and verifiable agreements, and the constant promotion of dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe.²⁹

24 Special Senate Committee on National Defence, *Proceedings*, 16 May 1989, p. 10.

25 Department of National Defence, *Defence Update: 1988-89*, March 1988, p. 15.

26 Paul Koring, "Clark Offers Compromise To End NATO Missile Stalemate." *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1989, pp. A1, A11.

27 Patrick Doyle, "Clark Credited with NATO Breakthrough." *Toronto Star*, 31 May 1989, p. A1.

28 *Commons Debates*, 4 April 1989, p. 7.

29 *Ibid.*

Mr. Clark concluded by stating:

Canada has many means to influence peace in the world. One of these, which has worked for over 40 years, and is essential to continued progress in East-West relations, is the NATO alliance.... NATO has been good for Europe, good for North America and good for Canada. This Government is committed to ensuring that Canada continues to play a full and leading role in NATO in helping shape a new era in East-West relations.³⁰

NDP Member Bill Blaikie followed Mr. Clark by acknowledging that NATO did indeed represent the "cornerstone" of Canadian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Alliance and some of the values its members had been asked to share, were, in his words, "arguably ambiguous, in other cases hypocritical and in some cases, morally questionable."³¹ Mr. Blaikie maintained that progress in areas such as arms control derived primarily from the superpowers, with NATO acting as "a kind of spectator" and a "kind of lobby" for arms build-up. He also criticized Canada for being "far too much of a spectator with respect to NATO in particular and world events in general." For example, Mr. Blaikie complained of a lack of active participation by Canada in the ongoing debate within the Alliance over the modernization of nuclear weapons.³² He concluded:

The notion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, I think all of us hope, is a notion that belongs more to history than to the future. We hope that events in the Soviet Union and events in the West are leading to a time when the disengagement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, when the Manichaeian world of two alliances contending with each other for the possible destruction of the world, will be a thing of the past. Canada does have a role to play. It is a role that this Government is not playing. If it should choose to live up to that role, it would receive much better comment from this corner of the House.³³

On 19 April 1989, Mr. Blaikie raised the issue of low-level training flights of NATO military aircraft over Canadian territory. Noting recent protests by the Innu people regarding such flights and their disruption of their way of life, Mr. Blaikie called upon the Government to inform NATO that low-level flight testing was no longer acceptable in Canada.³⁴ Prime Minister Mulroney replied that such issues would be resolved by using proper channels.³⁵

Returning to the issue of low-level flight testing the next day, Mr. Blaikie asked the Prime Minister for clarification of how the question of testing would be resolved and

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Commons Debates*, 19 April 1989, p. 689.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

whether the forum chosen would address the concerns and allow the participation of the Innu people.³⁶ Associate Minister for National Defence Mary Collins replied:

...low-level flying has been taking place for over 25 years in the Goose Bay area. In 1986, my predecessor established in conjunction with the Federal Minister of the Environment, a federal environmental review process. This is a process by which we can determine the facts, the facts of what the environmental and social and economic implications of low-level flying may be in that area. That process is ongoing. The environmental impact statement is being prepared.³⁷

Ms. Collins went on to point out that the Innu had submitted their views and their understanding of the environmental impact statement to the government, and that hearings would proceed in the fall of 1989. Such hearings, she added, would provide the forum for full discussion and rational decision-making on the issue.³⁸

On 1 May 1989, Liberal Member Warren Allmand raised the subject of the NATO debate over SNF, telling the House:

Canada must support West Germany in its attempt to reduce short range nuclear missiles in Europe. In this respect Canada must join with other NATO allies to convince the United States and Britain that this is the best option for peace and stability. To pursue modernization of these weapons, which was targeted for the mid-1990s, will jeopardize seriously the prospect for successful arms reduction in Europe, and undermine the possibilities for phasing out the cold war.³⁹

The next day, NDP Member Bill Blaikie observed that there was growing support for the German position favouring negotiations on SNF instead of the modernization supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. Noting that there was little indication of Canadian involvement in the debate, Mr. Blaikie asked External Affairs Minister Clark whether Canada was in fact prepared to support the German position.⁴⁰ Mr. Clark replied:

There is an agreement supported by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and all the Government heads of NATO that we should proceed with modernization. The question before NATO now is one as to the timing and balance between modernization and negotiation. The Government has been involved in

³⁶ *Commons Debates*, 20 April 1989, p. 736.

³⁷ *Ibid.*.

³⁸ *Ibid.*.

³⁹ *Commons Debates*, 1 May 1989, p. 1125.

⁴⁰ *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, p. 1203.

discussions and correspondence with other of our allies to work out a way that will allow the alliance to find an agreement enabling us to proceed with modernization and negotiation.⁴¹

On 11 May 1989, Mr. Blaikie asked for clarification of information that Mr. Clark had made a proposal aimed at resolving the Alliance debate over SNF modernization.⁴² In response, the Minister explained that while Canada had made some proposals and had received some responses to them, the sensitivity of the discussions precluded him from disclosing precise details about the process.⁴³ Nevertheless, he noted:

...a fundamental element of our position is that there should not be...the "third zero,"...a situation in which there is an absolute removal of SNF. Canada and other NATO partners, including West Germany...agreed to weapons..."up to date as necessary".... We adhere to that position. We believe there should also be negotiations, and we are looking for some way in which the two can be linked.⁴⁴

Mr. Clark concluded:

...our preoccupation at the moment - this is not a new Canadian role in NATO - is trying to bridge differences, trying to ensure that countries can come to Canada.... The Canadian preferred position would be to have some linkage between modernization and negotiation, to have an explicit indication that we would not end up with a third zero. Both the Netherlands and Canada are trying to encourage countries that do not yet agree to move towards agreement. That is what we are doing, and it is a continuing process.⁴⁵

That same day, Liberal Member William Rompkey raised questions in the House concerning Canada's NATO commitments in light of the recent budget cuts:

One year ago in Lahr...the Prime Minister said " - we will refit all our forces in Europe with appropriate equipment. Our attitude is simple: you are the best. We want you to have the best equipment to do a tough job -." In the past several days the Government has reneged on its commitment to increase Canadian forces in Germany and supply them with tanks. How can the Minister square the statement of the Prime Minister made in Germany...with the decisions taken in the last two weeks?⁴⁶

41 *Ibid.*.

42 Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Proceedings*, 11 May 1989, p. 14.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

46 *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1601.

Defence Minister Bill McKnight replied:

I would like to take the Hon. Member back to 1983, the last time his Party was in Government. Based in Central Europe, Canadian forces joined with allies, had 5,400 troops. There has been an additional 2,000 troops added. There will be more troops added this summer.⁴⁷

Interest in the NATO SNF debate continued throughout May 1989, with members of both the Liberal and New Democratic parties calling for strong Canadian efforts to help facilitate Allied agreement on the issue.⁴⁸ As the Summit concluded, comment was heard in the House on the compromise the Allies had finally achieved, and Canada's role in securing it. On 30 May 1989, Liberal Member Ross Stevenson commented:

...the compromise within NATO on a position for the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons was a major accomplishment. Our Prime Minister...and Secretary of State for External Affairs...have played an important role in achieving this compromise.⁴⁹

NDP Member Bill Blaikie also commented on the results of the Summit. On 31 May 1989, he stated that the NATO Agreement

...is predicated on a guarantee that there will be no elimination of short-range nuclear weapons. It seems to me that any negotiation and any agreement worth this planet would...at least head toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the Government of Canada, the Prime Minister...and the Secretary of State for External Affairs...are not doing themselves any service by boasting about an agreement in which they had a part the essence of which is the preservation of short-range nuclear weapons.⁵⁰

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⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ See, for instance, *Commons Debates*, 12 May 1989, p. 1647; 19 May 1989, p. 1962; and 26 May 1989, p. 2199.

⁴⁹ *Commons Debates*, 30 May 1989, p. 2317.

⁵⁰ *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1989, p. 2368.

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20. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION

BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping may be defined as the employment, under the auspices of a recognized international authority, of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of political conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. Peacekeeping activities range from unarmed missions with a role of observation and reporting only, through roles of investigation, supervision and control, to the interposition of armed military units and formations between the parties.¹

In the late 1940s, international observer missions were established along the India-Pakistan border, and in the Middle East following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution granting it the authority to recommend specific measures deemed necessary to maintain international peace. That same year, a UN Security Council resolution, sponsored by the United States in the absence of the Soviet Union, led to the creation of a unified military command to counter the North Korean offensive into South Korea. This action was unprecedented and has never been repeated.² The first large-scale UN peacekeeping operation was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), established with the help of Canada to supervise the cease-fire following the 1956 Suez Crisis. Since that time the UN has sent peacekeeping and observation missions to conflict areas including the Congo, Cyprus, the Middle East and Indochina. The 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN peacekeeping forces.

In addition to participating in sixteen UN peacekeeping missions, Canada has also contributed to five non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), created in 1954 to oversee the cease-fire in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos; its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), established in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN), created to supervise the 1968 elections in that country; the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, established in 1979 to observe the elections in Zimbabwe; and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, responsible for monitoring the security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Canadian contribution to the MFO began in 1986 and in 1988-1989 consists of 128 Canadians providing helicopter transportation for both troops and civilian observers.

¹ Colonel R.B. Mitchell, "Peacekeeping and the Canadian Army in the 21st Century" (Paper presented to the Seminar on "The Role of the Canadian Army in the 21st Century," Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 17 March 1989), pp. 2-3.

² UN operations in Korea, 1950-53, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping. (*Peacekeeping*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security *Factsheet* No. 4 (October 1988, updated and reprinted March 1989), p. 2.) One Canadian attaché is posted at UNCMAC on the Participating Nations Advisory Group.

Canada currently contributes to seven UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) was established in 1974 to monitor and supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Syria after the 1973 Middle East War. Two hundred and twenty-seven Canadians, of a total force of approximately 1300, provide logistics, communications and other technical services. The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is a permanent mission created in 1948 to monitor and maintain the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and to supervise the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. The force of approximately 295 includes twenty Canadians. Canada also participates in the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. The 575 Canadians out of approximately 2100 participants are responsible for policing the cease-fire and resolving disputes between the opposing factions in a sector containing the capital, Nicosia. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established in 1949 to supervise the India-Pakistan cease-fire in the Jammu-Kashmir area. Canada provides Hercules aircraft for moving the UN area headquarters biannually between Srinagar in India and Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

In 1988-1989, Canada agreed to participate in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). This operation was set up in May 1988 to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and to oversee the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Ten countries participate in UNGOMAP, each initially providing five military officers. One Canadian was stationed at Islamabad and four in Kabul with UNGOMAP's two Observation Teams. As of 1 May 1989, the number of Canadian military officers was reduced to three, two in Islamabad and one in Kabul. In January and February 1989 Canada began its participation in the Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP), a comprehensive humanitarian relief assistance programme for Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN. Canada provides a team of fourteen military persons, one in Islamabad and thirteen in Peshawar to train Afghan refugees in mine-clearing techniques. The plan does not fall under the present definition of peacekeeping but is regarded as "peacebuilding" (for more information see Southern Asia, Chapter 25 of *The Guide*.)

On 9 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). This operation was established by the UN Security Council, providing a force of 350 unarmed military observers from twenty-four countries to monitor the cease-fire implemented on 20 August 1988. Canada contributed a total of 525 persons to set up a fully self-sustaining communications network for all of UNIIMOG's communications needs along the 1200-km Iran-Iraq border, as well as fifteen observer troops who remain as part of the UN force. The soldiers arrived in Baghdad on 16 August 1988, followed by the members of the communications team. The latter returned to Canada between November and mid-December 1988.³

In February 1989, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was created by the UN Security Council to monitor Namibian peace plan agreements signed on 22 December 1988. Canada provides 237 soldiers as part of a peacekeeping force of 4650 personnel.

³ Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 171 (9 August 1988); Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 89/88; "Canadian Team Arrives in Iraq to Observe Truce." *Toronto Star*, 16 August 1988, p. A12; and Paul Koring, "UN Signallers Return Home Via Moscow." *Globe and Mail*, 5 October 1988, p. A8.

In December 1988, the Security Council unanimously voted to send a verification mission to Angola to verify the redeployment northward, and the total withdrawal of Cubans from that country. (This decision was a result of the regional accord formally signed in December 1988 by the US, South Africa, Angola and Cuba, which included the total withdrawal of Cuban soldiers fighting in the Angolan civil war [for further information see Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 24 of *The Guide*].) The mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVIM) will run over a period of thirty-one months (January 1989 to July 1991). The verification team includes seventy military observers and twenty civilians from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia. Canada was not invited to join UNAVIM and, therefore, is not party to it.⁴

Approximately 1250 members of the Canadian Armed Forces were posted at various points around the world in 1988-1989 in peacekeeping activities. Successive Canadian Governments have emphasized that Canada views peacekeeping as one aspect of conflict resolution, as an important contribution to the creation of the environment necessary to achieve political solutions to conflicts. Canada sees peacekeeping as an interim measure in the resolution of regional conflicts and has consistently called for a strengthening of the UN's peacekeeping expertise, as well as its institutional, financial and administrative base. The principles used to determine Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations were outlined in the Defence White Paper of 1987:

...The Government's decision will be based upon the following criteria: whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agree to a cease-fire and to Canada's participation in the operation; whether the arrangements are, in fact, likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term; whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canadian participation will jeopardize other commitments; whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants; and whether participation is adequately and equitably funded and logistically supported.⁵

Within the UN itself there is disagreement on a number of issues concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, the use of force by UN peacekeepers and the financing of UN peacekeeping operations. A number of countries have substantial debts to the UN, some withholding funds earmarked for peacekeeping. The UN estimates that the cost of peacekeeping activities will increase over the next few years to between \$1.5 and \$2 billion, if existing peacekeeping operations continue and conflicts in Central America, Cambodia and the

⁴ Paul Lewis, "Security Council Votes to Send a Force to Angola." *New York Times*, 21 December 1988, p. A7; and James Brooke, "U.N.'s Angola Mission to Take Cuba at its Word." *New York Times*, 8 January 1989, p. A5.

⁵ Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, Ottawa, 1987, p. 24.

Western Sahara are resolved and require UN peacekeeping forces.⁶ (Troop needs would increase from the present level of 10,500 to 30,000.⁷) There is a projected deficit for UN peacekeeping operations of approximately \$918 million for the years 1988 and 1989 (compared to a total annual UN budget of about \$800 million).⁸ Consequently, major peacekeeping operations, notably in Lebanon and Cyprus, are incurring large deficits, while troop-contributing countries such as Canada have generally borne most of the financial burden. The cost of Canada's current fiscal year peacekeeping commitments is in excess of \$40 million.⁹

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 29 September 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated Canada's reaction to the awarding of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces as follows

No country has been more steadfast or supportive in its commitment to U.N. Peacekeeping than Canada, and it is worth remembering that peacekeeping as we know it today was begun on a Canadian initiative more than 30 years ago....This award will have a special meaning for more than 80,000 Canadian men and women who have served in U.N. Peacekeeping contingents....This work has often been difficult even dangerous and 78 Canadians have given their lives in this duty.¹⁰

The then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced on 9 December 1988 that a statue would be erected in Ottawa, dedicated to the Canadian Forces members who have served in peacekeeping missions.¹¹

⁶ Tony Banks and Thalif Deen, "Namibia Casts Shadow Over UN." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 19 (15 April 1989), pp. 628-29; Paul Lewis, "The U.N. Dove: Hobbled by the U.S.?" *New York Times*, 9 August 1988, p. 10; and Paul Lewis, "U.N. Strains to Meet the Demand for Peace." *New York Times*, 28 August 1988, p. 3 (section 4).

⁷ Paul Lewis, "U.N. Chief Warns of Costs of Peace." *New York Times*, 11 December 1988, p. 4.

⁸ Banks and Deen, *supra* note 6, p. 629.

⁹ Robert Mitchell, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security *Background Paper* No. 23 (October 1988), p. 7; "200 Canadians to Join UN Force in Namibia." *Gazette*, 24 February 1989, p. B1; and "Peacekeeper Canada Steps in Again." *Toronto Star*, 10 August 1988, p. 14.

¹⁰ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 214 (29 September 1988).

¹¹ Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 91/88 (9 December 1988).

At the UN General Assembly session in October 1988, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky recommended that UN peacekeeping operations be strengthened, consolidated and "...put on a more solid legal and financial basis" in order to be used "more extensively for the implementation of Security Council decisions as well as for the prevention of emerging armed conflicts."¹² External Affairs Minister Clark did not comment directly on the Soviet proposal to establish a permanent UN peacekeeping force, but did affirm Canada's interest in establishing peacekeeping on "a more professional and broader basis."¹³

On 3 February 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark and Defence Minister McKnight announced that Canada had accepted a request from the UN to appoint a Canadian Commander of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Major-General Clive Milner assumed command of UNFICYP on 10 April 1989, ending his formal ties to Canadian Forces in Cyprus. He now reports directly to the UN Secretary-General. This appointment marks the second time in approximately thirty years that a Canadian has commanded a UN Force, the first was Lt. General E. L. M. Burns, who commanded the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in Egypt in the mid-1950s.¹⁴ In Cyprus, the Canadian contingent added 35 km of rural patrol to their duties in 1988 after Sweden pulled out the bulk of its 380 soldiers for financial reasons. Canada increased its contingent by sixty men, to make a total contribution to UNFICYP of 575 soldiers.¹⁵ Negotiations aimed at a settlement of the Cyprus situation resumed in September 1988 between George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus and Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community. An agreement in principle was concluded in early April 1989 to pull back from the Green Line (the dividing line) in Nicosia. The Commander of the Canadian Forces in Cyprus, Col. Chris Wellwoods, stated that should the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots withdraw from three sensitive positions in Nicosia, Canadian Forces would fill the gap.¹⁶ Should the agreement in principle be ratified and implemented, this would allow the UN to begin to negotiate a complete demilitarization of Nicosia and eventually a comprehensive settlement of the Cypriot situation.

In a letter to UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar in May 1989, Canada and seven other countries contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus said that "they are bearing an unfair financial burden by having to rely on other UN members

¹² Letter from Vladimir Petrovsky, Deputy Head of the Soviet Delegation, to the UN Secretary-General, United Nations Document A/43/629, 22 September 1988, p. 4.

¹³ As cited in David Cox, "Defence Notes: UN Peacekeeping." *Peace & Security*, vol. 3 no. 4 (Winter 1988/1989), p. 13.

¹⁴ Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 07/89 (3 February 1989).

¹⁵ Major-General Edward Fursdon, "Keeping the Peace in Cyprus." *Pacific Defence Reporter*, vol. 15 no. 8 (February 1989), p. 25; and Robert McDonald, "Guarding the Line." *Maclean's*, vol. 102 no. 13 (27 March 1989), p. 24.

¹⁶ "Canada Moves into Cyprus Battle Zones." *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 April 1989, p. A16.

to volunteer money."¹⁷ Further, it was reported in early June 1989 that Canada had let it be known formally in the Security Council that it wanted "a countdown on the endless summer of Canadian peacekeeping forces on Cyprus." A spokesman for Canadian Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier stated that "there's no question that continued participation is needed, but we must make the council aware that we're concerned about the cost, and the length of time it's gone on without settlement."¹⁸ The end result was a Security Council statement urging serious attempts at a political solution, without referring to the financing of the peacekeeping forces.¹⁹

On 22 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark committed Canada to assist in the implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence. Canada pledged approximately 225 Canadian Forces soldiers toward the 4650-strong UN operation.²⁰ An advance party departed from Canada in mid-March 1989, with the balance to have been in place by mid-April 1989. However, after over 1000 South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas crossed the Angola-Namibia border on the cease-fire date of 1 April 1989, the Canadian Government agreed to a UN request to hasten its troop deployment and provide additional air support to the entire UNTAG force.²¹ External Affairs Minister Clark criticized the UN for its lengthy debate over the costs and size of UNTAG's force, cut from a proposed 7500, and confirmed that only some 200 of 1000 UN personnel were in place at the Angola-Namibia border when the SWAPO incursion occurred.²² With on-going negotiations to place the Namibian peace process back "on track" in May and June 1989, the 257 Canadians committed to UNTAG are scheduled to return to Canada on 1 April 1990.²³

At present there are two other areas in which a Canadian contribution to UN peacekeeping forces may be called for in the immediate future: Central America and Cambodia. In addition, a UN peace plan for the resolution of the conflict in the Western Sahara may involve Canadian participation in peacekeeping activities in the near future although there is, thus far, no stated Canadian position on this issue.

In February 1989, a letter to the UN Secretary-General from Foreign Ministry officials of the five signatories of the Regional Peace Accord in Central America requested a team of unarmed military observers from Canada, Spain, West Germany and

17 "Canada Joins in Complaint About UN Peacekeeping Tab." *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 May 1989, p. A13.

18 Olivia Ward, "Canada Pressures U.N. for Push on Cyprus Peace." *Toronto Star*, 11 June 1989, p. H2.

19 *Ibid.*; and "Peacekeepers Seek Additional U.N. Funding for Cyprus." *Toronto Star*, 25 May 1989, p. 12.

20 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 255 (22 December 1988).

21 "Petawawa Troops Rush to Namibia." *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 April 1989 p. A6.

22 Gregory Wirick, "Report From the Hill: Peacekeeping Activity." *Peace & Security*, vol. 4 no. 2 (Summer 1989), p. 18.

23 John Best, "Rising Profile for Peacekeeping." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 June 1989, p. E3.

an unnamed Latin American country to verify a ban on providing bases for insurgents fighting neighbouring governments and to report on cross-border guerrilla movements.²⁴ A proposed observer force of 160 members was tentatively accepted by officials of the five signatory countries in March 1989, but full approval was stalled in disputes between the parties shortly afterwards. Should the proposal be approved by the Central American countries, the UN Security Council would debate the establishment of a UN force and send an advance party to further assess peacekeeping requirements.²⁵ Since the signing of the Guatemala Accord on 7 August 1987, the Canadian Government has expressed interest in participating in such a peacekeeping effort, but reservations focus on the relatively small size of the proposed peacekeeping force to date, and its eventual mandate. The official Canadian position is that should Canada receive an invitation to participate, as is widely anticipated, it will make its decision on the merits of the mission at that time.²⁶

On 5 April 1989, Vietnam formally asked Canada, Poland and India to form a monitoring commission to verify the withdrawal of the 50,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, scheduled to end in September 1989. External Affairs Minister Clark set as conditions for Canadian participation a Vietnamese agreement to withdraw, UN Security Council endorsement of the plan, a clear peacekeeping mandate with a set lifespan, proper funding, and evidence that this would be part of a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem.²⁷

In a letter sent to External Affairs Minister Joe Clark in April 1989, the Colombian rebel group M-19 (also known as the April 19 Movement) asked Canada to establish an observer mission to participate in the Colombian Government's peace negotiations with rebel groups beginning in July 1989. On 3 May 1989 it was reported that the group had still not received a reply from Mr. Clark. According to an External Affairs spokesman, a formal request to the Canadian Government by the Government of Colombia would be necessary before Canada would consider participating.²⁸

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In the House of Commons on 29 September 1988, the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty rose to report on the selection of the UN Peacekeeping Forces as the recipient of the

²⁴ John Hay, "Keeping the Peace: Canada Weighing Risky Proposals from Vietnam, Central America." *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 May 1989, p. B4; and "Central American States Ask UN for Observer Team With Canadians. *Gazette*, 9 February 1989, p. D12.

²⁵ "UN Force for Central America." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 13 (1 April 1989), p. 547.

²⁶ Gilles Paquin, "The Perils of Peacekeeping: Canada Should Think Twice Before Sending its Peacekeepers into the Quagmire of Central America's War." *Peace & Security*, vol. 3 no. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 6-7.

²⁷ Hay, *supra* note 24, p. B4.

²⁸ Malarek, Victor, "Colombian Rebels Seek Canadian Help." *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1989, p. A13.

1988 Nobel Peace Prize and to review Canada's long-standing commitment to UN peace-keeping operations.²⁹ MP Herb Gray (Lib.) spoke on behalf of the Liberal Party, extending his congratulations to the recipients as follows:

Canada plays a special role when it comes to the concept of peacekeeping. I think it is clear - and history records this - that this very concept was something created by a Canadian. The late Right Hon. Lester Pearson, when he was Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Government of Louis St. Laurent, at that time convinced the United Nations to establish a force made up of troops of member countries, including Canada, in a way which resolved the Suez crisis of 1956. As a result, Mike Pearson received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1957....[T]he awarding of this year's Nobel Prize...is a confirmation of how important, how valid, and how successful the concept...developed in 1956 has proven to be over the years.³⁰

On 24 August 1988, Mr. Beatty deposited an Order in Council with the House for Canadian participation in the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer's Group (UNIIMOG). He outlined the duties of the Canadian Forces and the communications team to be sent to assist UNIIMOG.³¹ The opposition parties unanimously supported the motion. However, reservations concerning the necessity of debating this matter in light of the unanimous consent of the House for the motion, and the lack of opportunity to discuss peacekeeping in the general context of Canada's foreign and defence policies³², prompted MP Derek Blackburn (NDP) to comment:

...[I]f you look at the Government's White Paper you will see that the Conservatives devoted just four paragraphs out of an 89-page document to peacekeeping. That shows you that support for the UN and peacekeeping really is not important to the Government, at least not at the time the White Paper was put together....Canadians have rejected the Conservative cold war vision of the world, and the Minister knows it. Now he is on his own little media campaign to try to tie his Government's image to peacekeeping. Otherwise, why are we not debating the submarine programme [and] the total force structure programme here in the House?³³

In the same debate, Minister for External Relations Monique Landry insisted that Canadian participation in UNIIMOG was "in line with the many recommendations contained in the White Paper on Defence published in 1987."³⁴

²⁹ *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1988, pp. 19747-48.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19748.

³¹ *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, pp. 18801-806.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 18806-18809.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 18808.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 18810-18811.

On 25 August 1988, Conservative Member Alan Redway made the following statement regarding the resumption of peace negotiations in Cyprus

...[F]ormal negotiations aimed at bringing about a peaceful settlement in Cyprus will resume at long last on September 15, after some three and a half years of interruption....We have an international reputation as a peace negotiator. We have experience with both minority rights guarantees and with a federal system of government....Because of this I would urge our Government to take and to play an active role in these Cyprus peace negotiations.³⁵

On 12 April 1989, Defence Minister McKnight rose to deposit an Order in Council approving the deployment of Canadian forces in support of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia

I would like to take this opportunity to once again underline the importance that this Government attaches to international peacekeeping and peaceful resolution of disputes....Later this afternoon, the largest contingent of troops will be on their way to Namibia....[W]e have this week responded to an additional call from the United Nations above and beyond our troop commitments and will be providing additional air support for the speedy deployment of the UN force.³⁶

On behalf of his Party, Liberal MP André Ouellet approved the decision to deploy Canadian Forces in support of UNTAG but had the following reservations:

The Minister's remarks are unfortunately incomplete and I deplore his failure to say anything about the situation in Namibia since April 1. Obviously, the recent incidents, the loss of life of many SWAPO members, greatly concern us Canadians. When the Minister tells us that he is sending troops..., he should give us an overview of the situation and give a report to us in the House, to the Canadian people and especially to the families of these service people who are going to that troubled part of the world....[W]e were talking about a United Nations force of some 7,000 soldiers. We know that there will only be 4,000. Many impartial observers consider this force much too small to really do the job....Secondly,...barely one quarter of the military forces have arrived....I wonder why...[the] offer of additional support...was not made several weeks ago....³⁷

During the same debate, MP Howard McCurdy (NDP) also approved the Canadian role in UNTAG on behalf of his Party, but complained of the delay in putting UN peacekeeping forces in place in time for the scheduled 1 April 1989 cease-fire in Namibia:

³⁵ *Commons Debates*, 25 August 1988, pp. 18839-18840.

³⁶ *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 396.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 396-397.

It is...the result of the failure of the Security Council, of which Canada is a member, to ensure speedy deployment of UNTAG forces in sufficient numbers.³⁸

On 15 August 1988, Liberal Member Lloyd Axworthy made a statement regarding Canada's prospective peacekeeping role in Central America:

...[A]ll Canadians were encouraged by the sight of troops of our Armed Forces going to join a UN peacekeeping mission in the Middle East....[A] Commons committee unanimously put forward a series of recommendations as to how the Government of Canada could provide important and constructive recommendations, proposals and initiatives to help the peace initiative along [in Central America]....I hope this House will call upon the Government to take some action and show the kind of initiative for peacekeeping that we can provide in Central America.³⁹

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³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 397-398.

³⁹ *Commons Debates*, 15 August 1988, p. 18295.

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SECTION III - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

21. CENTRAL AMERICA

BACKGROUND

The year 1988 was marked by unsuccessful efforts to adopt in full the Central American Peace Plan proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez. The "Arias Plan", signed on 7 August 1987 at Esquipulas, Guatemala, has retained its importance because it was the first time leaders of the five Central American countries--Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras--agreed in principle to comply with a process aimed at bringing peace to the region. The plan essentially requires of each Government a national reconciliation with opponents, a cease-fire within the existing constitutional framework, efforts to halt foreign aid to insurgents, a commitment not to provide assistance to groups aimed at destabilizing other governments, free and democratic elections, measures to help refugees return home and joint efforts to obtain international economic aid.

That implementation and verification of the planned measures are the main obstacles facing the signatories was evident at the summit held in San José, Costa Rica on 15 and 16 January 1988. Talks between the Governments of Guatemala and El Salvador and their respective opponents to negotiate a cease-fire have yet to produce serious results. On 28 February 1989 the Salvadoran army unilaterally declared a cease-fire until 1 June, when President Duarte was to step down. However, the guerrillas immediately rejected the declaration and launched renewed attacks on military installations, declaring that they would accept only a negotiated cease-fire. In early February 1989 an accord was reached by the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua. The Sandinistas agreed to make serious moves towards democratization and ensure fair procedures at the elections set for February 1990, in return for promises by the Honduran Government to disband the *contra* forces operating within its borders.

At Tesoro Beach, El Salvador on 13-14 February 1989, the five Central American Presidents held a Summit meeting to "reactivate the Arias Plan." The five agreed to the Honduran-Nicaraguan accord reached days earlier, with the additional provision that the *contra* forces and their families operating within Honduras borders would be repatriated or moved to other countries after disbanding. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega reaffirmed his intention to eliminate all censorship laws and hold all-level government elections no later than February 1990. At the Summit, the Presidents also agreed to invite UN observers into the region.

On 24 February 1989, in a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Foreign Ministry officials from all five signatories of the Peace Accord requested that a team of unarmed military observers from Canada, Spain and West Germany, as well as from an unnamed Latin American country, be sent to Central America. The main role of the observers would be to verify that none of the countries involved in the peace process supports any subversive activities against a neighbour country, to report on cross-border guerrilla movements, and to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. Canada, Spain and West Germany have agreed to take part in the peace-keeping mission and are now awaiting a formal request from the UN Secretary-General (for more information see Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*).

At a UN conference on Central American refugees in early April 1989 in Guatemala City, the Secretary-General stated that UN plans for a peacekeeping effort in the region were stalled because of a lawsuit filed at the World Court by Nicaragua against Honduras. The suit claims for damages and compensation as a result of *contra* activities in Nicaragua. Also in Guatemala City, on 13 April 1989, *contra* leaders met with representatives of various Nicaraguan political parties. Amidst reports of reduced US aid to their forces, the *contra* leaders stated that they would participate in a fair electoral process in Nicaragua.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has always openly supported peace efforts in Central America, particularly those of the Contadora group. Although it has never publicly condemned US activities in Central America, the Canadian Government has voiced opposition to third-party intervention in the region.¹ At the Forty-third Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, Canada voted in favour of a resolution urging the United States to comply with the June 1986 ruling of the World Court that US military aid to the *contras* violated international law, and that Washington should definitely cease these actions. In addition, Ottawa has provided Central American Governments with technical information on peacekeeping operations and on the verification of regional agreements aimed at ending hostilities. Canadian economic aid in the region, approximately \$55 million in 1987-1988, is another important aspect of Ottawa's policy toward Central American countries.

Canada has repeatedly shown its support for the Central American Peace Plan. External Affairs Minister Clark has indicated that, if formally asked, Canada will agree to take part in control and verification of an accord. Noting that "[t]he disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict," he has declared that "Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us."²

Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez visited Ottawa from 6 to 8 April 1989, and held talks with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, External Affairs Minister Clark and Finance Minister Michael Wilson. On 25 June 1989, Mr. Clark announced that Canada would provide technical assistance to the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua to help organize its general elections, scheduled for February 1990. Mr. Clark stated that "Canada attaches great importance to the holding of free and fair elections in Nicaragua." An elections official from Nicaragua met with Canadian officials in Ottawa on 26 and 27 June 1989 for discussions on Canadian assistance to the electoral process in Nicaragua.³

On the issue of human rights in Central America, External Affairs Minister Clark pointed out that "no outside country has been asked to involve itself in the political aspects of Esquipulas II; the commission for Verification and Follow-up, which presented its report to the Five in January 1988, was suspended precisely because it did not limit

¹ Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 15 September 1986.

² Department of External Affairs, *Statements* 87/49, 22 September 1987. See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release(s)* Nos. 154 and 163, 10 and 16 August 1987.

³ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 157, 28 June 1989.

its mandate to security issues."⁴ This issue was addressed in a statement delivered by Canadian Ambassador A. Raynell Andreychuk in the Third Committee of the 43rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 23 November 1988. Ms. Andreychuk praised the Peace Plan for its strong support of human rights issues and the democratization process, and urged the Central American Presidents "to honour this commitment to regional reconciliation with renewed vigour."⁵

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 5 July 1988, John Bosley, Chairman of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Peace Process in Central America, tabled the Committee's report entitled *Supporting the Five*. This Committee, composed of five Members of Parliament, was formed to study how Canada could play a constructive role in the Central American peace process. The report contained recommendations on military and political verification, the guarantee of human rights, democratic development of conditions and institutions, economic and humanitarian aid and the enhancement of Canada's diplomatic presence in the region, including the appointment of chargés d'affaires in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.

On 15 August 1988, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy made the following statement on Canada's overall role in the Central American peace process:

Six weeks ago a Commons committee unanimously put forward a series of recommendations as to how the Government of Canada could provide important and constructive recommendations, proposals and initiatives to help the peace initiative along. We have heard nothing from the Government since then. This is where Canada could provide a major contribution to an area of conflict in our own hemisphere and demonstrate our capacity and maturity as a country to help resolve conflicts.⁶

In a letter dated 23 September 1988 to the Chairman of the Special Committee, External Affairs Minister Clark responded positively to most of the report's recommendations. Mr. Clark said:

The Special Committee's Report shows what Canada has done and what we can still do. The task they assumed was difficult and complex. The work is all the more valuable in the present circumstances. It gives us hope, and it provides concrete ideas upon which we can try to build our attempts to encourage a just and lasting peace, and a more prosperous future for Central America.⁷

⁴ Department of External Affairs, Letter to Mr. Bosley, 23 September 1988, p. 2.

⁵ Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 23 November 1988.

⁶ *Commons Debates*, 15 August 1988, p. 18925.

⁷ Department of External Affairs, Letter to Mr. Bosley, 23 September 1988, p. 5. See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 207, 26 September 1988.

Mr. Clark addressed the report's recommendation to continue and strengthen Canada's economic aid to the region as follows:

The Government *accepts* the Committee's recommendation that \$100 million, in addition to currently planned expenditures, be allocated to assist Central American reconstruction and economic development efforts at this critical period in the region's history. Although an increase of this magnitude cannot be accommodated over a 5-year period as suggested by the Committee, we will make such commitment for the 6-year period 1988-1994. The full implementation of this commitment could, of course, be affected by developments in the peace process.⁸

Mr. Clark also said that the Government would open aid offices in Tegucigalpa, Managua and San Salvador by the autumn of 1989.

Mr. Clark agreed with the Committee's recommendation to strengthen Canadian diplomatic representation in Central America. A new Honorary Consul had recently been approved for Tegucigalpa, Honduras and "a recommendation has been made for an Honorary Consul in San Salvador."⁹ On 1 November 1988 Mr. Clark announced the appointment of an Honorary Consul of Canada in Managua, Nicaragua.¹⁰

In the House of Commons on 12 April 1989, Progressive Conservative MP Terry Clifford tabled the report of the Official Delegation of the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association on the Forum on Strengthening Democracy, held in Costa Rica on 6 to 8 February 1989. Mr. Clifford stated that, should proposals for the creation of a Central American Parliament be ratified, Canada would consider financial support towards that end.¹¹

During a wide-ranging debate on Canadian foreign and defence policies in the House of Commons on 13 April 1989, NDP MP Bill Blaikie made suggestions to the Government concerning Nicaragua:

...[T]he Nicaraguan Government is interested in having Canada play a role in the months leading up to the election set for February, 1990. I hope that the Minister will be open to any way in which Canada can be part of the international presence at the Nicaraguan elections, so those elections can be beyond reproach and can be seen to be a legitimate part of the peace process....I would encourage the Minister at the same time to consider enhancing development assistance to Nicaragua in order to alleviate some of their severe economic problems that are a result of the war, the [U.S.] embargo and various other things.¹²

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*.

¹⁰ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 233, 1 November 1988.

¹¹ *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 398.

¹² *Commons Debates*, 13 April 1989, p. 481.

Following Mr. Blaikie's reference to other concerns, External Affairs Minister Clark returned the debate to Central America:

...It is my view that had I accepted his voice and the voice of his Party over the last couple of years, and had we used our influence to condemn the United States in Central America, that probably would have cost us the capacity to play the very constructive, albeit quite limited and specific role that Canada is able to play in moving that region toward a peace process.¹³

Throughout 1988 and 1989, Members of Parliament addressed the question of human rights in individual countries in Central America (for further information refer to Human Rights - "Parliamentary Comment", in Chapter 27 of *The Guide*).

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BACKGROUND

Iran - Iraq

On 18 July 1988 Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 as the basis for talks with Iraq to end their eight-year war. Among other provisions, the Resolution calls for a UN-supervised cease-fire, withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries, prisoner exchanges, the establishment of a panel to determine responsibility for the war, and the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. On 8 August 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar announced that a cease-fire was to commence on 20 August 1988 and that both parties had agreed to send their representatives to Geneva for direct talks under UN auspices. In addition, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established by the UN Security Council, providing a force of 350 unarmed military observers from twenty-four countries, including Canada, to monitor the cease-fire, which went into effect as scheduled.

Several rounds of talks have taken place, all of which failed to make significant progress in implementing UN Resolution 598. Unresolved issues include the failure of Iran and Iraq to set up a joint cease-fire monitoring group. To settle the navigation question in the Shatt al 'Arab waterway, the strategic channel separating Iran from Iraq in the south, Iraq has demanded that Iran allow clearing of war debris from the waterway and concede Iraq's right to navigate freely in the channel. But Iran objects to the reopening of the waterway unless Iraq reaffirms support for the 1975 Algiers Treaty, which divides the channel between the two countries. Furthermore, Iraq is holding approximately 35,000 Iranian prisoners of war and Iran, 70,000 Iraqis. Iraq maintains that it accepted a prisoner exchange plan under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross on 5 October 1988. Iran refused an exchange of prisoners on 23 March 1989, demanding that Iraq first remove its forces to internationally recognized boundaries and return captured territory to Iran.

In December 1988 an international panel of aviation experts, in a report to the International Civil Aviation Organization, found that a series of mistakes by the US Navy contributed directly to the shooting down of an Iranian airliner on 3 July 1988. The USS *Vincennes* mistook the Iran Air passenger plane for an Iranian fighter plane. In mid-July 1989 the US announced compensation for the families of those killed in the incident. The money (\$250,000 for wage-earner victims, \$100,000 for others) will be held in escrow until agreement on its distribution is reached with Iran.

In March 1989 Iran broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, after Iran demanded that the British Government denounce the Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie and his novel *The Satanic Verses*. Many Western nations, including Canada, lodged diplomatic protests over an Iranian call for the death of the author. On 3 June 1989, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died. President Ali Khamenei was chosen as interim leader of Iran by an eighty-member assembly of theological experts. Presidential elections in Iran are scheduled for 28 July 1989. In late June 1989, the Soviet Union formally promised to help Iran strengthen its defence capabilities as part of an economic cooperation pact between the two countries. A joint declaration signed during a Moscow visit by

Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani provided no details about the new defence cooperation.

Lebanon

The fourteen-year-old civil war in Lebanon continued in 1988-1989, recently pitting Lebanese Christians against Syrian forces in Lebanon and their Lebanese Muslim and Druze militia allies. Lebanese president Amin Gemayel ended his six-year term in office in September 1988. In his last act as President, Gemayel appointed General Michel Aoun as leader of an interim military government after an unsuccessful attempt by Parliament to choose a successor to Gemayel. Lebanese Muslims asserted that Gemayel had violated provisions of an unwritten power-sharing agreement, devised in 1943, whereby the President and Army Commander of Lebanon will be Christian, the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament, a Shiite Muslim. Consequently, in late 1988, Lebanon possessed two rival governments: a predominantly Christian-led Government in East Beirut under the leadership of General Aoun, and a Muslim Government in West Beirut headed by Dr. Selim al-Hoss.

The latest outbreak of savage fighting between the two rival groups began on 8 March 1989. About 40,000 Syrian troops occupy approximately two-thirds of the country, with the Lebanese Muslim militia currently receiving arms from Syria, Libya and Iran. Iraq supplies the majority of arms to the approximately 10,000-strong predominantly Christian forces. A cease-fire brokered by the Arab League, which took effect on 11 May 1989, reduced casualties somewhat. Nevertheless, as of 29 June 1989, local police had counted 375 killed and 1471 injured in the fighting since 8 March.

An Arab League Summit meeting in Casablanca in May 1989 failed to persuade Syria's President Hafez Assad to withdraw his soldiers from Lebanon in spite of intense pressure on League members by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Egyptian President Mubarak and Jordan's King Hussein called for a Syrian withdrawal from the Muslim sector of Beirut and installation of a joint Arab police force drawn from Arab League member states other than Syria and Iraq. The proposal was rejected, but the Summit agreed to appoint a three-member committee headed by Morocco's King Hassan II and including Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to oversee attempts to solve the problems in Lebanon, including the election of a new Lebanese president. On 5 July 1989 in Paris, French President Mitterrand and Soviet President Gorbachev called for an immediate truce in Lebanon and a halt to arms deliveries to Lebanese groups in the conflict; the leaders affirmed their willingness to work within the UN Security Council to effect a comprehensive settlement.

Israel launched a major attack on Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) positions in southern Lebanon on 8 December 1988. This marked the first ground attack into Lebanon outside of Israel's self-declared security zone since the 1982 Israeli invasion of the country. PLO and Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia announced an agreement on 22 December 1988 to end the fighting between them in order to concentrate on fighting Israel together. On 30 December 1988, the Syrian-backed Amal militia and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Shiite Muslim factions) signed a pact in Damascus establishing an immediate cease-fire between the two groups and a joint anti-Israeli operations centre in southern Lebanon.

Israel and the Occupied Territories

During 1988 and the first part of 1989, the Palestinian uprising (*intifada*) in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip intensified. By 15 July 1989, approximately 550 Palestinians, thirty Israelis and sixty suspected collaborators (killed by Palestinians themselves) had died.

Addressing the Palestinian National Council in Algiers on 15 November 1988, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat declared the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as part of a broad political programme. On 25 November 1988 Arafat applied for, and a day later was denied, a visa to enter the United States to address the United Nations on the question of Palestinian independence. In Stockholm on 7 December 1988, and in Geneva on 13 December, in his address to the UN General Assembly (which had moved its session to Geneva in order to hear him), Arafat made significant announcements. He declared that the PLO acknowledged the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, including the state of Israel; he accepted UN Resolution 242 of 1967 (which calls on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories in return for security and recognition) and 338 of 1973 (which calls for the carrying out of Resolution 242) as the basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international peace conference; and he renounced all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism. In Paris on 2 May 1989, Arafat stated that the PLO Charter of 1964 calling for Israel's destruction was outdated, and null and void.

Heading a new coalition government, formed on 19 December 1988, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir presented peace plan proposals for the occupied territories in various stages. The main tenets of the proposals called for a re-endorsement of the Camp David Accords that led to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, the establishment of peace between Israel and Arab states, international efforts to improve the living conditions of Palestinians in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and elections to choose Palestinian representatives to negotiate a three-year interim period of self-rule to be followed by a comprehensive permanent solution to the occupied territories' problem. Shamir's election proposal was approved by the Israeli Knesset on 17 May 1989. On 5 July 1989 Shamir's Likud political bloc endorsed his election plan after he had accepted certain conditions, including: denying Arab East Jerusalem residents the right to vote; an end to the *intifada*; the continued construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and a refusal by Israel to give up any territory it holds at present. The PLO, which had reportedly been considering conditional approval of the election plan, stated that it could no longer do so because of the new conditions.

Twenty-two leaders of Arab League nations, meeting in Casablanca from 22 to 26 May 1989, had supported the PLO position that Israeli-proposed elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip could be held only if Israel withdrew from the territories and the elections took place under UN or other international supervision.

After a thirteen-year ban, on 14 December 1988 the United States announced that it was to begin a dialogue with the PLO, since various preconditions set out in a 1975 Memorandum of Agreement between the US and Israel had been met by Yasser Arafat's statements earlier that month. First meetings between US and PLO officials took place shortly after the announcement. On 13 March 1989 the Bush Administration called on all parties to the conflict to reduce tensions in the area. Israel was asked to free some

Palestinian prisoners and forego the use of administrative detentions without trials, the Palestinians asked to stop raids into Israel from southern Lebanon and halt the distribution of inflammatory leaflets in the occupied territories. On 14 March 1989 US Secretary of State James Baker suggested that Israel may have to negotiate with the PLO. During Egyptian President Mubarak's visit to Washington, US President Bush called for an end to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and suggested that he favoured a "properly structured" international Middle East peace conference. On 11 May 1989 Secretary of State Baker pressed Israel for details of its plan for Palestinian elections and asserted that Arab East Jerusalem residents should be allowed to vote in such elections and insisted on foreign supervision of the balloting. On 23 May 1989 Baker stated that Israel should abandon all ideas of annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, that it should reopen closed Palestinian schools in the occupied territories, halt all Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, and move towards negotiations. Baker also called on Arab states to end their economic boycott of Israel, to respect Israel's right to membership in international organizations, and to "repudiate the odious claim that Zionism is racism." Regarding the PLO, Baker called for a formal amending of the PLO Charter which calls for the destruction of Israel; PLO non-interference in international organizations, and a channelling of *intifada* violence into political dialogue.

In a ten-day diplomatic mission to the Middle East in February 1989 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet Union supported the Arab call for an international Middle East peace conference under the auspices of the UN Security Council, winning support for his views from Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. Shevardnadze also set out Soviet preconditions for the reestablishment of full diplomatic ties with Israel. These included Israeli acceptance of both an international conference on the Middle East and a dialogue with the PLO.

For a discussion of UN activity on the occupied territories question, including Canada's role at the UN, see *Canadian Current Position*.

CANADIAN CURRENT POSITION

Iran - Iraq

After an eight-year hiatus in official relations, on 18 July 1988 External Affairs Minister Clark announced that, effective immediately, Canada and Iran would resume normal diplomatic relations, and accordingly the two sides would exchange ambassadors.¹ The Canadian Embassy in Tehran reopened its doors officially on 16 October 1988.² On 9 August 1988 the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had agreed to provide troops as part of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), set up to monitor the 20 August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. Sixteen Canadians serve in the mission, after an initial 483 Canadians set up UNIIMOG's

¹ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 152 (18 July 1988); and Government of Canada, "Canada Welcomes Iranian Acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, New York, 18 July 1988." New York: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, *Press Release* No. 32.

² Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 226 (17 October 1988).

communications infrastructure.³ Responding to Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini's call for the death of author Salman Rushdie, on 22 February 1989 Canada followed the lead set by the twelve European Community nations and Norway and Sweden by withdrawing its chargé d'affaires from Tehran.⁴ Customs officials at the Department of National Revenue temporarily stopped, and later resumed, the importation of the Rushdie book into Canada after considering whether the book constituted "hate literature" under Canadian law. Prime Minister Mulroney called the decision to block temporarily the book's entry into Canada, "ridiculous." Commenting on Khomeini's death call on 28 February 1989, Mulroney stated: "[t]he suggestion that a contract should be put on the head of a citizen in a free country...is an absolute outrage.... It violates everything that Canada stands for."⁵ On 2 March 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark rejected a request from twenty-five Muslim diplomats in Canada to ban the Rushdie book and called for Islamic Conference member states to work with Canada and other states to remove the death threat.⁶ On 14 July 1989, it was reported that the National Iranian Oil Co. was opening an office in Calgary. External Affairs Minister Clark stated that he knew about the office opening but was not certain whether high-technology energy equipment was to be sold to Iran.⁷

Lebanon

Speaking on behalf of Minister Clark, Secretary of State and Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Gerry Weiner told a group of Lebanese protesters in Ottawa, on 6 April 1989, that Canada supported their demands for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Weiner added that Canada supports the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon; looks forward to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from its soil; and urges all warring factions to respect a cease-fire.⁸ On 20 April 1989 External Relations Minister Monique Landry outlined Canadian Government efforts to assist attempts to resolve the Lebanese crisis. Canada would continue to support the mediation efforts of the UN Security Council, the Arab League and President Mitterrand of France; continue participation in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) peacekeeping mission; provide a grant of \$500,000 for humanitarian assistance in response to a special appeal by the Red Cross; temporarily suspend the deportation of unsuccessful refugee claimants from Lebanon; and dispatch an immigration officer to Cyprus to process additional immigration applications by those Lebanese wishing to

³ Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 171 (9 August 1988).

⁴ "Canada Recalls Diplomat from Iran." *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 1989, p. A1.

⁵ "Mulroney Denounces Khomeini for Death Order." *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 March 1989; and "PM 'Embarrassed' by Blocking of Rushdie Book." *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 March 1989, p. A1.

⁶ Iain Hunter, "Clark asks Muslims to Remove Death Threat." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 March 1989.

⁷ Christopher Donville, "Hi-Tech Leak Denied in Iran-Alberta Deal." *Globe and Mail*, 14 July 1989, p. A8.

⁸ Charles Ker and Alan White, "Lebanese Canadians Want Syria Out of Their Homeland." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 April 1989, p. A11.

emigrate to Canada.⁹ In a report to Parliament submitted on 21 June 1989, an all-party House of Commons Committee recommended that Canada should reopen its embassy in Beirut (closed in 1985 because of dangerous and deteriorating conditions) in order to assist those Lebanese wishing to emigrate to Canada. The Committee also recommended the expansion of the special Canadian immigration office in Cyprus dealing with Lebanese applications for immigration to Canada, and a relaxation of immigration restrictions for Lebanese applicants.¹⁰

Israel and the Occupied Territories

Following conflicting statements from Prime Minister Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Clark as to whether Canada would recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),¹¹ Mr. Clark announced on 30 March 1989 that Canada was ending restrictions on official meetings with representatives of the PLO. In a lengthy statement, Mr. Clark outlined Canada's policy toward the Palestinian problem as follows:

The fundamental principles [of successive Canadian governments over the years] have long been

- support for the security, well-being and rights of Israel as a legitimate, independent state in the Middle East;
- support for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as enunciated in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967;
- recognition that for there to be a just peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be realized, including their right to play a full part in determining their future;
- insistence that for the PLO to play a role in Middle East peace negotiations, it must accept Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries....

The intifada in the occupied territories has demonstrated that Palestinian nationalism is a reality that must be taken into account.... The PLO decisions and statements of recent months, declaring their recognition of the State of Israel and their readiness to find an accommodation with it, represent a revision of traditional PLO policy.... Canada does not recognize the Palestine state proclaimed last November. However, the proclamation of a state does cast a different light on the question of Palestinian self-determination. Canada has long accepted the right and need for Palestinians to play a full part in negotiations to determine their future. We had been concerned that the phrase "self-determination" was being used as a code-word for an independent state, and that Canadian endorsement of the principle would be interpreted as Canadian advocacy of an independent state. That interpretation is no longer possible, because an independent state has been declared, and not recognized

⁹ *Commons Debates*, 20 April 1989, pp. 707-708.

¹⁰ "MPs Hear Plea to Help Lebanese Flee to Canada." *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 June 1989, p. B19; and "Should Take More Lebanese, Commons Committee Reports." *Globe and Mail*, 22 June 1989, p. A10.

¹¹ Ross Howard, "Statements on PLO by PM, Clark Indicate Deeper Foreign Policy Rift." *Globe and Mail*, 15 March 1989, p. A3; and Deborah Dowling, "PM Denies Rift With Clark." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 March 1989, p. A3.

by Canada. That allows Canada to endorse the principle that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination in accordance with the International Human Rights Covenants. That must be exercised through peace negotiations in which Palestinians play a full part. Those negotiations may lead to an independent state, or to a federation with an existing state, or to some other result. We do not prejudice the results of those negotiations.... The Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Yves Fortier, will meet with a representative of the PLO Mission to the United Nations. Other contacts will take place elsewhere as appropriate.... We take these actions in the expectation that they will encourage the PLO to continue on the course indicated by its recent statements and actions and with the hope that ultimately this will help bring security to Israel.¹²

On 4 April 1989 Mr. Clark stated that Canada retained a fundamental commitment to the security of Israel.¹³ Speaking to a group of delegates at the Canadian Jewish Congress plenary meeting in Montréal on 4 May 1989, Minister Gerry Weiner stated that the Canadian Government "must be firm and unyielding" in its protection of the state of Israel and that until the PLO amends its Charter calling for the destruction of Israel, Canada "cannot afford any further recognition."¹⁴

From 26 to 28 June 1989, Israeli President Chaim Herzog visited Canada and addressed a joint session of Parliament. Herzog accused PLO Chairman Arafat of continuing terrorist activities and insisted that Israel was a model of restraint in its behaviour during the "maintenance of law and order" in the occupied territories. Prime Minister Mulroney reaffirmed Canada's commitment to Israel's security and stated that "Canadians are deeply concerned because of their friendship for Israel and because of their profound conviction that human rights must be respected.... Canadians who understand and sympathize with Israel urge...moderation and reasonableness in the belief that ultimately such a policy will bring about an equally responsible attitude on the other side."¹⁵

On 8 July 1989 the Department of External Affairs announced that External Affairs Minister Clark would consider meeting his counterpart from the PLO.¹⁶

At the United Nations on 2 December 1988, Canada voted in favour of the resolu-

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- ¹² Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Statement...on Official Contacts with the PLO and Self-determination, Ottawa, March 30, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/8, pp. 1-3.
- ¹³ Mohammed Adam, "Israel's Security Important to Canada, Says Clark." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 April 1989, p. A3.
- ¹⁴ Olivia Ward, "Canada Firmly Supports Israel Minister Assures Jewish Group." *Toronto Star*, 9 May 1989, p. A17.
- ¹⁵ Tim Harper, "Israeli Army Restrained in Uprising Herzog Says." *Toronto Star*, 28 June 1989, p. A1.
- ¹⁶ "Clark Will Consider Meeting PLO." *Globe and Mail*, 8 July 1989, p. A5.

tion to move the General Assembly to Geneva in order to hear PLO Chairman Arafat.¹⁷ However, on 15 December 1988, Canada abstained on two resolutions: the first, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and Jerusalem, and the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and the second, upgrading the status of the UN Palestinian observer mission.¹⁸

On 11 January 1989 Canada abstained on a UN Security Council resolution to grant the PLO the right to address the Council directly as "Palestine". Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Yves Fortier, stated that Canada did not oppose Palestinian participation in Council debates, but reiterated that it had not recognized a Palestinian state.¹⁹ On 17 February 1989, Canada and thirteen other members of the UN Security Council voted to deplore Israeli actions in the occupied territories. The Department of External Affairs explained that the resolution had "combined justified criticism of Israeli practices in the occupied territories, together with a call for maximum restraint.... [I]t reaffirmed the need for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict.... Canada's statement...confirmed our historic bond of friendship with Israel and expressed our concern about the ongoing situation in the occupied territories." On the same date, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva passed a resolution, which Canada opposed, condemning the treatment and killing of Palestinians in the occupied territories.²⁰

On 20 April 1989 Canada voted with the majority of the UN General Assembly to condemn Israel for the excessive use of force and restrictions placed on worship in the occupied territories.²¹ In explaining Canada's vote in favour of a similar Security Council resolution on 9 June 1989, Ambassador Fortier stated that "[t]he information available to my government indicated a new and quite grave deterioration in the level of violence.... In Gaza especially, new measures to control the movement of individuals, including repeated curfews, have produced tinderbox conditions which an incident could ignite." At the same time Fortier commended Israeli authorities for standing up to Israeli "vigilantes", urged Israel to continue to prevent attacks by Israeli settlers against the local population, and called for Israel to reopen Palestinian schools in the occupied territories.²²

In his first direct communication with PLO Chairman Arafat, in a letter on 5 May 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark urged the PLO to drop its plan to seek membership in UN Agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Clark warned that PLO

17 Paul Lewis, "U.N. Votes to Move Session to Geneva." *New York Times*, 3 December 1988, p. 1.

18 Paul Lewis, "U.N. Ends Session in Geneva, Passing 2 Mideast Resolutions." *New York Times*, 16 December 1988, p. 15.

19 "Security Council Grants PLO Right to Speak as Palestine." *Globe and Mail*, 12 January 1989, p. A11.

20 "Canada Backs Move to Criticize Israel/U.S. Vetoes Proposal Criticizing Israeli Action." *Toronto Star*, 18 February 1989, pp. A1 and A14.

21 "Canada Votes to Condemn Israel." *Toronto Star*, 21 April 1989, p. 1.

22 Trevor Rowe, "Canada Condemns Israel in U.N. Vote." *Toronto Star*, 10 June 1989, p. 1.

membership in the latter might cause a world health care "crisis" because of a threatened cut in funding by the US. He also raised concerns about the PLO Charter calling for the destruction of Israel and suggested that Arafat reconsider his rejection of Israeli proposals for Palestinian elections in the occupied territories.²³

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 24 August 1988 the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty rose in the House of Commons to explain the Canadian Government's announcement (9 August 1988) of Canada's intention to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) peacekeeping mission to Iran and Iraq.²⁴ Speaking on behalf of their Parties, several MPs expressed their support for Canadian participation in UNIIMOG.²⁵ For further Parliamentary comment on this subject, see Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*.

Lebanon

During April and May 1989 the House of Commons heard numerous statements and extensive debate concerning Canadian Government policies toward Lebanon. On 20 April 1989 Liberal MP Jesse Flis commented:

To my question about Canada taking the initiative and calling for an emergency debate in the [UN] Security Council, the Secretary of State [for External Affairs] insisted that a debate was not warranted at this time as, according to the Minister, it would not have any effect on this situation.... One of the reasons I hope Canada lobbied so hard to get a seat on the Security Council was to play an active role in crises such as these.... While we applaud the aid that Canada has offered Lebanon through the Red Cross,...[t]his should be aid over and above the half million dollars that is to be put to use in Lebanon. To the suggestion from my Liberal colleagues and me that Canada open an office in Cyprus so that the refugees from Lebanon would not have to go to Syria to obtain visas, there was no response.²⁶

NDP MP Bill Blaikie agreed with the inadequacy of Canadian humanitarian aid to Lebanon and also called on the Government to initiate an emergency UN Security Council debate on Lebanon.²⁷

23 Paul Koring, "Abandon Plan to Join WHO, Clark Tells PLO." *Globe and Mail*, 10 May 1989, p. A1; and "UN Agency Delays Decision on PLO." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 May 1989, p. A6.

24 *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, p. 18802.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 18804-18806.

26 *Commons Debates*, 20 April 1989, pp. 708.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 709-710.

In response to a question from MP Alex Kindy (PC) on 21 April 1989 concerning Canadian immigration services to Lebanese citizens, External Relations Minister Landry stated:

...[O]ur embassy in Damascus is able to provide all immigration services. We have four officers on the spot.... Yesterday, we heard from our representative in Syria that Lebanese citizens can enter Syria on their Lebanese I.D. Card or passport.... People living in the Christian sector of Beirut, have passports that will get them to Cyprus. As for the services we are able to offer in Cyprus at the present time, I said yesterday in a statement in the House that we had a consular officer on the spot.... [W]e are able to cope with the demand for the time being....²⁸

On 2 May 1989 Liberal MP Sergio Marchi recalled:

We in the Liberal Party had asked repeatedly in the House...[for the Government] to establish, at the very earliest, a full consular immigration operation in Cyprus, because the very large and proud Lebanese Canadian community in this country wanted to extend an invitation or a sponsorship to families and friends back in Lebanon.... The problem was the inability and the inaccessibility of people in Lebanon to get to a Canadian office.... We have a full operation in Damascus, Syria, but because Syria is one of the antagonists in the war we could hardly imagine whether people, particularly of the Christian faith, would venture into Damascus.... The Government finally responded to those calls by saying that it was going to send one official to Cyprus in order to process those applications.... Our party thinks that we need a full-time immigration consular operation staffed with six or seven employees....²⁹

Liberal Member André Ouellet rose in the House on 29 May 1989 to comment on the Arab League's call for a political settlement to the Lebanese crisis:

...[W]e deeply regret that the Arab Summit did not recognize that it will be almost impossible to hold free presidential elections, to form a new government or to develop the constitution until the non-Lebanese armed forces have left the country.... I ask the Canadian Government to use all the resources at its disposal, especially its seat on the United Nations Security Council, to help the Lebanese determine their own future and their own government and be able finally to live in freedom and peace.³⁰

On 12 July 1988 Liberal MP Roland de Corneille called on the Government to develop measures to help those in Beirut refugee camps that were caught in the crossfire of rival Palestinian militia groups.³¹

²⁸ *Commons Debates*, 21 April 1989, pp. 794.

²⁹ *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1989, pp. 1238.

³⁰ *Commons Debates*, 29 May 1989, p. 2246.

³¹ *Commons Debates*, 12 July 1989, p. 17458.

Israel and the Occupied Territories

On 16 December 1988 Progressive Conservative Member Bob Corbett asked External Affairs Minister Clark whether, in light of the Palestinian National Council's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and its proclaimed renunciation of terrorism, the Canadian Government was planning to raise the level of contacts with the PLO. Mr. Clark replied: "We are intending no immediate change in the level or nature of those contacts, but we are naturally encouraged by developments which we think are important and positive in the Middle East..."³² On 7 April 1989 Mr. Corbett (PC) welcomed the subsequent initiative of the Canadian Government to upgrade its contacts with the PLO, noting that "Canada has long been well regarded by all parties in the Middle East as a peacekeeper and a moderate, trusted voice. This move will further reinforce that position."³³

Progressive Conservative Member Bill Attewell suggested on 15 May 1989 that "Canada would be more than willing to assist with any international supervisory process" with respect to Israel's proposed peace plan for the occupied territories.³⁴

On 27 June 1989 NDP MP Bill Blaikie asked External Affairs Minister Clark for the Canadian Government position on Israel's plan. Clark replied:

...We believe it is a significant and important proposal on the part of Israel. There are obviously a great many details that remain to be worked out. We think that it does provide a basis for movement toward a peaceful settlement in that region, based upon Resolution 242. In that spirit we support it actively and we will try to continue our efforts to encourage the Palestinians to respond in a positive way to that initiative.³⁵

On 28 September 1988 NDP Member Howard McCurdy voiced concerns over the violence in the occupied territories:

...I rise today in response to reports from the West Bank and Gaza Strip indicating that the Israeli Army is now using plastic bullets without restraint against Palestinians protesting their continuing oppression under occupation.... The replacement of rubber bullets by plastic ones last month has been accompanied by a marked increase in the number of people wounded, up from 19 in July to 130 in the first 25 days of September in the Gaza Strip alone.-...[T]hose casualty statistics are considered appalling by representatives of the United Nations.... Representatives of the United Nations have protested this

32 *Commons Debates*, 16 December 1988, p.147.

33 *Commons Debates*, 7 April 1989, p. 215.

34 *Commons Debates*, 15 May 1989, p. 1715.

35 *Commons Debates*, 27 June 1989, p. 3691.

deliberate and futile escalation. I call on the Government of Canada to do the same.³⁶

On 14 April 1989 Progressive Conservative MP Bob Corbett stated: "Surely it is high time for Israel's friends to tell her, in no uncertain terms, that the continual murdering of Palestinian civilians by the Israeli military is cruel, intolerable, and must stop."³⁷

Members of Parliament Bill Attewell (PC), Shirley Maheu (Liberal) and Sheila Finestone (Liberal) rose in the House on 10 May 1989 to make separate statements to honour the 41st anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel. Ms. Finestone stated:

For the past 41 years our country and Israel have shared a strong and close friendship based upon mutual respect and understanding. Although Israel has had to struggle to deal with some of the most trying crises that have ever challenged a modern state, Canadians are pleased to note that she remains a democratic and pluralistic state.... I hope all Members of the House join me in wishing Israel well on this occasion...in the hope that this year we shall finally see an enduring peace brought to all neighbours in the Middle East, as well as to the entire world.³⁸

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³⁶ *Commons Debates*, 28 September 1988, pp. 19725-26.

³⁷ *Commons Debates*, 14 April 1989, p. 505.

³⁸ *Commons Debates*, 10 May 1989, pp. 1529-30.

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BACKGROUND

Western Sahara

The thirteen-year guerrilla war in Western Sahara continued in 1988-1989. This conflict, which pits the Kingdom of Morocco against the *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro* (Polisario), has, to date, claimed approximately 10,000 lives. The Polisario, strongly supported by Algeria, is fighting for the independence of Western Sahara. Spain ended its colonial rule of the area with the signing of the Madrid Accords in late 1975, giving administrative control to Morocco and Mauritania. The latter renounced control of its portion in 1978, resulting in the complete annexation of the territory by Morocco.

In 1975, the International Court of Justice denied Morocco's claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

On 16 May 1988 Algeria and Morocco resumed diplomatic ties following a twelve-year break caused by Algeria's decision in 1976 to recognize the Sahrawi (Saharan) Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), proclaimed by the Polisario on 27 February 1976. In early February 1989, the President of Algeria, Chadli Bendjedid, made a three-day visit to Morocco. It was the first time in seventeen years that an Algerian President had been to Morocco officially. This rapprochement has nurtured hope for a speedier settlement of the Saharan conflict.

The United Nations in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has already made various attempts to initiate a peace process in the area. In 1987, a technical team of UN and OAU envoys visited Western Sahara and the bordering states in a fact-finding mission to establish a framework for a political solution to the conflict. During the summer months of 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar conducted separate negotiations with the parties in Geneva. On 30 August, representatives of the Polisario and Morocco accepted in principle the peace settlement proposed jointly by OAU Chairman, President Moussa Traore of Mali, and the UN Secretary-General.

The peace plan calls for a cease-fire and a referendum--to be organized and monitored by the UN in cooperation with the OAU--for self-determination by the Territory's people. A contingent of UN observers would also be deployed to verify the cessation of hostilities, a cease-fire implementation, and a prisoner exchange.¹ Algeria and Mauritania would assume the role of observers of the peace plan.

On 20 September 1988, the Security Council unanimously voted for the appointment of a UN Special Representative for Western Sahara to oversee the implementation of the peace process. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar assigned Héctor Gros Espiell of Uruguay to this post. In January 1989, Gros Espiell commenced his mission by visiting the Sarwi refugee camps (a total of twenty-six) located in the Tindouf region inside the

¹ *UN Chronicle*, vol. 25 no. 4 (December 1988), p. 32.

south-western Algerian border. These camps, which hold an estimated 165,000 refugees, are controlled by the Polisario and largely supported by Algeria. A substantial amount of humanitarian assistance comes from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

In early January 1989, an unprecedented meeting between King Hassan II and a high-level delegation of the Polisario took place in Morocco. An official Moroccan communiqué reported that the visit's working agenda included discussions on the proposed referendum. Furthermore, according to the Secretary-General of the Polisario Front, Mohammed Abdelaziz, a second round of talks between the two parties would most likely be held at the end of February.²

In the interim, the conflict in 1988 has seen intensified assaults along the Hassan Wall, which now extends for approximately 2500 km. (Morocco completed the sixth section of this "Sand Wall" of defence, which is enmeshed with barbed wire and links a series of fortified garrisons, in 1987. This area is further protected by minefields.³) In late September 1988, within three weeks of the conditional acceptance by Morocco and the Polisario of the UN-OAU peace plan, heavy fighting took place in the Oum Dreiga region.

Libya-Chad

Immediately following the Libyan capture of northern Chad's Aouzou Strip, Libyan bombing raids on N'Djamena, and a response by Chad in the form of air raids on the Libyan air-base at Maaten Es Sara, in mid-September 1987, a cease-fire between the two countries was negotiated upon the initiative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The cease-fire was generally regarded to have remained in place despite continuous sporadic fighting and provocative Libyan military flights over Chadian territory.

As a result of a Libyan initiative, direct talks under the aegis of the OAU were held in Libreville, Gabon from 7 to 9 July 1988 between the Libyan Foreign Minister, Jadallah Azouz at Talhi, and the Chadian Foreign Minister, Captain Gouara Lassou.

On 1 September 1988 Colonel Qaddafi declared that Libya's policy toward Chad had been in error. On 3 October 1988, a formal end to the Libya-Chad war was announced by the Chadian Embassy in Paris. Both countries agreed to immediately restore diplomatic ties, including the setting up of diplomatic missions in each other's countries, to respect the September 1987 cease-fire, and to settle their territorial disputes (centring on the Aouzou Strip).

Libyan concerns in further negotiations will focus on the 2000-3000 Libyans being held in detention in Chad, whereas the Chadians are concerned about the approximately 8000 Libyan soldiers stationed along Chad's northern border.

2 "Morocco - Polisario Talks Seen." *New York Times*, 21 February 1989, p. A13.

3 Dmitry Zgersky, "The 'Saharan wall' that the U.N. wants to pull down." *New Times* No. 39 (September 1988), p. 9. See also: K.R. Singh, "The Sand Wall is Crumbling." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12 no. 5 (August 1988), pp. 479-495.

France continues to provide economic and military assistance to Chad, including 1700 servicemen located in various parts of the country. In 1988 and early 1989, France reduced the size of its military contingent in Chad by 500 persons.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada maintains a policy of neutrality and non-interference toward the situation in Western Sahara. Ottawa encourages the ongoing efforts of UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar aimed at settling the conflict.

Canada abstained from voting on the Resolution concerning Western Sahara passed by the Forty-third Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 22 November 1988. This Resolution (86 for, 0 against and 53 abstentions) called upon the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario, to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a referendum.

Canada had also abstained from voting on the Resolution concerning the Western Sahara conflict passed by the Forty-second Session of the UN General Assembly in 1987. The Assembly's official records of the forty-second Session summarized Canada's explanation of the vote as follows:

Ms. Miller (Canada) said that her delegation urged all parties to the dispute to take advantage of the good offices made available to them to find a solution that would be acceptable to them and to the international community. It welcomed the agreement of the parties concerned to receive a technical mission and was prepared to provide technical advice if called upon to do so. Canada's abstention had been premised on the wish to leave the search for a solution to the parties involved and not to prejudge the matter.⁴

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The Western Sahara and Libya-Chad conflicts were not raised in the House of Commons between mid-July 1988 and mid-July 1989.

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⁴ UN Document A/C.4/42/SR.22 (2 November 1987), p. 15.

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BACKGROUND

Angola - Namibia - South Africa

Angola obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975. The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) formed the Government and sustained its position with the help of 13,000 Cuban troops. (This number eventually grew to an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Cuban soldiers.) A guerrilla group known as the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), aided by South Africa, became the major opposition force. South Africa defended its involvement on the grounds that Angola was being used as a base by the (Namibian) South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in its war for Namibia's independence from South Africa. In 1987 the civil war in Angola reached a stalemate as a result of Cuban and Soviet aid to the MPLA being matched by South African and US aid to UNITA.¹ By 1989, over 100,000 had died and 1.5 million required emergency food and other aid because of the war. On 22 June 1989, at a summit meeting of eighteen African heads of state in Gbadolite, Zaire, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA rebel Leader Jonas Savimbi agreed to an immediate cease-fire. Negotiations on the role of UNITA in the Angolan Government broke down shortly afterwards, with the Government accusing the rebels of breaking the cease-fire.

Namibia has been controlled by South Africa since Germany lost this colony in World War I. (The name of the territory was changed from South-West Africa to Namibia by the United Nations in 1968.) SWAPO, which is under the control of Ovambo tribe leaders and headed by Sam Nujoma, began a guerrilla war for independence in 1966. (The Ovambo tribe constitutes approximately fifty percent of Namibia's 1.63 million inhabitants.) In 1973, the UN General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "sole authentic representative of the Namibian people" after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1971 that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal. In 1978, Security Council Resolution 435 called for a cease-fire, a UN peacekeeping force, and UN-sponsored elections. Subsequently, South Africa affirmed its intention to negotiate the details of a Namibian peace process only if Cuban troops in Angola were withdrawn.

On 22 December 1988, high-level representatives of Angola, Cuba and South Africa formally signed two agreements in New York, following preliminary regional peace talks on 3 and 4 May 1988 in London under the mediation of the United States, and further rounds in Cairo, New York, Geneva, and Brazzaville, Congo. These established the basis for peaceful transition in Namibia. The first of the new agreements, signed by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), while expanding its terms to reduce South African forces from approximately 50,000 troops to 1500 troops in Namibia, within six weeks of the Agreement's implementation and to confine these troops to two bases south of the Angolan border. The second agreement, signed by Cuba and Angola, set out a withdrawal timetable for the 50,000 Cuban troops, to begin with a 3000-troop reduction on 1 April 1989. All Cuban troops would be redeployed north of the 15th parallel (200 miles north of the Angola-Namibian

¹ John Laffin, *The World in Conflict 1989 - War Annual 3*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989, pp. 27, 29, 199-201.

border) by August 1989. Twenty-five thousand would be withdrawn from Angola, and the remainder moved north of the 13th parallel (350 miles north of the border), by November 1989. The Cuban departure from Angola is to be completed by 1 July 1991. Further provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and the agreements signed in December 1988 include full independence for Namibia by April 1990, preceded by the election of a Constituent Assembly on 1 November 1989 to draft a Constitution and organize a new government.

On 16 February 1989, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), composed of 4650 peacekeeping troops (including approximately 250 Canadians), 500 police officers and 1000 civilian election monitors. Pressure from the five permanent members of the Security Council reduced the number of peacekeeping troops from an original count of 7500. To oversee Cuban troop withdrawals, a seventy-member UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVIM) had been established in December 1988 by the UN Security Council.²

However, on 1 April 1989, the official cease-fire date and the commencement of the Namibian independence process, more than 1,000 SWAPO guerrillas entered Namibia from Angola, taking advantage of the fact that the independence plan did not specify precisely where SWAPO forces were to remain during the arranged cease-fire. Over 300 SWAPO guerrillas were killed by South African forces as a result.³ In May 1989, talks resumed between Angolan, Cuban, and South African officials in an attempt to "retrack" the Namibian independence process. By July 1989, conditions in the original timetable, including the withdrawal of South African troops and the return of an estimated 40,000 Namibian exiles for scheduled elections on 1 November 1989, were being met. However, on 28 June 1989, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar warned that an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, perpetuated by South African police forces in northern Namibia, might jeopardize conditions for fair elections.

Mozambique - South Africa

After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won control of the new nation. The opposition guerrilla Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), known as RENAMO, was founded by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in 1977. After the end of white-minority rule in Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1982, South Africa took over the support and training of RENAMO guerrillas. In 1984, Mozambique's President Samora Machel signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, which provided for an end to South African support to RENAMO and Mozambican use of its territory as a base for African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas in their operations against South Africa. Machel was killed in a plane crash on 19 October 1986 and Joaquim Chissano took over the presidency. Mozambique has regularly accused South Africa of violating the 1984 Accord by continuing to support RENAMO. In August 1987, a Joint Security Commission was revived to monitor compliance with the

² Tony Banks and Helmoed-Romer Heitman, "UN to Monitor Angolan Pull-out." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 1 (7 January 1989), p. 10.

³ Gwynne Dyer, "Namibian Blunder a Case of Singular Stupidity." *Toronto Star*, 10 April 1989, p. 13; and "Namibia Independence Plan Stalled." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 May 1989, p. A7.

Accord. Nevertheless, 20,000 RENAMO troops remain in control of rural Mozambique, despite the assistance of 10,000 Zimbabwean troops to the Mozambican Government.

In a visit to Mozambique on 12 and 13 September 1988, South African President P. W. Botha called for reactivation of the 1984 Accord, reiterated previous assurances that South Africa no longer supported RENAMO, and pledged economic aid for Mozambique. RENAMO rebels continued a campaign of terror against Mozambican civilians (deaths being estimated at 100,000 since 1984), as well as attacking government installations such as the Cabora Bassa dam. On 7 February 1989 South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha asked the United States to broker a peace settlement for Mozambique. At the end of June 1989 the Mozambican Government offered to open peace talks with RENAMO rebels, provided they renounced violence and adhered to constitutional rule. In response, RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama called on FRELIMO to agree to a two-year transitional government that would prepare for elections and constitutional reform in Mozambique.

South Africa

In June 1988, South African President P. W. Botha renewed a two-year old state of emergency for another year and announced new press restrictions. On 12 August 1988, Nelson Mandela, imprisoned leader of the African National Congress (ANC), was hospitalized for tuberculosis and in December 1988 was moved to a private home on prison grounds. South African municipal elections were held in October 1988. The ruling National Party retained control over the majority of white cities, but the right-wing Conservative Party made gains in the areas of Transvaal and Natal provinces. Also in October, a fire bomb attack on the South African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) headquarters took place, following the 31 August bombing in Johannesburg of Khotso House, headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and other human rights groups. In November 1988, nineteen black activists on trial since 1986 for demonstrations and rent strikes near Johannesburg in 1984 (the "Delmas Treason Trial") were sentenced. Eight were acquitted, while the rest received sentences ranging from suspended five-year sentences to twelve-year prison terms. Also in November 1988, South African President P. W. Botha granted clemency to the "Sharpeville Six" who had been facing execution since March 1988 for their part in the killing of a municipal councillor in Sharpeville at the start of township unrest in September 1984.

South Africa's state of emergency was renewed in June 1989. During the previous three years an estimated 30,000 people had been detained under the special emergency powers, not including an estimated 6000 detained under other South African security laws. Frederik de Klerk captured the ruling National Party leadership in February 1989 and was to take his party into national elections scheduled for 6 September 1989, in which the 28 million-strong black majority would not be allowed to vote. Jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela confirmed in early July 1989 that he had met with President Botha.

Ethiopia - Somalia

The border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia for control of the Ogaden region began in 1977. Ethiopia and Somalia signed a treaty formally ending the conflict in April 1988 and agreed to an exchange of prisoners in August 1988. Ethiopia was motivated to negotiate because of the need to free its troops for counteroffensives against the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), fighting for secession from Ethiopia, and the Tigrean People's Liberation Army (TPLF), fighting to overthrow the present Ethiopian

Government. In 1988 and through the first months of 1989, fighting in the fourteen-year old Ethiopian civil war resulted in heavy Government territorial losses in the provinces of Tigre (December 1988) and of Eritrea. The Soviet Union, the country's main source of military and economic aid, pressured Ethiopian President Mengistu to negotiate with the rebel groups. On 15 May 1989, a coup attempt by senior Ethiopian military officers against President Mengistu failed. On 6 June 1989, the Ethiopian Parliament passed a resolution calling for peace talks with Eritrean and Tigrean rebels. The Resolution called for talks to be held without preconditions, in public, and in the presence of a neutral observer. On 13 June 1989, Tigrean rebels accepted Mengistu's offer of unconditional talks, with the Eritrean rebels subsequently following suit.

Regarding Somalia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean-Pierre Hocké, charged the Somali Government with using international food aid to feed Ethiopian refugees drafted to fight in its civil war against the Somali National Movement, a rebel group based in northern Somalia. Hocké also insisted that UN food supply routes be re-directed, and called for negotiations to phase out aid to Ethiopian refugees in Sudan by 1991 while assisting their return to their homeland.⁴

Sudan

Between 1955 and 1972, the Muslim Arabs of northern Sudan fought a major war against the Christian and animist rebels of the south. Despite a negotiated peace settlement, the southern peoples formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to fight oppression from state security forces and the imposition of Islamic laws (*sharia*). Receiving arms from Ethiopia, the SPLA, led by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, has encouraged the Dinka tribe, of which he is a member, to retaliate against the Sudanese Army. The war-induced starvation, aggravated by the obstruction of international food relief deliveries, is estimated to have killed 250,000 southern Sudanese in 1988 and led to the displacement of 1.6 million people.

On 14 May 1988, Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi announced the formation of a twenty-seven-member coalition Government. On 29 September 1988, President Museveni of Uganda announced that negotiations to end the civil war would take place between the SPLA and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the second largest partner after the Mahdi's Umma Party in the Sudanese coalition Government. Meetings between the SPLA and the DUP took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and on 16 November 1988, a peace agreement was reached calling for an immediate cease-fire, an end to the state of emergency, and an all-party conference to end the war and form a new government. The Mahdi Government accepted the peace accord on 26 March 1989 under pressure from its own army, moderate Arab states concerned with Islamic fundamentalism, and the US Government (which objected to the use of food as a weapon of war). In March 1989, the Sudanese Government stated, amid international skepticism, that it would agree to the

⁴ Jane Perlez, "Ethiopia Starts to Come Unglued After String of Military Setbacks/Ethiopian Regime is Said to Face Deepening Crisis." *New York Times*, 22 March 1989, pp. A1 and A8; and "U.N. Withholds Aid in Somalia Dispute." *New York Times*, 28 January 1989, p. A4.

large-scale distribution of relief food to southern Sudan.⁵ On 30 June 1989 Sudanese Army officers staged a bloodless coup, toppling the Mahdi Government and imposing martial law. The new military leader, General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, declared a month-long cease-fire in the civil war. This followed a unilateral rebel cease-fire called on 1 May 1989. Talks between the Sudanese Government and the SPLA were scheduled to begin in mid-July 1989.

Burundi

Long-standing tensions between the Tutsi, the politically dominant tribe which forms fifteen percent of the population, and the Hutu, erupted in the Ntega region of northeast Burundi on 10 August 1988. An estimated 1000 people from both tribes were killed in clashes on 15 and 16 August. The Burundian Army, composed mainly of the Tutsi tribe, launched reprisals between 17 and 22 August that claimed an estimated 5000 Hutu lives. Approximately 60,000 of 100,000 homeless have taken refuge in makeshift camps in the Butare region in neighbouring Rwanda.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Angola - South Africa - Mozambique

Canada has attempted to assist those countries affected by the conflicts in southern Africa. Canada was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council when Resolution 435 of 1978 (the Namibian independence plan) was adopted. In 1977, Canada joined the five-country "Contact Group" established by the UN to find a solution to the occupation of Namibia. In addition, Canada annually provides an estimated \$140 million in economic aid, chiefly through the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), to front line states (those bordering South Africa) such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. Since 1961, when the Diefenbaker Government declared its opposition to *apartheid*, Canada has repeatedly condemned South Africa for its domestic policies and intervention in the affairs of front line states. Since 1985, Ottawa has also imposed limited economic and diplomatic sanctions on Pretoria. (See previous editions of *The Guide*.)

The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa held its second and third meetings in Toronto (August 1988) and Harare, Zimbabwe (February 1989). The Commonwealth Committee was created by the Heads of Governments Meeting in October 1987 in Vancouver, and comprises the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the Toronto meeting chaired by Canada, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced that \$1 million would be put forward by Canada to implement a strategy to counter South African propaganda and censorship.⁶ In addition, Clark announced a feasibility study to explore the creation of a

⁵ Jane Perlez, "The Sudan's War by Starvation is Exhausting U.S. Diplomacy." *New York Times*, 19 March 1989, p. A2; Jane Perlez, "Sudan Agrees to Food Relief but Skepticism Persists." *New York Times*, 11 March 1989, p. A4; and "Sudan: Pragmatism Rules Peace Bid." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 March 1989, p. A8.

⁶ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No.165 (3 August 1988).

Commonwealth-wide network of non-governmental organizations to educate and train black South Africans.⁷

At the Commonwealth Ministers' Committee meeting in Harare, Clark expressed Canada's concerns as follows:

It is important to focus on South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbours.... Zimbabwe has suffered both directly from South African oppression and just as significantly from South African aggression and interference. So have the other states of the frontline. There is no reason for anyone to assume that South Africa's intentions have changed.... [W]e have to work on the assumption that it will not disappear until the system of apartheid itself is dismantled.⁸

At the same meeting, Clark announced that Canada would provide \$954,200 to the Canadian Council of Churches to assist displaced persons in Mozambique and Mozambican refugees who have fled to neighbouring states as a result of RENAMO guerrilla activities.⁹

Both Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on 29 September 1988¹⁰) and External Affairs Minister Clark have responded to requests from front line states for the protection of SADCC and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) projects from sabotage, by pledging logistical support, food and training to these states. Clark explained that "[t]he success of development projects in the SADCC region, particularly in the transportation and energy sectors, depends on the ability of those countries to protect the project sites. Destabilization and insurgency activities continue to be a threat to major development projects..."¹¹

On 26 September 1988, the Canadian Government announced that it would tighten a 1986 ban on Government procurement of South African goods by applying it to subsidiaries of South African companies. These companies would not be eligible for Canadian Government assistance and would not be able to sell to South African clients. Other measures included a ban on Crown Corporation product and commodity sales to South African-controlled companies and an expansion of the high-technology items sales ban to include the private sector. Toward this end, on 7 March 1989, South Africa was added to

⁷ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 164 (2 August 1988).

⁸ Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "At the Opening of the Third Meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa: Speech...[to the Committee], Harare, Zimbabwe, February 6, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/5, pp. 1-2.

⁹ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 025 (7 February 1989).

¹⁰ Rt. Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, "Address...before the UN General Assembly, New York, United States, September 29, 1988." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 213 (29 September 1988), p. 1.

Canada's "Area Control List", a list of countries for which exports in strategic and high-technology equipment are subject to control by the federal Government.¹²

Despite these measures, the voluntary nature of the bulk of Canada's sanctions against South Africa was reported to have contributed to an increase of sixty-eight percent in South African exports to Canada during the first eleven months of 1988. Total Canadian exports to South Africa were up forty-eight percent in 1988.¹³ Statistics Canada reported imports of \$76.9 million worth of goods from South Africa in the first four months of 1989, up 130.7 percent from \$33.33 million imported in the same period of 1988. Exports totalled \$30.9 million, down from \$38.7 million.¹⁴

In early 1989, it was reported that the Canadian Government had approved a \$600 million loan by the Bank of Nova Scotia to the South African Anglo-American Corporation through its base in Luxembourg.¹⁵ The loan was for a takeover of another South African company, but fell through when the bid collapsed. Further debate focussed on the export of commodities such as sulphur to South Africa and on the Canadian importation of products such as pulp and strategic metals from South Africa.¹⁶ Canadian-made equipment used by the South African military was reported to have been shipped through third parties.¹⁷ The 1988 annual report of the Canadian Government agency which monitors the Government's code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa gave Canadian firms passing grades for fair hiring, wages, and working conditions. Eleven Canadian firms pulled out of South Africa in 1987 and two in 1988, while six firms remained.¹⁸

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- 12 Rt. Honourable Brian Mulroney, *supra* note 10, pp. 2-3; Nancy Wood, "Clark Tightens S. African Sanctions." *The Gazette*, 27 September 1988, p. B5; "More Restrictions Put on South African Trade." *Gazette*, 7 March 1989, p. B1; and Ross Howard, "Tougher S. Africa Trade Ban is Sought/South Africa Ban Tightened." *Globe and Mail*, 7 March 1989, p. A1.
 - 13 Oakland Ross, "Ottawa-Pretoria Trade Jump Alarms African Nations/Clark Planning to Explain Increased Trade Figures." *Globe and Mail*, 6 February 1989, p. A1.
 - 14 Charlotte Montgomery, "S. African Exports to Canada Double." *Globe and Mail*, 13 July 1989, p. A1.
 - 15 Douglas Anglin, "Canada Can Toughen Its Sanctions Policy." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 May 1989, p. A9; and Oakland Ross, "Clark to Caution Canadian Banks on Loans to S. African Companies." *Globe and Mail*, 9 February 1989, p. A1.
 - 16 Andrew Cohen, "Sulphur for South Africa a Hot Issue." *Financial Post*, 13 February 1989, p. 13; and John Kohut, "Canada Seen as Having Few Options to Trade With South Africa." *Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1989, p. B5.
 - 17 Tim Harper, "Ottawa Said at Fault as Arms Embargo Broken." *Toronto Star*, 8 February 1989, p. A19; and Oakland Ross, "Canada Not Only Nation Queried on Arms Sales, Zimbabwe Says." *Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1989, p. A1.
 - 18 John Hay, "In South Africa, There's Now Hope For Change." *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 June 1989, p. A9.

The Canadian Government has maintained a policy of supplying humanitarian aid, but not military or institutional support, to the African National Congress (ANC), the main anti-*apartheid* group in southern Africa. Canadian Government officials did not meet with Peter Mahlangu upon his arrival in Toronto as the new representative of the ANC in Canada. The ANC has no diplomatic status in Canada, although it opened one of its forty-four world-wide missions in Canada eleven years ago.¹⁹

On the occasion of Nelson Mandela's seventieth birthday in July 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark urged the South African Government to grant his unconditional release and that of all political prisoners.²⁰ Clark condemned the August 1988 bombing of Khotso House, headquarters of the South African Council of Churches and other human rights groups and the October 1988 bombing of the headquarters of the South African Catholic Bishop's Conference (SACBC), and pledged assistance to help rebuild the two facilities.²¹ Commenting on the municipal elections held on 26 October 1988, Clark stated that the elections were "undemocratic, because they were organized on a strictly racial basis and severely limited the number of blacks eligible to vote."²² Expressing concern over the sentences received by defendants in the "Delmas Treason Trial", Clark maintained that the South African Government was using the legal system "to harass and suppress legitimate opposition to apartheid."²³ Clark welcomed the clemency granted to the convicted "Sharpeville Six" and urged that clemency be exercised in other, similar cases.²⁴

In July 1988 the Canadian Government announced that individuals travelling on South African passports and seeking entry into Canada to participate in sports events would be denied visas. On 28 June 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark and Minister of Fitness and Amateur Sport Jean Charest announced a strengthened Government policy on sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa. The policy includes encouraging Canadian sports organizations to decline invitations to events in third countries in which South Africans are participating. Further, Canadian sports organizations are requested to suspend athletes within their purview who participate in sports events in South Africa, compliance with which will be taken into account in Government funding decisions.²⁵

¹⁹ Charlotte Montgomery, "Ottawa Unlikely to Change Policy on ANC." *Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1989, p. A13; and Charlotte Montgomery, "PM Assailed as Lewis Welcomes ANC Envoy." *Globe and Mail*, 12 May 1989, p. A10.

²⁰ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 150 (15 July 1988).

²¹ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 188 (1 September 1988); and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 221 (12 October 1988).

²² Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 232 (28 October 1988), p. 1.

²³ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 246 (8 December 1988).

²⁴ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 240 (23 November 1988).

²⁵ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 156 (28 June 1989).

Namibia

On 22 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the agreements signed in New York providing for the UN-supervised Namibian independence plan, including the phasing out of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia. Subsequently, Clark announced that Canadian troops would be part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). An advance group of fifty soldiers departed from Canada in March 1989. Following the outbreak of hostilities on 1 April 1989, the Canadian Government pledged to accelerate the deployment of 200 additional peacekeeping troops, who arrived in mid-April 1989.²⁶ (See Peacekeeping and Observation, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*.) Aside from personnel attached to UNTAG, Canada will be sending a group of parliamentary election observers in September 1989. In addition, Canada has donated 4,000 ballot boxes and the services of an electoral computer expert for UN-monitored elections for Namibia's Constituent Assembly scheduled for 1 November 1989.²⁷

Ethiopia

Following a meeting with UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar in New York on 19 May 1988, Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry stated that "Canada, one of the principal donors to Ethiopia, continues to hope that the Ethiopian Government will agree to allow the actions of all Non-governmental Organizations who have expressed a humanitarian and unselfish desire to participate in relief operations."²⁸ In response to an urgent appeal from the UN Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), a Canadian Forces humanitarian relief mission to Ethiopia began on 1 June 1988 and continued through to September 1988, delivering food supplies for 100,000 people.²⁹

Sudan

It was announced on 17 October 1988 that Canadian Government officials had met with the Sudanese Ambassador to Canada to discuss the civil war in Sudan. According to an External Affairs press release, "The Canadian Government used the occasion to reiterate its serious concerns about the disastrous effects the civil war is having on the Sudanese population and pressed the Sudanese Government to explore all means available to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict." The Canadian Government contributed a total of \$17.5 million in aid to Sudan during 1988, including \$9 million in food aid, \$2 million for

26 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 255 (22 December 1988); "Clark Pledges Forces for UN in Namibia." *Globe and Mail*, 31 January 1989, p. A5; and Paul Koring, "SWAPO Broke Accord, Clark Acknowledges." *Globe and Mail*, 7 April 1989, p. A12.

27 *The Election Process in Namibia: An International Roundtable - A Summary Report Prepared by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security*. Ottawa, Canada, 6-7 July 1989, pp. 7-8 and 10; and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 152 (22 June 1989).

28 Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 110 (20 May 1988).

29 Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 75/88 (7 September 1988).

Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, and approximately \$2 million for Canadian and UN relief activities in the Sudan.³⁰

Burundi

On 31 August 1988, the Burundian Ambassador to Canada met with External Affairs Minister Clark, who expressed concern over the tribal conflict in northeastern Burundi. Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry announced that CIDA would provide food aid of \$100,000 and pledged initial humanitarian aid of \$100,000 to the refugees of the conflict. Further humanitarian aid was proposed as soon as Canadian Government fact-finding missions were concluded.³¹

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 16 September 1988 MP Howard McCurdy (NDP) questioned the Government's promise of 23 October 1985 to sever all economic relations with South Africa if there was no improvement in the situation with respect to *apartheid*. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark replied:

If other measures will not allow Canada to help us bring an end to an apartheid regime, then we are prepared to consider the absolute disruption of economic and diplomatic relations.³²

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney responded to a similar question by McCurdy on 27 September 1988 as follows:

It is widely recognized by the leaders of the Front Line States, the leaders of the Commonwealth, et le Sommet de la Francophonie that Canada has provided very important moral leadership in this vital fight against apartheid....We view it as a most complicated, important moral issue, the most sensitive moral issue affecting nations today.³³

In an exchange on 30 September 1988 between the Leader of the Opposition John Turner and Acting Prime Minister Flora MacDonald, Turner asked:

The situation has deteriorated in South Africa. Why did the Prime Minister not keep his word yesterday by imposing total sanctions and breaking diplomatic relations?

³⁰ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 225 (17 October 1988), pp. 1-2.

³¹ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 191 (2 September 1988).

³² *Commons Debates*, 16 September 1988, p. 19334.

³³ *Commons Debates*, 27 September 1988, p. 19696.

The Acting Prime Minister replied:

...the policy of the Canadian Government is to move in a deliberate and systematic way toward total sanctions....That approach is endorsed by the majority of members of the Commonwealth. It is endorsed by the leaders of the Front Line States in southern Africa. It is endorsed by those who best know the terrible situation which exists in South Africa....³⁴

According to Ms. MacDonald, in August 1988 Mr. Mugabe of Zimbabwe had told Prime Minister Mulroney "privately and publicly that he endorsed the anti-apartheid measures that Canada has taken, and that further steps are not necessary at this time."³⁵

On 31 August 1988, Liberal MP John Nunziata questioned the Government on the operation of South African companies in Canada. He asked:

If the Minister and his Government are committed...[to measures to demonstrate opposition to apartheid in South Africa], will he explain why two South African companies operating in Canada, Boart Canada International and Long Year Canada, have received grants from the federal Government, and that Long Year and another company linked closely to Boart Canada have received \$2 million in government contracts? Does the Minister feel that the Canadian taxpayer should be subsidizing South African companies operating in Canada?

Mr. Clark replied that he was not aware of the arrangements of these companies with the Canadian Government. Responding to a follow-up question by Mr. Nunziata, the then Minister for Regional Industrial Expansion and Minister of State for Science and Technology Robert de Cotret declared:

I can tell the House that the Department has not provided any financial assistance to Boart Canada Incorporated. At the moment there are some applications from Boart or Long Year before the Department, that any corporate citizen can make. They are under review and...I have requested that these particular cases be brought to my immediate attention.³⁶

On 18 July 1988, NDP MP Bill Blaikie spoke on behalf of his caucus, calling on the Government of South Africa to free Nelson Mandela.³⁷ On 17 August 1988, MP Howard McCurdy (NDP) stated:

...Mandela is a symbol of black South Africans' struggle for justice. His refusal to bend to the racist regime or to be robbed of his human dignity is nothing less than a fiery demand by all black South Africans for full and complete equality, socially, politically, and economically.... The South African Govern-

³⁴ *Commons Debates*, 30 September 1988, p. 19813.

³⁵ *Ibid.*.

³⁶ *Commons Debates*, 31 August 1988, p. 19110.

³⁷ *Commons Debates*, 18 July 1988, p. 17662.

ment must release Nelson Mandela, not because he is sick but for the same reason it should free all black South Africans, because it is right. Canada and the world should insist upon it.³⁸

On 29 August 1988 MP Dave Nickerson (PC) asked that Canada press the United Nations to conduct an investigation and to take action to stop the continuing of intertribal violence in Burundi.³⁹ Following questions from MP Barry Turner (PC) on 30 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark stated:

Officials of my Department have met the Ambassador from Burundi. A representative of the Government of Canada was in the country last week, has just returned to Rwanda and is reporting to us. We are meeting today with representatives of the Hutu population in the region. We will work through the Francophonie and other organizations to try to change the practices that have so shocked the world.... [T]he European Community has suggested that it would be helpful to have an independent commission of inquiry. That was rejected initially by the Government of Burundi. We hope that it will reconsider that reaction.⁴⁰

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³⁸ *Commons Debates*, 17 August 1988, p. 18428.

³⁹ *Commons Debates*, 29 August 1988, p. 18953.

⁴⁰ *Commons Debates*, 30 August 1988, p. 19042.

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BACKGROUND

India - Pakistan

On 17 August 1988 President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan was killed in a plane explosion, which a Commission of Official Inquiry later described as an "act of highly-sophisticated sabotage."¹

The resulting political vacuum was filled by the Chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was appointed interim President, and in early 1989 was voted in as President for five years. Elections for the National Assembly, which had been announced by Zia for 16 November 1988, proceeded as scheduled. Both Pakistanis and foreigners agreed that the elections were generally conducted freely and fairly (the first such elections in eleven years).² The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the main opposition party, won the largest number of seats (92 out of 205 contested seats) and Benazir Bhutto, the head of the PPP, was asked on 1 December 1988 by President Ishaq Khan to form the new government.³ Bhutto has thus become the first woman to lead a modern Islamic state.⁴ (Bhutto is the daughter of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who held office from 1971 to 1977 until he was deposed in a coup led by General Zia, at the time the Army Chief of Staff.)

The above-mentioned events, including Pakistan's thrust toward democratization, have contributed to a recent thaw in relations between India and Pakistan. Past tension has resulted from border disputes, complex ethnic and religious problems and, in more recent times, a regional arms race. On 29 December 1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India visited Pakistan, it was the first time in nearly thirty years that the head of an Indian Government had done so. During their meetings the two leaders finalized agreements on trade and cultural ties, as well as signing a separate agreement in which they pledged not to attack each other's nuclear power installations. The agreement has yet to be ratified by the Parliaments of the two countries.⁵

¹ "Un acte de sabotage a fait exploser l'avion de Zia." *Le Devoir*, 17 October 1988, p. 1.

² Barbara Crossette, "Bhutto Says Vote Gave Her Mandate." *New York Times*, 18 November 1988, p. 1; and "Bhutto crie victoire." *La Presse*, 17 November 1988, p. A1.

³ Crossette, *supra* note 2.

⁴ "Benazir Bhutto est prête à prendre la tête du Pakistan." *La Presse*, 18 November 1988, p. A8; and Barbara Crossette, "Daughter of Determination: Benazir Bhutto." *New York Times*, 2 December 1988, p. 1.

⁵ Barbara Crossette, "What Gandhi and Bhutto Didn't Discuss: Kashmir." *New York Times*, 3 January 1989, p. A10; and Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India." *New York Times*, 9 July 1989, p. 5.

The issue of Kashmir, which continues to harm relations between the two countries, apparently was not discussed during these meetings.⁶ Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars, of which two, in 1947-1948 and in 1965, were over Kashmir. When India and Pakistan were divided in 1947, Pakistan believed that Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population, should have fallen under its control. India did not agree and an armed conflict ensued, resulting in the division of the region between the two countries.

The United Nations has called for a plebiscite on the issue among the Kashmiris both in Pakistan and India. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in which Canada participates, was established in 1949 to supervise the "line of control." Canadian observers provide Hercules aircraft for moving the UN area headquarters biennially between Srinagar (India) and Rawalpindi (Pakistan).

At the end of June 1989 it was reported that India and Pakistan had agreed to discuss the possibility of withdrawing their troops from the Siachen (Himalayan) glacier, to create a demilitarized zone. The Siachen glacier, located in Kashmir and bordering China, has never been officially demarcated. Tensions over the glacier have intensified since 1984 when India seized the area.⁷

In early March 1989, India announced a reduction in its defence budget. According to an Indian senior official, this decision was partly a by-product of recently improved relations with both China and Pakistan. However, he also stressed that if the US agreed to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, then the decision to reduce the budget might be rescinded.⁸

On 22 May 1989, India successfully launched its first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Agni. The missile is credited with a range of 2500 km and a payload of one ton. Prime Minister Gandhi insisted that the Agni was not a nuclear weapons system,⁹ although some Western defence experts maintained that the missile could be equipped with a thermonuclear bomb.¹⁰ (In 1974, India detonated a "peaceful" nuclear explosion.)

Reports continue of a Pakistani programme to develop nuclear weapons, despite repeated official assurances that it is engaged in a strictly peaceful nuclear program.

6 Crossette, *supra* note 4.

7 Sanjoy Hazarika, "India and Pakistan Plan Pullout of Troops From Disputed Glacier." *New York Times*, 28 June 1989, p. 2.

8 Sanjoy Hazarika, "India Reduces its Military Budget as Links With Neighbors Improve." *New York Times*, 2 March 1989, p. A8.

9 Bryan Johnson, "India Flexing New Military Muscle With Missile-Based Defence Plan." *Globe and Mail*, 27 May 1989, p. A1; and Pushpinder Singh, "India's Agni Success Poses New Problems." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 11 no. 22 (3 June 1989), pp. 1052-53.

10 "Launch Puts India in Missile Club." *Toronto Star*, 23 May 1989, p. A17.

In an address to the US Congress in June 1989, Prime Minister Bhutto repeatedly denied that Pakistan has nuclear weapons and stated that her country "remain[s] ready to accept any safeguards, inspection and verification that are applied on a non-discriminatory regional basis."¹¹ Pakistan and India are not signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Pakistan has stated that it would sign the Treaty if India agreed to do so.

In early 1989, Pakistan announced the successful testing of two long-range surface-to-surface missiles with a payload of half a ton, the HATF-1 (approximately 70-km range) and the HATF-2 (approximately 300-km range). Furthermore, on 29 June 1989, Pakistan's Secretary of State for Defence announced that Pakistan would attempt to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile similar to India's Agni.

In early June 1989, during an official visit to Britain, Bhutto said that Pakistan had formally invited India to engage in bilateral arms control talks as well as discussions that might lead to a regional agreement on nuclear non-proliferation.¹² In July 1989, US President Bush reportedly urged India to begin talks with Pakistan about each other's nuclear research programs in order to reduce tensions between the two countries.¹³

India - China

On a visit to India in November 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev stressed that the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union, China and India would not only be beneficial to all parties involved, but also "crucial for Asia and the world." However, Gandhi reportedly told Gorbachev that although China had expressed the need for improvements in relations with India, it had not yet given any indication of change in what Gandhi described as its "rigid" stand on settlement of their border dispute.¹⁴

The following month Gandhi visited Beijing, marking what has been described as the "beginning of a new era" in relations between India and China.¹⁵ The two countries signed accords on science and technology, civil aviation (the establishment of direct air flights between New Delhi and Beijing), and culture (exchanges of students, artists and films).

Gandhi and his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng, also signed an agreement establishing a high-level working group to negotiate a possible solution to the Himalayan border

¹¹ "Pakistan has No Nuclear Arms, Bhutto Tells U.S. Congress." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June 1989, p. A20; and "Bhutto obtient le soutien du président américain." *Le Devoir*, 7 June 1989, p. 4.

¹² "Bhutto has Invited India to Talk About Arms Control." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June 1989, p. A2.

¹³ Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India." *New York Times*, 9 July 1989, p. 5.

¹⁴ Salamat Ali, "A Shot in the Arm: Gorbachev Reassures Gandhi over China Rap-prochement." *The Economist*, vol. 142 no. 48 (1 December 1988), p. 38.

¹⁵ "Gandhi se rend à Pékin." *Le Devoir*, 19 December 1988, p. 5.

dispute which has soured relations between the two countries since the eruption of a brief border war in 1962. India claims that China is illegally occupying an area of approximately 38,000 sq km on the western Himalayan border; China is calling for the return of approximately 90,000 sq km of mountainous frontier making up India's northeast Province of Arunachal Pradesh.¹⁶ Eight rounds of talks on the territorial dispute have been held between experts from the two countries since 1981, but without success.

Li Peng also reportedly discussed the issue of Tibet with Gandhi, underlining the hope that India would retain its traditional position of "non-interference" as well as "non-involvement" with the alleged "separatist" activities of some members of the Tibetan community in India. The Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, and approximately 100,000 Tibetan refugees live in India.¹⁷

Afghanistan

In accordance with the agreement signed in Geneva in April 1988 by Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union and the US as guarantors, roughly half of the more than 100,000 Soviet military personnel had been withdrawn from Afghanistan by September 1988. On 4 November 1988 Soviet President Gorbachev, charging that increased attacks against the Afghan Government were directly a result of arms provided to Afghan guerrillas by the US through Pakistan, temporarily suspended the military withdrawal. Addressing the United Nations on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev proposed an agreement to cut off weapons shipments to the guerrillas and to the Afghan Government headed by President Najibullah. The proposal was renewed in a message to US President Bush on 17 February 1989, but was rejected by Washington.

On 25 December 1988, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, and Ambassador to Afghanistan Yuli M. Vorontsov met with the exiled King of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, for talks on forming a broad-based Afghan Government.

In Taif, Saudi Arabia on 3 to 5 December 1988, the Soviet Union and the Afghan-guerrilla alliance based in Pakistan held their first meeting since Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in 1979. The Kabul Government was excluded from the talks at the request of the guerrilla coalition. Following sessions in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in January 1989, the guerrillas broke off the negotiations as a result of the Soviets' insistence that President Najibullah be included in any future Afghan coalition government. On 3 January 1989, the guerrilla alliance announced the formation of a temporary representative council that would have the authority to name an interim government in Afghanistan.

Following visits to Kabul and Islamabad by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in January and early February 1989, the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. Afghan guerrilla leaders called for a *shura* or consultative council of about 400 delegates to form the basis of a new government in exile. The council, which met from 10 to 24 February 1989, elected Sibgatullah Mojadedi as acting President and

¹⁶ "Gandhi prône l'amitié sino-indienne." *La Presse*, 20 December 1988, p. B10; and "China and India Agree to More Border Talks." *New York Times*, 23 December 1988, p. A3.

¹⁷ *La Presse*, *supra* note 2; and "Rajiv Gandhi quitte Pékin avec quelques accords, dans une nouvelle 'ambiance'." *La Presse*, 23 December 1988, p. B5.

Adurab Resul Sayyaf as acting Prime Minister of the government-in-exile. Feuding between various groups dominated the council, particularly on the issue of representation of Afghanistan's largest minority, Shiite Muslims. At the start of March 1989, the guerrilla Provisional Government held its first cabinet meeting inside Afghanistan.

On 5 March 1989 intense fighting began in a prolonged guerrilla attack on the border city of Jalalabad, 160 km east of Kabul near the Afghan border with Pakistan. Fighting has continued through to July 1989, the summer months traditionally incurring the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan, before the winter hampers guerrilla movements. On 20 May 1989, President Najibullah appointed a three-member commission to negotiate, without condition, an end to the war.

Ending a five-day visit to the US on 10 June 1989, Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto joined with US President Bush in stating that they were both committed to a political solution to the Afghan war, while continuing to provide weapons, transport and food to Afghan rebel groups. It has been widely reported that the Soviet Union has continued to supply weapons to the Kabul Government after its military withdrawal from the country in February 1989. US-Soviet talks on Afghanistan were scheduled for 31 July to 1 August 1989.

Sri Lanka

The first anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to establish peace in Sri Lanka, on 29 July 1988, was marked by protests, acts of violence, and a general strike. The Agreement by the then President, J. Jayawardene, of Sri Lanka and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was intended to "legitimize" India's military presence on the island in the form of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Indian troops were deployed to help the Government in Colombo put an end to Tamil militant violence against the majority Sinhalese, specifically by disarming all militant Tamil groups including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who had become the "undisputed masters" of the Tamil resistance (separatist) movement.¹⁸ However, ethnic strife and the guerrilla war, which had erupted in 1983, continued. There are currently an estimated 45,000 to 60,000 Indian troops in the northern and eastern regions of the country.

Approximately 9000 to 10,000 Sri Lankans have died as a result of the civil war, and terrorist activities by the resurrected *Janata Vimukti Peramuna* (JVP or People's Liberation Front), a militant Sinhalese group operating in the south. The IPKF has suffered more than 900 casualties.¹⁹

On 8 and 9 September 1988, President Jayawardene issued a proclamation allowing for a temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, essentially creating a semi-autonomous Tamil-dominated province as stipulated by the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. Elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council (also provided for under the Agreement) were held on 19 November 1988. The majority in the seventy-one-

¹⁸ John Laffin, *The World in Conflict 1989 - War Annual 3*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989, p. 205.

¹⁹ "Les Sri Lankais vont voter dans la peur et le sang." *Le Devoir*, 19 December 1988, p. 5; and "India Seeking Way Out of Sri Lankan Conflict." *Gazette*, 8 May 1989, p. A10.

member Assembly was won by the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), which has since been under the protection of the Indian Force. The LTTE boycotted the elections. The merger will be subject to a July referendum in the former Eastern Province.²⁰

Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa of the ruling United National Party (UNP) won the Presidential elections which were held on 19 December 1988. On 12 January 1989, the new President lifted the state of emergency which had been imposed by President Jayawardene in May 1983. In addition, Premadasa quickly acted to fulfill an electoral promise calling for a "negotiated withdrawal" of the IPKF by requesting a partial removal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka. The Indian Government subsequently withdrew approximately 3000 soldiers. (A similar withdrawal of an estimated 2500 troops had occurred on 7 June 1988.)

The first direct negotiations between the LTTE and the Colombo Government since 1983, were held in May and June 1989. On 28 June, it was announced that the two sides had agreed to an immediate cease-fire, and had decided to pursue discussions on a variety of important issues, including demands for a Tamil independent state.²¹

President Premadasa officially requested, in early June 1989, that India begin a total withdrawal of its personnel from Sri Lanka, to be completed by 29 July 1989, the second anniversary of the signing of the July 1987 "Peace Accord". This request was repeated on 27 June. Gandhi replied in a letter to Premadasa in mid-July that a withdrawal would be possible only when the terms of the July 1987 Agreement had been fully implemented, especially those regarding an end to the Tamil insurgency.

Renewed violence was reported in both north and south at the end of June 1989. The militant Sinhalese (JVP) demand the complete withdrawal of Indian troops and an end to Tamil autonomy before they will lay down their arms. Tamil groups have also begun an offensive against the Tigers (LTTE), fearing that any peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Government will exclude them from the "political picture." On the other hand, the Tigers demand total removal of the Indian Force and dissolution of the Provincial Council in the Northeastern province, which is administered by members of Tamil groups protected by Indian troops.²² Growing opposition has been reported among the Sri Lankan population to the presence of Indian troops on their soil, which are being perceived as an "army of occupation."

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 17 August 1988, following the death of President Zia, the Minister for International Trade and Acting External Affairs Minister John Crosbie extended condolences on the

²⁰ Barbara Crossette, "If the War has Ended, Why are so Many Dying?" *New York Times*, 9 March 1989, p. 4.

²¹ "Sri Lanka and Tamil Rebels Agree to a Cease-fire." *The New York Times*, 29 June 1989, p. A5.

²² Gabriella Gamini, "Insurgency Pushing Sri Lanka Near Chaos." *Toronto Star*, 9 July 1989, p. H3.

part of the Government of Canada to the people of Pakistan. Crosbie described Zia as being

...deeply committed to the social and economic development of the people of Pakistan and to bringing peace to that troubled area of the world. He will be long remembered for the leadership he provided in assisting the people of Afghanistan in their efforts to restore independence.... The Government and people of Canada hope that this tragedy will not affect the further restoration of democracy to Pakistan.²³

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced, on 21 February 1989, that Canada had agreed to participate in a comprehensive humanitarian relief and economic assistance programme for Afghanistan, under the auspices of the United Nations. To train Afghan refugees in mine-clearing techniques, Canada would provide a team of twelve military personnel for a period of four months, starting 23 March 1989.

There are reportedly millions of unexploded mines in war-torn Afghanistan. Other countries providing teaching teams included France, Italy, Norway, Turkey, and the United States.

Mr. Clark described the mine awareness and clearance training programme (known as Operation *Decimal*), as "a most important one in the overall relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan." "Canada's participation," he said, was "a concrete and highly visible demonstration of our commitment to the United Nations' humanitarian assistance efforts."²⁴

Canada also pledged \$22 million over the next two years to the Afghanistan Repatriation and Rehabilitation Programme. This pledge was in addition to the \$19 million which Canada had been providing annually to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.²⁵

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The only Parliamentary comment on Southern Asia during this period consisted of condolences on the death of Pakistan's President Zia,²⁶ and approval of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.²⁷

²³ Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 88/37 (17 August 1988). See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 182 (19 August 1988).

²⁴ Government of Canada, *News Release* AFN: 13/89 (21 February 1989, p. 1; and Captain Marsha Dorge, "Helping the Afghans Home." *Sentinel*, vol. 25 no. 3 (March 1989), pp. 2-4.

²⁵ Government of Canada, *supra* note 24, p.2.

²⁶ *Commons Debates*, 17 August 1988, pp. 18439-40.

²⁷ *Commons Debates*, 13 April 1989, p. 482.

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*BACKGROUND**Sino-Soviet Relations*

In the early 1980s, Soviet overtures to China ran up against China's declaration of three major obstacles to better relations with the Soviet Union, namely, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet troops along the Chinese border, and Moscow's support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Gradually, steps were taken which improved the climate for the establishment of better relations, including the announced Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and agreement to resolve border disputes and help end the Cambodian conflict.

From 1 to 3 December 1988, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was in Moscow for preparatory talks before a Summit meeting between Chinese and Soviet leaders. During the visit, the Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers announced agreement on a diplomatic-military group of experts to discuss methods of force reduction along their common border. Against the background of student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities, Soviet President Gorbachev attended a Summit meeting with Chinese leaders on 15 to 18 May 1989, the first such meeting held between the two countries in thirty years. As reported in the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit, agreement was reached on various fronts. The two countries stated that their relationship would develop on the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. Both sides agreed to take steps to reduce armed forces on the Soviet-Chinese border to a minimum, with the Chinese welcoming the December 1988 Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of seventy-five percent of its troops stationed in Mongolia. The Chinese expressed the hope that the remaining Soviet troops would soon be fully withdrawn from Mongolia.

Concerning unresolved border issues, the countries agreed to upgrade the negotiations under way, from the deputy foreign minister level to the foreign minister level. In Shanghai at the end of his visit, on 18 May 1989, Gorbachev proposed talks to demilitarize the 6400-km border. The Summit communiqué also declared that neither country laid claim to hegemony in any form in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other parts of the world. Both also agreed to the active development of economic, trade, scientific, technological and cultural ties between their countries. Discussions were also held on the Cambodian problem (see the "Indochina Conflict" below).

The Indochina Conflict

The ten-year Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia continues to be a focal point of tension in East Asia. The major parties to this conflict remain the Soviet-funded, Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under the titular leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The United Nations recognizes the Coalition as Cambodia's legal Government, although the PRK controls the greater proportion of the country's territory, including the capital of Phnom Penh. Most of the aid to the CGDK is channelled through Thailand from China.

The arduous path to a comprehensive peace settlement for Cambodia included a number of regional talks. In July 1988, an Indonesian and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led initiative pulled all interested parties (Kampuchean factions, the PRK and Vietnam) together for informal talks in Jakarta. These made little progress, however. In October 1988, further sessions of all parties were marked by deadlock, and a November 1988 Paris meeting of the Kampuchean factions also resulted in little progress. On 19 to 21 February 1989, with all parties present in Jakarta once again, the regional peace process stalled on the questions of verification of the proposed pullout of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the composition of an interim government prior to elections.

As a result of Soviet prodding and internal economic pressures, Vietnam declared in 1988 that its forces would be withdrawn from Cambodia no later than the end of 1990, regardless of the outcome of the peace talks. Other developments outside the formal regional peace process included the reaching of a broad agreement between China and Vietnam in January 1989 on an internationally supervised withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia by September 1989. This resulted from the first direct talks between the Vietnamese and the Chinese in more than nine years. In April 1989, Vietnam formally announced, amid international skepticism, that it would unconditionally withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia by September 1989.

On 1 May 1989, the Hun Sen Government announced changes to Kampuchea's Constitution, including the declaration of Buddhism as the state religion and the restoration of the country's official name to Cambodia for the first time since the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot took power in 1975. These changes were in line with demands of the Sihanouk-led coalition.

The Sino-Soviet Summit held in Beijing in mid-May 1989 included discussions on the Cambodian problem, building upon previous statements issued by the two sides in February 1989. As recorded in the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit, the Soviet Union and China expressed a desire to prevent a civil war after the scheduled withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Both sides agreed that, as Vietnamese troops are withdrawn, all states concerned should gradually cut, and eventually halt, military aid to the Cambodian parties. They also agreed to support the holding of an international conference on the Cambodian problem. Regarding Cambodian internal politics, the Soviets maintained that the various problems, including the holding of general elections under international control and agreements between the parties, should be solved by the Cambodians themselves. The Chinese declared support for an interim four-party coalition government led by Prince Sihanouk during the transition period between the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of an election. Finally, both sides agreed to respect the results of such an election.

For a brief period in May 1989, it was reported that a power-sharing agreement between Hun Sen and Sihanouk was within reach. Stumbling blocks toward such an agreement were reported to include fears, both internationally and in Indochina, of a Khmer Rouge takeover of the Sihanouk coalition, and an announcement on 30 May 1989 by US officials that the Bush Administration would launch a new covert military aid programme for the non-communist resistance in Cambodia. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee blocked the latter proposal, however.

On 3 July 1989, the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Brunei declared that a UN-monitored Vietnamese troop withdrawal, and subsequent elections, would have to be part of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. A meeting between Hun Sen and Sihanouk, scheduled for 24 July 1989 in Paris, was expected to pave the way to a peace settlement. In an open letter on 11 July 1989, Prince Sihanouk called for US aid to strengthen his bargaining position against both Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge. Representatives from Sihanouk's forces, Hun Sen's Government, the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam were scheduled to meet in Paris on 30 July 1989 for a conference aimed at producing a power-sharing agreement.

Clashes occurred repeatedly between Vietnamese and Chinese forces along their 400-mile border from 1988 through early 1989. Military actions also continued between the forces of Thailand and Laos, in their border dispute, which began in 1975.

Japan - Soviet Union

In spite of Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be strained. Widely cited as the greatest obstacle to an improvement in relations is the territorial dispute over the four islands northeast of Hokkaido seized by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War and over which Japan claims sovereignty.

In December 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo (for the first time in almost three years) for a round of talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno. Some of the issues discussed included economic cooperation between the two countries, regional security, the environment and the disputed territories. The only concrete result of the talks was an agreement in principle to establish a working group to continue talks on the territorial issue at the deputy foreign minister level.

East Timor

East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, declared its independence in 1975 but was subsequently invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces. Guerrilla forces, led by the FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) have continued to resist the Indonesian occupation. The source of military aid (albeit, small) to the FRETILIN is unclear, but the supplies are believed to have reached the resistance movement via Malaysia. An estimated 200,000 out of a population of 688,000 have died over a period of ten years.

While this issue is the subject of debate in Portugal, the Indonesian media have been restricted by its Government from reporting on military activities in East Timor. There seems to be little chance of direct negotiation between the fighting parties. Several organizations, including the Canada-Asia Working Group, petitioned the UN Decolonization Committee in August 1988 to keep the issue of East Timor on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. In the fall of 1988, on the recommendation of the General Committee, the Forty-third Session of the General Assembly decided to include an item entitled "Question of Timor" in the provisional agenda of its Forty-fourth Session.

North and South Korea

Despite a series of contacts and proposals, North and South Korea continued to disagree on terms that would result in their first high-level political and military bilateral talks. In July 1988, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea called for the normalization of relations between the North and South. He proposed certain measures, including a formula for economic trade and cultural exchanges, as steps toward this normalization.

Addressing the UN General Assembly for the first time, on 18 October 1988, Roh Tae Woo proposed a peace conference between North and South Korea, with the added participation of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. He also discussed reunification, as well as commercial and cultural exchanges. In November, a communiqué released by the North Korean Central News Agency outlined a plan for reunification suggesting a loose confederation of the North and South, upholding their respective political systems.

On 17 January 1989, North and South Korea tentatively agreed to meet in February for a round of highest-level official political and military talks. On 8 February, North Korea announced that it would not attend these preliminary talks, citing annual South Korean and American joint military manoeuvres ("Team Spirit") as a major obstacle to any further inter-governmental dialogue. Nevertheless, North Korean and US officials have reportedly met in Beijing three times since autumn 1988.

In late June 1989, a bill was introduced in the US Senate to withdraw 10,000 of the over 40,000 US troops in South Korea over three years. The US House of Representatives heard calls for South Korea to consider taking over more responsibility for its own security, given US fiscal pressures and the prospering South Korean economy. The Bush Administration opposes a unilateral cutback in US forces, insisting that reductions could occur only after agreement with South Korea and other US allies in Asia. On 28 June 1989, President Roh Tae Woo rejected all demands for US troop cuts in Korea, citing the continued intransigence of North Korea and the "recent turmoil in China." Roh also called on the US to disregard rising anti-US sentiment in South Korea.

Sporadic meetings between North and South Korean legislators have taken place, beginning in August 1988. In late April 1989, the Chairman of the Democratic Justice Party, South Korea's ruling party, was chief delegate to the "South-North parliamentary talks." The talks ended with little result, however.

Despite the inconclusive political and military talks between North and South Korea, some success has been reached in the economic sphere. On 1 February 1989, Chung Ju Young, founder of the Hyundai conglomerate, and Choe Su Gil, president of the Taesong Bank of North Korea, signed an agreement in principle on a joint business project (the development of a tourist site on the eastern coast of North Korea). It was the first time in forty-three years that an agreement of this kind had been signed between North and South Korea. Also, in June 1989, South Korean delegates attended the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students in North Korea.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Ottawa suspended its aid to Vietnam, in 1979, following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and, in 1982, recognized the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Canada supports peace efforts such as those made by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and once again co-sponsored, in late 1988, a UN Resolution on the situation in Cambodia. The original Resolution of 1978 called for an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, and a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means. Canada has continued to support this resolution, which has undergone minor revisions, through 1988-1989. It has also continued to support the Coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk, of which the Khmer Rouge is a member. Philippe Kirsch, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada at the United Nations, told the General Assembly on 3 November 1988:

...For Canada, there has been no greater cause of concern within the South East Asian region than Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia.... There are hopeful signs of Vietnam's movement on Cambodia, as evidenced in their announcement of the withdrawal of their troops from Cambodia by 1990.... We welcome the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) which was held this July [1988] and attended by the main Cambodian parties as well as the Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Laos.... The dialogue between Prince Norodom [sic] Sihanouk and Mr. Hun Sen over the past year is another manifestation of the search for a lasting and just solution to the Cambodian question and I wish to take this opportunity to express Canada's strong support for the efforts made by Prince Sihanouk.... Other interested parties outside the region also have indicated a willingness to assist and encourage the negotiating process.... We join them in seeking the comprehensive political solution.... The main elements of such a solution are clear. First and foremost is the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces, which must be carried out in the context of that overall political solution. This must be accompanied by the cessation of all foreign interference.... We also strongly support the establishment of a Cambodian government of national reconciliation, drawn from the various Cambodian political groups. Finally, the international community must do everything possible to assure external support and to encourage and reinforce peace and stability in the region.... I cannot, however, leave the subject of Cambodia's future without expressing Canada's strong support for the call made in the draft resolution..., not to return to "the universally condemned policies and practices of a recent past".... We abhor the crimes and atrocities committed under the Pol Pot Regime [Khmer Rouge].... It is thus our collective responsibility to ensure that there is no return to these extreme violations of human rights witnessed in Cambodia.... [I]t is that same sense of responsibility which has led Canada to provide ongoing aid to Khmer refugees in Thailand. Our ASEAN friends continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing exodus.... To show our support, Canada has given tens of millions of dollars to assist refugees in these countries of first asylum, as well as further humanitarian

support for elements of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. More than 117,000 refugees from this region have found a home in Canada since 1975. More are expected this year, and again in 1989.¹

In April 1989, Vietnam and Cambodia invited Canada, India and Poland to form a monitoring commission to verify the scheduled withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. The three invited countries had previously served in a peacekeeping role in Cambodia (1954-1969), Laos (1954-1974) and Vietnam (1954-1973). The Canadian Government has established certain pre-conditions before agreeing to take part in such a mission, including agreement from all Cambodian political groups to its presence (for a further discussion of Canada's position see *Peacekeeping and Observation*, Chapter 20 of *The Guide*).

Regarding the Korean question, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark welcomed the July 1988 proposal of South Korean President Roh Tae Woo to improve exchanges between the North and the South. Mr. Clark declared: "We strongly support the restoration of the dialogue between North and South Korea which is critical to easing the tension on the Korean peninsula."²

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

NDP MP Jim Manly addressed the issue of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in a statement made in the House of Commons on 11 August 1988. He said:

...the Special Committee on Decolonization [UN] will consider the illegal occupation of East Timor since 1975 by Indonesia. Since that time Indonesia has waged a genocidal war against the people of East Timor.... This is the human rights situation that Canada chooses to ignore. Because of extensive trade links with Indonesia, Canada turns a blind eye to its human rights abuses.... In spite of Canada's pretence that our development assistance is linked to human rights, Indonesia remains one of our largest aid recipients.³

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BACKGROUND

The fortieth anniversary of the adoption, by the United Nations General Assembly, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was celebrated on 10 December 1988. Professor John Humphrey, a member of two drafting committees which prepared the original Declaration and the first Canadian to be awarded a United Nations human rights prize¹, was invited to join the Canadian delegation at the United Nations in New York for the celebration. In his speech to the UN, Humphrey noted:

[The Universal Declaration of Human Rights] quickly became a standard by reference to which the conduct of governments in their relations with individual men and women is judged. Its influence is reflected in the law and jurisprudence of many countries. And it has inspired a whole new body of international law, including the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights.... Human rights are directed to the protection of the dignity and worth of the human purpose. But human rights law also has another purpose. History tells us that there is a close relationship between respect for human rights and the peace of nations.²

The principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been legally codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1976. These include the rights to life, liberty and security of persons, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest, equality before the law, and freedom of thought and expression. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), also of 1976, includes the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to education. The "Optional Protocol" to the ICESCR allows individuals to press complaints against their own government through the UN Human Rights Committee. Other conventions on specific rights include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (entered into force in 1951), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1954) and its 1967 Protocol, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987). Canada is a party to all of the above Conventions, with the exception of the Convention on Apartheid.³

¹ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 244 (8 December 1988).

² Professor John Humphrey, "Intervention of Canada...Item 38: Fortieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York, 8 December 1988." New York: Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, *Press Release* No. 65, pp. 1 and 2.

³ Compiled from Gerald Schmitz and Victoria Berry, *Human Rights: Canadian Policy Toward Developing Countries*. Ottawa: North-South Institute, *Briefing Paper* No. B-21e (December 1988), pp. 2-3.

The International Bill of Rights (the collective title for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and its "Optional Protocol"), has spurred on the development of other international and regional agreements on human rights. An example of this is the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which entered into force in 1975, and to which Canada is a signatory. Adherence to UN covenants and conventions is monitored by the UN and UN-related agencies--particularly by the General Assembly (Third Committee), the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the International Labour Office. Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act is monitored by the CSCE.

On the bilateral plane, in response to human rights abuses, Canada suspended its aid to the Amin Government of Uganda in 1977; to Chile, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Afghanistan in the 1970s; and to El Salvador and Guatemala in 1981.⁴ (The decision to reinstate aid to El Salvador was made in December 1984 and to Guatemala in November 1987.)

In 1982-1983, in response to the Final Report of a House of Commons Sub-Committee on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean⁵, the Canadian Government announced that it "was prepared to terminate or suspend aid where 'gross violations of human rights or conditions of conflict make the provision of an aid program impossible,' and to prohibit arms sales 'to any government whose human rights practices are wholly repugnant to Canadian values'".⁶ The 1987 Government response to the Final Report of the House Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, known as the Winegard Report⁷, stated:

The degree to which human rights are respected is a factor in determining eligibility for Canadian development assistance.... In situations where there is concern about...human rights, the content and channels through which development assistance is directed are chosen to alleviate the condition of those oppressed.... Where violations of human rights are systematic, gross and continuous, government-to-government aid is denied or reduced...Canada will continue to use a combination of public pressure and private persuasion to register our concerns and to make clear the importance of these issues in Canadian foreign and development policy.⁸

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12. See also: Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean* (Issue No. 78). Ottawa, 1982.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ William C. Winegard, Chairman, *For Whose Benefit? (Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs)*. Ottawa, May 1987.

⁸ Canadian International Development Agency, *Canadian International Development Assistance: To Benefit A Better World: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade--or Whose Benefit?: Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs*.

Upon tabling its new aid strategy in 1987, the Government stated that "Cabinet will be provided annually with information on the relevant human rights situations as part of their determination of channels through which Canadian assistance will be provided and what level of bilateral assistance will be allocated." Canadian aid, it announced, would be channelled through non-governmental and multilateral organizations to ensure that "aid goes directly to the poor in areas where it is most needed."⁹

Canada has adopted legislation to protect human rights within its own boundaries, namely the Canadian Bill of Rights, enacted in 1960, the Constitution Act on Human Rights (1977), and the Constitution Act comprising the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). Since human rights come under provincial jurisdiction, the Federal Government has worked with the provinces (which have also passed their own legislation) to formulate Canadian policies in this field.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 19 January 1989, after twenty-seven months of talks in Vienna, the thirty-five-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) issued a broad-ranging agreement on the protection of human rights. The Vienna Conference was the Third Follow-up Meeting (FUM) on the review of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and involved all European countries (including the Soviet Union but with the exception of Albania), as well as Canada and the United States.

The Vienna Concluding Document commits participating governments to "respect the right of citizens to participate actively in the promotion and protection of human rights;...ensure freedom of religion and prevent discrimination against religious communities and individuals;...[and] respect freedom of movement within and between countries including the right to leave any country and return to one's own country."¹⁰ Other provisions ensure against arbitrary arrest, detention and abusive psychiatric practices and allow individuals, institutions and organizations "to obtain, possess, reproduce and distribute information material of all kinds."¹¹ Canada contributed to the

Ottawa, September 1987, pp. 50-52. See also: Schmitz and Berry, *supra* note 3, p. 13.

⁹ Canadian International Development Agency, *Sharing Our Future*. Ottawa, 1987, p. 93; and Schmitz and Berry, *Supra*⁹² note 3, p. 13.

¹⁰ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 008 (16 January 1989), p. 1 (of Annex).

¹¹ "Excerpts from East-West Agreement on the Protection of Human Rights." *New York Times*, 17 January 1989, p. 1. See also: Robert Pear, "35 Nations Issue East-West Pact to Protect Broad Human Rights." *New York Times*, 17 January 1989, p. 1.

drafting of various individual clauses, especially those pertaining to the freedom of religious practice, the freedom of movement, and, in co-sponsorship with Hungary, the protection and promotion of the human rights of minorities.¹²

During the conference, Canada and others expressed concern over progress in human rights by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. Concern was particularly evident over Romanian statements that qualified the binding aspect of the agreement on the Romanian Government, and with the suppression of demonstrations in Prague by Czech authorities.¹³ In response to the Romanian statements, Canadian Ambassador William Bauer stressed that, according to CSCE rules, official CSCE documents are adopted by consensus and are therefore fully binding on all CSCE States.¹⁴ At the CSCE concluding session, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

Not all participating States have made the same progress. Even in those participating States where reforms are being implemented, there remain pockets of resistance and all-too-frequent lapses into old ways. In some participating countries, minorities and religious believers continue to be harassed and persecuted, and attempts are made to deny them their rights, indeed their very existence, and to eradicate their cultural and religious identities.¹⁵

From 18 April through 12 May 1989, a CSCE Information Forum was convened in London to review the "information provisions" of the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Concluding Document. Unique to the Helsinki process was the active participation of journalists at the Forum, including six on the Canadian delegation. Among the approximately seventy proposals tabled at the meeting, one was co-sponsored by Canada, an omnibus text containing measures to eliminate travel restrictions and improve the working conditions of journalists, improve citizens' access to information of all kinds, and facilitate exchanges, seminars, and joint ventures among participating states. The proposal also addressed the impact of high technology on the dissemination of information, and emphasized the importance of a free flow of information to members of national minorities or regional cultures. The proposal is expected to be improved and re-introduced at the next main CSCE review meeting in Helsinki in 1992.¹⁶ In his opening address,

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- 12 Richard Gwyn, "Soviet's Plight Almost Sank Rights Accord." *Toronto Star*, 18 January 1989, p. A27.
- 13 "Droits de l'Homme: Clark critique Prague et Bucarest." *La Presse*, 20 Janvier 1989, p. C12.
- 14 A. Bloed, "Successful Ending of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, vol. 7 no. 1 (January 1989), p. 114.
- 15 Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "On Conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Follow-up Meeting: A Speech...[to the CSCE], Vienna, January 19, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/3, p. 7.
- 16 "CSCE Information Forum: Closing Statement by Ambassador William Bauer, Head of the Canadian Delegation," 11 May 1989, pp. 3-4.

Canadian Ambassador Bauer declared:

...Canada is committed to increasing, through all the avenues offered by modern means of Communication, freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.... [W]e welcome and support the decisions by Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union to comply, to a much greater degree than in the past, with their CSCE commitments in this sphere. It is regrettable, however, that some signatory states remain locked in a dark age of information where the only 'correct' facts are those put out by the ruling party....¹⁷

An information sheet, distributed by External Affairs, later identified the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and especially Romania, as having displayed a negative attitude at the meeting, while the Soviet Union's performance was described as "uneven".¹⁸

Canada also played an active role at the inaugural meeting of the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Paris, between 30 May and 23 June 1989. In his speech to the opening session of the Conference, External Affairs Minister Clark noted that the next meeting would be held in Copenhagen in 1990, and went on :

...Then it will be fair to expect full compliance with all provisions [of the Vienna Concluding Document] by all participating states.... Already there has been enough progress in certain areas to confirm that the expectations of Vienna were realistic. On the issue of family reunification, I am pleased to say that Canada now has no outstanding cases with Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union.... In Poland the Round Table Agreement between the government and the solidarity [sic] movement has refreshed the hope for human rights and progress towards democracy.... In Hungary the tearing down of fenced barriers to the West has been accompanied by expanding economic and political pluralism and freedom.... And in the Soviet Union we have seen remarkable elections.... We look forward to the legal and constitutional reforms which will firmly secure the rule of law in the Soviet Union and work towards the fulfillment of the human rights obligations that its government has agreed [sic].... There are, unfortunately, some countries whose record has not matched their Vienna commitments.... One of them is Bulgaria, its treatment of its Turkish minority population is cause for particular concern.... Romania...has formally declared that it is not bound by the important new human dimension undertakings.... It has, in short, openly and conspicuously violated important elements of the Vienna Concluding Document. It has continued, with increasing heavy-handedness, to ignore the fundamental rights and freedoms of large numbers of its people.¹⁹

¹⁷ "CSCE Information Forum: Statement by Ambassador William Bauer, Head of the Canadian Delegation," 20 April 1989, p. 3.

¹⁸ "Canada at the CSCE, London Information Forum, April 18-May 12, 1989," p. 2.

¹⁹ Rt. Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "[A] Speech...to the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Paris, May 30, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* No. 89/15, pp. 3-5.

At the Francophone Summit in Dakar, Senegal, from 24 to 26 May 1989, Canada introduced a resolution, which received unanimous support, calling for "the respect of human rights as well as for the right to development both within and outside our community."²⁰ It was the first time that the Francophonie had adopted such a resolution, which had reportedly been on the Canadian agenda since the previous Summit in Québec in 1987.²¹ External Affairs Minister Clark described the move as "a significant step forward," while conceding that it would not result in "immediate or dramatic improvements."²² In his words: "Once you get people started, you have some leverage to affect their behaviour."²³ Prime Minister Mulroney reportedly stressed human rights in his opening speech at the Summit's first closed-door session of Heads of State and Heads of Government, declaring:

Throughout the world, one thing becomes clearer and clearer: Human rights are inseparable and indispensable. Without economic, social and cultural rights, development is stunted because the spirit is weak. Human rights are a precondition for peace, an engine for prosperity, a legacy for our children.²⁴

The Prime Minister affirmed that respect for human rights would be an important element in the decisions that the Canadian Government would take in responding to requests for foreign aid.²⁵

On 17 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark announced the appointment of Ms. A. Raynell Andreychuk as Canada's Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Elected in May 1988 to the Commission after a normal rotational absence since 1984, Canada began its three-year term in January 1989.²⁶ Ms. Andreychuk told the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in November 1988:

One of the dominant themes of the past year has been "reconciliation". Major conflicts are gradually being resolved.... Nonetheless, we must not let more dynamic political situations blind us to glaring human rights inadequacies.... In

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²¹ Patrick Doyle, "France Forgives \$3 Billion in Debt as Summit Opens." *Toronto Star*, 25 May 1989, p. 25.

²² *Ibid.*.

²³ Graham Fraser, "Francophone Summit to Consider Rights." *Globe and Mail*, 24 May 1989, p. A8.

²⁴ Doyle, *supra* note 21.

²⁵ Denis Lessard, "Droits de l'homme: la France refroidit les espoirs du Canada." *La Presse*, 24 May 1989. See also: Denis Lessard, "Le sommet de Dakar abordera la question des droits de l'homme." *La Presse*, 23 May 1989; and Denis Lessard, "Le Canada menace de lier son aide au tiers-monde au respect des droits de l'homme." *La Presse*, 25 May 1989.

²⁶ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 111 (27 May 1988); and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 178 (17 August 1988).

El Salvador the government of President Duarte rolled back significantly the level of violence and human rights violations from the early 1980s.... [T]he protection of human rights in El Salvador over the last year has weakened, and that number of human rights abuses has increased markedly.... In Guatemala, while human rights violations have diminished significantly since the beginning of the decade,...[t]he resurgence of death squads and disappearances is a matter of profound concern. The Esquipulas accord of last year, agreed to by all five Central American Presidents...sought not only peace but respect for human rights and democratic values.... [W]e urge them to honour this commitment.... The Canadian government is deeply concerned by the overall treatment by the Iraqi authorities of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, and particularly by the reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians.... Of particular concern [in Iran] are reports of summary arrests, torture and large-scale arbitrary executions of political detainees.... National reconciliation was the essential theme of the recent plebiscite in Chile, conducted under conditions which were sufficiently fair and equitable to produce credible results.... By contrast,...the situation in the Israeli Occupied Territories presents serious human rights concerns.... We believe that respect for human rights is an essential component of the peace process.... We stress the concept of reconciliation in these situations because so many conflicts originate, directly or indirectly, in human rights problems, or because divisive political conflicts have potentially disastrous consequences for respect for human rights.²⁷

An investigator from the UN Commission on Human Rights arrived in Canada, in mid-July 1989, to prepare for the start of an inquiry into allegations that Canada has violated treaties with its aboriginal peoples.²⁸

Canada's ratification of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in June 1987 exempted Articles 21 and 22 "which recognize the right of the monitoring Committee [set up by the Convention] to accept and judge complaints against a country by another nation or by individuals." Of the thirty-eight countries that have thus far ratified the Convention, twenty-three, including Canada, the Soviet Union, Mexico and China, have not agreed to be judged by the monitoring Committee. However, on 19 January 1989, an External Affairs spokesperson stated that "Canada will accept the right of a United Nations Committee to hear complaints of torture and cruelty against the country" by June 1989 or sooner.²⁹ The delay has been officially attributed to the necessity of coordinating federal-provincial legislation pertaining to this matter.

²⁷ Her Excellency Ms. A. Raynell Andreychuk, Ambassador of Canada in the Third Committee of the 43rd Session of the United Nations, "[A] Statement [to] the Third Committee of the 43rd Session of the United Nations, New York, November 1988." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* pp. 1-3.

²⁸ Geoffrey York, "UN Rights Agency Set to Start Probe into Canada's Treatment of Indians." *Globe and Mail*, 15 July 1989, p. 1.

²⁹ Charlotte Montgomery, "Canada Assailed for 'Opting Out' of UN Scrutiny on Torture Treaty." *Globe and Mail*, 18 January 1989, p. A9; and "Canada to Accept UN Committee." *Globe and Mail*, 20 January 1989, p. A8.

On 15 August 1988, Bill C-147, an Act to establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, was introduced in the House of Commons. The legislation received royal assent in September 1988. The mandate of the Centre, which will be located in Montreal, is, in the words of the Bill, "to initiate, encourage and support cooperation between Canada and other countries in the promotion, development and strengthening of institutions and programs that give effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the *International Bill of Rights*...."³⁰

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Human rights violations in the Soviet Union and the East European countries continued to spark comment in the House of Commons. Several Members of Parliament referred to incongruities between the "promises" of *perestroika* and *glasnost* and the present "realities". On 23 August 1988, NDP Member Bill Blaikie urged Chairman Gorbachev to stretch "new thinking" beyond Soviet borders:

One of the true tests of *glasnost* and *perestroika* will be whether the new winds of freedom are allowed to blow in countries which for too long have been under Soviet domination. It has been suggested that Chairman Gorbachev show good faith by allowing free and open elections at the municipal level throughout Soviet occupied Europe as a first step. We in the NDP urge that this be done.³¹

In the case of Poland, on 1 September 1988, Progressive Conservative Member Andrew Witer called upon External Affairs Minister Clark "to press Polish officials to reinstate Solidarity, and to fulfil their obligation as a signatory of the Helsinki Accord by guaranteeing freedom of expression...."³² The Romanian Government was strongly criticized for abusing its citizens and especially for its decision "to bulldoze 7000 villages, uprooting and scattering the 2.5 million native Hungarians throughout Romania...."³³

³⁰ Canada, The House of Commons, *Bill C-147: An Act to Establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development*. Ottawa: September 13, 1988, p. 2. See also: Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Proceedings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs*, Issue No. 34 (27 September 1988), pp. 34 : 17-38; Daniel Drolet, "Montreal, not Ottawa, gets Rights Centre." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 August 1988, p. A5; Gisèle Côté-Harper and John Courtney, *International Cooperation for the Development of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions (Report to the Right Honourable Joe Clark and the Honourable Monique Landry)*. Ottawa, June 1987, pp. 1-5; and Schmitz and Berry, *supra* note 3, pp. 13-14.

³¹ *Commons Debates*, 23 August 1988, p. 18694. See also: 22 August 1988, pp. 18614-18615; and 27 September 1988, p. 19669.

³² *Commons Debates*, 1 September 1988, p. 19153. See also: 22 August 1988, pp. 18614-18615; 23 August 1988, p.18694; and 27 September 1988, pp. 19669-19670.

³³ *Commons Debates*, 11 August 1988, p. 18196. See also: 19 August 1988, pp. 18574-18575; and 31 August 1988, p. 19114.

On 11 May 1989, PC Member Barbara Greene stated:

Europe is incensed and outraged at the disaster zone that is now Romania. Hungary is overflowing with refugees from this cruel regime.³⁴

On 20 June 1989 PC Member Maurice Tremblay informed the House that thousands of Bulgarian citizens, belonging to the Turkish minority, had been expelled to neighbouring countries. Tremblay stated that he was pleased that External Affairs Minister Clark had issued a communiqué on 16 June 1989 expressing Canada's concern about the expulsions, and that the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires had been called in and been made aware of the Canadian disapproval of his Government's actions.³⁵

Statements were also made in the House on behalf of individual Soviet citizens and minority groups within the Soviet Union.³⁶

On 23 May 1989, one day prior to the start of the Third Francophone Summit in Dakar, Senegal, Opposition Leader John Turner asked whether the Government intended to "denounce vigorously the human rights abuses of some Francophone countries" at the Summit. The Minister of State (Finance) Gilles Loiselle replied:

...[T]he Secretary of State (for External Affairs) has indeed placed a resolution for debate at the Dakar conference. I believe and hope that this will be a beginning of the improvement he desires.³⁷

Following the crackdown of the Chinese Government on protesters in Beijing's Tian'anmen Square on 3 to 4 June 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark proposed the following motion, seconded by the leaders of the Liberal Party and the New Democrat Party, which received the unanimous consent of the House:

...[N]oting that:

-the relationship between Canada and the People's Republic of China is important to Canadians and has been of benefit to both countries over the past many years;

-authorities in the People's Republic of China have directed the armed forces of China to attack the unarmed civilian population of Beijing in contravention of all humane principles of conduct;

-the students and citizens of Beijing were peacefully advocating democratic principles and human freedoms as is the fundamental right of all peoples of the world; and the authorities of China resorted to the use of excessive and

³⁴ *Commons Debates*, 11 May 1989, p. 1590. See also: 18 May 1989, pp. 1910-1911.

³⁵ *Commons Debates*, 20 June 1989, p. 3292.

³⁶ *Commons Debates*, 25 August 1988, p. 18841; 26 August 1988, p. 18902; and 3 May 1989, p. 1242.

³⁷ *Commons Debates*, 23 May 1989, p. 2042.

indiscriminate armed force on a scale and scope which appalls all Canadians and has resulted in the tragic deaths of large numbers of innocent civilians; [Members of Parliament] therefore:

unequivocally condemn this brutal use of force against the peaceful populace of Beijing and call upon the authorities of China to cease this senseless killing and immediately adopt a course of dialogue with the people of China.³⁸

(For further information concerning events leading up to and following the Chinese Government crackdown of June 1989, including the Canadian Government response, refer to Appendix 7 of *The Guide*.)

Several Members of Parliament expressed concerns over human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala, especially the increase in violations in the former.³⁹ NDP Member Lynn Hunter declared:

Since 1983, Canada has provided over \$13 million in bilateral aid to the Government of El Salvador.... With the presidential elections concluded, government-supported violence and repression are on the increase.... Canadians do not want to be associated with a regime which utilizes human rights violations and murder. Canadians are proud of our record of promoting peace, yet our Government, through bilateral aid, does business with this Government which refuses to negotiate a settlement to the nine-year war....

I call on the Government to reconsider our bilateral aid program to El Salvador so that the aid is channeled through non-governmental organizations until we see a substantial improvement in the human rights environment.⁴⁰

On 2 May 1989, Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry assured the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade that "the bilateral aid program to Salvador...has been managed by a Canadian NGO [non-governmental organization], the Canadian Hunger Foundation, and has been carried out by Salvadorian NGOs to assist some 200,000 displaced persons in need."⁴¹ In reply, Ms. Hunter charged that "The non-governmental organizations of Canada have repudiated that program completely, except for one, the Canadian Hunger Foundation, and the minister knows very well what is going on here.... You have a credibility problem if you think you can foist off the Canadian Hunger Foundation as not being anything other than a bilateral aid program that supports the government of El Salvador."⁴²

38 *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1989, p. 2599.

39 *Commons Debates*, 15 September 1988, p. 19283; 12 April 1989, p. 384; 20 April 1989, p. 725; 24 May 1989, p. 2083; and 1 June 1989, p. 2414.

40 *Commons Debates*, 12 April 1989, p. 384.

41 House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 1 (2 May 1989), p. 1 : 40.

42 *Ibid.*, pp. 1 : 40-41.

Other countries whose human rights records were criticized in the House of Commons included Burma, Burundi, Chile, Indonesia (East Timor), Iraq (Kurds), Pakistan (Ahmadis), and Zimbabwe.⁴³ On 13 September 1988, Liberal Member Roland de Corneille stated:

There is confusion on the part of Canadians who ask how it is that we are giving assistance to a Government like that of Haiti when it is thoroughly repressing its people...we must look at what is happening in Burundi because of threatened genocide, not only threatened but, in fact, genocide of the Hutu tribe and majority of the people by a minority repressive regime.... While it is correct to criticize the policies of the Soviet Union, Chile and so on in terms of their failure to live up to the idea of human rights, brutal genocide and the massacre of tens of thousands of people is going on elsewhere.... The same thing could be said about the aboriginal people in East Timor and in Irian Jaya. The oppression by Indonesia of those people and the genocide which has taken place over many years is again another example of brutal murder and slaughter on a wholesale scale.... Yet Indonesia receives international development assistance from Canada.⁴⁴

In September 1988, parliamentary debate focussed on the establishment of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Bill C-147). Although the House generally agreed with the main thrust of the Bill, several members of parliament expressed some reservations on specific issues pertaining to the Centre. On 13 September 1988, NDP Member Howard McCurdy sounded the following concerns about the Centre's "terms of reference":

...while the Bill attends...to a kind of definition by saying that for the purpose of this Act the International Bill of Rights will constitute the reference and source for adjudicating what constitutes human rights, it fails to deal with what constitutes democracy and democratic development.... One of the concerns...is that Canada seeks to enhance human rights and democracy by a means which would not impose on other nations our own institutions and values.... What we want, I think, is to be able to communicate the ideal of democratic values which are common to the Canadian people.... I think Canada must reflect internationally--not by imposing its institutions or rigid definitions on other nations--a kind of Canadian consensus of the values underlying democracy and to apply criteria developed from those values in distributing aid.⁴⁵

⁴³ See *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, pp. 19179, 19183; 20 September 1988, p. 19431; 16 December 1988, p. 138; 14 April 1989, p. 506; 16 May 1989, p. 1786; and 24 May 1989, p. 2085.

⁴⁴ *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, p. 19176.

⁴⁵ *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, pp. 19179-19180.

Similarly, Liberal Member Jean-Robert Gauthier complained that "...the Bill gives no indication what the Government wants to do or how we define democratic rights.... I don't want us to be accused of imperialism and I don't want us to export our way of life to these countries."⁴⁶

Also questioned in the House were the structure, financing, location and name of the Centre.⁴⁷

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⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19181.

⁴⁷ See *Commons Debates*, 13 September 1988, pp. 19173-19185; 15 September 1988, p. 19282; and 30 September 1988, pp. 19835-19845.

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28. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

BACKGROUND

A general rise in the frequency of international terrorist incidents in the early to mid-1980s prompted Western states to place a high priority on adopting policies and measures to counter such acts. Their effectiveness has been evidenced in the relative decrease of overt terrorist incidents, in particular cases of air terrorism, although the problem is far from solved. Bombings continue to comprise over half of all terrorist incidents, while hostage-taking and assassination are the second and third most frequent forms.

International efforts have been generated through the strengthening of existing conventions, such as the Tokyo, Montreal and the Hague Conventions created under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and through the creation of new agreements and resolutions. Among the most significant of these is the 1985 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61, passed by consensus, which condemns, outright, all acts of terrorism.

The new American Administration has pledged to continue the fight against international terrorism and is determined, along with other governments, to see terrorists brought to justice for their actions. Examples include the trial and conviction of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers, and the case of Fawaz Younis who was the first person convicted in March, 1989 in the United States under a 1984 law permitting US authorities to apprehend terrorists outside of US borders. Younis was convicted for the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian airliner in 1985.

Other developments over the past year include the decision of the US Government in late August 1988 not to override a Federal Court ruling allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer mission to the UN to remain open. Congress had originally approved closing the office on the basis of a 1987 Anti-Terrorist Act. Although the US felt the PLO should not be permitted to operate on American soil because of its purported terrorist affiliations, it was decided that the Anti-Terrorist Act could not be applied to the organization. Many countries, including Canada, had found the US to be in breach of its obligations as host country under the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement.

These same sentiments, however, did not prevent the US from denying PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat a visa entry in November, 1988, blocking him from addressing the UN General Assembly in New York. This decision came despite a UN resolution supported by 151 countries "deploring" the American denial and stating that the decision violated its obligations as host country. In December the Assembly was moved to Geneva for its annual debate on Palestine in order to hear Arafat, and, in an historic move, the Chairman personally renounced terrorism. He also declared that the PLO had rejected terrorism "in all its forms." This move led to an American decision to commence a dialogue with the PLO in December 1988. Similarly, the Canadian Government decided in March 1989 to permit the development of official, high-level talks with the PLO.

Pan American Flight 103 crashed outside of Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, killing all 259 passengers on board as well as an estimated eleven persons on the ground. Officials have traced the source of the crash to a bomb planted in a radio-cassette player, although the organization responsible has not yet been determined.

In response to the Lockerbie disaster, a meeting of the ICAO Council was held at its Montreal Headquarters in February 1989. Transport ministers from ten countries passed a resolution at this time calling for improved detectability of explosives on board aircraft, and requesting a further development of standards to strengthen aviation security.

In January 1989 the NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral European countries signed an East-West Agreement on Human Rights which includes several articles condemning terrorism and presses for an increase in national and international efforts to combat terrorism and "insure the extradition or prosecution of persons implicated in terrorist acts."

In late June 1989 US and Soviet experts met for the first time in Moscow in order to determine possible areas for bilateral cooperation and coordination in counter-terrorism efforts, including exchanges of information. However, both sides refrained from officially giving any details on the meetings.

State-sponsored terrorism has become of increasing concern for Western states in recent years. Several events in the past year underscore this, such as the allegation that Libya was building a chemical weapons plant which could have been used to supply several known terrorist organisations, and the Iranian-sponsored death threat against British citizen Salman Rushdie. A joint political declaration issued by the Group of Seven in July 1989 at the Paris Summit reaffirmed the industrialized countries' commitment to fighting terrorism, and stated that "in particular, they condemned state-sponsored terrorism."

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

A recent publication by the Department of National Defence reports that, in relative terms, there has been a low level of international terrorist incidents directly affecting or involving Canada.¹ A similar conclusion was reached by a Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety in 1987, which nevertheless stated that "terrorism presents one of the principal security threats to Canada today in terms of immediacy, but not severity" and that "international terrorism presents a major challenge to Canada, to Canadian policy, to intelligence and to law enforcement, currently and for the foreseeable future."²

Incidents such as the 1985 seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by Armenian gunmen and the Air India crash over the Atlantic which killed 329 persons, demonstrate that Canada is not invulnerable to terrorist acts. More recently, in April 1989, a Canadian resident of Lebanese origin hijacked a bus and held several people hostage on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. The hijacker, Charles Yakoub, claimed to represent the Front

¹ Anthony Kellett, *Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Impact on Canada*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Report No. R100, February 1988.

² William Kelly, *Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1987, pp. 1 and 8-9.

for the Liberation of Christian Lebanon, although the RCMP believe the group to be nonexistent.

Canada has consistently condemned acts of terrorism and has in recent years continued to join other nations in doing so. This has included statements issued at various economic summits, the most recent example being at the Toronto Summit in June 1988, when the Group of Seven reaffirmed its condemnation of terrorism and its commitment to fight against it.

Canada has also cooperated on an informal basis since 1987 with the Trevi Group, formed by ministers of the European Economic Community to exchange and compile information on, among other areas, counter-terrorism.

In an effort to support existing ICAO principles, Canada and the United States jointly issued a declaration in November 1988 stating that their governments "will not allow hijacked aircraft which has [sic] landed in their territory to take off again" and would take measures to regain control of the aircraft and detain the hijackers.³ Canada and the United States also held a meeting in Ottawa in October 1988 as part of their Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, formed in January 1988 with a view to meeting annually, or more often if required.

In February 1989, Liberal Leader John Turner called for Canada to break diplomatic ties with Iran in reply to the death threat issued against Rushdie. He stated that Canadians "do not support terrorism of any kind, and certainly not the style of state-supported or state-sponsored terrorism advocated by Iran."⁴ External Affairs Minister Joe Clark responded to the Rushdie affair by summoning a meeting of Islamic states' representatives to Canada in an effort to urge their governments "to engage themselves in a search for a pragmatic solution to the Rushdie affair and the elimination of the threats to the author and his publishers."⁵

After traces of cyanide were found in a few Chilean grapes in Philadelphia in April 1989, Federal Health Minister Beatty banned the imports of all Chilean produce for four days and ordered existing stocks taken off the shelves. The US had received threats through its embassy in Santiago in March that Chilean exports would be poisoned. Canada receives most of its produce from Chile via the US.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In September 1988, Progressive Conservative Party Member John Ostrom commented on the case of Francesco Piperno, an Italian terrorist who lived in Canada for seven years while applying for refugee status, before being extradited and sentenced by an Italian Court in 1988. Mr. Ostrom used this case to exemplify what he termed the abuses in the immigration system, and requested that the following action be taken:

³ Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 235 (2 November 1988).

⁴ *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 1989, p. A2.

⁵ Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 040 (25 February 1989).

...Any individual who commits terrorist acts in countries which have democratic Governments should be returned to those nations....All terrorists who commit crimes against innocent civilians, such as airplane hijackers, should be returned to those countries to face justice.⁶

Progressive Conservative Party Member Geoff Scott expressed his sympathies to the families who suffered losses in the Lockerbie tragedy in December 1988, and asked the Department of External Affairs to "keep us posted on the international intrigue surrounding the disintegration of Flight 103" since Canadian citizens were involved.⁷

The hostage-taking incident on Parliament Hill in April 1989 sparked comment by several Parliamentary Members. Mr. Nunziata expressed concerns about the timing of the information relayed to the RCMP:

The hijacking incident on Friday raises some very serious questions about national security and the ability of our policy forces to respond quickly, effectively, and co-operatively with respect to acts of terrorism.⁸

Solicitor General Pierre Blais responded by congratulating the RCMP on its effective and quick reaction to the situation and assured Mr. Nunziata, as well as other Members who had commented on the lack of communication between various police units, that a full review was to be conducted into the handling of the incident.

In June 1989, the fourth anniversary of the Air India crash provoked renewed comment from Liberal Party Member John Nunziata. He questioned why little was being done by the Government to investigate the circumstances surrounding the downing of the aircraft, and whether it was not necessary to undertake a royal commission of inquiry. Solicitor General Pierre Blais noted that the RCMP was still conducting a criminal investigation and added:

Obviously it is most unfortunate. Many people died. This type of investigation takes a lot of time to get all the facts...We must let the RCMP continue this investigation. It has committed all the available energy and resources required for this purpose.⁹

⁶ *Commons Debates*, 27 September 1988, pp. 19719-20.

⁷ *Commons Debates*, 23 December 1988, pp. 713-4.

⁸ *Commons Debates*, 10 April 1989, p. 283.

⁹ *Commons Debates*, 22 June 1989, p. 3526.

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APPENDIX 1

Canadian Treaty Obligations*

The Geneva Protocol of 1925

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).

Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

United Nations Charter

Signed: 26 June 1945.

Ratified: 9 November 1945.

Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

North Atlantic Treaty

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

Partial Test Ban Treaty

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.)

Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.

Ratified: 28 January 1964.

Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

* in the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.

Outer Space Treaty

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof). Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.

Ratified: 17 May 1972.

Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

Biological Weapons Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction).

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.

Ratified: 18 September 1972.

Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

ENMOD Convention

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques).

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.

Ratified: 11 June 1981.

Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Entered into force for Canada: 11 June 1981

Inhumane Weapons Convention

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects).

Signed: 10 April 1981.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Assistance for Nuclear Accidents

(Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency).

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport).

Signed: 22 September 1980.

Ratified: 21 March 1986.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

The Antarctic Treaty

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material).

Acceded: 4 May 1988.

Entered into force: 4 May 1988.

APPENDIX 2

The Canadian Armed Forces

1. Personnel (1989)

Regular Forces	87,874	July 1989
Primary Reserve	26,399	December 1988
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	36,595	December 1988
Civilian Strength	37,362	
	<hr/> 188,230	

<u>Command</u> ¹	<u>Regulars</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u> ²
Maritime	12,098	3,616	7,707	23,421
Mobile	19,883	19,849	5,988	45,720
Air	23,216	1,023	7,041	31,280

¹. Major commands only; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

2. As of December 1988

2. Functional and Regional Commands

<u>Command</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Maritime	Halifax, Nova Scotia
Mobile	St.-Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, F. R. Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1989

3. Naval Forces - Maritime Command, Fleet Strength

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u> ¹
Patrol Submarines	3
Destroyers	4
Frigates	15 (3 reserve)
Replenishment Ships	3
Tanker, Small	1
Research Vessels	3
Patrol Vessels/Training Ships	7
Gate Vessels	5
Reserve Tenders	14
Tugs	14
Auxiliaries	25
MCMA's	<u>2</u>
	96

1. As of July 1989

4. Land Forces - Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tanks	114 Leopard C-1
Armoured Fighting Vehicles - Reconnaissance	175 Lynx
Armoured Fighting Vehicles (Cougar)	195 Cougar
Armoured Personnel Carriers	1090 M-113 269 Grizzly
Artillery (Howitzer)	44 Model 44 [L-5] (pack 105 mm) 189 towed 105 mm 50 M-109 Self-Propelled (155 mm)
Anti-tank Weapons (TOW) Recoilless Rifles	787 Carl Gustav 84 mm
Anti-tank Guided Weapons	151 Tow
Air Defence	
Guns	57 L-40/60 40 mm
Surface-to-air Missiles	111 Blowpipe

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1989

5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment¹

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Fighter	81 CF-116 (Freedom Fighter) 135 CF-18D (F/A-18A/B Hornet)
Electronic Countermeasures	7 CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20) 16 CC-144 Challenger
Maritime Reconnaissance	18 CP-140 Aurora 29 CP-121 Tracker
Transport	27 CC-130E/H/MT Hercules 5 CC-137 (Boeing 707) 7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan 7 CC-138 Twin Otter 14 CC-115 Buffalo 67 CT-133 Silver Star 132 CT-114 Tutor 21 CT-134/134 A Musketeer 2 CC-142 Dash 8
<u>Type (Helicopters)</u>	
Anti-Submarine Warfare	35 CH-124 Sea King
Observation	66 CH-136 Kiowa
Transport	45 CH-135 Twin Huey 7 CH-147 Chinook
Search and Rescue	14 CH-113/A Labrador/Voyageur 9 CH-118 Iroquois
Training	14 CH-139 (Bell 206)

1. Includes storage, instructional, and repair.

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE SUMMER 1989

6. Canadian Forces Europe

a. Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) - Headquarters: CFB Lahr, F. R. Germany

Unit Formation	Unit Name	Base
Armoured Regiment	The 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)	CFB Lahr
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry	
	1 st Battalion Royal 22 nd Regiment	CFB Baden-- Soellingen
	1 st Battalion Royal 22 nd Regiment	CFB Lahr
Artillery Regiment	1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery	CFB Lahr
Engineer Regiment	4 Combat Engineer Regiment	CFB Lahr
Helicopter Squadron	444 Tactical Helicopter Squadron	CFB Lahr
4 Air Defence Regiment	128 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Baden-- Soellingen
	129 Airfield Air Defence Battery	CFB Lahr
Headquarters & Signal Units	4 Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters and Signal Squadron	CFB Lahr
Support Units	4 Service Battalion	CFB Lahr
	4 Field Ambulance	CFB Lahr
	4 Military Police Platoon	CFB Lahr
Communications Units	CFE Communication Group Headquarters Communication Squadron	CFB Lahr
	Communication Squadron	CFB Baden-- Soellingen

b. Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) - Headquarters: Lahr, F. R. Germany

Unit Formation	Unit Name	Base
Fighter	409 Tactical Fighter Squadron CF-18	CFB Baden-Soellingen
	439 Tactical Fighter Squadron CF-18	CFB Baden-Soellingen
	421 Tactical Fighter Squadron CF-18	CFB Baden-Soellingen
Headquarters Unit	Headquarters 1 CAD	CFB Lahr
Support	1 Air Maintenance Squadron	CFB Baden-Soellingen

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1988

Sources In addition to interviews with staff of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), the following sources were consulted for this Appendix:

Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, Proceedings, Issue No. 23, 31 May 1988, p. 23A:6.

DND, Defence 88

DND, Fact Sheets

IISS, The Military Balance 1987-1988

APPENDIX 3

Canadian contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1948	22	79	298
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-1979	27	Yes ¹	102-39
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)	² Korea	1950-1954	8000	-	
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)	² Korea	1953-	2	1	
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-1974	133	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1)	Egypt	1956-1967	1007	-	6373-3378
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-1959	77	-	591-375
Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo (Zaire)	1960-1964	421	-	19,828
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea	1962-1963	13	-	15,761

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-1964	36	-	189-25
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1126	575	6411-2345
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Dominican Republic	1965-1966	1	-	3
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India-Pakistan Border	1965-1966	112	-	96-78
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-1969	2	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 2)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-1979	1145	-	6973-4031
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973-	278	-	
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel-Syria (Golan)	1974-	227	227	1450
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978-	117	-	7000-5773
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Egypt-Israel	1982-(1986)	140	128	2700

(1) Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)

(2) UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the Present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Afghanistan Pakistan	1988	5	3	50-40
United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Iran/Iraq	1988	540	15	408-955
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia	1989	301	237	4650
³ Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP)	Pakistan	1989	14	3	70

(3) The Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) for Afghanistan, 1989, falls outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*. It is a humanitarian relief assistance programme.

Source: National Defence, Canada, Directorate Peacekeeping Operations.

PUBLIC OPINION

Many polls measuring Canadian attitudes on arms control, defence, foreign policy, and regional conflict issues were conducted between July 1988 and July 1989. The following is a summary of many of these, categorized under the subject headings of Canadian Defence Policy; Canadian Foreign Policy; and International Affairs.¹

Canadian Defence Policy

In July 1988, Gallup Canada asked 1033 Canadians, regardless of their voting preference in the upcoming federal election, which federal leader best represented their way of thinking on a number of national issues, including defence. The survey found that 39 percent of the respondents did not know which leader came closest to their way of thinking on defence matters; 29 percent stated Brian Mulroney; 14 percent, John Turner; 10 percent, Ed Broadbent; and 9 percent, none of the leaders.

Gallup asked 1033 Canadians in July 1988 for their opinion on the issue of mandatory one-year military training for young men. Forty-five percent of the populace favoured such a proposal, 50 percent were opposed and 5 percent had no opinion. Military training for women received less support, with 31 percent in favour, 63 percent opposed and 7 percent having no opinion.

The same poll also asked respondents who deemed themselves capable of serving in the military whether they would fight for their country. Over half--56 percent--stated they would fight for Canada; 17 percent stated it would depend on the immediate circumstances of the conflict; 23 percent said they would not fight; and 5 percent did not know.

In a poll conducted by Angus Reid and Associates for the Department of Finance in July 1988, 1505 respondents were asked to rate the importance they placed on nineteen different issues. The results were grouped into four categories according to public priorities. The purchase of new equipment for the armed forces fell into the category of lowest priority, with only 17 percent of those surveyed thinking the issue required a great deal of attention from the Government.

In January 1989, Gallup asked 1021 Canadians their opinion of the planned purchase of nuclear-propelled submarines (SSNs) for the armed forces. Of those surveyed, 22 percent supported the plan, 69 percent were opposed, and 9 percent did not know. In an Angus Reid poll conducted for Greenpeace and released in February 1989, over 70 percent of 1503 respondents indicated opposition to the purchase of SSNs. Fifty-nine percent were strongly opposed; 12 percent were moderately opposed; 11 percent were strongly in

¹

Owing to the length and scope of the 1988 CIIPS Public Opinion Survey, only selected questions and responses appear in this summary. For a more detailed analysis of the CIIPS survey, see Michael Driedger and Don Munton, *Security, Arms Control and Defence: Public Attitudes in Canada*. Ottawa: CIIPS, Working Paper No. 14, December 1988; and Don Munton, "Canadians and Their Defence." *Peace and Security*, vol. 3 no. 4 (Winter 1988/1989), pp. 2-4.

favour; 14 percent were moderately in favour; and 4 percent offered no opinion. The CIIPS poll conducted in June and July 1988 asked its 1005 respondents whether they approved or disapproved of the purchase "to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans." In contrast to the above results, 18 percent strongly disapproved; 26 percent disapproved; 44 percent approved; and 12 percent strongly approved.

Telepoll Research Inc. surveyed 1498 Canadians in March on whether women should be given equal opportunity with men for military employment, including combat roles. The poll, sponsored by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, found that 65 percent favoured giving women combat roles, while 30 percent were opposed. More respondents--78 percent--favoured allowing women to be fighter pilots, and 78 percent also agreed that women should be allowed as crew members on warships. On the same issue, Gallup interviewed 1037 people in April and found that 48 percent favoured women in combat roles; 43 percent were opposed; and 9 percent had no opinion.

Following the release of the Federal budget, Telepoll conducted a survey of 1520 people in May asking whether they believed the defence cutbacks, including cancellation of the purchase of SSNs and closing of military bases, would affect Canada's security. Nearly 70 percent of the Quebecers surveyed, thought the cutbacks would have no effect on national security, with 45 percent of all other Canadians polled sharing the same view. Twenty-six percent of the Quebecers believed that the cutbacks would decrease national security, while 47 percent of the rest of those polled held this view.

The CIIPS poll of June and July 1988 asked if Canada should reduce its NATO commitment. Twenty-six percent of the respondents strongly disagreed; 53 percent disagreed; 17 percent agreed; and 4 percent strongly agreed. The CIIPS poll also asked if Canada ought to spend significantly more on defence. Eighteen percent strongly disagreed; 40 percent disagreed; 31 percent agreed; and 12 percent strongly agreed.

An April 1989 Gallup poll found that 44 percent of 1024 people questioned believed Canada should permit cruise missile testing over Canadian territory by the United States while 51 percent felt tests should not be permitted. Five percent did not know.

Canadian Foreign Policy

To begin its survey, the CIIPS poll asked its respondents to judge how well-informed they were on international affairs and Canadian foreign policy issues. Fourteen percent felt they were very well-informed; 55 percent, somewhat informed; 26 percent, not too informed; and 5 percent, not at all informed. The questionnaire then asked how much influence Canada has on the course of world events. The poll found that 5 percent believed Canada has a great deal of influence; 55 percent believed it has some influence; 39 percent, very little influence; and 2 percent, no influence at all.

Turning to regional conflict issues, a Gallup poll of 1028 people conducted in October 1988 found 46 percent of respondents approving increased Canadian aid to black-ruled countries in Southern Africa. Thirty-one percent felt Canada should not get involved, while 10 percent disapproved for some other reason. Thirteen percent did not know.

A November 1988 survey of 1021 Canadians by Thomas Lightstone and Co. for the Department of External Affairs found that 23 percent favoured full sanctions by Canada against South Africa and 24 percent favoured more sanctions than Canada had imposed.

Twenty-four percent were satisfied with the level of sanctions, while 11 percent called for fewer, 7 percent called for none at all, and 11 percent did not answer. Asked which regional conflict concerned them most, 51 percent named South Africa; 22 percent, Nicaragua; 19 percent, Afghanistan; and 8 percent did not answer. A slim majority of respondents--51 percent--indicated they were somewhat familiar with the South African conflict, while 16 percent said they were very familiar with it. Those not very familiar equalled 20 percent and 14 percent said they were not familiar with the situation at all. The survey also showed that a majority does not believe that the South African government is putting an end to apartheid, or that Canadians are getting an accurate picture of what is happening in South Africa.

A Gallup poll of 1024 Canadians conducted in March 1989 found 62 percent of respondents aware of South Africa's racial policies and 38 percent, not. Asked what Canada should do about the situation, 13 percent felt we should not interfere; 47 percent believed Canada should maintain relations while urging South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies; 35 percent believed Canada should cut off relations; and 5 percent did not know.

In April Gallup conducted 1037 interviews on the issue of Canadian relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Asked whether they believed Canada should upgrade its diplomatic relations with the PLO, 35 percent said yes; 43 percent said no; and 22 percent did not know.

A survey conducted by Angus Reid in May indicated that 59 percent of 1502 Canadians thought Canada supported US foreign policy too often. One-third of the respondents disagreed.

MacLean's magazine and Decima Research conducted a poll in early 1989 in which they asked 1000 people: "Would you strongly support, support, oppose, or strongly oppose, Canada and the United States adopting common and identical policy on all matters relating to defence and foreign affairs?" Twenty-four percent strongly opposed this notion; 36 percent opposed it; 33 percent supported it; and 5 percent strongly supported it.

International Affairs

In November 1988, Gallup polled 1041 Canadians on how peaceful they foresaw 1989. Thirty percent thought 1989 would be peaceful; 47 percent felt it would be the same as 1988; 19 percent foresaw a troubled year; and 4 percent did not know. The same question was asked by Gallup in thirty-three other countries around the world. More people in Brazil were anticipating a troubled year (44 percent) than in any other nation, and the highest percentage of most people anticipating a peaceful year were in the Soviet Union (52 percent).

A February Gallup poll asked 1042 Canadians their views on the Soviet Union's position in the world. Thirty-seven percent of respondents felt the USSR was more or less content with its power, while 49 percent thought it was trying to increase its area of influence. Fifteen percent did not know.

The May 1989 Angus Reid survey (mentioned above) found 59 percent of respondents felt Gorbachev's reforms would bring about positive change in the Soviet Union, while 25 percent disagreed. Thirteen percent thought the risk of nuclear war had increased, while

50 percent believed it had decreased and 35 percent felt it had stayed the same. The Soviet Union was thought slightly more likely than the United States to begin a nuclear war deliberately--with 22 percent support versus 21 percent. However, the United States was thought more likely to begin an accidental nuclear war--30 percent versus 17 percent. By a margin of 61 percent to 32 percent, respondents believed a nuclear war was more likely to begin accidentally, than deliberately. Fifty percent of respondents felt Soviet leader Gorbachev had done the most for peace over the past few years, while 24 percent believed President Reagan had done the most, (16 percent felt that both had worked toward peace). Finally, the United States was thought by 43 percent of respondents, and the Soviet Union by 36 percent, to contribute more to political instability.

The CIIPS poll asked many questions pertaining to international affairs in general, some of which are summarized below. Asked which situation posed the greatest threat to world peace, 5 percent of respondents identified Soviet actions on the international scene; 11 percent, US actions; 23 percent, the superpower arms race; 32 percent, the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries; 24 percent, the Middle East situation; and 4 percent, conflicts elsewhere in the world.

Five percent of those polled believed that a nuclear war was very likely within the next twenty-five years; 25 percent believed it likely; 56 percent, unlikely; and 14 percent, very unlikely. Asked whether the chances of nuclear war breaking out were greater, less, or the same, as ten years ago, 27 percent felt that they were greater, 47 percent that they were less, and 26 percent that they were the same.

Fifty-nine percent believed that a nuclear attack would be initiated by accident, 41 percent believed such an attack would be deliberate. Asked who they believed would be responsible for either an accidental or deliberate attack, 10 percent identified the United States; 13 percent, the Soviet Union; 32 percent, both superpowers; and 45 percent, some other country. Finally, 32 percent believed a substantial reduction in present nuclear arms levels would slow down the arms race, while 68 percent believed nations would continue to develop and produce more destructive weapons after a reduction, thereby continuing the arms race.

APPENDIX 5

Strategic Nuclear Balance

UNITED STATES

	Launchers	Warheads	yield (Mt)	total warheads
ICBMs				
Minuteman II	450	1	1.20	450
Minuteman III	200	3	0.17	600
Minuteman III 12A	300	3	0.33	900
MX	50	10	0.30	500
SLBMs				
Poseidon C3	224	10	0.05	2240
Trident C4	384	8	0.10	3072
Bombers				
B-52 G	90			
B-52 H	90			
B-1B	90			
FB-III A	48			

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, *Nuclear Weapons Databook. Vol. 1: US Forces and Capabilities* (Revised edition) (forthcoming, Spring 1989).

Strategic Nuclear Balance

SOVIET UNION

	launchers	Warheads	Yield (Mt)	total Warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11				
M2	160	1	1.1	160
M3	210	3x350 (MRV)		630
SS-13	60	1	0.75	60
SS-17	120	4	0.75	480
SS-18	308	10	0.55	3080
SS-19	350	6	0.55	2100
SS-24	20	10	0.55	200
SS-25	150	1	0.55	150

SLBMs

SS-N-6	240	1	1.00	240
SS-N-8	286	1	0.80	286
SS-N-17	12	1	1.00	12
SS-N-18	224	7	0.20	1568
SS-N-20	100	10	0.50	1000
SS-N-23	64	4	0.25	256

Bombers

Bear A	15
Bear B/C	25
Bear G	45
Bear H	75
Blackjack	10

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. IV: Soviet Nuclear Forces* (forthcoming, Winter 1989).

APPENDIX 6

Canada and Security at the United Nations

The United Nations deals with arms control, disarmament, and regional conflict issues in a number of different forums, including:

- a) The Plenary of the General Assembly
- b) The Security Council
- c) The First (Political and Security) Committee
- d) The Special Political Committee
- e) The United Nations Disarmament Commission
- f) Various *Ad Hoc* Committees and bodies
- g) Various study groups
- h) The Conference on Disarmament (CD)

a) The Plenary of the General Assembly

In general, the General Assembly may discuss any issues or matters within the scope of the United Nations Charter. One of its main purposes, however, is to refer agenda items to the seven Main Committees, including the First and Special Political Committees. All UN members have the right to representation on the Main Committees. Following deliberation on these items by the Committees, draft resolutions are voted upon and, in turn, referred back to the General Assembly. Resolutions are then finalized by votes taken in the Plenary.

b) The Security Council

The Security Council has the primary responsibility within the UN system for maintenance of international peace and security. Its main functions include peaceful settlement of disputes and action taken to ensure and encourage peace. The Council reacts to international events as they arise and, as in the case of the establishment of peacekeeping operations, implements measures to prevent or reduce conflict. The Security Council consists of fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and ten members elected on a regional basis by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Decisions on procedural matters require the support of nine members. All other decisions require an affirmative vote by nine members including the five permanent members, who each hold a veto. In October 1988, Canada was elected to the Security Council for a two-year term for the fifth time since 1946. The remaining members of the Security Council are: Algeria, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Colombia, and Finland.

c) The First Committee

The First Committee deals with arms control, disarmament, and international security matters. It is a deliberative, as opposed to a negotiating, body. In recent years, it has dealt with as many as eighty resolutions per year. During the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1988, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, was Chairman of the First Committee. Some of the main issues of special interest to Canada considered by the First Committee include: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; Comprehensive Test Ban; Chemical Weapons; Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons purposes; and streamlining of the Committee's work. Participants in the Committee try to work toward consensus on all resolutions but many are put to an actual vote.

d) The Special Political Committee

This Committee considers a wide range of issues not considered by any of the other six Main Committees. At the Forty-third Session these included: the effects of atomic radiation; international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories; peacekeeping; information; the Malagasy Islands; science and peace; and Apartheid.

e) The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

The UNDC is another deliberative body whose work on arms control and disarmament is limited to certain issues. In 1989, the UNDC dealt with the following: reduction of military budgets; nuclear disarmament; naval armaments and disarmament; South Africa's nuclear capability; the role of the UN in disarmament; conventional disarmament; and consideration of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade. At the Forty-second Session in 1988, the UNDC reached consensus on two items, verification and confidence-building measures, thus removing them from the agenda. The Commission meets each year in May for about a month, with all member states entitled to participate. Unlike the First Committee, its work is conducted solely by consensus.

f) Various *Ad Hoc* Committees and Bodies

These are generally bodies which function under mandate from the General Assembly. They are of both long and short duration, depending upon the nature of their considerations and the purpose of their work. They include such bodies as the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUS), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Con-

ference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT PrepCom), the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and the Conference on Disarmament (see below).

g) Various Study Groups

Occasionally the General Assembly calls for special studies to be conducted on various issues relating to arms control, disarmament, and international conflict. Five Study Groups were mandated in 1988, covering the topics of verification, nuclear weapons, effective and verifiable measures to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East, scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security, and promoting transparency in the international transfers of conventional arms. Canadian External Affairs Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs Fred Bild, is chairman of the Verification study group. Canada is not involved in the other four studies.

h) Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The CD is a forty-nation Committee separate from but mandated by the UN. Canada has been a member from its earliest beginnings. It is the world's only global multilateral forum for negotiation in the field of disarmament. It meets twice yearly in Geneva to negotiate on the following issues: nuclear test-ban; cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; chemical weapons; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; and comprehensive programme of disarmament. The CD also creates *ad hoc* working groups and committees to consider various issues. Decisions at the CD are made by consensus.

Security Council Voting Record (1 January – 31 July 1989)

Canada voted YES to each of the following Resolutions passed by the Council:

S/RES/627(1989) - Re: Date of election to fill vacancy in the International Court of Justice.

S/RES/628(1989) - Re: Support and implementation of tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba.

S/RES/629(1989) - Re: Namibia, UNTAG, and financial assistance to Namibia.

- S/RES/630(1989) - Re: Extending mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon.
- S/RES/631(1989) - Re: Renewal of mandate of Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.
- S/RES/632(1989) - Re: Implementation of UN plan for Namibia.
- S/RES/633(1989) - Re: Renewal of mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force.
- S/RES/634(1989) - Re: Extending Resolution 186(1964) for stationing of UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus.
- S/RES/635(1989) - Re: International Civil Aviation Organization and cooperation of all States in research of plastic or sheet explosives.
- S/RES/636(1989) - Re: Reaffirming Geneva Convention as being applicable to Palestinian territories.
- S/RES/637(1989) - Re: Central America and efforts toward peace.
- S/RES/638(1989) - Re: Hostage-taking and abduction.
- S/RES/639(1989) - Re: Renewal of mandate of UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

Three draft resolutions were defeated. The first, which Canada voted against, deplored the downing of two Libyan aircraft by the United States and called on the US to suspend its military manoeuvres off the Libyan coast. This was opposed by all three Western members of the Security Council. Canada supported the other two draft resolutions, vetoed by the US alone. The first of these strongly deplored Israeli practices against the Palestinian people and called upon Israel to desist from its violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The second again strongly deplored Israeli practices and called for Israel to stop deporting Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and allow safe return for those already deported.

Canada abstained on four non-resolution (procedural) votes taken during the January-July 1989 period. Three of these votes involved requests by the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the debate in the Security Council on items regarding the situation in the Occupied Territories. The other vote concerned a request by the Alternate Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the debate on the shooting down of two Libyan aircraft. Each of these requests was allowed, with the United States casting the only negative vote.

Source for Security Council Voting Record: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

**Resolutions on Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at UNGA 43
Resulting from First Committee Deliberations**

Resolution and Lead Sponsor	Resolution (supported by Canada)	Vote (Yes/No/Abstain)
(*Canada co-sponsor)		
43/23 (Brazil)	Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic	144-1-7
43/62 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	149-0-5
43/64 (Australia)*	Urgent Need for a CTB	146-2-6
43/65 (Egypt)	NWFZ in the Middle East	Consensus
43/66 (Pakistan)	NWFZ in South Asia	116-3-34
43/67 (Sweden)	Conventional Weapons Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Consensus
43/69 (Pakistan)	Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons	152-0-3
43/70 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space	154-1-0
43/71 (Tanzania)	Denuclearization of Africa a) Implementation of the Declaration	151-0-4
43/72 (Byelorussia)	Prohibition of Development of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction	152-0-2
43/73 (Romania)	Reduction of Military Budgets	Consensus
43/74A (Australia)*	1925 Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention	Consensus
43/74B (Austria)*	Second Review Conference of the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons	Consensus
43/74C (Poland)*	Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons	Consensus

43/75A (Zimbabwe)	Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations	141-0-12
43/75B (Zimbabwe)	Relationship Between Disarmament and Development	Consensus
43/75C (UK)	Stockpiling of Radiological Weapons	Consensus
43/75D (Denmark)	Conventional Disarmament	Consensus
43/75E (China)	Nuclear Disarmament	Consensus
43/75F (China)	Conventional Disarmament	Consensus
43/75G (UK)*	Objective Information on Military Terms	130-0-10
43/75I (Colombia)*	International Arms Transfers	110-1-38
43/75K (Canada)*	Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes	144-1-7
43/75L (Sweden)	Naval Armaments	152-1-1
43/75M (Norway)*	Seabed Treaty	Consensus
43/75N (Sweden)	Comprehensive UN Study on Nuclear Weapons	141-1-9
43/75O (UK)*	Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations	103-0-46
43/75P (France)*	Confidence- and Security-Building and Conventional Disarmament	Consensus
43/75Q (Nigeria)	Dumping of Radioactive Wastes for Hostile Purposes	129-1-10
43/75R (Cameroon)*	Review of the Role of the UN in the Field of Disarmament	Consensus
43/75S (Peru)	Conventional Disarmament on a Regional Scale	125-0-23
43/76D (Tanzania)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	Consensus
43/76F (Nigeria)	UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament	Consensus
43/76G (Nepal)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia	Consensus

43/76H (Peru)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Latin America	Consensus
43/77B (Yugoslavia)	Third UN Special session on Disarmament	152-0-2
43/78A (Bahamas)*	Report on Disarmament Commission	Consensus
43/78D (Mexico)	Climatic Effects of Nuclear War	145-0-4
43/78G (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
43/78H (FRG)*	Guidelines for Confidence-Building Measures	Consensus
43/78I (Netherlands)*	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	96-0-53
43/78J (Romania)	Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race	143-1-9
43/78K (Mexico)	Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	Consensus
43/78L (Nigeria)	1990s as Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus
43/79 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace	Consensus
43/81A (USA)*	Compliance with Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements	Consensus
43/81B (Sweden)*	Study of Role of UN in Verification	150-1-0
43/82 (UK)*	Non-Proliferation Treaty IV	137-0-11
43/83 (Trinidad)	Liability for Illegal Transfer of Weapons	Consensus
43/85 (Malta)	Strengthening of Security/Cooperation in Mediterranean	Consensus
43/86 (Cameroon)	Strengthening of Regional and International Peace and Security	Consensus
43/90 (USSR)	Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security	97-3-45
43/422 (Czech.)	Contribution of the UN Specialized Agencies	Consensus

Opposed by Canada

43/68 (Bulgaria)	Strengthening of Security of Non-nuclear Weapon States Against Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons	117-17-16
43/76B (Mexico)	Freeze on Nuclear Weapons	135-12-3
43/76E (India)	Convention on Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons	133-17-4
43/78B (GDR)	Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War	126-17-6
43/78E (Argentina)	Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament	135-13-5

Abstained by Canada

43/22 (Costa Rica)	Right of Peoples to Peace	118-0-29
43/63A (Mexico)	Cessation of All Nuclear Test Explosions	136-4-13
43/63B (Mexico)	Cessation of All Nuclear Test Explosions	127-3-21
43/71 (Tanzania)	Denuclearization of Africa b) Nuclear Capability of South Africa	138-4-12
43/75H (Ukraine)	Implementation of UNGA Resolutions on Disarmament	131-2-20
43/75J (Iraq)	Stockpiling of Radiological Weapons	116-2-29
43/75T (Tanzania)	Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa	141-0-13
43/76A (Cyprus)	Disarmament and International Security	129-1-21
43/76C (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	144-0-10
43/77A (India)	Impact of Scientific and Technological Developments	129-7-14
43/78C (Czech.)	International Cooperation for Disarmament	136-1-13
43/78F (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear War	136-3-14

43/78M (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	136-3-14
43/80 (Jordan)	Israeli Nuclear Disarmament	99-2-51
43/87 (GDR)	Need for Results-oriented Political Dialogue	127-1-24
43/88 (Poland)	Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	128-0-24
43/89 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of Security	128-1-22

Totals: Canada in favour 53 (29 consensus)
 Canada opposed 5
 Canada Abstained 17

Source for Resolutions on Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security:
 Department of External Affairs, *The Disarmament Bulletin*. Vol. 9 (Fall/Winter 1988), pp. 13-14.

APPENDIX 7

Recent Political Disturbances in China (April-July 1989)

BACKGROUND

In April 1989, demonstrations by students and workers demanding greater democratic freedoms, and an end to Government corruption, began in Beijing's Tian'anmen Square. On 18 April 1989, several thousand students marched through the capital chanting democratic slogans and singing revolutionary songs as they mourned the death of Hu Yaobang, the Communist Party leader who was forced to resign in 1987 after "hardliners" criticized him for failing to suppress student demonstrations in late 1986 and 1987. Defying a Government ban on public protests, on 22 April 1989, more than 100,000 people gathered in Tian'anmen Square and marched through the streets of Beijing demanding greater press freedoms, and freedom of speech. A march held on 20 April followed a Government rejection of student conditions for talks.

On 13 May, about 2000 students began a hunger strike at Tian'anmen Square. On 4 May, an unannounced Politburo meeting had reportedly endorsed the views of Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang, which included calls for discussions with the students and limited steps toward greater democracy. On 15 May, with the arrival of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Beijing, hunger strikers camping out in Tian'anmen Square refused to end their vigil. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng issued a warning to protesters on 19 May, but agreed to a key student demand by arranging a nationally televised meeting with leaders of the students' pro-democracy movement. Li and Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang visited the 3000 hunger strikers at the Square.

On 20 May, the Government called on army troops to move into Beijing, imposing martial law in parts of the city. With one million people in the streets defying martial law, troops were prevented from reaching the Central Square. Zhao Ziyang was stripped of all power, retaining only his title of Communist Party General Secretary. On 25 May, upon orders from Prime Minister Li Peng, Chinese troops encircled Beijing. Chinese student leaders were ready to end their two-week occupation of Tian'anmen Square, but reiterated their demands for greater democratic freedoms and the resignation of Li Peng.

On 2 June, thousands of students and workers turned back more than 2000 unarmed troops who were marching toward Tian'anmen Square. On 3 June, violent confrontations began as troops beat dozens of protesters before retreating. On 4 June, tens of thousands of Chinese troops took back Tian'anmen Square from the pro-democracy protesters. Chinese witnesses and Western intelligence reports stated that up to 3000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Western diplomatic sources in Beijing said the number of deaths was "in the thousands". The area around Tian'anmen Square was completely sealed off by troops. Accounts of extreme brutality by soldiers, against persons in the Square, began to surface.

After the Tian'anmen Square massacre, Chinese troops fanned out in Beijing in a search for the pro-democracy protest leaders. On 9 June 1989, Deng Xiaoping, China's senior leader, appeared on Chinese television with a group of nine other top Government officials and commended the army for its role in the crushing of the protest movement. On 10 June, the Government announced that it had arrested more than 400 participants in the movement, including leaders of unofficial student and labour organizations. China's national news service showed scenes of protest leaders being arrested throughout China. The following day, a Government spokesman stated that Zhao Ziyang would become the

subject of an investigation, culminating in possible criminal proceedings against him for his actions in previous months. Also, the Government issued a warrant for the arrest of Fang Lizhi, China's best known dissident who, along with his wife Li Shuxian, had taken refuge in the US Embassy in Beijing.

On 13 June, Chinese authorities began a manhunt for twenty-one student leaders by flashing pictures of the activists on national television. By 20 June more than 1300 persons had been arrested, including five of twenty-one student leaders identified in the national campaign. On 21 June, Chinese authorities staged a public execution of three men accused of taking part in a violent protest in Shanghai earlier in the month. Beijing radio reported that forty-five others had been sentenced to death or imprisonment. On 22 June, it was reported that twenty-four executions had been carried out. On 24 June, Jiang Zemin, a former mayor of Shanghai, was appointed Communist Party General Secretary. The next day, the Chinese Communist Party publicly called for a purge of members who were active in the pro-democracy movement.

Immediately following the violent crackdown of 3 and 4 June 1989, world leaders voiced grief and outrage at Chinese Government actions. In addition to individual diplomatic protest actions and economic measures, on 28 June 1989, the European Community leaders announced a series of reprisals against Beijing, including a suspension of military cooperation and arms sales, suspension of high-level contacts, postponement of new cooperation projects, and an extension of visas for Chinese students studying in Europe. Leaders of the seven Western industrialized nations, attending their fifteenth annual economic summit in Paris, issued a statement on 14 July 1989 condemning the "violent repression" of the pro-democracy movement "in defence of human rights.: The statement--by the US, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan--also took note of diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed by the individual states and called on the World Bank to postpone reviews of new loans to China. However, in a joint press conference with the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, the US Ambassador to the UN agreed that the UN Security Council should not consider the issue of the Chinese Government's actions in Beijing on 3 and 4 June 1989.

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 4 June 1989, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark summoned the Chinese Ambassador to Canada, Xhang Wenpu, who was read a statement calling on the Chinese Government "to urgently and immediately take steps to stop the aggressive and senseless killing by its armed forces.: Clark asked the Ambassador to ensure that he passed on to his authorities the degree of Canada's outrage.¹ On the same day, Western nations and Chinese communities throughout the world condemned the military crackdown with pleas for restraint and calls for political and economic sanctions against China. Also, Chinese Canadians across Canada marched on Chinese consulates and held vigils for the civilians killed in Beijing.²

¹ "Clark Condemns China Crackdown." *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 June 1989, p. A6; and Department of External Affairs, *Statement* 89/16, p. 3.

² Eric Skelton, "20, 000 Demonstrators March on Consulate." *Globe and Mail*, 5 June 1989, p. A4; and Robert Sibley, "Chinese Canadians Urge Government to Act." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 June 1989.

On 5 June 1989 in the House of Commons, the External Affairs Minister announced Canadian actions in response to events in China. These included:

- advising the 600 Canadians resident in China, half of whom were in Beijing, to leave immediately, with Canadian Government assistance if required;
- postponing the signing of a series of memoranda of understanding on development assistance projects in China;
- suspending nuclear cooperation consultations;
- suspending relations between the Canadian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army, including suspension of sales of non-lethal military equipment to China;
- allowing some 4,500 Chinese students in Canada to remain by issuing them one-year visa extensions; and
- working at the UN to support calls for moderation and restraint in China.³

On 12 June 1989, Mr. Clark announced that Canada would be withdrawing its Ambassador to China, Earl Drake, for consultations.⁴ On 15 June, the Chinese Ambassador to Canada was called in again and presented with allegations that his diplomats were harassing Chinese students in Canada. The Ambassador told reporters afterwards that Canada should not be meddling in China's internal affairs. It was confirmed on 16 June that at least two Chinese diplomats stationed in Canada had defected and were seeking political asylum in Canada.⁵

On 20 June 1989, Ambassador Drake appeared before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade.⁶ The Government also convened a "National Round Table" made up of businesspersons, academics, non-governmental organizations and representatives of the Chinese Canadian community, to develop Canada's broad strategy toward China. New measures to protest China's behaviour, while at the same time encouraging Canadians to maintain "people-to-people" exchanges with China, were announced on 30 June 1989. The measures included:

- Canadian withdrawal from development-assistance projects involving a state auditor training programme, a lube oil centre, and urban traffic management programme;
- indefinite suspension of consulting activity associated with the Three Gorges hydro-electric project;

³ Department of External Affairs, *supra* note 1, pp. 3-5.

⁴ Tim Harper, "Canada Calls Home China Envoy." *Toronto Star*, 13 June 1989, p. A4.

⁵ Richard Cleroux, "Clark Says Chinese Spying on Their Students in Canada. *Globe and Mail*, 17 June 1989, p. A1; Robert Lee and Charles Rusnell, "Chinese Diplomats Defect." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 June 1989, p. A1; and Iain Hunter, "Clark Confronts Chinese Envoy." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 June 1989, p. A1.

⁶ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence*, Issue No. 8 (20 June 1989), pp. 8:3-25.

- cancellation of a television transmission facility project which External Affairs Minister Clark described as "clearly supportive of China's state propaganda apparatus", and discussion with the CBC to bolster the broadcasting of Mandarin-language news into China;
- suspension of federal funding for participation in Chinese-hosted trade shows for the remainder of 1989;
- increased capacity in Shanghai and Beijing to handle potential immigrants to Canada;⁷
- provision of \$1.5 million to Chinese students in Canada to be used to establish a National Coordination Office, to provide Chinese students with information, counselling and referral services as well as emergency financial assistance; and
- assurances that all immigration measures to remove Chinese nationals to China had been indefinitely extended.⁸

The Government did not invoke trade sanctions against China. Mr. Clark stated, after a meeting with business leaders, that "it would be in nobody's interest to absolutely cut off commercial and other connections between Canada and China.: Canada ran a \$1.6 billion surplus with China in 1988 on total two-way trade of \$3.5 billion, up fifty-eight percent from the year before.⁹

On 11 July 1989, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, after meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London before leaving for the Paris economic Summit, urged the Chinese Government to respect its international treaties and instil a "climate of confidence" in Hong Kong. Despite repeated pleas from Hong Kong, Britain had refused to issue any guarantees that it would welcome the more than three million Hong Kong residents with British passports before 1997, when control of the colony is to be handed over to China in accordance with a 1984 British-Chinese Treaty. Mr. Mulroney stated further that Canada, having taken in half of the 45,000 persons who emigrated from Hong Kong in 1988, "know[s] a little bit about some of the difficulties.... We also know the difficulties the United Kingdom has and we think that the onus is on China--not on the United Kingdom--to respect...its undertakings given to the United Kingdom in respect to the treaty."¹⁰ It has been reported that the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in China has fuelled the demand for visa applications at the offices of the Commission for Canada in Hong Kong.¹¹

⁷ Department of External Affairs, *Statement* 89/18 (30 June 1989), pp. 4-5.

⁸ Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 160 (30 June 1989).

⁹ Jonathan Manthorpe, "Clark Rules Out 'Dramatic' Sanctions." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 June 1989, p. A6; and Tim Harper, "Canada Backing Off Trade Sanctions After Clark, Business Leaders Meet." *Toronto Star*, 23 June 1989, p. A14.

¹⁰ Linda Diebal, "Pressure China on Human Rights in Hong Kong Mulroney Urges." *Toronto Star*, 12 July 1989. p. A1.

¹¹ Michael Bociurkiw, "Troubles in China Send Hong Kong into Wild Scramble for Canadian Visas." *Globe and Mail*, 26 June 1989, p. A1.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Beginning on 5 June 1989, the House of Commons debated the events taking place in China and Canada's response to them. During Question Period and in an emergency debate called on 5 June, some forty Members of Parliament addressed the issue. Many spoke of the history of Canada-China relations; expressed shock, grief and outrage at the Chinese Government's 3 and 4 June 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters and killing of civilians; and pressed for various diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Chinese Government. (For the complete text of the all-Party Resolution passed by the House condemning the Chinese Government, refer to Parliamentary Comment in Chapter 27 of *The Guide*, Human Rights.)

At various times on subsequent days in the House, Opposition Members questioned and suggested measures that could be taken by the Canadian Government. Issues raised included the recall of the Canadian Ambassador to China¹²; reported defections of Chinese embassy staff in Canada¹³; the evacuation of Canadians in China¹⁴; sponsorship of Chinese families wishing to join their relatives in Canada¹⁵; requests from Chinese refugees for Canadian visas¹⁶; the relaxation of Canadian immigration rules for Chinese nationals¹⁷; and consultations with other nations and multilateral organizations on this matter.¹⁸ Mr. Clark announced many of the Government's positions and measures (described in the previous section) during these debates.

In addition to the above-mentioned matters, several MPs called on the Government to press for UN Security Council debate on the events in China.¹⁹ Liberal MP Jesse Flis asked Mr. Clark about this possibility:

...On Monday [5 June 1989], the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that Canada was considering as a member of the United Nations Security Council an initiative to put pressure on the Chinese leadership to stop the bloodshed.... On Tuesday [6 June 1989], he said that the United Nations had no mandate in a country's internal affairs.... The conflict may well be within the walls of China. However, considering China's nuclear capability the general instability poses an imminent threat to global security.... In light of this, will the...[Minister] tell us what steps he has taken to convince the Assembly that the situation does pose a potential global threat and therefore does indeed fall within the United Nations mandate of ensuring global peace and security?

12 *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1989, p. 3012.

13 *Commons Debates*, 16 June 1989, p. 3134.

14 *Commons Debates*, 6 June 1989, p. 2661.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 2662-2663.

16 *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1989, p. 3009.

17 *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1989, p. 2551; and 16 June 1989, p. 3137.

18 *Commons Debates*, 6 June 1989, pp. 2661-2662.

19 *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1989, pp. 2552, 2595 and 2612; and 16 June 1989, p. 3134.

Mr. Clark replied:

...[T]he House will recall that I made the point yesterday [6 June 1989] that in a country of the power and size of China the disorder that is occurring cannot long remain an internal matter. However, I know that all Members of the House of Commons would want the United Nations to respect the letter of its charter.... Today [7 June 1989], the Prime Minister has signed a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations.... First, it conveys to the Secretary General the resolution adopted unanimously by the House of Commons on Monday night and the record of debate. It also indicates to the Secretary General that Canada would support very strongly both his leadership and action that might be taken through ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] and action that might be taken through the Human Rights Commission. It indicates that in our view that in these circumstances the United Nations and the Secretary General should act in a way to have the fullest impact possible within the terms of the charter.²⁰

On 14 June 1989, Liberal Leader John Turner asked Mr. Clark whether the Government was planning to table a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the actions of the Chinese Government. He also asked the Minister to consider speaking to Soviet President Gorbachev to press him into a stronger position against the Chinese Government and to press the Soviet Union into confronting China openly at the United Nations. Mr. Clark replied that he was interested in the Opposition Leader's suggestion.²¹

On 26 June 1989, Mr. Turner asked Mr. Clark:

...I have not heard Canada yet call for strong international action from the International Monetary Fund or from the World Bank. I have not heard Canada talk about cutting off economic aid. In the Minister's own words, we cannot have business as usual.... My constituents, in particular, and members of the Chinese Canadian community across Canada are very concerned about the future of Hong Kong.... Will the Government, through the Minister, place on the next agenda of the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government the issue of Hong Kong which is destined to fall under Chinese jurisdiction in 1997?

The External Affairs Minister responded as follows:

...[T]hat is a very interesting suggestion.... As the Right Hon. Leader of the Opposition knows, that meeting will in fact be in Asia [Kuala Lumpur] this year [October 1989], so it may well be a particularly appropriate venue for that kind of discussion.²²

20 *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1989, p. 2709-710.

21 *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1989, p. 3013.

22 *Commons Debates*, 26 June 1989, p. 3591.

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